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WELCOME: DAVID H. LEWIS, VICE ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY 
(RET), ACQUISITION CHAIR, ACQUISITION RESEARCH 
PROGRAM 
Vice Admiral David H. Lewis, USN (Ret.) took the helm as the Naval Postgraduate School 
Chair of Acquisition. As chair, he will lead the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) in the Graduate 
School of Defense Management and connect NPS with leaders and policymakers in the acquisition 
community. 
Lewis graduated from NPS in 1988 with a Master of Science in Computer Science, and we’re 
pleased to welcome him back to campus in this leadership role. Lewis is replacing the founding Chair 
of Acquisition, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.) Jim Greene, who retired this June. 
Most recently, Lewis served as Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency, 
managing over $7 trillion in defense contracts. In this role, he oversaw the agency’s efforts to ensure 
that supplies and services contracted for by the Department of Defense are delivered on time and in 
line with contract performance requirements. 
During his career at sea, Lewis served as a communications officer, fire control and missile 
battery officer, and combat systems officer aboard destroyers and guided-missile cruisers. 
Upon selection to flag rank in 2009, Lewis served as Vice Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command and then served four years as Program Executive Officer, Ships, where he directed the 
delivery of 18 ships and procurement of another 51 ships. From 2014-2017 he served as 
Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command where he led a global workforce of 
10,300 civilian and military personnel who design, develop and deploy advanced communications 
and information capabilities. 
Lewis’s extensive experience in shipbuilding has given him a unique understanding of the full 
acquisition lifecycle. He has delivered ships as a program manager and program executive officer, 
then later sustained and modernized them as a fleet engineer and systems commander. He will bring 
valuable perspective to NPS students and faculty, as well as the broader acquisition innovation 
community working to get superior capabilities into the hands of our warfighters. 
Lewis’s expertise in product delivery will amplify ARP’s ability to execute its mission of 
delivering the real-time information and analytical capabilities needed by today’s acquisition 
professionals and policymakers. Adding VADM Lewis to the team also demonstrates NPS’s 
continued commitment to providing world-class defense-focused education and research... 
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KEYNOTE SPEAKER: FREDERICK J. (JAY) STEFANY, 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, 
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION) 
Frederick J. (Jay) Stefany serves as acting assistant secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development and Acquisition) (Acting) as of Jan. 20, 2021, having served as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Ship Programs since April 2018. In this role, he is responsible for executive 
oversight of all naval shipbuilding programs, major ship conversions, and the modernization and 
disposal of inservice ships. He is also responsible for executive oversight of cost, schedule and 
performance of surface ship, submarine, and Marine Corps combat systems, electronic warfare 
systems, shipboard radars, and Navy missile defense programs. 
Previously, Stefany served as executive director, Amphibious, Auxiliary and Sealift Office, 
Program Executive Office, Ships. He provided executive leadership to 200 personnel and oversaw 
one of the broadest acquisition portfolios in the Navy, including more than $30 billion in complex 
shipbuilding procurements. His responsibilities spanned four major program offices: LPD 17 Program 
(PMS 317), Amphibious Warfare Program (PMS 377), Strategic and Theater Sealift Program (PMS 
385), and the Auxiliary Ships / Small Boats and Crafts Program (PMS 325). 
Additionally, he oversaw several active major programs, to include LHA 6, LPD 17, EPF, 
ESB, T-AKE, T-AO(X), and Heavy Icebreaker ship classes, as well as ship-to-shore connectors, 
landing craft, research ships, and service craft boats. 
Stefany entered the Senior Executive Service in March 2012, and has been in Civil Service 
for more than 27 years. Serving in a variety of key leadership positions throughout his career, 
including program manager and deputy program manager for the LPD 17 class Amphibious Transport 
Dock ship program (2004-2012). During his tenure, the first six ships of the San Antonio class were 
delivered and construction started on four additional hulls. He also assumed responsibilities for 
management of the initial concept work on a replacement for the Navy’s Command & Control Ships 
and later, the replacement for the LSD 41 and 49 class ships. 
Previous assignments include director of Naval and Commercial Construction (2002-2004), 
responsible for oversight of the Navy’s portfolio of Amphibious, Auxiliary and Special Mission ships 
and craft for the assistant secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN 
RD&A); assistant program manager in PMS 377 for LCAC (2000-2002) and for Amphibious Ship 
Combat / C4I Systems (1998-2000); and project engineer for both the LHD 5-7 (1992-1998) and LHD 
1-4 (1987-1991) ship acquisition programs as PMS 377 delivered LHD 1-6 and LSD 52 to the Fleet. 
Stefany received his bachelor of science degree in mechanical engineering from Lehigh 
University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in 1985, and his master of science degree in management from 
the Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Florida (National Capital Campus), in 1998. He is also 
a 1996 graduate of the Defense Systems Management College Advanced Program Management 
Course. 
During his distinguished federal service career, Stefany has received the Navy Civilian 
Meritorious Service Award and two Navy Civilian Superior Service Awards. 
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PANEL 8. ACQUISITION MODERNIZATION 
Wednesday, May 12, 2021 
7:45 a.m. – 
9:00 am. 
Chair: Brigadier General Michael E. Sloane, USA, Program Executive Officer for 
Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (IEW&S) 
Panelists:  
Lieutenant General Thomas H. Todd III, USA, Deputy Commanding 
General, Acquisition and Systems Management, United States Army 
Futures Command 
Lieutenant General Michael Williamson, USA (Retired), Vice President 
for Missiles, Lockheed Martin 
Lieutenant General Neil Thurgood, USA, Director for Hypersonics, 
Directed Energy, Space & Rapid Acquisition 
Lieutenant General Thomas H. Todd III, USA—serves as the Program Executive Officer, 
Aviation. He accepted this post on 11 January 2017. Todd previously served as the deputy 
commanding general of Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) and senior 
commander at Natick Soldier Systems Center. Todd earned a bachelor of science in business 
administration from The Citadel in 1989 and received his commission as a second lieutenant upon 
graduation. He is a graduate of the Army Aviation Officer Basic Course and Initial Entry Rotary Wing 
training. Todd is also a graduate of the OH-58 and H-60 Maintenance Test Pilot Course, the Army 
Aviation Officer Advanced Course, as well as the Command and General Staff Officer Course. He 
holds masters of science degrees in contract management and strategic studies from the Florida 
Institute of Technology and U.S. Air War College, respectively. 
Lieutenant General Michael Williamson, USA (Retired)—Lieutenant General Michael E. 
Williamson retires after 34 years of service to the U.S. Army in a Special General Officer Retirement 
ceremony hosted by General Daniel B. Allyn, 35th Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army, in Conmy Hall, 
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va., March 2, 2017. Lieutenant General Williamson retired from his 
career with his final position as the Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)).   
Lieutenant General Neil Thurgood, USA— Lieutenant General L. Neil Thurgood is the 
Director for Hypersonics, Directed Energy, Space and Rapid Acquisition, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He 
assumed duties in March 2019. In this position, LTG Thurgood is responsible for the rapid fielding of 
select capabilities to deter and defeat rapidly modernizing adversaries, including overseeing 
development of an Army Long Range Hypersonic Weapon. He leads the Army Rapid Capabilities and 
Critical Technologies Office mission to rapidly and efficiently research, develop, prototype, test, 
evaluate, procure and field critical enabling technologies and capabilities that address immediate, 
near-term, and mid-term threats, consistent with the Army’s modernization priorities. 
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PANEL 9. TRENDS IN DEFENSE ACQUISITION: ANALYSIS 
FROM CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES (CSIS) 
Wednesday, May 12, 2021 
9:15 a.m. – 
10:00 a.m. 
Chair: Phil Rodgers, Director, Acquisition Management and Approaches, OUSD 
(A&S) 
Assessing the Role of Congress in Defense Acquisition Program Instability 
Seamus Daniels, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Todd Harrison, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Defense Acquisition Trends 2021 
Greg Sanders, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Rhys McCormick, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Trends in OTA Usage Across the Federal Government 
Rhys McCormick, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Greg Sanders, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
Phil Rodgers— is the Director of Acquisition Approaches and Management. He joined the 
Department of Defense in 1982 serving as a Naval Officer in a variety of positions. His ashore 
assignments included tours on the Chief of Naval Operations staff as a manpower analyst and 
program analyst concentrating on Logistics and Mobility analyses, as well as long range program 
planning. 
After leaving active duty, Mr. Rodgers accepted a position with the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis where he conducted independent cost estimates and financial analysis of major Defense 
contractors; and industrial base assessments of interest to the Navy. He then assumed duties as the 
Program Manager for the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) system. 
Mr. Rodgers joined the staff of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics) (USD(AT&L)) in 1995, and was selected into the Senior Executive Service in 2000. From 
2000 to May 2007 he served as the Deputy Director, Resource Analysis within the Directorate for 
Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) leading acquisition and technology planning, 
programming, and budgeting process activities for the USD(AT&L). He also conducted a wide range 
of assessments of major resource issues for use in Defense Acquisition Board reviews and in the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. 
In May 2007, he assumed duties as the Principal Deputy Director, Acquisition Resources and 
Analysis; responsible for integrating all USD(AT&L) planning, programming and budgeting activities, 
as well as for overseeing the efficient functioning of the Department’s formal weapons systems 
acquisition process. He managed the governance process and systems providing Department-wide 
access to authoritative and timely information supporting major acquisition oversight and decision 
making. He was the functional leader of the 7000 members of the Business community of the defense 
acquisition workforce, setting workforce policies and guiding training through the Defense Acquisition 
University. He also provided management oversight and guidance for the DoD FFRDCs and 
University Affiliated Research Centers. 
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In August 2018, he was reassigned to become the first Director, Acquisition Approaches & 
Management responsible for leading Defense acquisition policy formulation and implementation for 
various aspects of the Defense Acquisition System; to include the Middle Tier of Acquisition, 
Business Systems, and Software. He also leads policy development and implementation for the 
acquisition and licensing of Intellectual Property. He is the DoD lead for data collection and statutory 
reporting to Congress on $2T of investments in Major Defense Acquisition Programs. 
He received his MS in Operations Research Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School. 
His honors and awards include the Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service (three awards) as 
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Assessing the Role of Congress in Defense Acquisition 
Program Instability 
Seamus P. Daniels—is an Associate Fellow and Associate Director for Defense Budget Analysis in the 
International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he 
contributes to the center’s research on issues related to defense funding, force structure, and military 
readiness. He has authored publications on trends in the overall defense budget, the legislative process 
surrounding defense appropriations, Navy readiness funding, and NATO burden sharing. He holds an 
A.B. from Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs with minors in Near Eastern 
studies and Arabic language and culture. [sdaniels@csis.org] 
Todd Harrison—is the Director of Defense Budget Analysis and the director of the Aerospace Security 
Project at CSIS. As a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program, he leads the center’s efforts to 
provide in-depth, nonpartisan research and analysis of space security, air power, and defense funding 
issues. He has authored publications on trends in the overall defense budget, military space systems, 
defense acquisitions, military compensation, military readiness, nuclear forces, and the cost of overseas 
military operations. He graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with both a BS and an 
MS in aeronautics and astronautics. [tharrison@csis.org] 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to evaluate the impact of Congress on funding instability for defense acquisition 
programs. While the Department of Defense (DoD) requests specific funding levels for 
procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs each fiscal 
year in the president’s budget submission, Congress ultimately determines the funds that will be 
made available to those programs via the appropriations process. While lawmakers 
constitutionally hold the power of the purse and oversight authority over the DoD, changes 
between the requested and actual level of funding for programs can force defense officials and 
industry partners to adjust program schedules and funding requirements. At a macro level, 
changes can also disrupt wider defense planning and strategic priorities for the Department and 
the executive branch. This study assesses trends in funding for acquisition accounts and 
programs relative to the requested level of funding from Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 to FY 2020 to 
determine if Congress regularly funded programs above or below administrations’ budget 
requests over that time frame. It identifies specific procurement and RDT&E accounts that 
typically have their funding adjusted by lawmakers and trends in the differences between 
requested funding and the actual level of funding. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) outlines the priorities of the administration in the 
budget request submitted to Congress for the upcoming fiscal year. Along with its request for 
funding for the next fiscal year, the Department submits thousands of pages of budget 
information justifying the funds required for its programs and outlining its plans in detail. For 
acquisition programs (primarily funded through the procurement and research, development, 
test, and evaluation [RDT&E] accounts), the DoD also provides lawmakers with detailed 
information at the line item and program element levels on program schedules and 
requirements as well as projected future funding requirements in the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP). 
While the executive branch articulates its own strategic priorities, plans its defense 
acquisition agenda, and distributes contracts to private sector partners, Congress retains the 
power of the purse and ultimately has the final say in deciding which acquisition programs 
receive funding and how much they receive. Led by each chamber’s respective appropriations 
subcommittee on defense, the legislative branch can choose to match, modify, or eliminate the 
DoD’s requested funding levels for procurement and RDT&E programs as well as alter the 
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quantity of systems or platforms procured. Congressional adjustments to the budget can also be 
made after funding is appropriated via rescissions that cancel some or all of the budget authority 
prior to its obligation (Saturno et al., 2016, p. 20). Likewise, the DoD can reprogram funding to 
move it among accounts as needed within the constraints set by appropriators (Saturno et al., 
2016, p. 12).  
Congressional decisions on funding for acquisition programs in the appropriations 
process can have a significant impact on an administration’s defense plans. Adjustments to the 
program of record for acquisition projects can force the program management teams in the DoD 
to alter the program’s schedule and contracting actions. In addition to affecting the performance 
of acquisition programs, these adjustments can have secondary effects on private sector 
partners, particularly the prime contractors tasked with developing and building systems and 
their suppliers. At the macro level, disruptions to acquisition plans in the appropriations process 
can also affect an administration’s ability to operationalize its defense strategy. Ultimately, the 
power of Congress to appropriate money gives the legislative branch an important role in 
overseeing how defense dollars are spent and the execution of defense strategy. 
This analysis seeks to assess trends in congressional action on funding for defense 
acquisition programs relative to the requested level. It will compare the actual funding level for 
procurement and RDT&E accounts with the original level proposed in the administration’s 
budget request and identify specific accounts which are regularly adjusted by Congress. 
Ultimately, this analysis aims to inform defense planners, acquisition officials and program 
managers, and industry partners of trends in congressional appropriations for defense so they 
can better plan for how the congressional budget process is likely to affect the defense budget 
request on a more granular level using historical data. 
Methodology 
This study assesses trends in congressional action on defense acquisition funding from 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 through FY 2020. The time frame was selected to determine the impact 
of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 on funding for procurement and RDT&E accounts. In 
an effort to reduce the federal deficit, the BCA imposed caps on discretionary funding levels for 
defense and non-defense programs between FY 2012 and FY 2021, among other efforts. These 
budget caps were then increased by Congress in a series of budget agreements over that time 
frame (Harrison & Daniels, 2020, p. 6). However, the inability of lawmakers to identify an 
alternative to the deficit reduction plan outlined in the BCA following its passage in 2011 led to 
sequestration, a budgetary mechanism that reduces discretionary spending in excess of the 
budget caps. A sequester was triggered in March 2013 that led to cuts of 6.7% and 8.1% to 
procurement and RDT&E accounts, respectively (Daniels, 2019, p. 3). 
In its approach to measuring the role of Congress in acquisition funding, this analysis 
compares the requested level of funding from the presidential budget request with the actual 
level of funding for procurement and RDT&E accounts. Budget data was compiled from the 
procurement programs’ (P-1s) and RDT&E programs’ (R-1s) justification books published by the 
Office of the Comptroller with each year’s budget request. 
The actual level of funding for acquisition programs is calculated approximately 2 years 
after it is originally requested (for example, actual funding levels for FY 2019 are published with 
the FY 2021 request). While the enacted level of funding passed by lawmakers would be a more 
direct comparison to illustrate congressional action on the budget request (since lawmakers can 
make adjustments to funding after it is appropriated), this data is not consistently captured in 
budget justification documents due to delays in enacting appropriations. It is also not captured in 
legislative text in a machine-readable format at the program level. The actual funding level will 
not typically differ dramatically from the enacted level of funding, with the exception of FY 2013, 
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when sequestration occurred. Since the actual funding level for FY 2020 is not yet available, the 
enacted funding level is used because it is available and accurately reflects what was 
appropriated.  
Occasionally, administrations may submit supplemental budget requests or amendments 
to their original budget requests. The requested level data analyzed in this study incorporates 
adjustments submitted by the administration after the fact and is also inclusive of Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. One exception is FY 2017, in which the Trump 
administration submitted an updated budget request after taking office, which amended the 
request submitted by the Obama administration. The data for that year’s request in this study 
represents the Obama administration’s request and any changes requested by that 
administration, but it does not include changes requested by the Trump administration that 
occurred during the middle of FY 2017. 
Congressional adjustments to the requested level of funding for procurement and 
RDT&E accounts are measured by calculating the percent change between the actual funding 
level and the requested level for each given fiscal year. An average percent change for the FY 
2010 to FY 2020 time frame is then calculated to allow for more direct comparison. Analysis is 
conducted at the topline procurement and RDT&E level, the military department level, and 
account level with further analysis at more granular levels to explain trends in the data.  
Analysis of Congressional Action on Procurement Funding 
Topline Procurement Funding 
If assessed at the topline level, congressional funding for procurement accounts relative 
to the presidential request has fluctuated considerably over the period of analysis. Figure 1 
presents the percent change from the actual level of procurement to the requested level. While 
funding is 2.9% higher than the requested topline on average from FY 2010 through FY 2020, 
actual funding for procurement accounts was below the requested amount for 4 years between 
FY 2011 and FY 2014. This was due in no small part to concerns over the federal deficit and the 
impact of the BCA in constraining the defense budget. The Obama administration repeatedly 
requested funding for defense programs above the level permitted by the BCA budget caps, yet 
congressional adjustments to the caps did not always match the level of increase requested by 
the Obama administration. Sequestration also contributed to lower actual levels of funding for 
procurement relative to the request in FY 2013. 
 
Figure 1. Actual Total Procurement Funding vs. Requested Level 
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Actual procurement funding surpassed the requested level by almost 18% in FY 2018 as 
a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018). The 2-year budget deal raised the 
spending caps for defense higher than the Trump administration had requested and was 
significantly larger than previous 2-year agreements that increased the caps from FY 2014 to 
FY 2015 and FY 2016 to FY 2017 (Daniels & Harrison, 2020). 
Procurement Funding by Military Department 
When assessed by military departments and defense-wide, or “Fourth Estate,” accounts, 
the procurement funding data yields similar trends to the topline analysis, as shown in Figure 2. 
However, defense-wide procurement funding shows significant fluctuations and differences 
relative to the request. This is largely due to the small amount of procurement funds requested 
for defense-wide accounts compared to the military departments; adjustments above or below 
that requested level will appear more drastic when represented as a percentage change 
because of the smaller amounts of funding involved. At times, the DoD may also request funds 
for defense-wide accounts, which Congress then cuts from defense-wide and appropriates 
directly into other service accounts. 
 
Figure 2: Actual Procurement Funding vs. Requested Level by Military Department 
Compared across the FY 2010 to FY 2020 time frame, actual procurement funding for 
the defense-wide accounts was an average of 6.9% higher than the request, compared to 2.9% 
for overall procurement funding. Of the military departments, the Army received the greatest 
increase above the request at 5.3% on average, in comparison to a 4.2% average increase for 
the Navy and 0.3% for the Air Force. While Army accounts received significantly more funding 
than requested in FY 2017 and FY 2018, Congress was less generous in FY 2019 and 
appropriated slightly less funding than requested in FY 2020.  
Procurement Funding by Account 
A comparison of the requested and actual levels of funding at the account level provides 
a better idea of the factors driving trends at the military department level. Table 1 ranks 
procurement accounts by the average percent change between the actual level of funding and 
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the requested level over the FY 2010 to FY 2020 time frame.1 Three Army accounts—weapons 
and tracked combat vehicles (W&TCV), aircraft, and missiles—received the greatest percentage 
increase over the budget request. As Figure 3 shows, funding for those three accounts 
exceeded the requested level for at least 7 of the 11 years assessed. Funding for W&TCV was 
higher than the request every year until FY 2019 and exceeded the requested level by nearly 
60% in FY 2018.  
 
Table 1: Average Difference Between Requested and Actual Funding Levels by Procurement Account 
Account Average Percent 
Change 
Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army 15.1% 
Aircraft Procurement, Army 7.5% 
Missile Procurement, Army 7.0% 
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 6.8% 
Procurement, Defense-wide 5.8% 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 5.1% 
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 2.2% 
Other Procurement, Army 2.0% 
Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force 0.9% 
Procurement of Ammunition, Army 0.9% 
Procurement, Marine Corps 0.7% 
Other Procurement, Air Force 0.5% 
Weapons Procurement, Navy -1.8% 
Other Procurement, Navy -2.8% 
Space Procurement, Air Force -2.9% 
Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense -3.0% 
Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps -5.5% 
 
1 Only certain defense-wide accounts are included in this ranking given the irregular nature of some 
accounts and the fact that others only had several years’ worth of data compared to the 11 years of data 
for most other accounts assessed.  
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Missile Procurement, Air Force -5.7% 
 
Figure 3. Army Actual Procurement Funding vs. Requested Level by Account 
As previously discussed, the Navy received the second largest average increase above 
its requested level compared to the other two military departments. This was driven by funding 
for the shipbuilding and conversion account, which on average received 6.8% more funds than 
requested. As Figure 4 shows, Congress also added to the Navy’s aircraft procurement account 
from FY 2015 through FY 2020 for an average increase of 5.1% above the requested level. 
However, Congress regularly appropriated less funding for the Navy’s weapons, ammunition, 
and other accounts than requested over the selected time frame. 
 
Figure 4. Navy Actual Procurement Funding vs. Requested Level by Account 
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Air Force procurement accounts received relatively smaller plus ups, if any, compared to 
their Army and Navy counterparts, as shown in Table 1. On average, Congress increased 
funding for the Air Force aircraft procurement account by an average of 2.2%, less than the 
increases for both the Army and Navy’s aircraft accounts. After initially receiving nearly 9% 
more funding than requested when the account was created in FY 2016, Air Force space 
procurement has received 2.9% less funding than the requested level, on average. The Air 
Force’s missile procurement account was the account cut most by Congress over the selected 
time frame, receiving an average of 5.7% less funding than requested. Congressional funding 
exceeded the requested level only once over the 11-year period, in FY 2015, as depicted in 
Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Air Force Actual Procurement Funding vs. Requested Level by Account 
Procurement Funding by Category 
Analyzing the difference between the requested and actual level of funding by category 
type provides a better impression of Congress’s procurement priorities. Table 2 ranks the 
average percent change between the actual level of funding and the requested level over the 
FY 2010 to FY 2020 time frame for 10 distinct categories of procurements assigned by the 
authors. Based on this data, Congress has regularly increased funding for missile defense 
programs more than any other category at an average of nearly 18% over the requested level. 
Funding for missile defense exceeded the requested level in 10 out of the 11 years assessed 
and was almost 55% higher than what was requested in FY 2017 (see Figure 6).  
Shipbuilding programs received the second largest increase on average of any distinct 
category, which could be due to the strong support from representatives for shipyard 
constituencies in Congress. Lawmakers also increased funding for aircraft and ground systems 
at an average of 4.6% and 3.6% above requested levels, respectively. The addition to ground 
systems was driven by a significant plus to the Army W&TCV account in FY 2018, as shown in 
the previous section. Four procurement categories received less than the requested level on 
average between FY 2010 and FY 2020: missiles and munitions; space systems; 
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Table 2. Average Difference Between Requested and Actual Funding Levels by Procurement Category 
Category Average Percent 
Change 
Missile Defense 17.8% 
Support and Other 10.5% 
Shipbuilding 8.9% 
Aircraft 4.6% 
Ground Systems 3.6% 
Classified 0.5% 
Missiles and Munitions -1.1% 
Space Systems -3.7% 




Figure 6. Actual Procurement Funding vs. Requested Level by Category 
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Analysis of Congressional Action on Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation Funding 
Topline Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Funding 
As Figure 7 shows, topline RDT&E funding largely follows a similar pattern to trends in 
topline procurement in the FY 2010 to FY 2020 period, with exceptions in FY 2011 and FY 
2020. Similar to procurement, RDT&E accounts also received a generous boost in FY 2018 as a 
result of the budget deal reached that year. Over the 11 fiscal years analyzed in this study, 
RDT&E funding was an average of 1.2% higher than the requested level. 
 
Figure 7. Actual Total RDT&E Funding vs. Requested Level 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Funding by Budget Activity 
Funding for RDT&E is organized into different budget activities that “correspond to different 
phases of the development process” (Harrison and Daniels, 2020, p. 9). They include 
• Basic Research (6.1) 
• Applied Research (6.2) 
• Advanced Technology Development (6.3) 
• Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (6.4) 
• System Development and Demonstration (6.5) 
• Management Support (6.6) 
• Operational Systems Development (6.7) 
Funding for the first three budget activities is collectively referred to as Science and 
Technology (S&T) funds. In the FY 2021 request, the DoD requested funds for a new budget 
activity, Software & Digital Technology Pilot Programs (6.8), but because it did not appear until 
FY 2021, it does not fall within the range of data analyzed for this study. 
Table 3 shows the average percent change between the requested and actual funding 
levels for each RDT&E budget activity between FY 2010 and FY 2020. On average, 
Management Support received 28.9% more funding than requested, while Applied Research 
received 16.5% more. Congressional support for Management Support funding was so strong 
that it received more funding than requested in all 11 years during the period of analysis, as 
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shown in Figure 8. Lawmakers also provided overall S&T accounts an average of 9.1% more 
funding than requested over that time frame.  
Table 3. Average Difference Between Requested and Actual Funding Levels by RDT&E Budget Activity 
Budget Activity Average Percent Change 
Basic Research (6.1) 2.0% 
Applied Research (6.2) 16.5% 
Advanced Technology Development (6.3) 4.9% 
Aggregate S&T Funding 9.1% 
Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (6.4) 0.6% 
System Development and Demonstration (6.5) -6.6% 
Management Support (6.6) 28.9% 
Operational Systems Development (6.7) -2.5% 
Total RDT&E Average 1.2% 
 
The System Development and Demonstration and Operational Systems Development 
budget activities both received less funding than the requested level on average over the FY 
2010 to FY 2020 period. Congress provided an average of 6.6% less funding than requested for 
System Development and Demonstration, while Operational Systems Development received 
2.5% less than the requested level, on average.2 Advanced Component Development and 
Prototypes only received an average of 0.6% more than the request.  
 
2 In the FY 2010 R-1 justification spreadsheets, the DoD requested approximately $17.7 billion in RDT&E 
funding for “Other Programs” categorized under budget activity 99. The R-1 justification book in PDF form 
specified that amount as funding for classified programs. While the spreadsheets assigned that funding to 
budget activity 99, calculations based on the data in the justification book showed that just over $17.5 
billion of the classified amount fell under budget activity 6.7, and the remainder fell under budget activity 
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Figure 8. Actual RDT&E Funding vs. Requested Level by Budget Activity 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Funding by Military Department 
When assessed by military department, defense-wide RDT&E programs received the 
greatest increase relative to the request at an average of 5.5%, followed by Army programs at 
3.4%. As Figure 9 shows, Army RDT&E was over 10% higher than the requested level from FY 
2016 to FY 2018 and surpassed 20% in FY 2018. Funding for the Navy and Air Force’s RDT&E 
programs fell below the requested level on average between FY 2010 and FY 2020, at 0.4% 
and 1.5% lower than the request for each department, respectively. 
 
Figure 9. Actual RDT&E Funding vs. Requested Level by Military Department 
Conclusion 
The appropriations process is one of Congress’s primary tools in exercising its oversight 
authority on the executive branch’s defense policy and, more specifically, its defense acquisition 
plans. As the preceding analysis has illustrated, the process enables lawmakers to signal their 
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priorities to the administration by increasing or decreasing the funding levels for programs in the 
annual budget request. This study reaches several findings based on that analysis: 
• Congressional action on procurement and RDT&E accounts largely followed similar 
trends over the past decade, due in no small part to the impact of the BCA and 
subsequent budget deals. With minor exceptions, Congress underfunded (relative to the 
request) both procurement and RDT&E accounts following the passage of the BCA in 
FY 2011, and it appropriated more than requested beginning in FY 2015. The budget 
deal reached in 2018 (BBA 2018) led to a notable increase above the request for 
procurement and RDT&E accounts in that same year. 
• Congress has clear favorites among procurement accounts. Programs for missile 
defense, shipbuilding, aircraft, and ground systems all received increases above the 
requested level on average over the FY 2010 to FY 2020 period. 
• Lawmakers regularly increase RDT&E funding for Management Support (6.6) and S&T 
(6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). Support for other budget activities is not as strong. 
While Congress is able to enact its own defense priorities via the appropriations process, 
concerns over strategy are not the only drivers of congressional preferences for some programs 
over others. The appropriations process also serves as a political tool for lawmakers to serve 
their constituencies, which may include defense factories that produce aircraft or shipyards 
constructing future vessels.  
For the executive branch, the budget request can similarly serve a political purpose for 
enacting the administration’s priorities. With the knowledge that Congress regularly increases 
funding for some accounts above the request, the DoD can be strategic in signaling its own 
plans to the Hill. For example, it could cut funding from some accounts in the budget request if it 
feels confident that Congress is likely to restore that money later in the process. Understanding 
these trends in congressional action can enable policy-makers, program managers, and 
industry leaders alike to improve planning and efficiency in the overall acquisition process.  
References 
Daniels, S. P. (2019). How would sequestration impact DoD in FY 2020? Center for Strategic 
and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/190515_Daniels_DBA_layout_FINAL_v2.pdf  
Daniels, S. P., & Harrison, T. (2018, February 20). Making sense of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2018 and what it means for defense. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/making-sense-bipartisan-budget-act-2018-and-what-it-
means-defense 
Harrison, T., & Daniels, S. P. (2020). Analysis of the FY 2020 defense budget and its 




Harrison, T., & Daniels, S. P. (2020). Analysis of the FY 2021 defense budget. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. http://defense360.csis.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/Analysis-of-the-FY-2021-Defense-Budget.pdf  
Saturno, J., Heniff, Jr., B., & Lynch, M. S. (2016). The congressional appropriations process: An 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 18 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Defense Acquisition Trends 2021: A Preliminary Look 
Rhys McCormick—is a Fellow with the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His work focuses on unmanned systems, global defense 
industrial base issues, and U.S. federal and defense contracting trends. Prior to working at DIIG, he 
interned at the Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy at CSIS and the Peacekeeping and Stability 
Operations Institute at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a bachelor’s degree in security and risk 
analysis from Pennsylvania State University and a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown 
University. [rmccormick@csis.org]  
Greg Sanders—is a Fellow in the International Security Program and Deputy Director of the Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS, where he manages a research team that analyzes data on U.S. 
government contract spending and other budget and acquisition issues. In support of these goals, he 
employs SQL Server, as well as the statistical programming language R. Sanders holds a master’s 
degree in international studies from the University of Denver, and he holds a bachelor’s degree in 
government and politics and a bachelor’s degree in computer science from the University of Maryland. 
[gsanders@csis.org]  
Andrew Hunter—is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Program and Director of the Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group at CSIS. From 2011 to 2014, he served as a senior executive in the 
Department of Defense, serving first as Chief of Staff to Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics Ashton B. Carter and Frank Kendall before directing the Joint Rapid 
Acquisition Cell. From 2005 to 2011, Hunter served as a Professional Staff Member of the House Armed 
Services Committee. Hunter holds a master’s degree in applied economics from Johns Hopkins 
University and a bachelor’s degree in social studies from Harvard University. [ahunter@csis.org] 
Abstract 
This report, the latest in an annual series, examines the trends in what the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) is buying, how the DoD is buying it, and from whom the DoD is buying. This 
year’s study focuses on the acquisition system’s response to the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy’s emphasis on peer and near-peer competition and the emergence of a new research 
and development (R&D) paradigm. This report looks at whether there has been a significant shift 
in the DoD’s investment posture between platform portfolios and the composition of R&D 
spending between contracts and Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements. Additionally, 
this report includes analysis of the topline DoD contracting trends. 
Introduction 
This paper examines the notable trends in what, how, and from whom the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has been buying. These trends provide critical insights into the DoD’s priorities 
and the industrial base’s response to those priorities. These trends provide vital information 
describing the timely situation of defense acquisition. Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 was one of 
the first years in which the budget was developed following and in accordance with the release 
of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), the trends for FY2020 are particularly interesting. 
Identifying and discussing the shifts in the defense industrial base and acquisition system in 
response to the NDS are of particular intrigue given that previous Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS)–funded research showed that it can take the acquisition system years to respond to 
changes in priorities. 
This report uses the methodology used in Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
reports on federal contracting. For over a decade, the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) 
has issued a series of analytical reports on federal contract spending for national security by the 
government. These reports are built on Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) data, which 
is downloaded in bulk from https://www.usaspending.gov/. DIIG now maintains its own database 
of federal spending, which includes data from 1990 to 2020. This database is a composite of 
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FPDS and DD350 data. For this report, the study team relied on FY2000 to FY2020 data. All 
dollar figures are in constant FY2020 dollars, using Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
deflators. For additional information about the CSIS contracting data analysis methodology, see 
https://github.com/CSISdefense/Lookup-Tables. 
For this paper, CSIS focused on the following research questions: 
• Area: Has there been a significant shift in DoD investment between and within the areas 
of products, services, and research and development (R&D) to reflect the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy priorities? 
• Platform Portfolio: Have there been significant changes across the different sectors of 
the defense industrial base? 
• Other Transaction Authorities (OTA): What are the significant trends in OTA usage 
across the DoD and how does the growth of OTAs affect the DoD’s technology 
development efforts? 
• Components: Have there been significant shifts in defense contracting trends between 
the major DoD components? 
DoD Contract Spending in a Budgetary Context  
Defense contract spending continued to grow in FY2020, at nearly twice the rate of 
growth of overall defense spending. As shown in Figure 1, total defense contract obligations 
increased from $391.5 billion to $421.3 billion, an 8% increase. Comparatively, defense 
spending increased less than 4%, rising from approximately $707 billion to $732 billion. Defense 
contract spending accounted for 57.5% of defense spending in FY2020, the highest level this 
century. This continues the ongoing trends over the course of the defense contracting rebound 
where defense contract spending has grown at rates faster than the overall rate of growth in 
defense spending. Between FY2015 and FY20202, overall defense spending increased 18% 
compared to the 41% growth in defense contract obligations. Given that the defense budget is 
likely to remain relatively flat in the coming years, it will be difficult for the DoD to maintain this 
level of defense contract spending.  
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Figure 1. Defense Contract Obligations Versus Budget Authority, 2000–2020 
Source: FPDS; Department of Defense, “National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 2021 (Green Book),” Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 2020; Department of Defense, "Analysis of the FY 2021 Defense Budget” Todd 
Harrison and Seamus Daniel, CSIS (Washington, DC), August 2020; CSIS analysis 
In addition to the growth in defense contract spending, OTA obligations have continued to grow 
as the DoD increasingly uses them in response to the FY2016 legislative changes in the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), aimed at incentivizing their usage. DoD OTA 
obligations increased 113% in FY2020, rising from $6.6 billion in FY2019 to $14.1 billion in 
FY2020. Between FY2015 and FY2020, DoD OTA obligations increased 2030%. Of note, while 
the sum of OTA dollars obligated increased 113% last year, the Sum of Base and All Options 
Value or potential total contract value of DoD OTA obligations only increased 1%. This could 
suggest that while OTAs are likely to continue to rise in future years, we might not see the same 
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Figure 2 shows defense OTA obligations from FY2015 to FY2020. 
 
Figure 2. Defense OTA Obligations, 2015–2020 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
What Is the DoD Buying? 
As previous CSIS research showed, you started to see some of the “emergent shifts in 
the composition of the DOD’s investment portfolio” in the FY2019 contract data (McCormick, 
2020). You continue to see some of these shifts in the DoD’s investment portfolio, but there are 
also some outliers. Defense Products, which had started to slow down in FY2019, rebounded 
strongly in FY2020. Defense Products contract obligations increased 11% in FY2020, rising 
from $197.2 billion to $218 billion. Defense Services contract obligations continued to grow in 
FY2020, but at not at the same rate as before. Defense Services contract obligations increased 
from $164.0 billion in FY2019 to $173.1 billion, a 6% increase. Defense R&D contract 
obligations fell slightly in FY2020, falling from $30.3 billion to $30.2 billion, a 0.5% decline. 
However, that does not tell the full story as OTAs are increasingly supplementing contracts, 
particularly for R&D activities. Overall, if you include both R&D Contract and OTA Obligations, 
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Figure 3 shows defense contract obligations by area from FY2000 to FY2020.  
 
Figure 3. Defense Contract Obligations by Area, 2000–2020 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
Defense Contract Obligations by Stage of R&D 
Previous CSIS analysis last year showed evidence that there is a “paradigm shift 
ongoing in the DoD as OTAs have become a core element in the DoD’s approach to technology 
acquisition over the last five years.” While we have seen some recovery in defense contracting 
in “the early and mid-stages of the development pipeline for major weapon systems” 
(McCormick, 2020a), that has not yet proven out for the later stages. However, there was 
evidence to suggest that “OTAs are partially supplanting contracts in the mid-to-late stages of 
the development pipeline for major weapon systems” (McCormick, 2020b).  
There were mixed fortunes for the two early-stage R&D activities, Basic Research (6.1) 
and Applied Research (6.2) in FY2020. Defense Basic Research defense contract obligations 
declined 5% in FY2020, falling from $4.0 billion to $3.8 billion. Applied Research contract 
obligations increased from $7.9 billion to $8.0 billion, a 1% increase. Between FY2015 and 
FY2020, Basic Research and Applied Research contract obligations increased 10% and 18% 
respectively.  
Similar to the early-stage R&D activities, there were divergent fortunes for the two mid-
stage R&D activities, Advanced Technology Development (6.3) and Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes (6.4), after several years of growth in both. Advanced Technology 
Development contract obligations declined slightly in FY2020, falling from $6.2 billion in FY2019 
to $6.0 billion in FY2020, a 3% decline. Advanced Component Development & Prototypes 
contract obligations increased 8%, rising from $7.3 billion in FY2019 to $7.9 billion in FY2020. 
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Component Development & Prototypes (6.4), contract obligations have increased 40% and 84% 
respectively.  
The data continue to suggest that “OTAs are partially supplanting contracts in the mid-
to-late stages of the development pipeline for major weapon systems” (McCormick, 2020b). Last 
year, System Development & Demonstration (6.5) contract obligations declined 8% and have 
declined 18% between FY2015 and FY2020. Similarly, Operational Systems Development (6.7) 
contract obligations declined 7% in FY2020 and are down 39% from where they were in 
FY2020. Meanwhile, defense OTA R&D obligations went from $6.7 billion in FY2019 to $14.8 
billion in FY2020, a 122% increase. Between FY2015 and FY2020, defense OTA R&D 
obligations have increased 1,850%.  
Figure 4 shows defense contract obligations by stage of R&D from FY2000 to FY2020.  
 
Figure 4. Defense R&D Obligations by Stage of R&D, 2015–2020 
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Figure 5. Defense Contract Obligations by Platform Portfolio, 2000–2020 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
Similar to previous years, the data show mixed trends for the platform portfolios 
emphasized in the NDS: Air and Missile Defense, Nuclear, Space, Cyberspace, and C4ISR 
(Department of Defense, 2018). 
Over the course of the defense contracting rebound, Air and Missile Defense contract 
obligations have whipsawed back and forth between growth and declines, and FY2020 was no 
exception to that trend. After declining 18% between FY2018 and FY2019, Air and Missile 
Defense contract obligations rebounded in FY2020. Air and Missile Defense contract obligations 
increased from $11.5 billion in FY2019 to $14.8 billion in FY2020, a 29% increase. Between 
FY2015 and FY2020, Air and Missile Defense contract obligations have increased 45%.  
After seeing substantial growth in FY2019, defense Space Systems contract obligations 
slightly came back down to Earth last year. Defense Space Systems contract obligations fell 1% 
last year, falling from $7.3 billion in FY2019 to $7.2 billion in FY2020. Despite this decline, 
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Electronics, Communications, and Sensors (EC&S) had seen steady growth at the start 
of the defense contracting rebound, but that trend came to a halt in FY2020. EC&S contract 
obligations declined from $55.8 billion in FY2019 to $54.9 billion in FY2020, a 2% decline. 
EC&S contract obligations increased 28% between FY2015 and FY2020. 
Ordnance and Missiles contract obligations continued to increase in FY2020, but not at 
the level higher than the overall rate of growth like they had done so in previous year. Last year, 
defense Ordnance and Missile contract obligations increased 4%, less than half the overall rate 
of growth. While Ordnance and Missiles grew at a rate less than the overall growth rate last 
year, Ordnance and Missiles contract obligations grew 95% between FY2015 and FY2020, over 
twice the overall rate of growth in defense contract obligations.  
Outside of the platform portfolios emphasized in the NDS, there were interesting trends 
in the three major weapon system sectors: Aircraft; Ships & Submarines; and Land Vehicles.  
After notable whiplash between growth and declines at the start of the defense 
contracting rebound, defense Aircraft contract obligations have continued their steady growth 
over the last 2 years. Defense Aircraft contract obligations increased from $92.0 billion in 
FY2019 to $105.1 billion in FY2020, a 14% increase. Between FY2015 and FY2020, defense 
Aircraft contract obligations have increased 56%.  
The Ships & Submarines had been steadily growing throughout the defense contracting 
rebound but saw sizable growth in the last year. In FY2020, Ships & Submarines contract 
obligations increased 18%, rising from $34.0 billion to $40.0 billion, a new record high level. 
Ships & Submarines contract obligations increased 70% between FY2015 and FY2020. 
The Land Vehicles sector had been on the rebound after experiencing the brunt of the 
cuts of sequestration and the defense drawdown but experienced a setback in FY2020. 
Defense Land Vehicles contract obligations fell from $13.2 billion in FY2019 to $11.7 billion in 
FY2020, an 11% decline. Despite this 1-year decline, Land Vehicles contract obligations 
increased 43% between FY2015 and FY2020, a rate slightly than the overall rate of growth.  
Defense Components 
Navy contracting obligations, which had been on the decline at the start of the defense 
contracting rebound, have continued their bounce back over the last 2 years. Navy contracting 
obligations increased 20% last year, rising from $124.5 billion in FY2019 to $150.0 billion in 
FY2020. As a share of total defense contract obligations, the Navy went from 31.8% to 35.6%, a 
20-year high. Between FY2015 and FY2020, Navy contract obligations have increased 62%, the 
second-largest growth among DoD components only behind the Missile Defense Agency.  
The Army continued its slow but steady growth path that it has been on over the course 
of most of the defense contracting rebound. Army contract obligations increased from $96.7 
billion in FY2019 to $100.1 billion in FY2019, a 3% increase. As a share of total defense 
contract obligations, the Army continued to fall slightly, from 24.7% to 23.8%. Between FY2015 
and FY2020, Army contract obligations have increased 26%, the lowest among the three 
military services and well below the overall growth in defense contract obligations (41%). 
After 2 years of steady growth between FY2018 and FY2019, Air Force contract 
obligations stalled out in FY2020. Air Force contract obligations went from $77.5 billion in 
FY2019 to $77.8 billion in FY2020, a 0.5% increase. As a share of total defense contract 
obligations, the Air Force fell from 19.8% to 18.5%. Between FY2015 and FY2020, Air Force 
contract obligations increased 26%.  
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) continued on its ascendent path that it has been on 
the last few years. MDA contract obligations increased from $9.0 billion in FY2019 to $12.3 
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billion in FY2020, a 37% increase. Between FY2015 and FY2020, MDA contract obligations 
increased 141%, the highest level among all DoD components and nearly 3.5 times the rate of 
overall growth in defense contracting obligations.  
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) continued to decline, as it has done so over the 
past few years. DLA contract obligations declined 7% last year, falling from $45.1 billion in 
FY2019 to $41.9 billion in FY2020. Despite the declines in recent years, DLA contract 
obligations are still up 24% in FY2020 from where they were in FY2015.  
Figure 6 shows defense contract obligations by component from FY2000 to FY2020. 
 
Figure 6. Defense Contract Obligations by Component, 2000–2020 
Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis 
Conclusion 
Defense Contract Obligations Continued to Grow Even as Defense Budget Leveled Off 
Defense contract spending continues to grow in FY2020 even as defense spending has 
started to level off some. In FY2020, defense contract spending grew at nearly twice the overall 
rate of growth in defense spending. Defense contract spending accounted for 57.5% of defense 
spending in FY2020, the highest level this century. If the defense budget remains relatively flat 
in the coming years as currently expected, it will be difficult for the DoD to maintain this level of 
defense contract spending. 
Mixed Trends in the 2018 National Defense Strategy Priority Platform Portfolios 
The data show mixed trends for the platform portfolios emphasized in the NDS (Air and 
Missile Defense, Nuclear, Space, Cyberspace, and C4ISR). 
EC&S declined 2% in FY2020 after several years of growth. Despite this decline, EC&S 
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Space Systems fell 1% in FY2020 after experiencing growth the previous year.  
Air and Missile Defense contract obligations continued to whipsaw over the course of the 
defense contracting rebound, rebounding again in FY2020, seeing a 29% increase after a 
sizeable decrease the preceding year.  
Mixed Growth in Early and Mid-Stage of the Weapon Systems Pipeline 
The data show mixed trends in both the early and mid-stages of the weapon systems pipeline. 
In the early R&D stages, Basic Research (6.1) contract obligations declined 5% while 
Applied Research (6.2) increased 1%. In the mid-stage, Advanced Technology Development 
(6.3) and contract obligations declined 3% while Advanced Component Development & 
Prototypes (6.4) contract obligations increased 8%.  
OTA Usage Continues Increasing, Supplementing Contracts in the Mid-to-Late Stages of 
the Development Pipeline for Major Weapon Systems  
OTA usage across the DoD continues to surge in response to the FY 2016 NDAA 
legislative changes that aimed to incentivize their usage. In FY2020, defense R&D OTA 
obligations increased from $6.6 billion to $14.1 billion, a 113% increase. Since FY2015, defense 
R&D OTA obligations have increased 2,030%. 
The impact of R&D OTAs is most notable in the late stages of the development pipeline 
for major weapon systems, where contracting has largely fallen off a cliff. System Development 
& Demonstration (6.5) and Operational Systems Development (6.7) contract obligations 
declined 8% and 7% respectively last year. However, comparatively, defense OTA R&D 
obligations went from $6.7 billion in FY2019 to $14.8 billion in FY2020, a 122% increase. While 
not all of that $14 billion goes to late-stage weapon systems development, a sizable percentage 
does.  
As highlighted in seven recent CSIS reports, the growth in OTAs is massive, and it is 
increasingly clear that OTAs are supplementing contracts in certain traditional defense 
acquisition activities and that a new R&D paradigm is emerging. However, the full implications 
of that final paradigm shift for both government and industry remains unknown.  
Navy and Air Force Bounce Back; Army Slows Down, but Continues Growing 
Navy contract obligations continued their rebound into FY2020, increasing 20%. As a 
share of total defense contract obligations, the Navy rose from 31.8% to 35.6%. 
Air Force contracting continued its whipsaw over the course of defense contracting 
rebound, stalling out in FY2020 after 2 years of steady growth. Air Force contract obligations 
went from $77.5 billion in FY2019 to $77.8 billion in FY2020, a 0.5% increase. 
The Army continued its slow but steady growth path that it has been on over the course 
of most of the defense contracting rebound, increasing 3% in FY2020. Between FY 2015 and 
FY2020, Army contract obligations have increased 26%, the lowest among the three military 
services and well below the overall growth in defense contract obligations (41%).  
Final Thoughts 
The overall picture that emerges from a detailed examination of the 2020 data reveals 
important signals for the future of the defense acquisition system. First, it appears that contract 
spending may either be approaching or has reached a local peak in the typical boom and bust 
cycle of defense acquisition. Second, the 5-year rebound in the acquisition system made some 
progress in addressing the priorities of the NDS, but few if any of the NDS priority areas really 
stand out in their performance compared to areas of the defense acquisition system that were 
not so prioritized. These two factors create a challenge for the department as resources tighten, 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 28 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
which may compel more profound shifts in support of various sectors of the acquisition system. 
Lastly, the growth of OTAs has substantially reshaped the system development pipeline for the 
DoD, altering how the department ingests new technology and who participates and controls 
that process. This shift will likely reshape relationships in the defense industry as well over time, 
but the nature of that reshaping and what new centers of control emerge is very much open to 
debate.  
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Abstract 
The federal government’s use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements has exploded in 
recent years, thanks in large part due to a surge in popularity within the Department of Defense 
(DoD). Neither a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement, OTAs are an acquisition approach 
that enable certain federal agencies to access goods and services outside of the traditional 
acquisition system. This research examines the trends in OTA usage across the DoD to provide 
insights into what the DoD is using OTAs for, how they are spending under an OTA, and to whom 
the majority of OTA obligations go.  
Introduction 
Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs) have become an increasingly popular tool across 
the DoD as senior Pentagon officials and congressional leadership seek ways to guide the 
defense acquisition enterprise as it seeks to maintain continued U.S. technological superiority 
against global competitors like China and Russia. Subsequently, DoD OTA obligations 
increased from $0.76 billion to $16.18 billion between Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 and FY2020. 
Neither contracts, grants, nor cooperative agreements, OTAs are a more flexible acquisition 
approach that enables specific federal agencies to access goods and services outside of 
traditional acquisition processes.1 These authorities give these agencies greater flexibility and 
customization in designing appropriate acquisition approaches, but they are not without risk. 
OTAs are often more restricted to a specific set of activities, largely centered around research 
and development (R&D), and require a more skilled acquisition workforce to design and execute 
these activities that may lack the necessary familiarity and training amongst the broader 
community.  
The DoD has had some form of OTA authority since 1989 (when the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency [DARPA] was given the authority to enter into OTAs), so what 
explains its increased popularity in recent years? The DoD’s recent interest in OTAs is heavily 
driven by the FY2015 and FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanding what 
the DoD can use OTAs to accomplish. Section 812 of the FY2015 NDAA expanded the range of 
what types of prototypes could be perused under an OTA, while Section 815 of the FY2015 
NDAA “expanded DoD’s OTA authority by making DoD’s OTA authority permanent, modifying 
the definition of nontraditional defense contractor, and allowing DoD to issue follow-on 
production contracts for OTA prototypes” (McCormick, 2019). In the FY2016 NDAA conference 
report, House and Senate conferees noted that the expansion of the DoD’s OTA authorities was 
designed to “support Department of Defense efforts to access new source of technical 
 
1 Besides the DoD, the following 10 federal agencies have some form of OTA authority: Advanced Research 
Projects Agency–Energy, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Institute of Health, and the Transportation 
Security Agency.   
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 30 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
innovation” by making OTAs “attractive to firms and organizations that do not usually participate 
in government contracting due to the typical overhead burden and ‘one size fits all’ rules” (H.R. 
Rep. No. 114-270, 2015). 
The following paper examines the notable trends in the DoD OTA authorities since the 
FY2015 and FY2016 NDAA statuary changes expanded the DoD’s OTA authorities and seeks 
to answer the following research questions: 
• What are the topline trends in the DoD’s OTA usage? 
• What is the DoD procuring using OTAs? 
• How are the different DoD components using OTAs? 
• What is the extent of competition for DoD OTA awards? 
• From whom is the DoD procuring using OTAs? 
 
This brief builds and expands on the methodology used in other CSIS reports that 
employ data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). Unlike other Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group reports on federal contracting, which rely on bulk data downloaded 
from https://www.usaspending.gov/, this brief relies on the data downloaded directly from 
https://beta.sam.gov/ and https://www.fpds.gov/. All dollar figures are reported in constant 
FY2020 dollars, using Office of Management and Budget (OMB) deflators.  
Topline Trends 
The data show that the rapid growth in the DoD’s usage of OTAs did not slow down in 
FY2020. DoD OTA obligations increased 113% last year, rising from $7.6 billion in FY2019 to 
$16.2 billion in FY2020. Between FY2015 and FY2020, DoD OTA obligations have increased 
from $0.76 billion to $16.2 billion, a 2,030% increase (see Figure 1). Of note, while the sum of 
OTA dollars obligated increased 113% last year, the Sum of Base and All Options Value or 
potential total contract value of DoD OTA obligations only increased 1%. This could suggest that 
while OTAs are likely to continue to rise in future years, we might not see the same level of 
year-over-year growth that we have seen in recent years. 
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What Is the DoD Buying With OTAs? 
Given the purpose of OTAs, it is not surprising that the DoD has predominantly used 
OTAs for R&D activities, but OTAs are not unique to R&D. Between FY2015 and FY2020, 89% 
of total DoD OTA obligations were awarded for R&D compared to 8% for Products and 3% for 
Services. 
OTA R&D obligations increased from $6.7 billion in FY2019 to $14.8 billion in FY2020, a 
122% increase. Between FY2015 and FY2020, DoD OTA R&D obligations increased 1,850%.  
OTA Products contract obligations increased from $0.6 billion in FY2019 to $0.95 billion 
in FY2020, a 59% increase. Between FY2015 and FY2020, DoD OTA Products obligations 
increased 43,654%.  
OTA Services contract obligations increased from $0.4 billion to $0.5 billion last year, a 
29% increase. DoD OTA services obligations are up 58,761% between FY2015 and FY2020. 
Figure 2 shows defense OTA obligations by area from FY2015 to FY2020.  
 
Figure 2. Defense OTA Obligations by Area, 2015–2020 (Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
As shown in Figure 3, unsurprisingly the predominance of DoD OTA obligations in recent 
years have gone to prototypes efforts. It is only in recent years that the DoD has received the 
authority to award follow-on production OTA agreements, so it is not too surprising to see that 
production OTAs are still in their infancy. While there is not much to this data at this point in 
time, this will be an important area that CSIS will continue to monitor into the future as the DoD 
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Figure 3. Defense OTA Obligations by Type of Agreement, 2015–2020 (Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
How Is the DoD Using OTAs for R&D?  
Previous CSIS research showed that “OTAs are taking on a more major role in the mid-
to-late stages of the development pipeline for major weapon systems” (McCormick, 2000a). 
While this largely held true into FY2020, there were several notable developments and shifts in 
the composition of the DoD’s OTA R&D portfolio. 
In the mid-stage R&D activities, there was significant growth in Advanced Technology 
Development (6.3), while Advanced Component Development & Prototypes (6.4) actually 
declined slightly. Advanced Technology Development OTA obligations increased from $0.6 
billion in FY2019 to $8.0 billion, a 1,196% increase. Meanwhile, Advanced Component 
Development & Prototypes OTA obligations declined 1% in FY2020, falling from $3.9 billion to 
$3.8 billion.  
In the later-stages of the weapon-systems development pipeline, there was actually a 
drop-off from previous levels. System Development & Demonstration (6.5) OTA obligations 
declined 37%, totaling $0.5 billion in FY2020 compared to $0.8 billion in FY2019. This decline 
was somewhat offset by the gains in OTA obligations Operational Systems Development (6.7), 
but Operational Systems Development still accounts for less than 1% of all DoD OTA 
obligations.  
Finally, both Basic Research (6.1) and Applied Research (6.1) saw increased OTA 
obligations in 2020, but the two early-stage R&D activities both fell as a share of overall defense 
OTA spending. Basic Research OTA obligations increased from $0.3 billion to $0.5 billion, a 
50% increase. However, Basic Research fell as a share of overall defense obligations from 5% 
to 3%. Applied Research saw an 87% increase in OTA obligations in FY2020 from FY2019 but 
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Figure 4 shows defense OTA obligations by stage of R&D from FY2015 to FY2020.  
 
Figure 4. Defense OTA Obligations by Stage of R&D, 2015–2020 (Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
DoD OTA Awards by Platform Portfolio 
As shown in Figure 5, several trends emerge in analyzing DoD OTA obligations by platform 
portfolio. 
 






































































Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 34 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Aircraft OTA obligations increased from $0.1 billion in FY2019 to $0.4 billion in FY2020, 
a 3,365% increase.  
Space Systems, which had been on an uptick in recent years, saw a decline in OTA 
obligations last year. Defense Space Systems OTA obligations declined 27% in FY2020, falling 
from $1.1 billion to $0.8 billion. 
Ordnance and Missiles, the predominant OTA platform portfolio prior to the recent 
statutory changes, saw a decline in OTA obligations in FY2020 but remains the second largest 
platform portfolio. Ordnance and Missile OTA obligations declined from $2.9 billion in FY2019 to 
$2.6 billion in FY2020, a 10% decline. However, Ordnance and Missiles OTA obligations are still 
up 373% between FY2020. As a share of overall defense OTA obligations, Ordnance and 
Missiles fell from 72% in FY2015 to 16% in FY2020. 
Other R&D and Knowledge Based, previously the second-largest platform, succeeded 
Ordnance and Missiles as the largest OTA platform portfolio in FY2020.2 Other R&D and 
Knowledge Based contract obligations increased a staggering 350% last year. Total Other R&D 
and Knowledge Based OTA obligations increased from $2.5 billion to $11.3 billion. This 
increase was primarily driven by R&D- DEFENSE OTHER: SERVICES (ADVANCED 
DEVELOPMENT), which saw an increase in OTA obligations from $0.14 billion in FY2019 to 
$7.2 billion in FY2020, a 5,013% increase. Of note, the following product or service codes 
comprised the top five Other R&D and Knowledge Based accounts ordered by total OTA 
obligations between FY2015 and FY2020:  
1. R&D- DEFENSE OTHER: SERVICES (ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT) 
2. R&D- DEFENSE OTHER: OTHER (ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT) 
3. EDUCATION/TRAINING- COMBAT 
4. R&D- MEDICAL: BIOMEDICAL (APPLIED RESEARCH/EXPLORATORY 
DEVELOPMENT) 
5. R&D- MEDICAL: BIOMEDICAL (ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT) 
How Are the Different DoD Components Using OTAs? 
The Army remains the leader in OTA usage across DoD components, but other 
components have also seen substantial increases in recent years. In FY2020, Army OTA 
obligations increased from $5.1 billion to $13.2 billion, a 161% increase. Army OTA obligations 
have increased 1,840% since FY2015. After seeing an uptick in OTA obligations in FY2019, Air 
Force OTA obligations declined last year. Air Force OTA obligations declined 20% last year, 
falling from $1.7 billion in FY2019 to $1.3 billion in FY2020. After a slow start to OTA usage, the 
Navy has seen a significant increase in OTA usage over the last 2 years. Navy OTA obligations 
increased from $0.2 billion in FY2019 to $0.6 billion in FY2020, a 253% increase. Between 
FY2015 and FY2020, Navy OTA obligations increased 24,633%. There was a notable increase 
in OTA obligations last year for “Other DoD,” largely driven by the Washington Headquarters 
Services (WHS).  
Between FY2015 and FY2020, the Army accounted for 76% of total defense OTA 
obligations compared to the Air Force and DARPA, which both accounted for 12% while the 
Navy accounted for approximately 3%. In FY2020, the Army accounted for 82% of defense OTA 
obligations; the Air Force accounted for 8% of defense OTA obligations last year after 
accounting for 22% the previous year; DARPA fell to 2%; and the Navy rose slightly to 4%.  
 
2 Other R&D and Knowledge Based serves as a catch-all category that doesn’t fit into platform portfolios but 
includes a wide range of activities that include biomedical, technical services, and other R&D activities. 
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Figure 6 shows defense OTA obligations by customer from FY2015 to FY2020.  
 
Figure 6. Defense OTA Obligations by Customer, 2015–2020 (Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Army Contracting Command New Jersey (ACC–NJ), headquartered out of Picatinny 
Arsenal, once again remains as the largest contracting office awarding OTAs across all of the 
DoD. In FY2020, ACC–NJ accounted for 62% of all DoD OTA obligations and has accounted for 
60% of all DoD OTA obligations between FY2015 and FY2020. Outside of ACC–NJ, the Army 
continues to retain several contracting offices executing OTAs, accounting for five of the top 10 
DoD OTA contracting offices between FY2015 and FY2020. Outside of the Army, two Air Force 
contracting offices remained in the top 10—Launch Enterprise Systems Directorate and Space 
Development & Test Wing—but the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (HNK C3IN), fell 
out of the top 10 and was replaced by Joint Munitions Command. 
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Table 1. Top 10 DoD OTA Contracting Offices, 2015–2020 (Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
 
Competition for DoD OTA Awards 
As shown in Figure 7, the data continue to show positive trends in the rates of competition for 
DoD OTA obligations. Just 10% of DoD OTA obligations were competed in FY2015, but that 
share has been rising every year since. In FY2020, 92% of DoD OTA obligations were awarded 
after competition.  
 



































1 ACC–Picatinny, NJ Army  19.5 
2 DARPA DARPA 1.9 
3 Launch Enterprise Systems Directorate Air Force 1.8 
4 ACC–Aberdeen Proving Grounds Army 1.7 
5 ACC–Redstone Arsenal Army  1.3 
Top 5 Total 26.2 
6 Space Development & Test Wing Air Force 0.8 
7 WHS Other DoD 0.6 
8 TACOM Army  0.5 
9 Joint Munitions Command Army 0.5 
10 ACC–Orlando Army 0.4 
Top 10 Total 28.9 
Overall DoD Total 32.5 
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From Whom is the DoD Buying? 
As shown in Figure 8, the rise in the vast majority of DoD OTA obligations in recent 
years were awarded to vendors categorized as having nontraditional significant participation.3 
Between FY2018 and FY2019, it appeared that there might be an emerging trend showing an 
increased share of DoD OTA obligations being awarded with cost sharing, but that trend halted 
in FY2020. In FY2020, defense OTA obligations awarded with cost sharing fell from $1.1 billion 
to $0.9 billion, a 14% decline, and subsequently fell as a share of DoD OTA obligations from 
15% to 6%. Of note, as highlighted in previous CSIS reports (McCormick, 2000), although the 
data show that nearly 96% of DoD OTA obligations were awarded to nontraditional significant 
participation, consortia were awarded the majority of OTA obligations in recent years.   
 
 
Figure 8. Defense OTA Obligations by Nontraditional Government Contractor Participation, 2015–2019 
(Source: FPDS; CSIS analysis) 
Conclusion 
Defense OTA Obligations Continued to Grow at Staggering Rates  
The data show that the rapid growth in the DoD’s usage of OTAs did not slowdown in 
FY2020. DoD OTA obligations increased 113% last year, rising from $7.6 billion in FY2019 to 
$16.2 billion in FY2020. However, the Sum of Base and All Options Value or potential total 
contract value of DoD OTA obligations only increased 1% last year, suggesting we could see 
some slowdown in the same level of year-over-year growth that we’ve seen in recent years. 
R&D Remains the Majority of DoD OTA Obligations   
Defense R&D OTA obligations increased 122% between FY2019 and FY2020, 
compared to the 59% increase and 29% increase in Products and Services respectively. 
 
3 Nontraditional vendors are often used as a shorthand for major Silicon Valley firms, other commercial technology 
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Between FY2015 and FY2020, 89% of total DoD OTA obligations were awarded for R&D 
compared to 8% for Products and 3% for Services. 
Mid-Stage R&D Continues Growing While Later-Stage R&D Falls Off    
Although there was a slight decline in Advanced Component Development & Prototypes 
(6.4) OTA obligations in FY2020, those losses were more than offset by the 1,196% increase in 
Advanced Technology Development (6.3) OTA obligations. However, the later-stages of the 
weapon-systems development pipeline saw a drop off where the decline in System 
Development & Demonstration (6.5) was not nearly close to being offset by the relatively small 
total increase in Operational Systems Development (6.7).   
The Army Remains the Predominant User of OTAs Across the DoD   
The Army remains the predominant user of OTAs across all of the DoD, but other 
components, notably the Navy, have made more extensive use of OTAs in recent years than 
they previously did. Army OTA obligations increased 161% in FY2020 and are up 1,840,416% 
since FY2015. Navy OTA obligations increased from $0.6 billion in FY2019 to $0.8 billion in 
FY2020, a 253% increase. 
Nontraditional Significant Participation Remains Dominant as Cost-Sharing Declines  
For a few years, it seemed that there might be an emerging trend showing that cost-
sharing was gaining a foothold for defense OTA obligations. However, this trend halted in 
FY2020 as OTA obligations awarded with cost sharing declined 14% and fell as a share of OTA 
obligations to 6% from 14%.  
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Abstract 
Requirements form the backbone of contracting in acquisition programs. Requirements define the 
problem boundaries within which contractors try to find acceptable solutions (design systems). At 
the same time, requirements are the criteria by which a customer measures the extent that their 
contract has been fulfilled by the supplier. Therefore, requirements are instrumental in the 
success of acquisition programs. In this context, the quality of a requirement set is determined by 
the level of contractual safety that it yields. From a technical perspective, contractual safety is 
driven by the accuracy, precision, and level of completeness of the requirement set. 
Unfortunately, textual requirements do not provide acceptable levels of contractual safety, as they 
remain a major source of problems in acquisition programs. This is partly caused by the inherent 
limitations of natural language to statically capture written statements with precision and 
accuracy. In addition, natural language is difficult (often impossible) to parse into consistent 
logical or mathematical statements, which limits the use of systematic and/or automated tools to 
explore completeness. Model-based requirements have been proposed as an alternative to 
textual requirements, with the promise of enabling higher accuracy, precision, and completeness 
when eliciting requirements. However, this promise has not been demonstrated yet. Therefore, 
research is needed to understand the contractual impacts of using model-based requirements 
instead of textual requirements before model-based requirements can be widely adopted to 
support acquisition programs. This paper presents preliminary results of a research project that 
measures the contractual safety yielded by model-based requirements. Specifically, the research 
addresses the main question of whether using model-based requirements improves the 
contractual safety of acquisition programs compared to using textual requirements. The accuracy, 
precision, and completeness achieved by model-based requirements are empirically measured 
using an experimental study. We employ a notional airborne solution to a surveillance and 
detection problem. 
Introduction 
Requirements form the backbone of contracting in acquisition programs. Requirements 
define the problem boundaries within which contractors try to find acceptable solutions (design 
systems; Salado et al., 2017). At the same time, requirements are the criteria by which a 
customer measures the extent that their contract has been fulfilled by the supplier (INCOSE, 
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2015). Hence, it is not surprising that some authors consider requirements the cornerstone of 
systems engineering (Buede & Miller, 2016). 
Within an acquisition context, the quality of a requirement set is determined by the level 
of contractual safety that it yields. In the experience of the second author in acquisition 
programs (leaving contractual mechanisms aside and focusing only on the technical side of 
acquisition) contractual safety is driven by the accuracy, precision, and level of completeness of 
the requirement set: 
• Achieving accuracy is necessary to guarantee that the requirements capture the real 
needs of the customer (Salado & Nilchiani, 2017c). 
• Achieving precision is necessary to guarantee that the supplier interprets the 
requirements exactly as the customer intended when writing them (Salado & Wach, 
2019b). 
• Achieving completeness is necessary to avoid gaps in the problem formulation (Salado 
et al., 2017). If requirements are missing, a supplier may reach contractually acceptable 
solutions that do not fulfill the needs of the customer. 
Unfortunately, textual requirements do not provide acceptable levels of contractual 
safety, as they remain a major source of problems in acquisition programs (GAO, 2016; 
Gilmore, 2011). This is partly caused by the inherent limitations of natural language to statically 
capture written statements with precision and accuracy (Pennock & Wade, 2015). In addition, 
natural language is difficult (often impossible) to parse into consistent logical or mathematical 
statements (Fockel & Holtmann, 2014; Gervasi & Zowghi, 2005; Tjong et al., 2006), which limits 
the use of systematic and/or automated tools to explore completeness (Carson et al., 2004; 
Salado & Nilchiani, 2017b; Salado et al., 2017). 
Model-based requirements have been proposed as an alternative to textual 
requirements, with the promise of enabling higher accuracy, precision, and completeness when 
eliciting requirements (Salado & Wach, 2019b). Hence, we suggest that model-based 
requirements will improve contractual safety in acquisition programs. However, this statement 
remains to be proven. Although prior work has provided some indication in this direction (Salado 
& Wach, 2019b; Wach & Salado, 2021a, 2021b), we currently do not completely understand 
how engineers will interact with and interpret model-based requirements.  
In this paper, we present preliminary results of an experimental study that evaluates the 
contractual safety of model-based requirements by studying their precision, accuracy, and 
potential for completeness compared to textual requirements. Particularly, we show some initial 
results that measure the impact of both types of approaches in the elicitation of requirements 
that are properly bounded and free of unnecessary constraints. 
Literature Review 
Model-based Requirements 
Most of the literature in model-based requirements deals with aspects related to 
requirements management (e.g., requirements traceability and allocation (Badreddin et al., 
2014; Borgne et al., 2016; Holder et al., 2017; Holt et al., 2012; Marschall & Schoemnakers, 
2003; Mordecai & Dori, 2017; Ribeiro, 2018; Schmitz et al., 2010) or requirements engineering 
and management processes (Holt et al., 2012; Holt et al., 2015; Holt et al., 2012; Holt et al., 
2015). Modeling the actual requirements is generally accomplished with one of two approaches. 
The first approach defines a specific type of model object that encapsulates the requirement, 
which is formulated using a textual statement. For example, SysML uses elements called 
requirement element and requirement diagram (Friedenthal et al., 2015). Given the inherent 
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vagueness of natural language to formulate requirements (Salado & Wach, 2019b), such 
modeling approach provides minimal improvement with respect to working with textual 
documents (from the perspective of enabling computational assessment of requirement 
completeness). While parsing textual requirement statements into a set of properties or 
constraints associated to objects has been shown to be feasible in software systems (Lu et al., 
2008), since parsing protocols rely on the structure of natural language, and not on meaning, 
the resulting requirements model inherits the vagueness of natural language. 
In the second approach, system models are directly flagged as requirements. They often 
use behavioral models and/or state machines to capture functional requirements (Aceituna et 
al., 2011; Aceituna et al., 2014; Adedjouma et al., 2011; Soares & Vrancken, 2008; Ouchani & 
Lenzinia, 2014; Pandian et al., 2017; Siegl, 2010), and non-functional requirements are 
captured as properties or attributes of the system (Reza, 2017; Saadatmand, 2012). For 
example, in SysML, this is achieved by defining values for the physical block that represents the 
system for which requirements are being formulated (Fockel & Holtmann, 2014; Holt et al., 
2015). However, this second approach presents two weaknesses, which are discussed at length 
in Salado and Wach (2019b). First, the separation between functional and non-functional 
requirements is ambiguous (Salado & Nilchiani, 2014), since, from a systems-theoretic 
standpoint, such a distinction does not really exist (Salado & Wach, 2019b). Requirements 
modeled in such a way may therefore inaccurately capture the requirement of concern. Second, 
since directly using behavioral models of the system of interest imposes a solution as the 
requirement (INCOSE, 2012), such requirements may also unnecessarily constrain the solution 
space (Salado et al., 2017).  
To overcome these problems, formal requirement models that prescribe a requirement 
structure without relying on pre-existing textual statement have been proposed (Borgne et al., 
2016; Micouin, 2008). For example, Micouin defines a requirement as a combination of a 
condition (e.g., when flying), a carrier (e.g., the system), a property (e.g., power consumption), 
and a domain (e.g., less than 100 W) (Micouin, 2008). While internally consistent, these 
structures do not prescribe the type of property that may be defined. As a result, they allow for 
imposing a system solution by defining design-dependent requirements, which are considered a 
poor practice in requirements engineering (INCOSE, 2012) because they unnecessarily 
constrain the solution space (Salado et al., 2017). 
Alternatively, requirements have also been modeled as exchanges in which the system 
of interest participates. Three approaches are predominant: model requirements as data 
exchanges (Teufl, 2013), as exchanges between actors (Miotto, 2014), and as input/output 
transformations through physical interfaces at the system boundary (Salado & Wach, 2019b). 
The first approach is insufficient to model space system requirements because it is only capable 
of modeling data exchanges, not physical aspects of the problem space. While the second 
approach (modeling requirements as exchanges between actors) may be promising to model 
stakeholder needs, it is not adequate for system requirements. This is because the requirement 
remains unbounded (dependent on the actions of external systems), which is considered a poor 
practice in requirements engineering (INCOSE, 2012). The third approach, which is the basis of 
True Model-Based Requirements (TMBR), is consistent with the principles of systems theory 
and the guidelines for writing good requirements (Salado & Wach, 2019b). It was used as the 
basis to develop the TMBR approach used in this paper and described in the next section. 
The True Model-Based Requirements Approach 
In this paper, TMBR is implemented as an extension of behavioral and structural model 
elements of SysML (Friedenthal et al., 2015). The usage of the different model elements relies 
on semantics that differ from those corresponding to the original model elements in SysML. 
Specifically, the models presented in this paper capture solution spaces (sets of solutions), not 
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systems (single solutions). While SysML models are used for diagrammatic purposes, their 
meaning differs from the traditional SysML specification. In particular, TMBR’s implementation in 
SysML is architected as follows: 
1. An extended sequence diagram captures the required logical transformation required to 
the system. 
2. Signals capture required logical inputs and outputs with their required attributes. 
3. Ports in block elements capture the required physical interfaces and their required 
properties through which inputs and outputs are conveyed. 
4. An extended state machine diagram is used to capture mode requirements, which 
capture the simultaneity aspects of requirements applicability. 
A visual representation of the basic construct of a requirement modeled as an 
input/output transformation is shown in Figure 1. Blocks are used to represent the system of 
interest for which requirements are being defined and sequence diagrams are used to capture 
the required flow of inputs (and outputs) to (and from) the system. In this way, the system 
remains a solid line, preventing the modeler from defining design-dependent or inner aspect of 
the system; only the system’s behavior at its boundary in the form of external inputs and outputs 
is allowed. In (and out)-flows to (and from) the system are defined as items (i.e., energy, 
information, or material) not as actions, hence guaranteeing consistency with systems theoretic 
principles for system requirements. 
 
Figure 1. Input/Output Transformation Sequence Between a System and an External System 
The signal element is used to capture the required input and output characteristics. 
Attributes of the signal are used to capture the required characteristics of the inputs and 
outputs. Examples of an input and an output are shown in Figure 2. The required interfaces 
through which the required inputs and outputs must be exchanged are captured using ports. An 
example of this is shown in Figure 3. The required properties of the interfaces are captured 
using InterfaceBlocks. Properties and values are used to capture requirements on the physical 
and transport (data) layers of the interface. An example of a modeled interface is shown in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 2. Example of Input/Output Signals 
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Figure 3. Example of Logical Capture of Interfaces 
 
Figure 4. Example of Use of an InterfaceBlock to Capture the Characteristics of an Interface 
Simultaneity of requirements applicability is captured by extending the use of SysML 
state machine diagrams rather than capturing all requirements in one large sequence diagram. 
This is defined as a mode requirement, which captures all requirements that “do not have 
conflicting requirements and that must be fulfilled simultaneously” (Salado & Wach, 2019b). An 
example of this is shown in Figure 5. In this example, the Accept external energy requirement 
and the Compute tasks requirements need to be fulfilled simultaneously. 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of a Mode Requirement Used to Capture Requirement Simultaneity 
It is critical to note that the state objects in the state diagram do not represent states in 
the traditional sense of SysML. They are only used in this implementation of TMBR to capture 
operational scenarios under which different requirements are expected to be fulfilled at the 
same time. The model does not impose any design constraint for the system, such as what 
states it will have; such design decision is left open. Eventually, a real state machine diagram 
that captures the actual behavior of a potential system (not the required one) may have a 
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completely different set of state elements (in the diagram) than the mode requirement diagram 
contains for indicating requirements applicability (i.e., as used in this paper). This is because in 
a solution model, state elements capture system states, whereas, as indicated, state elements 
in TMBR capture operational conditions that differ in the requirements that need to be fulfilled 




A total of 44 participants participated in the study, and 40 participants finished the study 
and turned in their artifacts. Participation was voluntary and participants received a 
compensation of $15 per hour, up to a total of $225, for participating in the study. Only adults 
participated in the study. The following inclusion criteria were used when selecting participants: 
• Undergraduate or graduate student in systems engineering at Virginia Tech. 
• Undergraduate or graduate student in aerospace engineering at Virginia Tech. 
The following exclusion criteria were used when selecting participants: 
• Not meeting the inclusion criteria. 
• Students registered in a course taught by the authors during the study. 
• Minors, prisoners, and adults incapable of consenting on their own behalf. 
These criteria were considered appropriate because of three reasons. First, students are 
easier to recruit than professional engineers and can devote a significant amount of time to the 
study on short notice. Second, we could control the base knowledge of all participants more 
easily, factoring out the effects of prior experiences or individual preferences on the results of 
the study. For example, whereas a professional engineer may confront a conflict between 
applying a newly learned approach (i.e., model-based requirements) with their experience using 
a different approach, a student is embedded in a natural dynamic of learning and applying new 
methods. Third, we did not consider the inexperience of students to be a factor in this study. In 
fact, such inexperience was a necessary condition for this study because of the difficulty in 
controlling for the experience of engineers when eliciting requirements. 
Determination of compliance of participants to selection criteria was performed by the 
authors at the start of the study.  
Students were assigned to each group randomly. To do this, we separated aerospace 
engineering students and systems engineering students. Then we randomly split them into two 
groups. To ensure that all the participants meet the experiment criteria and to avoid any 
conflicts of interests, we conducted a survey to gather demographic information.  
Instruments 
Five instruments were developed for use in the experiment (see Table 1). All instruments 
were developed before the study was initiated. The table is organized sequentially, i.e., the 
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Table 1. Research Instruments Used in the Study 
Instrument Description 
Consent form This instrument was used to inform the participants about the conditions of 
the study. 






This instrument consisted of a slide deck and synchronous online 





This instrument consisted of a slide deck, research papers, and synchronous 
online presentations by an instructor. 
Problem 
description 
This instrument was used as a problem statement. It also listed the expected 
behavior of the participants during the study. It is provided in the Appendix. 
 
Design 
In this section, the study design is discussed. This discussion includes the statement of the 
hypotheses, factors in the design, a discussion on the validity and reliability of the design, 
detailed procedures for executing the study, and a summary of the data analysis methods. 
Hypotheses 
The study was designed to test the following three hypotheses: 
H1. Model-based requirements yield fewer unbounded requirements than textual-based 
requirements. 
H2. Model-based requirements yield fewer unnecessary constraints than textual-based 
requirements. 
H3. Model-based requirements achieve higher completeness than textual-based 
requirements. 
All hypotheses focus on the performance of the groups. It was expected that the results would 
confirm the three hypotheses. 
Experimental Design 
Two groups of engineers were asked to elicit requirements from potential users of a 
surveillance and detection system. One group acted as the control group and the other group 
acted as the experimental group. The control group employed textual requirements, while the 
experimental group employed model-based requirements.  
Each group consisted of 22 students. Eleven students were in the aerospace 
engineering major and the other 11 were in the systems engineering major. Aerospace 
engineering students participated to both bring subject matter expertise on the problem 
statement and prevent investigators’ biases on the subject. Each aerospace engineering 
student was teamed up with another study participant (i.e., a system engineering student). The 
one-to-one allocation was intended to avoid coupling effects between the study participants, 
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which eases the factorial analyses necessary to test the hypotheses of this study. However, 
later in the experiment, four students from the model-based requirements engineering dropped 
out of the study before they finished their artifacts. Therefore, the study consisted of 11 groups 
of textual requirements and 9 groups of model-based requirements. 
After splitting participants into two groups, each group was trained in just one of the 
methodologies, either model-based requirements or textual requirements. Group 1 received 10-
hour training on textual requirements. Group 2 received 10-hour training on Model-based 
Requirements. This split helps avoiding confounding effects between knowing both methods but 
applying only one of them. The 10-hour training was divided into two blocks of 5 hours apiece. 
Training was not provided by the researchers, but by independent instructors. Training in 
model-based requirements was provided by an author of a seminal Model-Based Requirement 
paper. In this way, we could control for adequate learning and application of the model-based 
requirements framework, by having an instructor who developed such a framework. Training in 
using textual requirements was provided based on material in (Buede & Miller, 2016; Lee et al., 
2009; Wasson, 2016). In this way, we mitigated potential biases that the researchers might have 
introduced if provided the training of both methods. The instructor had over 5 years of 
experience in eliciting requirements for large-scale engineered systems and prior experience in 
conducting this type of training. 
An important observation was that during or after the training sessions for Model-Based 
Requirements (i.e., Group 2), three students dropped out of the experiment. They cited 
difficulties in understanding Model-Based Requirements Engineering as the main reason for 
their decision. Therefore, we started with 22 students for each group and ended up with 22 
students in Group 1 and 18 students in Group 2. 
The one-on-one study was conducted in five 1-hour sessions. Each session was 
separated by 1 week to allow the participant to reflect and process the insights and data 
collected during the elicitation session. 
Each team performed the elicitation sessions in isolation from other participants. The 
teams performed their task only with the knowledge they gained from the training sessions. That 
is, the elicitation sessions were conducted sequentially and not for the entire sample at once. 
No outsider source was used during the elicitation process. To ensure that the teams worked in 
isolation with no outside help, all the sessions were video recorded. 
The surveillance and detection need of the case study defined in Larson et al. (2009) 
was used as the problem statement. The hypothesis was tested using stakeholder needs for 
surveillance and detection of fire over the U.S. map. In the study, participants in both groups 
developed a requirement set for an Earth Observation Satellite. The stakeholder need was to 
build a system that could detect and monitor potentially dangerous wildfires throughout the 
United States. This satellite would survey the United States daily to give the Forest Service a 
means for earlier detection to increase the probability of containment and to save lives and 
property.  
A survey was employed to gather demographic information of the participants. 
Factors in the Design 
The independent variable in this investigation is the requirements approach. There are 
two alternatives: (1) textual requirements and (2) model-based requirements as defined in 
Salado & Wach, 2019b. 
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Four dependent variables were measured: 
• Number of inapplicable requirements. This variable provides a measure of the actual 
effectiveness of both the control method and the experimental method to elicit 
inapplicable-free requirements. 
• Number of unnecessary constraints. This variable provides a measure of the actual 
effectiveness of both the control method and the experimental method to elicit 
unnecessary requirements, such as solution-dependent ones. 
• Number of unbounded requirements. This variable provides a measure of the actual 
effectiveness of both the control method and the experimental method to elicit 
adequately bounded requirements. 
• Level of completeness of the requirement set. This variable provides a measure of the 
completeness of the resulting requirement sets when using both the method employed 
by the control group and the method employed by the experimental group. 
Effects related to experience, competence, and specific knowledge were controlled by the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria of the participants.  
In designing the experiment, several constraints were imposed that could have restricted 
the ways in which the independent variables could be manipulated. Three primary factors 
constrained the experiment: 
• Time. The elicitation problem was limited to 5 hours per problem. This is considered 
much lower than what would be allocated in a real-life development for the given system 
of interest. Therefore, this limitation poses a threat to completeness in the elicitation 
effort. However, since all participants are subjected to the same limitation, we suggest 
that the effectiveness of the method can still be measured. 
• Participants. First, the elicitation activity was performed in isolation (that is, one analyst 
and one stakeholder) and not in teams of analysts. This is not necessarily representative 
of a real-life development for the given system of interest. Therefore, this limitation 
poses a threat to correctness in the elicitation effort due to potential lack of domain 
knowledge. However, since all participants are subjected to the same limitation, we 
suggest that the effectiveness of the method can still be measured.  
• Single domain. The problems only address one type of system, a satellite. This poses a 
threat to generality of the results. 
Threats to Internal Validity 
In an internally valid experiment, the relationships between observed differences on the 
independent variable are a direct result of the manipulation of the independent variable, not 
some other variable. Table 2 lists internal threats to validity and their potential interference with 
the experimental design, if any. 
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Table 2. Threats to Internal Validity 




No The cause variable (requirements formulation method) was used as an 
input to create the effect variable (formulated requirements). 
Confounding No Prior knowledge and experience in the field of systems engineering 
was controlled through recruiting. 
History No The study was conducted in a short time and no extraneous event was 




The study was conducted in several sessions separated in time. 
Although participants were instructed to not read or learn anything on 
the topics relevant to the study until their responses were delivered, the 
researchers had no mechanism to control maturation. However, the 
video recording of the different sessions could indicate if maturation 
happened. This assessment has not been done for this paper. 
Repeated 
testing 
No No pre-test was given. 
Instrumentality Potentially Factor: The researchers could link the artifact under evaluation to the 
different groups. 
Mitigations: The experiment did not use pre-test instruments in 
conjunction with post-test instruments. 
Statistical 
regression 
No Random allocation of participants to groups. 
Selection bias No (1) Groups were randomly created. (2) Pre-testing was not performed. 





No Random allocation of participants to groups. 
Diffusion Yes Although participants were instructed to not exchange any information 
or opinion about the experiment with other participants until cleared out 




No (1) The experiment did not have intermediate results gates. (2) 





No verbal interaction between the researcher and the participants 
regarding the experiment besides pre-produced instruments and minor 
clarifications about the expected deliverables. 
 
Threats to External Validity 
In an externally valid experiment, the results are generalizable to groups and environments 
outside of the experimental setting. Table 3 lists internal threats to validity and their potential 
interference with the experimental design, if any. 
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Table 3. Threats to External Validity 








No There was a single treatment in the study (one training session before 










No (1) Instruments prepared before the experiment and provided in written 
form. (2) Participants were randomly assigned to groups. (3) 
Administration of treatment (instruction) was not performed by the 
researchers. (4) Evaluation criteria not defined by the researchers. 
 
Data Analysis 
For textual requirements, requirements were de-categorized and compiled as a single 
list for each participant. For model-based requirements, requirements were transformed into 
individual statements using the template described in Salado and Wach (2019a) and 
consolidated as a single list for each participant. 
Each requirement in each list was evaluated and classified as inapplicable, unbounded, 
unnecessary constraint, or adequate. The following criteria, which were derived from industry 
guidelines (INCOSE, 2012) and used in prior research for the same purpose (Salado & 
Nilchiani, 2017a), were used to classify the requirements: 
• Inapplicable requirement: A requirement that addresses a system external to the system 
of interest. Indications of this include statements where the subject of the requirement is 
not the system of interest or one of its parts or the requirement addresses aspects of the 
development process. 
• Unbounded requirement: A requirement that the system of interest cannot fulfill on its 
own, but which fulfillment depends on the action of systems external to the system of 
interest. An indication of this is that the statement contains more than one system.  
• Unnecessary constraint: A requirement that enforces a particular design solution. 
Indications of this include the use of terms such as use, be composed of, consist of, or 
include, among others, or the use of a system’s part as the subject of the statement. 
• Adequate requirement: Any requirement that is not classified in any of the other three. 
Completeness was assessed in two steps. First, all generated requirements were 
aggregated, consolidating those that refer to the same aspect or mutually exclusive aspect that 
the system had to fulfill as a single requirement. Second, the coverage of each set of 
requirements from the participants was assessed against this aggregated list. While 
completeness of a requirement set cannot be proven (Carson, 1998; Carson et al., 2004; 
Carson & Shell, 2001), we suggest, as in Salado and Nilchiani (2017a), that this coverage 
provides valuable insights about how the different approaches might impact completeness.  
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These evaluations were performed independently by both authors and then 
consolidated. The authors knew the approach used to define the requirements when performing 
the evaluation, which leads to some of the biases described in the section Threats to Internal 
Validity. 
Descriptive statistics were used to characterize the responses of the participants, as well 
as their demographics. Inapplicable requirements were removed from the comparisons of 
unbounded requirements, unnecessary constraints, and completeness to enable fair 
comparisons between the two approaches. While inferential statistics were initially planned to 
quantitatively compare both approaches, we found some problems to process the deliverables 
of the group using model-based requirements. Instead, a qualitative assessment was 
performed. 
Results 
In this section, we show preliminary results of a subset of the gathered data during the 
experiment. In particular, we randomly picked the deliverables of three participant pairs from the 
control group and three from the experiment group. 
Group Composition 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the distributions of prior experience using textual 
requirements and using MBSE, respectively. While experience in textual requirements among 
the two groups was a bit imbalanced, the group had, in general, little or no experience. A similar 
situation was given with respect to experience in MBSE. Comparing both the control and the 
experimental groups, the experience relevant to their approach was similar.  
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Figure 7. Prior Experience Using MBSE 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of prior experience in designing or working with space 
systems among the different groups. The responses indicated more dispersion, which could be 
explained by the fact that around half of the participants were aerospace students and half not 
aerospace students. It should be restated that each pair of participants in each group were 
formed by one aerospace student and non-aerospace student.  
 
Figure 8. Prior Experience in Designing or Working with Space Systems 
 
Evaluation of Textual Requirements 
Table 4 shows the results of assessing the requirements delivered by three participant 
pairs in terms of the number of unbounded requirements, inapplicable requirements, and 
unnecessary constraints. Table 5 shows a few examples of such requirements directly taken 
from the participants’ responses. 
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Table 4. Summary Assessment of Textual Requirements 










1 45 16 10 16 4 (10%) 
2 145 49 40 55 7 (5%) 
3 98 27 41 1 32 (33%) 
 
Table 5. Requirement Examples from the Participants’ Responses 
Unbounded 
requirements 
The system shall provide space-based “fire-scouts” that survey the United 
States daily. 
The system shall provide space-based “fire-scouts” that survey the United 
States daily. 
The satellite shall be deployed in low Earth orbit. 
Unnecessary 
constraints 
The antenna shall allow the satellite to communicate with the ground. 
Propellant shall be an ionized thrust that can be recharged using solar cells. 
The satellite shall utilize GPS. 
Inapplicable 
requirements 
The rockets shall withstand temperatures from XXX-to-XXX degree 
Fahrenheit. 
Separation shall occur once satellite is in specified orbit. 
The satellite shall pass all the Vega Launch Vehicle Manual’s quality 
inspection requirements. 
 
To evaluate the fidelity of the requirements activity, we compare the results presented in 
Table 4 with those obtained in a similar study, which was conducted by one of the authors with 
professional engineers and is reported in Salado and Nilchiani (2017a). The comparison is 
presented in Table 6. While data are not available in Salado and Nilchiani (2017a) for 
unbounded requirements, participants employed textual requirements a bit less effectively (that 
is, with more unnecessary constraints and inapplicable requirements). We suggest that this 
difference is, however, not dramatic, and consider that the participants correctly used the 
training to formulate textual requirements. 
Table 6. Comparison Against Performance of Practicing Engineers (Salado & Nilchiani, 2017a) 
Variable Practicing Engineers This Experiment 
Relative number of unbounded 
requirements 
Mean n/a 32% 
Median n/a 34% 
Relative number of unnecessary 
constraints 
Mean 27% 31% 
Median 26% 28% 
Relative number of inapplicable 
requirements 
Mean 16% 25% 
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Evaluation of Model-Based Requirements 
Two of the three responses we randomly selected for this pilot evaluation show 
significant misuse of TMBR. Two main issues were found. First, some participants used signal 
elements to represent actions instead of items that are exchanged between systems. An 
example of this, directly taken from a participant’s response, is shown in Figure 9. Second, 
some participants decomposed the system of interest into its components. An example is shown 
Figure 10. Therefore, they cannot be used in the assessment.  
 
Figure 9. Example of TMBR Misuse: Use of Actions Instead of Signals in Exchanges Between Systems 
 
Figure 10. Example of TMBR Misuse: Decomposition of System of Interest into Components. 
The third response, while adequately using TMBR, did not generate complete models (a 
partial example is shown in Figure 11). Specifically, the characteristics of the signals and the 
interfaces through which they ought to be exchanged were not modeled. Yet, we consider that 
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this response is valid for the pilot assessment, since effects on the hypotheses listed in the 
section Hypotheses can be evaluated. 
 
Figure 11. Example of Adequate Yet Incomplete Use of TMBR 
The requirement models led to 31 unique requirement statements, none of which was an 
unbounded requirement, an unnecessary constraint, or an inapplicable requirement. A few 
examples are shown here: 
R1. The satellite shall accept force of launch. 
R2. The satellite shall accept instructions 1 when heat signature is detected. 
R3. The satellite shall provide images when heat signature is detected. 
 
As discussed, according to TMBR, the models should have incorporated required 
properties of the items and of the interfaces through which they are transferred. For example, 
the item “force of launch” in R1 should have been completed with the actual mechanical forces 
injected into the satellite (e.g., a random vibration profile). Similarly, the models should have 
been completed with the description of the satellite’s attachment/physical point through which 
such vibration profile was to be injected. These were not provided in the participant’s response.  
Comparison 
The performance of the control and experiment groups with respect to the hypotheses 
listed in Section 3.3.1 are compared in Table 7. While these results are preliminary, given the 
small size of the sample and the problems encountered with the responses in the experiment 
group, they provide some indication of the superiority of model-based requirements to textual 
requirements. In terms of unbounded requirements, inapplicable requirements, and 
unnecessary constraints, these results were expected because such types of requirements are 
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Table 7. Results Comparison Between Control and Experiment Groups 
 
*Note: As shown in Table 4, none of the responses in the sample achieved 0% performance in any of the variables, 
and the maximum number of adequate requirements obtained was 32 with a 54% coverage. 
For completeness, in absolute terms, using model-based requirements led to more 
adequate requirements than using textual requirements. To assess coverage, the requirements 
from every participant were aggregated to a total of 57 adequate requirements. Model-based 
requirements achieved higher coverage than textual requirements, although one of the 
responses in the control group achieved a coverage of around 54%. However, it is important to 
note that the coverage achieved in the experiment group may not have a high fidelity due to the 
incompleteness in the models, as discussed earlier. 
5. Conclusions and Future Research  
We have presented in this paper preliminary results of an experimental study to evaluate 
the contractual safety of model-based requirements as compared to textual requirements. The 
preliminary results reported here have been limited to a subset of the all the data collected and 
to just four variables: number of unbounded requirements, inapplicable requirements, and 
unnecessary constraints, and coverage. The preliminary data support the claim that model-
based requirements are superior in all variables to textual requirements. 
However, some issues were encountered with the application of model-based 
requirements. Particularly, participants failed to use the modeling rules of TMBR, the modeling 
paradigm for requirements used in this study. We interviewed the TMBR instructor after 
reviewing the responses from the participants to better understand the results of the training 
prior to the start of the requirements definition activity. According to the instructor, the two 
issues described in the previous section were common misunderstandings he encountered 
during the whole training, and while he addressed them several times, he was not confident that 
the participants fully grasped them at the conclusion of the training.  
We have reviewed the material that was used for the training and conjecture three 
potential causes. First, the material that was used for training relied heavily on academic 
papers, which might have been too hard to process for the participants, who were 
undergraduate students. Second, the participants in charge of modeling the requirements were 
primarily students in an industrial engineering program, being biased toward process flows over 
design. Third, TMBR may require more training time than initially scoped. The experience 
gained in this pilot study informs the development of dedicated training material that is more 
easily digested by participants, including an evaluation gate during the training and potentially 
increased training duration. 
Variable Control Group 
(textual reqs)* 
(sample size = 3) 
Experiment Group 
(TMBR) 
(sample size = 1) 
Relative number of unbounded 
requirements 
Mean 32% 0% 
Median 34% 0% 
Relative number of unnecessary 
constrains. 
Mean 31% 0% 
Median 28% 0% 
Relative number of inapplicable 
requirements 
Mean 25% 0% 
Median 36% 0% 
Adequate requirements Mean 14 31 
Median 7 31 
Coverage Mean 26% 51% 
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Finally, we note that future work is planned to complete the evaluation with the full set of 
responses and to include measures related to precision and accuracy with which the 
requirements were captured in textual forms and with models. 
Appendix 
We want to develop an Earth Observation Satellite. Our goal is to build a system that 
can detect and monitor potentially dangerous wildfires throughout the US. wildfires claim 
hundreds of lives, threat thousands more, and lay waste to millions of acres, causing losses in 
the billions of dollars. The system needs to provide space-based “fire-scouts” that would survey 
the US daily to give the Forest Service a means for earlier detection to increase the probability 
of containment and to save lives and property. 
The following needs, among others you consider necessary, are to be taken into account: 
1. Satellite will be placed in LEO. 
2. Continuous monitoring. 
3. Be operational for at least 5 years. 
4. Launched onboard Vega. (Link to the actual user manual was provided.) 
5. Use Space@VT ground station. (Link to a datasheet of the actual ground station was 
provided.) 
If you need to quantify any value, use notional ones and specify your assumptions. No need for 
actual analyses. 
Please derive the requirements for this system. 
RULES: 
1. You cannot use or read requirements related to similar satellite 
2. Report all information that you have used for this activity 
3. Ideally, you just use your own knowledge 
4. No work in between sessions. 
5. No learning about requirements engineering during the whole study. If required as part of 
formal coursework, let us know. 
6. You cannot talk to anyone during the duration of the study about the study, not even your 
peer in the session. 
7. You should brainstorm with your peer in each session. 
8. You should hand in the final result of requirement derivation process after all the five 
sessions are finished. 
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Abstract  
Digital engineering transformation changes the practice of systems engineering, and drives the 
need to re-examine how engineering effectiveness is measured and assessed. Early engineering 
metrics were primarily lagging measures. More recently leading indicators have emerged that 
draw on trend information to allow for more predictive analysis of technical and programmatic 
performance of the engineering effort. By analyzing trends (e.g., requirements volatility) in context 
of the program’s environment and known factors, predictions can be forecast on the outcomes of 
certain activities (e.g., probability of successfully passing a milestone review), thereby enabling 
preventative or corrective action during the program. This paper discusses continuing research 
on the adaptation of existing systems engineering leading indicators (developed under the 
assumptions of document-based engineering) for digital (model-based) engineering. Model-based 
implications identified in the research are discussed in support of the use of existing leading 
indicators in digital engineering programs. An illustrative example describes how measurement 
data can be extracted from a digital system model and composed into indicators. The importance 
of visualization and interactivity is discussed, especially the potential role of visual analytics and 
interactive dashboards. Several recommendations for future research are proposed based on 
interim research findings.  
Introduction  
Defense programs have long used engineering metrics to provide status and historical 
information, but implementation has been limited by the nature of the traditional, document-
based engineering approach. Further, early systems engineering metrics were primarily lagging 
measures, providing information for the next program instead of the current one. Systems 
engineering leading indicators were subsequently developed to allow for more timely predictive 
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analysis of the technical and programmatic performance of the engineering effort on a program. 
Leading indicators use an approach that draws on trend information to allow for more predictive 
insight (Rhodes et al., 2009). A systems engineering leading indicator is a measure for 
evaluating the effectiveness of how a specific program activity impacts engineering 
effectiveness, which may affect the system performance objectives.  
Both lagging and leading indicators are found to be useful in many fields (e.g., 
economics, health, social science; Zheng et al., 2019). While lagging measures (e.g., system 
defects) continue to provide useful information over time for an enterprise, they are insufficient 
for real-time decisions during a program. Relatively little evidence exists on the application of 
leading indicators in the engineering of systems. The value of leading indicators comes from 
examining trends (e.g., requirements volatility) in context of the program’s characteristics and 
known factors. This information can then be used to make predictions to forecast the outcomes 
of certain activities (for example, likelihood of successfully passing a milestone review). Leading 
indicators have provided some improved ability to assess ongoing engineering effort, and where 
necessary, take preventative or corrective action during the program.  
Existing leading indicators were developed under the document-based engineering 
approach. The introduction of digital engineering practices can have a potentially radical or 
disruptive impact on the processes, tools, and time lines of engineering programs. Rapidly 
accelerating analytical and design capabilities will have limited impact on overall program pace 
and effectiveness if reviews and decision-making processes fail to adapt to the processes and 
cadence of digital engineering and management. Research is necessary in order to understand 
and adapt existing indicators for digital engineering and management practice. Additionally, the 
art of the possible needs to be explored including how digital system model information could be 
used to extract and compose base measures into indicators. Investigation is also needed to 
understand how newer sciences and technologies—such as data science, visual analytics, and 
interactive dashboards—could better inform timely leadership decisions in model-centric 
programs.  
Background  
Foundational work on systems engineering leading indicators was initiated in 2004. The 
early efforts produced a systems engineering leading indicators guide (Roedler & Rhodes, 
2007) with 13 leading indicators defined using measurement specifications. This work was 
subsequently evolved through collaboration from organizations and individuals across the 
systems engineering community with over 20 organizations as contributors. The result was a 
second version of the guide (Roedler et al., 2010), with five new leading indicators and several 
appendices added. Additional studies and papers have also been published by various authors 
(Elm et al., 2008; Elm & Goldenson, 2013; Gerst & Rhodes, 2010; Gilbert et al., 2014; Knorr, 
2012; Montgomery & Carlson, 2010; Orlowski, 2017; Orlowski et al., 2015; Rhodes et al., 2009; 
Shirley, 2016; Zheng et al., 2017; and Zheng et al., 2019).  
Prior work on leading indicators was done under the assumption of traditional, 
document-based engineering practice. This paper shares interim findings of a continuing 
research effort to investigate adaptation of the systems engineering leading indicators for digital 
engineering and use in model-centric programs.  
Motivation and Research Approach 
The broad motivation for the work is to enable more timely and informed decisions on 
systems engineering activities and resources. The transformation to digital engineering has 
prompted a need to re-examine the systems engineering leading indicators for this new context. 
The investigation aims to provide findings for model-centric programs seeking to use the leading 
indicators, as well as contribute recommendations to inform the larger effort of the systems 
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engineering community to establish the next generation of digital engineering effectiveness 
measurement.  
Since each of the indicators requires some additional considerations under digital 
engineering, the first year in this research focused on identifying potential modifications and 
interpretation guidance (Rhodes, 2020). The digital engineering environment and newer 
technologies open new possibilities for providing program leaders with leading insights into the 
effectiveness of systems engineering efforts. Accordingly, in the second year of the research the 
focus has been on defining specific model-based implications for the 18 leading indicators, and 
possible enhancements through three areas of inquiry. First, the research explores how metrics 
data can be obtained from digital system models that are produced by the systems engineering 
team. Second, it explores how information from descriptive system models can be extracted and 
composed as composite leading indicators that give overall indication of effectiveness versus a 
set of separate indicators. An illustrative case is used to show how measurement data can be 
extracted directly from descriptive system models and composed as enhanced leading 
indicators that can provide insight into effectiveness of engineering on a model-centric program. 
(Note: Integrated model-based tools were used in investigations during this research project. 
The selection of tools in the examples is not intended as an endorsement; the software used by 
the research team was selected based on pre-existing availability and case examples). Third, 
the research seeks to understand how interactive dashboards can be used to extract and more 
effectively display measurement information to positively impact program reviews and decisions.  
The justification for pursing this research approach extends from the DoD Digital 
Engineering Strategy (DoD, 2018), which discusses five goals. Goal 3, Incorporate 
Technological Innovation to Improve Engineering Practice, has a Subgoal 3.2 that discusses the 
use of technological innovations to improve digital engineering practice. There are many 
technological innovations of interest; some are specifically relevant to both the measures of 
digital engineering effectiveness on a program and the enabling technologies to support 
collection, analysis, and display of leading indicators of engineering effectiveness. As noted in 
the strategy, “data analytics can help gain great insights from existing model data” (DoD, 2018, 
p. 14). The strategy recommends that stakeholders use technological innovations to improve 
decision-making and performance of computationally intensive engineering activities.  
The collection and analysis of systems engineering measurement data falls under that 
category of activities. Digital engineering tools are recognized as a means to increase 
engineering efficiency (DoD, 2018, p. 17) and to provide access to vast data. Leading indicators 
are especially important to monitoring effectiveness on a continuous basis, and also to ensure 
that effectiveness is not compromised for sake of efficiency. The strategy calls for leadership to 
“establish accountability to measure, foster, demonstrate, and improve tangible results across 
programs and the enterprise” (DoD, 2018, p. 22). Common enabling technologies used in digital 
environments to generate, analyze, and display measurement data will encourage a common 
foundation for cross-program comparison and learning.  
Knowledge gathering from subject matter experts through technical exchanges and 
workshops provided insights regarding adaptation of leading indicators and potential new 
indicators of interest. This includes investigation of publications, studies, workshop reports and 
interim research findings from academic research groups, professional and industry societies, 
and cross-industry initiatives. Literature review is used to explore newer leading-edge 
techniques and approaches for collection and synthesis of measurement data, as enabled by 
digital engineering practices and environments.  
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Measurement Specifications 
Standardizing leading indicators of engineering effectiveness across programs is 
facilitated through measurement specifications. The systems engineering community has been 
using measurement specifications for many years, based on foundational work of PSM in 
software and systems measurement (PSM, 2020). The systems engineering leading indicators 
initiative adopted the PSM measurement specification format. Accordingly, each of the systems 
engineering indicators is characterized using a measurement specification with detailed 
description, insights provided, interpretation guidance, and usage guidance. Detailed contents 
of the measurement specifications for leading indicators is described in Roedler et al. (2010) 
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Table 1. Systems Engineering Leading Indicator Specification Fields (Roedler et al., 2010, adapted by 
Zheng et al., 2019) 
 
In the near term, the existing measurements specifications can be augmented with 
model-based implications. In the future, modified and new measurement specifications are 
envisioned in a new release of the leading indicators guide. Developing the next version of the 
guide necessitates a community effort extending from implications identified in this research, 
insights from practitioners, and results of ongoing investigations and initiatives on digital 
engineering metrics.  
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Model-Based Implications for Leading Indicator Implementation  
The existing 18 leading indicators, as investigated through semi-structured interviews 
and technical exchange workshops, were shown to have varying implications related to model-
based systems engineering. The implementation of a leading indicators in context of digital 
engineering will be based on many factors, such as nature of the program, processes used by 
the enterprise, model-based toolset selection and implementation, engineering culture of the 
enterprise, and maturity of digital engineering in the enterprise, as well as external influences 
(e.g., customer preferences, etc.).  
Based on research findings, the leading indicators are grouped into three subsets: (1) 
leading indicators most likely to be implemented with direct use of a model-based toolset; (2) 
leading indicators most likely to be partially implemented with use of a model-based toolset; and 
(3) leading indicators less likely to be implemented with use of a model-based toolset. The three 
groups of leading indicators are then summarized in Tables 2, 3, and 4 to highlight model-based 
implications. Prior to the summary tables, two indicators, requirements trends and facility and 
equipment trends, are discussed in greater detail.  
Requirements Trends Leading Indicator 
The Requirements Trends leading indicator is used to evaluate the stability and 
adequacy of the requirements to understand the risks to other activities toward providing 
required capability, on time and within budget. This is done through an evaluation of trends in 
the growth, change, completeness, and correctness of the system requirements definition, as 
well as the quality of and consensus around the system operations concept. This indicator 
provides insight into rate of maturity of the system definition against the plan, and whether the 
system definition is maturing as expected. Additionally, it characterizes the stability and 
completeness of system requirements that could potentially impact design, production, 
operational utility, or support.  
Requirements growth, changes, or impacts that exceed expectations or exhibit a lower 
closure rate of TBDs/TBRs than planned may indicate insufficient quality of architecture, design, 
implementation, verification, and validation efforts. This in turn could result in elevated schedule 
and cost risks, and/or a future need for different levels or types of resources/skills.  
Near Term: The use of requirements management tools and databases is a mature 
practice in systems engineering. Tracking the growth trends and volatility of requirements is 
therefore a relatively straightforward matter of the compilation of data on the requirements within 
the database and the development of processes for regular review and action where implied. 
These functions could be incorporated into or added to existing requirements management tools 
within the MBSE environment to assist program decision-makers in assessing progress during 
the system development.  
Longer Term: MBSE tools and methods introduce a number of new ways to assess and 
understand the quality of requirements and the degree to which they are being met over the 
course of the system development life cycle. A transition to primary use of an MBSE approach 
in system development could enable a broader range of analysis and model checking. 
The expression of requirements as executable models has been demonstrated to 
improve the quality of requirements and decrease errors relating to poorly-defined requirements 
(Micoun et al., 2018). Model-based requirements provide the ability to validate that the system 
model is logically consistent, and the ability to answer questions such as the impact of a 
requirement or design change, or the assessment of how a failure could propagate through a 
system. Using this approach, it is possible to verify design models using a simulation-based 
verification process in order to detect and remove design errors. Model-based requirements 
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may be included in a curated database for reuse in other development efforts, with the potential 
for savings in time and resources. 
Model-based requirements may be used in early system analysis to assess 
requirements completeness and correctness through the identification of gaps, conflicts, or 
redundancies in the existing requirements set, prior to the development of more detailed 
engineering models and analysis. MBSE analysis using model-based requirements could 
validate the requirements themselves and ensure they don’t contribute to undesirable emergent 
behaviors at the system level. A potential indicator of requirements quality in the MBSE 
environment might include the percentage of requirements that are formatted and expressed as 
models and the rate and total proportion of requirements validation through modeling and 
simulation at both the component and system level. 
Model-based requirements may be archived and reused across multiple development 
projects. Any issues that are identified with the requirements in one project could potentially be 
traced to other projects that use the same models. The traceability inherent in using these 
archived requirements models enables enhanced root cause analysis and system refinement, 
triggering actions to correct and validate the originating requirement to prevent continuing 
propagation of errors. An indicator of requirements maturity in an MBSE environment might 
include the proportion of requirements models that include a validation pedigree. The presence 
of requirements models without a validation pedigree (at least to a specific standard defined by 
the enterprise) could indicate greater risk of potential future requirements changes and 
instability in the system baseline. 
Facilities and Equipment Trends Leading Indicator  
The Facility and Equipment Availability Trends leading indicator is used to determine the 
availability of critical facilities and equipment needed for systems engineering activities over the 
project life cycle. The indicator is composed of two metrics, measuring facility availability and 
equipment availability. The intent of this indicator is to provide a view of facility and equipment 
availability on the project over time. Facilities and equipment are of different types and may 
provide key capabilities to the program. The facility availability measurement provides insight 
into the difference between the planned need for a facility type and the existing inventory of 
available facilities that meets the need for the desired capability. Insufficient facilities—labs, test 
ranges, floor space, etc.—of various types may cause a project to be unable to meet its 
customer needs, create costly overruns, and inability to meet schedule targets. Similarly, a 
project requires various types of equipment that also may provide key capabilities for the 
program. Equipment availability measurement provides insight into the difference between the 
planned need for an equipment type and the existing inventory of available inventory that meets 
the need for the desired capability. Insufficient equipment (fabrication equipment, measurement 
equipment, cleanroom equipment, test equipment, software and systems applications, etc.) may 
cause a project to be unable to meet its customer needs, create costly overruns, and inability to 
meet schedule targets. Facility Availability and Equipment Availability as measurable concepts 
assess whether adequate facilities and equipment can be allocated to the project to meet life 
cycle milestones. This reveals differences between systems engineering needs on the project 
and available facilities and equipment based on projected needs. The leading insights provided 
to the project are potential shortfalls of systems engineering related facilities and equipment, 
and potential problems with the project’s ability to meet desired milestones (Roedler et al., 
2010).  
Near Term: As an initial step in adapting the existing systems engineering (SE) leading 
indicators, the measurement specification can be augmented by adding model-based systems 
engineering implications to the Implementation Considerations within the Additional Information 
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section of the measurement specification. Model-based programs necessitate personnel have 
(or have access to) computing “equipment,” including desktop/laptop computers or workstations 
with adequate performance, access to networks and/or intranet, data and model repositories, 
model libraries, computer services support, data/cloud storage, etc. Facilities may include the 
individual engineer’s workspace, as well as collaborative spaces. There is also a need to have 
access to the selected version of model-based toolset that is maintained. The facilities and 
equipment need to support any required upgrades of versions, which may have implications for 
the existing computing facilities. Another implication consideration is that facilities and 
equipment must accommodate any necessary collaboration with other internal groups and/or 
external organizations (such as a supplier or customer) as needed. The facilities and equipment 
must be adequate to support this. This includes necessary facilities and equipment to support 
tool interoperability, data/model exchange, version compatibility control, model sharing, model 
security, etc. Model-based programs need to have adequate budget allocated, as insufficient 
availability of the necessary facilities and equipment will have major impact on systems 
engineering effectiveness. 
Longer Term: As we look to the future of digital engineering, the issue with using the 
existing Facilities and Equipment Availability leading indicator is that it takes a somewhat 
decoupled approach at these rather than as highly interconnected, as is the case for MBSE. In 
fact, with the transformation of traditional engineering to digital engineering, there is a need to 
look at this in context of the larger digital ecosystem. This includes interconnected digital 
environments that extend beyond the boundaries of the engineering organization. In the existing 
SE leading indicator guide published in 2010, the Facilities and Equipment Leading Indicator 
has relatively less substance than the other indicators given that it was not a major focus of the 
team. With digital engineering transformation, taking the perspective of the overall digital 
engineering ecosystems is necessary. The success of systems engineering on a program will 
be fully dependent upon the environment and infrastructure available to participate as part of the 
larger ecosystem. The supporting infrastructure required for digital engineering (Bone et al., 
2018) necessitates that a new leading indicator be developed respective to the importance it 
has to system success and the dimensions and complexity of that infrastructure.  
 Leading Indicators Most Likely to Be Implemented with Direct Use of a Model-Based 
Toolset  
The first subset of leading indicators, as shown in Table 2, are those that are most likely 
to be implemented with the direct use of the program’s MBSE toolset. In this case, the base 
measures as shown in the respective measurement specifications in the leading indicator guide 
(Roedler et al., 2010) are likely to be obtainable from the system model and composed into a 
leading indicator. Assuming an effective user interface and any required trend data, this 
provides the ability to obtain real-time leading indicator information to better inform and 
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Table 2. Leading Indicators Most Likely to Be Implemented With Direct Use of Model-Based Toolset 




Insight Provided  Model-Based Implications 
Requirements 
Trends 
Rate of maturity of the system definition 
against the plan. Additionally, 
characterizes the stability and 
completeness of the system 
requirements that could potentially 
impact design, production, operational 
utility, or support. 
• See the section Requirements 






Change request backlog which, when 
excessive, could have adverse impact 
on the technical, cost, and schedule 
baselines.  
• Model-based tools will enable 
collection and analysis of data 
• MBSE enables fixing defects earlier 
in time, where less effort is typically 
required. Accordingly, historical 
trends will vary from model-centric 
programs. 
Interface Trends Interface specification closure against 
plan. Lack of timely closure could pose 
adverse impact to system architecture, 
design, implementation, and/or V&V, 
any of which could pose technical, cost, 
and schedule impact. 
• Similar to requirements trends; see 
the section Requirements Trends 





Progress against plan in assuring 
customer requirements are valid and 
properly understood. Adverse trends 
would pose impacts to system design 
activity with corresponding impacts to 
technical, cost, & schedule baselines 
and customer satisfaction.  
• Similar to requirements trends; see 
the section Requirements Trends 
Leading Indicator for a detailed 
discussion. 
• Model-based tools may accelerate 
the pace of validation so historical 





Progress against plan in verifying 
design meets the specified 
requirements. Adverse trends would 
indicate inadequate design and rework 
that could impact technical, cost, and 
schedule baselines. Also, potential 
adverse operational effectiveness of the 
system. 
• Similar to requirements trends; see 
the section Requirements Trends 
Leading Indicator for a detailed 
discussion. 
• Model-based tools may accelerate 
the pace of verification so historical 
data trend data may not be as 
useful. 
 
Leading Indicators Most Likely to Be Partially Implemented with Use of a Model-Based 
Toolset  
The second subset of leading indicators, as shown in Table 3, are those that are most 
likely to be partially implemented with the use of the program’s model-based toolset. For 
example, technical performance risk information might be associated with the system model, but 
there may be other programmatic risk information that is tracked elsewhere. The extent to which 
the five leading indicators in this table are able to be generated from a model is dependent on 
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Table 3. Leading Indicators Most Likely to Be Partially Implemented With Use of Model-Based Toolset 








Effectiveness of risk management process 
in managing/mitigating technical, cost, & 
schedule risks. An effective risk handing 
process will lower risk exposure trends.  
• Model-based tool sets provide 
opportunity to have risk associated 





Effectiveness of the SE organization in 
implementing risk mitigation activities. If SE 
is not retiring risk in a timely manner, 
additional resources can be allocated 
before additional problems are created. 
• Model-based tool sets provide 
opportunity to have risk associated 






Progress towards meeting the Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs)/Performance 
(MOPs)/Key Performance Parameters 
(KPPs) and Technical Performance 
Measures (TPMs). Lack of timely closure is 
an indicator of performance deficiencies in 
the product design and/or project team’s 
performance.  
• Model-based approaches, 
methods, and tools will enhance 
technical performance 
measurement.  
• Ability to project planned value and 
predict variances may be improved, 




Progress towards the creation of a product 
or the delivery of a service that meets the 
quality expectations of its recipient. 
Understanding the proportion of defects 
being found and opportunities for finding 
defects at each stage of the development 
process of a product or the execution of a 
service. 
• With model-based approach errors 
and defects may be found earlier in 
time; software can automate finding 
and fixing some defects. 
• Necessitates defining an alternative 
to “defects per page.”  
• Historical defect discovery profiles 
from traditional engineering will 
likely not be suitable; defects 
models and discovery profiles will 






Adequacy of internal processes for the 
work being performed and also the 
adequacy of the document review process, 
both internal and external to the 
organization. High reject count would 
suggest poor quality work or a poor 
document review process each of which 
could have adverse cost, schedule, and 
customer satisfaction impact. 
• Models may become tracked work 
products in model-centric 
programs; criteria would need to be 
developed. 
• Models may influence the approval 
rate of system work products. 
 Leading Indicators Less Likely to Be Implemented with Use of Model-Based Toolset  
The third subset of leading indicators, as shown in Table 4, are those that are less likely 
to be implemented with the use of a program’s model-based toolset. Presently, these leading 
indicators would likely be tracked in a separate technical management tool or tracking system. 
Model toolset experts view it as possible to extend model-based toolsets to include any 
programmatic and process models in a model-centric environment. So, while at present there 
are likely to be few programs that have implemented this, the likelihood will increase over time 
as model-based environments evolve.  
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Table 4. Leading Indicators Less Likely to Be Implemented with Use of Model-Based Toolset 








Risk associated with incorporation of 
new technology or failure to refresh 
dated technology. Adoption of 
immature technology could introduce 
significant risk during development 
while failure to refresh dates 
technology could have operational 
effectiveness/ customer satisfaction 
impact. 
• Increased use of models may enhance 
ability to assess potential impacts. 
Review Action 
Closure Trends 
Responsiveness of the organization in 
closing post-review actions. Adverse 
trends could forecast potential 
technical, cost, and schedule baseline 
issues. 
 
• Model-centric programs are likely to have 
more continuous action item review than 
traditional. 
• Technical-related action items may be 





Quantity and quality of SE personnel 
assigned, the skill and seniority mix, 
and the time phasing of their 
application throughout the project life 
cycle.  
• Model-based approaches, methods, and 
tools require additional staffing and skills, 
possibly at different points in program. 
• Insufficient model-based staffing/skills 




Quality and consistency of the project 
defined SE process as documented in 
SEP/SEMP. Poor/inconsistent SE 
processes and/or failure to adhere to 
SEP/SEMP, increase project risk. 
• Model-based programs will be using newer 
and/or developing processes integrated 
with toolsets. 
• Compliance deviations and comments 
recorded within the model enable 
automated compliance measurement.  
• Process compliance measurement needs 
to accommodate modifications to process 






Availability of non-personnel resources 
(infrastructure, capital assets, etc.) 
needed throughout the project life 
cycle. 
• See the section Facilities and Equipment 





Progress toward a system that is 
affordable for the stakeholders. 
Understanding the balance between 
performance, cost, and schedule and 
the associated confidence or risk. 
• Assessing affordability under the digital 
engineering paradigm is likely to require 
different approach. 
• Lacking historical data, model-based 
programs need to develop, approach, and 
adjust measurement of this. 
Architecture 
Trends 
Maturity of an organization with 
regards to implementation and 
deployment of an architecture process 
that is based on an accepted set of 
industry standards and guidelines. 
• Model-based approaches/tools will have 
influence on assessing maturity. 
• Programs should tailor base measures as 
needed to reflect advantages of model-
based approaches/tools. 
Schedule and 
Cost Pressure  
Impact of schedule and cost 
challenges on carrying out a project. 
• Minimal historical data available for the 
digital engineering situation, and setting 
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Composability of Leading Indictor Measurement Data 
Leading indicators are most useful when applied for predictive purpose to facilitate 
programmatic decisions and/or corrective actions. Requirements Trend indicators, for instance, 
are used to evaluate trends in the growth, change, completeness, and correctness of the 
definition of system requirements. Traditionally, this indicator provides insight into the rate of 
maturity of system definition against the plan. It also characterizes stability and completeness of 
system requirements which could potentially impact design, production, operational utility, or 
support. In traditional document-based engineering practice, requirements are central objects 
that can be used for assessing maturity of system definition. In model-based engineering, 
however, there are many other constructs and digital artifacts. With modeling languages (e.g., 
SysML, LML) there are requirements diagrams, use case diagrams, activity diagrams, state 
machine diagrams, parametric diagrams, and others. With the advantages of model-based 
approaches, a leading indicator used to assess progress of system definition that uses only 
requirements would be a limited indicator. In this case, one would want to consider progress of 
systems definition to include composition of measurement information from system diagrams of 
all relevant types. 
Composability concerns selection of elements that can logically and reasonably be 
assembled. In context of this research, the focus is on composability of base measures 
extracted from a digital system model or digital process model used to produce a leading 
indicator. An initial step is to consider the existing 18 leading indicators. Future research is 
needed to explore new leading indicators (e.g., model volatility) that are made tractable through 
model-based toolsets. Automation and augmented intelligence offer opportunities to explore the 
future of leading indicators for digital engineering program decision-making.  
Illustrative Case Discussion  
An illustrative case has been used in the research to explore how digital engineering is 
expected to modify and/or enable the leading indicators most likely to be implemented with 
direct use of model-based toolsets. These five leading indicators (see Table 2) all relate to 
aspects of requirements management. In the current state of practice, requirements are typically 
collected and stored in a specialized requirements database, often using software (e.g., 
DOORS® or other similar packages suited to needs of the project/enterprise). These types of 
packages are generally interoperable with and/or loosely coupled to other systems engineering 
model-based toolsets.  
It is the assumption of this research team that the specific details of this will vary based 
on the chosen model-based tools used. For the purposes of this illustrative case, Innoslate® was 
used to conduct a number of small scale exercises. Innoslate® is an integrated MBSE software 
package that implements the open source LML ontology, which is compact but comprehensive 
(Dam, 2019, p. 5). LML provides an organized and structured terminology for systems 
engineering, enterprise-defined extensions, and includes features that support the earliest 
concept stage throughout the life cycle to disposal (Dam, 2019, pp. 6, 10). Innoslate enforces 
the important principal of concordance, which facilitates single source of truth by requiring that a 
given piece of information in the systems engineering knowledge base will have the same 
meaning when viewed through different language or visualization lenses. 
The Action entity in the LML ontology is the primary building block for functional models. 
Similarly, the Asset entity is the primary building block for physical models. Every entity has a 
“type” property, which allows many variants of Actions and Assets to be represented. For 
example, Actions may be described as Activity, Capability, Event, Function, Process, or Task. 
Assets may be described as Component, Entity, Service, Sub-system, or System as needed in 
a particular modeling context.  
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The other key basic concept in functional models is Input/Output, which represents the 
flow of information in or out of an Action, including Item, Trigger, Information, Data, and Energy. 
The corresponding basic concept in a physical model is the Conduit, which might be 
implemented as a Data Bus, Interface, or Pipe.  
Relationships are used to make connections among entities. Decomposition is denoted 
with the decomposed by/decomposes relationships. A functional model Action can be allocated 
to a physical model Asset using the “performed by/performs” relationship. A functional model 
Input/Output entity may be allocated to a physical model Conduit via the “transferred 
by/transfers” relationship where the functional flow thereby becomes constrained by the 
properties of the physical device implementing the Conduit. Standard entity attributes are 
defined in the LML ontology along with standard relationships and the entity types they connect 
(LML Steering Committee, 2015).  
Tracking the trends needed for the leading indicators (Table 2) requires taking 
snapshots of metrics values at intervals over time as the program proceeds. If integrated into an 
LML model, this program management data would be stored as objects in the database to 
facilitate integrative analysis with other program data.  
Requirements Trends and Interface Trends  
The metrics required for Requirements Trends and Interface Trends can be composed 
by counting explicit and implicit requirements identified in the Innoslate database. Explicit 
requirements are found in Requirements entities that contain natural language statements, 
which are (1) sourced from documents loaded into the system; (2) entered directly into the 
database by engineers; or (3) computed from other data and stored in the database.  
Implicit requirements are derived from the functional and physical models developed by 
engineers during requirements analysis. Functional Requirements may be defined by Action 
entities and the flows, relationships, and properties that describe them. Innoslate also has a tool 
that converts Actions in a functional model into implied Assets and Conduits in a physical 
model.  
Interface Requirements can be inferred from Conduit entities that connect Assets in the 
physical model. The technical characteristics of the endpoint Assets and the Conduit combine to 
specify the interface requirements. Performance Requirements often come from data related to 
Asset entities and connections. External interfaces would be represented by connecting a 
Conduit to an Asset that is outside the system boundary. 
As requirements analysis progresses, the model and the requirements will grow deeper 
and broader. In traditional practice, the requirements are frozen in text and isolated from the 
models that engineers use for analysis. Whether explicit or implicit, a requirement in Innoslate is 
linked by relationships to other elements of the model, giving greater context to understanding 
the meaning of a requirement. For example, by running simulations on executable models, the 
engineer can identify whether a set of requirements has face validity or meets expectations. 
Spider charts and hierarchy charts can be used to visualize the structure of the model and the 
requirements.  
As systems understanding develops, some information will be less refined than other 
information. For example, the value for a parameter in a requirement may be unknown (TBD) or 
estimated (TBR). LML Decision entities can be attached to the model to represent the both the 
uncertainty and the process for finding the missing information as well as defining assumptions. 
When the TBD/TBR is resolved, the updated Decision entities provide a record of how the value 
was obtained.  
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Requirements Validation Trends and Requirements Verification Trends  
Systems engineering practice involves beginning requirements validation and verification 
early in the project as requirements are found and entered into the database. At the early stage, 
Innoslate and some other toolsets offer a natural language tool for checking the quality of 
requirements statements against six of the eight standard criteria (clear, complete, consistent, 
design, traceable, verifiable but not correct and feasible). Another tool applies heuristics to 
evaluate models and requirements in more depth. A roll-up of these quality metrics could 
provide leaders with early insight on how well the requirements are progressing and whether 
problems are being left to later in the life cycle where they will be more difficult to resolve. 
Innoslate also includes a Test Center where test plans and scenarios can be built for early or 
later use and VCRM Reports generated. The leading indicators for requirements verification and 
requirements validation could be improved by adding a measure for progress on developing test 
plans to complement the metric for successful completion of validation and verification testing. 
Product validation and verification also needs to be considered holistically as well as individually 
by requirement. The model can be used with simulation tools to predict the behavior of the 
whole system or subsystems. 
Visualization and Interactivity 
More complex leading indicators are likely in the digital engineering context, resulting 
from increased information, synthesis, and composability of measurement data. Accordingly, 
decision-makers will face challenges in comprehending the information, including a need to 
understand the underlying assumptions and uncertainties in the constituent data elements. 
Investigating the approach to display such leading indicators is an important area of inquiry. 
Measurement dashboards have been used extensively for decades, typically providing static 
display of information. Visual analytics and interactive technologies provide the opportunity to 
create dynamic dashboards that would enable a decision-maker to be able to interact with the 
data. This provides more transparency to underlying data, as well as enabling the development 
of understanding and trust in the information.  
Visual Analytics  
Visual analytics is fundamentally about collaboration between a human and a computer 
using visualization, data analytics, and human-in-the-loop interaction. More than just 
visualization tools, visual analytics aims to take advantage of a human’s ability to discover 
patterns and drive inquiry to make sense of data. Thomas (2007) defined visual analytics as 
“the science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces” that “provides the 
last 12 inches between the masses of information and the human mind to make decisions.” As 
engineering becomes increasingly model-based, the available information to draw on to 
generate measures of effectiveness is vast and complex. It is foreseeable that decision-makers 
could be presented with large amounts of data that would be cognitively challenging to 
comprehend and find patterns that could be used to judge the effectiveness of the engineering 
on an ongoing program. For this reason, the knowledge and recent advancements in visual 
analytics may offer significant support in processing and displaying measurement data.  
Vitiello and Kalawsky (2012) state the “guiding process in visual analytics is a synergy 
between interactive visualization and automated analysis of the data.” They discuss an 
approach that integrates a visual analytic-based workflow to the notion of sensemaking. The 
authors describe using visual analytics to support systems thinking to make sense of complex 
systems interactions and interrelationships, enabling rapid modeling of the systems of interest 
for systems engineering design and analysis processes. The visual analytic-based sensemaking 
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Interactive Dashboards 
Systems engineers, managers, and government sponsors all rely on creative work 
products of systems engineering and all need to glean an appropriate level of understanding of 
the work as it progresses. The mean time for a warfighting system to move from well-defined 
concept to initial operating capability can be substantial, regularly averaging 6–7 years (Dwyer, 
2020). Leading indicators can help stakeholders see how a project or program is progressing 
throughout the life cycle and whether it is on target to deliver what is needed when it is needed 
at an affordable cost.  
The complexity of understanding the status and trajectory of a program is high and 
larger than any one person can hold in one’s head. Systems engineering methods, languages, 
and models are intended to leverage visualizations, structure, and compuational representations 
to make the task manageable for all the humans who must be involved. Model-based systems 
engineering incorporates all of those features. Sindiy et al. (2013) demonstrates how clean 
visual representations can help in making MBSE models accessible. Dam (2019) argues that in 
addition to visualizations, modeling language and ontology matters, since a representation that 
is inherently fragmented and lacks a well-structured ontology will be less cognitively accessible 
to users. Dashboards are often created as views into program data that has been extracted and 
loaded into a data warehouse. Dam (2020) proposes that stakeholders should be given 
controlled direct access to MBSE models to improve the speed and depth of understanding in 
system reviews. He also argues that prime contractors and subcontractors can achieve better 
coordination by using MBSE models as a vehicle for communication about the system that is 
being created, program progress, and how organizations with different roles and incentives will 
fit together to deliver the capability needed to meet customer objectives.  
Selby (2009) argues that interactive dashboards facilitate effective management. 
Leading indicator project data can be presented in a compact form with tools for organizing 
data, drilling into the underlying data, and connecting data to analytic tools and models. 
Orlowski (2017) and Orlowski et al. (2015) extend Selby and propose a framework for guiding 
leading indicator development and usage. Recent work by Thiruvathukal et al. (2018) shows the 
potential for using open source software repositories in the development of software metrics 
dashboards. Nadj (2020) addresses how interactive dashboards help managers in gaining and 
maintaining situational awareness to understand the context of metrics.  
Discussion and Future Directions 
Potential impact of adapted and extended leading indicators is twofold: (1) to continue to 
provide visibility into the future state through use of leading indicators in model-centric 
programs; and (2) to enhance insights provided by the leading indicators related to digital 
models and artifacts that enrich the systems development practice. The current set of leading 
indicators is predicated on use of document-driven processes and major milestone reviews. The 
transformation to digital-model based engineering will result in the use of digital artifacts, with 
more frequent review of the expected system performance (Parrot & Weiland, 2017). One of the 
expected outcomes of digital engineering is to move away from milestone design reviews to 
more continuous reviews given access to the maturing system model. Leading indicators can be 
very supportive of this goal (Orlowski, 2017; Orlowski et al., 2015). An open question is how 
trend information for models and digital artifacts (e.g., SysML diagrams) could be used in a 
similar manner to predict when the model is in a state where a review activity is most useful.  
 Interim Research Findings  
Interim outcomes of the research include knowledge for augmenting measurement 
specifications of existing systems engineering leading indicators to describe model-based 
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implications, and illustrating what is possible for enhanced measurement through direct use of 
model-based toolsets. Another interim outcome is initial investigation of how visual analytics and 
interactive dashboards may be used to provide leading indicator information that provides a 
deeper understanding for program leaders. This research has identified considerations and 
additional interpretation guidance to augment existing systems engineering leading indicator 
measurement specifications. The results are aimed at assisting systems engineering 
organizations that have been using leading indicators as they transition to model-based systems 
engineering.  
This research has also included initial investigation for how model-based toolsets 
enable the collection and composability of base measures to generate leading indicators. An 
initial investigation of interactive dashboards suggests that program leaders will be able to make 
improved and accelerated decisions using leading indicators if these are integrated with model-
based environments to provide on-demand trend information. Implications identified in this 
research, including potential new leading indicators, can inform ongoing efforts in the systems 
community to define new or revised metrics for digital engineering programs and enterprises.  
Related Research and Initiatives 
Interim and final research outcomes are shared with several working groups as input to 
future research on digital engineering metrics and revision of the leading indicators guide. The 
DoD Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC) performed a research activity in 2020 that 
investigated digital engineering transformation metrics (McDermott et al., 2020). Metrics 
categories were derived as a general categorization, including adoption, user experience, 
velocity/agility, quality, and knowledge transfer. Literature review and a survey were performed, 
resulting in a set of top metrics categories related to the benefit of digital engineering. Although 
the focus of the leading indicators and digital engineering metrics are somewhat different, their 
relationship is worth considering as potential additional leading indicators are developed.  
The outcomes of the SERC investigation, other ongoing measurement related efforts, 
and foundational work by PSM are employed in a broader Aerospace & Defense Digital 
Engineering Metrics Initiative. This initiative brings together a diverse team including industry 
associations, government agencies, FFRDCs, UARCs, academia, and industry (including AIA, 
NDIA, INCOSE, OUSD R&E, SEI, SERC, the Aerospace Corporation, PSM, MIT, and several 
companies). The effort aims to define an industry consensus measurement framework and 
candidate performance indicators for digital engineering, and to align measures with business 
information needs for project execution and organizational performance improvement.  
Limitations and Future Research  
The research largely draws from the defense systems engineering community and 
literature from that sector. Future research can investigate additional sectors, as well as related 
disciplines. Expert knowledge was gathered though available workshops and from prior leading 
indicator project participants in the early phases. The limitations imposed by the COVID-19 
pandemic, especially on workshops and conference events other than virtual, resulted in 
reduced opportunities for access to the community of interest. Planned group discussions were 
replaced with individual interviews and discussions, which resulted in reduced iteration and 
feedback opportunities.  
This research has included some experimentation with extraction of metric data based 
on a single systems engineering toolset (selection of toolset was based on ease of use and 
availability to research team). Future research is needed to investigate extraction and 
composition of measurement information across the available model-based toolsets. 
Additionally variation in implementing digital engineering practice need to be examined in regard 
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to this objective. For example, some of the existing leading indicators depend on disciplined 
management processes for approval of key program artifacts (e.g., requirements, change 
orders, interfaces, and test plans). While these processes are not part of the system being 
developed, they can be modeled and/or tracked through model-based toolsets. This would 
enable measuring aspects of process compliance. Dam (2019) gives examples of how software 
could be used in support of measuring management processes.  
Model-centric programs have the opportunity to leverage leading-edge technologies in 
the collection, composition and display of measurement data, as well as enable better decisions 
to be made throughout the program life span. Two aspects for future investigation are 
techniques emerging from visual analytics and data science. Model-based acquisition programs 
will be faced with dealing with four cited challenges of big data: volume: the magnitude of digital 
engineering information; variety: existence of digitized assets (e.g., drawings, etc.) that are not 
in themselves models; velocity: rapid information flow (e.g., operational digital twins sending 
information back to the digital system model); and veracity: uncertainty inherent in model data 
(e.g., artificial data from simulations, incomplete data, subjectivity in models).  
Future research is needed to further elicit ideas from the systems community on 
program level indicators and enterprise-level indicators. Desirable research is to conduct 
industry case studies to learn from digital engineering early adopters concerning what metrics 
and leading indicators they have implemented, as well as novel approaches that have been 
developed. This includes extraction and composition of leading indicators, the implementation of 
measurement dashboards, and the specific practices used in making decisions with 
measurement information.  
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Abstract 
Program technical reviews are discrete points in time, within a system’s life cycle, where the 
system is evaluated against a set of specific accomplishments, known as “entrance criteria.” 
These criteria are used to track the technical progress, schedule, and program risks. Technical 
reviews serve as gates used to demonstrate that the program is on track, and should be allowed 
to proceed. Current technical reviews are based around evaluations of static, contractually 
obligated documents that are used to demonstrate successful completion of the entrance criteria. 
These documents represent “snapshots” of the systems and do not represent a total view of the 
system. As a result, systems are often viewed by the entrance criteria individually, which fail to 
account for the system from a holistic perspective. Department of Defense (DoD) organizations 
are migrating to Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) environments, with a vision of 
modernizing, developing, delivering, operating, and sustaining systems. Model-based reviews 
allow for complexity to be managed more efficiently because data, not “systems engineering 
products,” is the commodity used to evaluate the entrance criteria. The data-driven MBSE 
technical reviews will provide greater insights and details across a program’s life cycle. This 
paper discusses the applicability of current technical reviews criteria to MBSE. 
Key words: Technical Review, Model-Based Systems Engineering 
Background 
Model-based processes are one of the most widely-discussed issues within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) today. For example, Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
is a quarterly discussion at the Navy’s Systems Engineering Stakeholders Group (SESG) and 
has been a tenant of the National Defense Industrial Association Systems Engineering and 
Mission Conference for the past several years. The DoD Digital Engineering Strategy (2018) 
provides a vision on how the DoD will modernize, develop, deliver, operate, and sustain 
systems. This strategy is important because advances in technology have led to larger and 
more complex systems. This implies a need for a clear, concise way to express the system 
design (clear, logically consistent semantics), and a need to represent systems differently to 
account for emergent behavior within the system due to the increased complexity.  
When developed properly, models can provide a precise virtual representation of the 
functional, physical, parametric, and program entities of the systems. Increased emphasis is on 
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the model itself, specifically the objects and relationships it contains, rather than the diagram, to 
encourage better model development, usage, and decision-making.  
This paper evaluates the suitability of current systems engineering models for MBSE 
technical reviews. The section “Systems Engineering Technical Reviews” provides an overview 
of these reviews and serves as a point of departure of our evaluation. The section “SETRS in an 
MBSE Environment” discusses Systems Engineering Technical Reviews (SETR) in an MBSE 
environment. The section “Applicability of Current Technical Review Criteria to MBSE Technical 
Reviews” discusses applicability of current technical review criteria to MBSE technical reviews.  
Systems Engineering Technical Reviews 
The System Acquisition Life Cycle Model identifies five primary phases that take the 
system from concept development and material solution analysis through operations and 
support (AcqNotes, 2019). Systems Engineering Technical Reviews (SETR) are discrete points 
in time, within a system’s life cycle, during which the program is assessed against a set of 
program specific accomplishments (entrance criteria). The SETRs serve as gates that when 
evaluated successfully, demonstrate that the program is on track to achieve its final program 
goals, and should be allowed to proceed to the next acquisition phase. Figure 1 shows the 
technical reviews superimposed on the Systems Acquisition Life Cycle Model (derived from 
DAU, 2018). The acquisition phases, with their associated technical reviews, are described in 
Table 1 (derived from Manning, 2019).  
The technical reviews that were considered most likely to benefit from MBSE are 
conducted during the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA), Technology Maturation and Risk 
Reduction (TMRR), and the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phases—the 
phases that lead to Milestone C. Beaufait (2018) studied the applicability of MBSE to programs 
post-Milestone C, and concluded that MBSE can benefit programs post-Milestone C; however, 
introducing MBSE that far into the life cycle of the program will face challenges related to cost, 
schedule, and a lack of understanding of MBSE. At this stage of the program, the 
implementation of MBSE has an additional cost that is likely not planned in the budget, and 
skeptical program managers are reluctant to make that investment in exchange for the promised 
benefits of MBSE (Beaufait, 2018). 
 
Figure 1. System Acquisition Life Cycle Model (DAU, 2018) 
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The technical reviews that this research considered for applicability to an MBSE environment 
are (AcqNotes, 2019): 
• Initial Technical Review (ITR)—A multi-disciplined review to support a program’s initial 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) within the Materiel Solutions Analysis phase 
(MSA). 
• Alternative System Review (ASR)—A review that assesses the preliminary materiel 
solutions that have been developed during MSA. 
• System Requirements Review (SRR)—A review to ensure that system requirements 
have been completely and properly identified, and that a mutual understanding between 
the government and contractor exists during the Technology Maturation and Risk 
Reduction (TMRR) phase. 
• System Functional Review (SFR)—A review to ensure that the system’s functional 
baseline is established and can satisfy the requirements of the Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD) or draft Capability Development Document (CDD) within the currently 
allocated budget and schedule, during TMRR. 
• Preliminary Design Review (PDR)—A review that establishes the allocated baseline of a 
system to ensure a system is operationally effective. A PDR is conducted before the 
start of detailed design work and is the first opportunity for the government to closely 
observe the contractor’s hardware and software design. This review is conducted during 
TMRR. 
Current SETRs are based around lengthy reviews of static, contractually obligated 
“artifacts” that are used to demonstrate successful completion of the entrance criteria. 
Participants typically “freeze” these “artifacts” many days prior to the SETR in order to provide 
baselines from which to synchronize various products used during the review. This baselining 
and eventual loss of concordance1 between “artifacts” are the primary drawbacks when 
conducting reviews using “artifact-based” methods. 
 
 
1 Concordance is the ability to represent a single entity, such that data in one view, or level of abstraction, 
matches the data in another view, or level of abstraction, when talking about the exact same thing. This 
allows for complexity to be managed more efficiently because each entity is ideally represented in the 
model only once, essentially creating a virtual representation of the system in the model. Systems 
engineering views are generated from the data (Vaneman, 2018). 
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Table 1. Summary of the DoD System Acquisition Life Cycle Phases (Vaneman & Carlson, 2019) 
Life Cycle 
Phase 





MSA assesses potential solutions for a needed 
capability in an Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD). The MSA phase is critical to program 
success and achieving materiel readiness 
because it’s the first opportunity to influence 
systems supportability and affordability by 
balancing technology opportunities with 
operational and sustainment requirements.  
• Initial Technical Review (ITR) 
• Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
• Alternative System Review 
(ASR) 
 






The purpose of TMRR is to reduce technology 
risk, engineering integration, and life cycle cost 
risk and to determine the appropriate set of 
technologies to be integrated into a full system. 
The TMRR phase conducts competitive 
prototyping of system elements, refines 
requirements, and develops the functional and 
allocated baselines of the end-item system 
configuration.  
• System Requirement Review 
(SRR) 
• System Functional Review 
(SFR) 
• Preliminary Design Review 
(PDR) 
 






A system is developed and designed during 
EMD before going into production. The phase 
starts after a successful Milestone B, the formal 
start of any program. The goal of this phase is to 
complete the development of a system or 
increment of capability, complete full system 
integration, develop affordable and executable 
manufacturing processes, complete system 
fabrication, and test and evaluate the system 
before proceeding into the production and 
deployment (PD) Phase. 
• Critical Design Review (CDR) 
• Test Readiness Review (TRR) 
 





A system that satisfies an operational capability 
is produced and deployed to an end user during 
PD. The phase has two major efforts: (1) Low-
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and (2) Full-Rate 
Production and Deployment (FRP&D). The 
phase begins after a successful Milestone C 
review. 
• Full Rate Production (FRP) 
• Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) 
 





During OS, a system that satisfies an 
operational capability is produced and deployed 
to an end user. The phase has two major efforts: 
(1) Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and (2) 
Full-Rate Production and Deployment (FRP&D). 






SETRs in an MBSE Environment 
Current SETR reviews require various DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) views, and 
other systems engineering artifacts, to serve as evidence for various aspects of the system’s 
progress and status. These views are often “document-based,” and thus are developed 
statically without an underlying model structure. In an MBSE environment, the system is 
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In an MBSE environment, the model is a virtual representation of the system and 
becomes the focus of a SETR. Using the model as the source for decision-making throughout 
the system acquisition life cycle is a significant departure since programs often generate unique 
artifacts for the sole purpose of the reviews. Each system element should be represented only 
once in the model just as it is in the real-world system. The data that comprises the model is 
iteratively developed and maintained throughout the system life cycle.  
A significant difference between traditional document-based technical reviews and 
model-based technical reviews is model structure. Structure defines the relationships between 
the system entities, establishes concordance within the model, and allows for the emergence of 
system behaviors and performance characterizations. Structure provides decision-makers with 
insights that have been heretofore unavailable. This includes emerging system behavior, and 
the assurance that a common system baseline is used to report on various aspects of the 
systems. A discussion of model-development is beyond the scope of this paper, but a lengthy 
description can be found in Vaneman et al. (2020). 
While an MBSE environment contains a virtual representation of the system, current 
SETR criteria rely on model-based data, which is depicted by views within a presentation 
framework, similar to a document-based review. While a virtual representation of the systems 
will exist, the acquisition community currently lacks the experience of viewing the data in this 
format. Thus, the SETR criteria still requires the information to be viewed in the standard 
document-based systems engineering format. This is acceptable, because the virtual system 
can represent data in any desired presentation framework (e.g., DoDAF), but there is additional 
information available to the reviewer in the model itself as described in this paper. 
Table 2 shows the applicability of MBSE views to the system acquisition life cycle. The 
relationships in the matrix were made by correlating the generic criteria for each review, or 
content of the major documents, to the data in each system engineering view. The existing 
review criteria is designed to be addressed by document-based processes. Given that the 
MBSE environment creates a virtual system, the SETR criteria need to be revised to account 
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Table 2. Applicability of Systems Engineering Views within the Systems Acquisition Life Cycle (Vaneman 
& Carlson, 2019) 
 
 
As an example of how data created in an MBSE environment can yield new insights into 
the status of the system, consider the Alternative Systems Review (ASR). The ASR assesses 
the preliminary technology solutions that have been developed during the Materiel Solution 
Analysis (MSA) Phase. The SETR ensures that one or more proposed materiel solution(s) have 
the best potential to be cost effective, affordable, operationally effective and suitable, and can 
be developed to provide a timely solution at an acceptable level of risk to satisfy the capabilities 
listed in an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD; Manning, 2019).  
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The systems engineering process typically has to progress to the point where the following 
information is available for the ASR (TTCP, 2014): 
• Description of how the users will conduct operations, and how they expect to use the 
new system in this context of major mission areas and scenarios 
• Statement of need, and capabilities, in terms oriented to the system users, the 
stakeholders, and independent of specific technology solutions 
• The required system characteristics and context of use of services and operational 
concepts are specified 
• Major stakeholder capabilities are identified and documented, but detailed system 
requirements analysis has yet to be completed 
• The constraints on a system solution are defined 
• Results of an AoA with a recommended preferred solution  
• Initial plans for systems engineering (e.g. Overview and Summary information (AV-1), 
Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), Systems Engineering Management Plan [SEMP]) 
providing the notion of “how” this system can be realized, including the level of process 
and process maturity needed to generate a system of the required complexity 
• Initial definition of the environment and the characteristics of the threat 
• Initial test and evaluation strategy, including test cases derived from user operational 
vignettes, concept of operations, and capability description 
• An understanding of where the greatest risks and challenges may reside 
An analysis of the ASR generic entrance criteria2 (DAU, 2019) against traditional and 
MBSE reviews is shown in Table 3 (Vaneman & Carlson, 2019). First the criteria are reviewed in 
the context of traditional reviews. Many of the criteria were assessed to be partially satisfied. 
These results do not suggest that ASRs have not been performed properly in the past. Rather, 
given the absence of concordance in document-based reviews, the criteria requiring different 
types of data using different artifacts is extremely difficult to achieve efficiently and effectively. 
All of the criteria were assessed to be satisfied in an MBSE environment because of the 




2 Entrance criteria are used to track the technical progress, schedule, and program risks. 
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Is the initial CONOPS updated to 
reflect current user position about 
capability gap(s), supported missions, 






CV-2, CV-6, OV-1, OV-6c, OV-5b/6c 
Are the required related solutions and 
supporting references (ICD and CDDs) 
identified? 
Partial Yes CV-2, CV-3, CV-6, OV-4, OV-5b, 
OV-5b/6c 
Are the thresholds and objectives 
initially stated as broad measures of 
effectiveness and suitability (e.g., 
KPPs)? 
Yes Yes CV-2, OV-5b, OV-5b/6c, SV-7 
Is there a clear understanding of the 
system requirements consistent with 
the ICD?  
Yes Yes CV-2, CV-3, CV-6, OV-4 
Are high-level description of the 
preferred materiel solution(s) available 
and sufficiently detailed and 
understood to enable further technical 






OV-2, OV-5b, SV-1 
Are interfaces and external 
dependencies adequately defined for 
this stage in life cycle? 
Partial Yes OV-2, SV-1 
Are system requirements sufficiently 
understood to enable functional 
definition? 
Partial Yes OV-5b, OV-5b/6c 
Is a comprehensive rationale available 
for the preferred materiel solution(s), 
based on the AoA? 
Partial Yes CV-2, CV-3, CV-6, OV-2, OV-4, OV-
5b, OV-5b/6c.  
Can the proposed material solution(s) 
satisfy the user needs?  Partial Yes CV-2, CV-3, CV-6, OV-2, OV-5b, OV-5b/6c. 
Have cost estimates been developed 
and were the cost comparisons across 
alternatives balanced and validated? 
Partial Yes OV-2, OV-5b, SV-1  
Have key assumptions and constraints 
associated with preferred materiel 
solution(s) been identified? 
Partial Yes OV-2, OV-5b, SV-1 
 
Applicability of Current Technical Review Criteria to MBSE Technical Reviews 
An initial assumption for this research was that the approximately 85 systems 
engineering model visualizations that currently exist could be used to address all SETR 
questions for review through the TMRR phase. However, this research does recognize that 
some questions may have to be adjusted from binary (yes or no) questions (e.g., “Does the 
project have a Risk Management Guide?”) to questions that provide more concrete details to 
allow for better program and system analysis. 
Our research found that MBSE, as it currently exists, can be used to satisfy the criteria 
found throughout the MSA phase and during most of the TMRR phase. However, we found that 
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current MBSE environments do not adequately address the criteria for a PDR. Review criteria 
for PDRs were evaluated from the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the Navy’s Strategic 
Systems Program (SSP), and the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). The criteria from 
NAVAIR was eventually selected to be reviewed because it was found to be the most 
comprehensive. 
During this research, 846 PDR questions were evaluated for applicability to be 
addressed by current MBSE. Of these 846 questions, only 80 questions could be addressed 
directly by current MBSE models. To make the problem manageable, the 864 questions were 
categorized into 56 PDR criteria categories. Of these 56 categories, only 11 categories were 
adequately satisfied by MBSE, 13 categories were partially satisfied by MBSE, and 32 
categories were not adequately satisfied by MBSE. Tables 4a and 4b show the 56 PDR criteria 
categories and the assessed MBSE ability to satisfy those criteria. 
These disappointing results do not mean that employing MBSE methods to PDRs should 
be abandoned. To achieve better PDR results, it is clear that new visualization techniques must 
be developed to fully realize the benefits of an MBSE environment. Developing new 
visualizations also makes sense because many of the approximately 85 current visualizations 
have been used by the systems engineering community for decades. While many of these 
models have been the cornerstone of technical reviews, a true MBSE environment, where the 
model is a virtual representation of the system, will glean additional insights that have heretofore 
been unrealized.  
In addition to the PDR evaluation categories not being represented in MBSE 
visualizations, there is another issue. Over time, the scope of the PDR questions increased to 
the point where many senior leaders agree that questions were added without an appropriate 
audit of suitability. For PDRs to be more effective in their current form, and in an MBSE 
environment, a detailed evaluation of the review criteria needs to be explored, and questions 
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Table 4a. PDR Criteria Categories and the MBSE Ability to Satisfy Them 
PDR Criteria Category MBSE Ability to 
Satisfy Criteria 
Schedule Planning ↑ 
Program Critical Path → 
Cost/Schedule/Performance/Key Performance Parameters (KPP)  ↑ 
Latest Cost Estimate  → 
Production Costs Estimates ↓ 
Operating and Support (O&S) Costs Estimate  → 
Earned Value Management (EVM) → 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) review ↑ 
Software Metrics  → 
Program Management  ↑ 
Configuration Management (CM)  ↑ 
Systems Engineering Processes  ↑ 
Acquisition Logistics Support Management and Staffing ↓ 
Automated Information Technology (AIT) ↓ 
Risk Management (RM) Processes  ↑ 
Logistics Budgeting and Funding ↓ 
Test Processes (TEMP, T&E Strategy, etc.) → 
Production Processes (ISO 9000, etc.) ↓ 
Software → 
Producibility ↓ 




Mass Properties ↓ 
Human Systems Integration Engineering  ↓ 
Environmental Regulations ↓ 
Safety and Health ↓ 
System Safety ↓ 
Hazardous Material Management ↓ 
Pollution Prevention Program ↓ 
Maintenance Planning → 
Key  
Adequately satisfies criteria in category ↑ 
Partially satisfies criteria in category → 
Does not satisfy criteria in category ↓ 
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Table 4b. PDR Criteria Categories and the MBSE Ability to Satisfy Them 
PDR Criteria Category MBSE Ability to 
Satisfy Criteria 
Testability and Diagnostics → 
Manpower, Personnel and Training (MP&T) ↓ 
Training Outline and Curricula Design ↓ 
Training Material  ↓ 
Training Devices / Simulators  ↓ 
Supply Support ↓ 
Organic Support ↓ 
Supply Chain Management / PBL Management ↓ 
Warranty Management ↓ 
Support Equipment ↓ 
Technical Data ↑ 
Product/Technical Data Package and Publications ↓ 
Computer Resources ↓ 
Facilities  ↓ 
Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation  ↓ 
Design Interface ↑ 
Manufacturing Planning ↓ 
Parts and Materials Selection ↓ 
Commodity Management ↓ 
Root Cause Corrective Action → 
Obsolescence ↓ 
Platform Diagnostics Integration → 
Life Cycle Logistics → 
Performance Requirements ↑ 
 
Key  
Adequately satisfies criteria in category ↑ 
Partially satisfies criteria in category → 
Does not satisfy criteria in category ↓ 
 
Conclusions 
Formalized planning for modeling and decision-making across the life cycle must include 
a new approach for SETRs. This not only includes the content of the reviews, but how the 
models will be assessed against the criteria (Dam, 2018). We found that current processes for 
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assessing documents are not adequate in an MBSE environment. For example, many questions 
are binary in nature, and do not provide any insight into the “health” of a program. Consider, for 
example, a question that takes this form: “Does the program have a risk management plan?” 
The answer is “yes” or “no” and does not provide any insights into the quality of the plan content 
or the program “health.” 
The DoD Digital Engineering Strategy (2018) states that there is a strong need to ensure 
that decision-makers understand the different model types and what information can be gleaned 
from them. The results of our analysis of how MBSE will satisfy a PDR were unexpected 
because we believed that current MBSE visualizations would address a wider range of the PDR 
content. While our research found only 9.5% of PDR questions to be adequately addressed by 
current MBSE methods, we do not recommend abandoning the use of MBSE for PDR 
assessments. Instead, it is clear from this research that new visualizations must be developed 
to adequately address the needs, and provide greater insight with faster comprehension for the 
details across the life cycle. 
As DoD organizations migrate to an MBSE environment, efficiencies will be gained by 
transitioning from the traditional paper-based reviews to model-based reviews. Model-based 
reviews allow for complexity to be managed more efficiently because data, in lieu of “systems 
engineering products,” is the commodity that will be used to evaluate the entrance criteria. The 
MBSE milestone reviews will provide greater insight with faster comprehension for the details 
across a program’s life cycle. This will not only provide efficiencies for the review, but will 
improve the program’s cost and schedule efficiency.  
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defeating then-prevalent radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (IED). 
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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the process of building knowledge about what we term as behavioral 
acquisition, which explores defense acquisition from a behavioral standpoint, including the impact 
of psychology, organizational behavior, and politics. Behavioral acquisition studies the decisions 
acquisition professionals make in Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs. The paper 
focuses on one aspect of these decision processes in the defense acquisition environment: 
behavioral biases. In three defense acquisition programs studied, we find strong evidence that 
planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and recency bias affected the 
management and decision-making within these programs. This research helps us better 
understand and predict how acquisition professionals and senior leaders think and make 
decisions about program strategy, managing resources, and leading people. A key element in this 
perspective is that important insights into these decisions derive from models in which agents are 
not fully rational. Behavioral acquisition is analogous to behavioral finance, which has 
successfully applied social science theories—especially from psychology—to improve the 
accuracy of predictions about the behavior of actors across the entire financial landscape.    
 
Keywords:  behavioral acquisition, systemic biases, program management, decision making, 
defense acquisitions, culture, leadership, hierarchies 
Introduction 
Program managers (PM) are at the center of the defense acquisition process, yet there 
are substantial gaps in our knowledge about how PMs actually make decisions about the 
programs they manage on behalf of the defense community. Given the size of the defense 
acquisition portfolio in the United States, better knowledge of the intricacies of decision-making 
by PMs might be highly valuable for informing improvements in defense acquisition processes in 
the future, including for PM training and education. This paper contributes to the process of 
building knowledge about what we term as behavioral acquisition, which explores defense 
acquisition from a behavioral standpoint, including the impact of psychology, organizational 
behavior, and organizational politics. 
Our paper focuses on one particular aspect of these decision processes in the defense 
acquisition environment: behavioral biases. These biases can be categorized into cognitive and 
emotional biases, but their common root is in the ways in which human brains use their limited 
capacities to process information. The results are decision-making capabilities that are, at times, 
stunning in their elegance and effectiveness in real world environments (Gigerenzer et al.,1999; 
Klein, 2009) and, at other times, shockingly flawed and error prone (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
That both outcomes are possible is one of the geniuses of the human brain. We provide a 
detailed treatment of four well-known behavioral biases and their scope to occur in acquisition 
programs. We examine the scope issue by doing a deep-dive into three significant acquisition 
programs using a case study-based approach to determine whether there is prima facie 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 94 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
evidence that behavioral biases play a role in decision-making in acquisition programs. The 
programs are 
• Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) program: Joint rapid acquisition effort executed in 
response to urgent warfighter needs leveraging new technologies. 
• Joint Common Missile (JCM) program: Joint major defense acquisition program executed as 
a development effort with a deliberate acquisition approach with approved requirements. 
• Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program: Service-specific major defense acquisition 
program executed as a development effort with a deliberate acquisition approach with 
approved requirements. 
A key observation we make is that there is a lack of research studying the effects of 
behavioral biases on decision-making in the defense acquisition environment. Kiesling and 
Chong (2020) studied decision biases within acquisition programs by tracing the presence of 
keywords indicating specific biases from Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) summary 
documents of the acquisition programs. However, the research did not study primary source 
program data (Kiesling & Chong, 2020). Therefore, at this point, it is sensible to motivate 
research on this topic with two basic questions: (1) How do behavioral biases affect decision-
making in acquisition programs? And (2) to what extent do behavioral biases affect acquisition 
outcomes? The three acquisition programs studied were all wide-open to bias creeping into 
them in the forms of the planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and 
recency bias. What the empirical cases illustrate best is that acquisition programs are 
environments where there is abundant opportunity for behavioral biases to play a significant role 
in decision-making; they are a perfect setting where one would expect to see these biases 
occurring. Furthermore, in some instances, the data is more suggestive. Not only was the 
opportunity in place, but there is at least some evidence that these biases were playing a role in 
program decision-making in ways that probably affected program outcomes. The data here is 
circumstantial but, when pieced together, the fact-pattern is suggestive of this conclusion. We 
cannot say anything more definitive than this based on the case data we have available, but 
certainly the patterns we see are consistent with biases playing a role. 
It is worth pointing out that in our study we focused on the setting in which real 
acquisition managers do their work rather than the acquisition manager role in the abstract. This 
means we look at the acquisition challenge of juggling performance, schedule, and budget from 
a pragmatic perspective rather than as some kind of abstract rational optimization game. Recent 
acquisition reform directives and statutes require data-driven analysis and decisions, which put 
an emphasis on rational optimization. But whatever technologies of analysis are the fad or 
fashion of the day (and in the defense acquisition profession there have been many, over the 
years) decision-making inevitably still consists of boundedly rationally individuals operating 
inside a collective entity (a program) trying to make better decisions that deliver improved 
organizational outcomes (Levinthal, 2018). Hence, despite calls for more rationality, the 
organizational and political dimensions of decision-making still matter very much, and we shall 
see that these dimensions interact with behavioral biases in particular ways. 
Background and Literature Review 
Defense Acquisition Overview 
Defense acquisition professionals facilitate the development, testing, procurement, and 
fielding of capability to warfighters. The program manager (PM) is at the center of defense 
acquisition, whose purpose is to deliver warfighter capability. The PM is responsible for cost, 
schedule, and performance (commonly referred to as the “triple constraint”) of assigned 
projects—usually combat systems in the Department of Defense (DoD). The PM has a 
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hierarchal chain of command (or authority) through the DoD in the executive branch. PMs report 
directly to a program executive officer, who reports to the service acquisition executive (an 
assistant secretary for that service—either Army, Navy or Air Force), and who reports to the 
defense acquisition executive (the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment). Depending on the program’s visibility, importance and/or funding levels, a 
program’s milestone decision authority (MDA) is assigned to the appropriate level of the chain of 
command. 
Programs within defense acquisition require resources (primarily funding) and contracts 
(for execution of work) with industry. Congress provides the resources for the defense programs 
through the annual enactment of the defense authorization and appropriations acts, which 
become law and statutory requirements. The PM, through warranted contracting officers, enters 
contracts with private companies within the defense industry. As a backdrop to this complex 
acquisition environment for PMs, three decision support templates exist to guide programs: one 
for the generation of requirements, a second for the management of program milestones and 
knowledge points known as the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (often referred to as little “a”), 
and a third for the allocation of resources. Each of these decision support systems is 
fundamentally driven by different and often contradictory factors. The requirement generation 
system is capability needs-driven based on an evolving threat—requiring a responsive 
acquisition system. The resource allocation system is calendar-driven, with Congress writing an 
appropriations bill and the president signing the bill every fiscal year—providing control of 
funding to Congress and transparency to the public and media for taxpayer money. The 
Adaptive Acquisition Framework is event-driven by milestones—based on commercial industry 
best practices of knowledge points and off–ramps supported by the design, development, and 
testing of the systems as technology matures and integration and manufacturing challenges 
occur. The combination of the PM triple constraint, chain of authority, acquisition environment, 
and decision support templates provides a framework to view U.S. defense acquisition, referred 
to as the Defense Acquisition Institution (or big “A”) and depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Defense Acquisition Institution or Big “A” 
  
Due to the inherent complexity of the development, procurement, and fielding of 
sophisticated weapons systems that are required to operate reliably in challenging military 
environments, acquisition programs often fail to deliver required performance capabilities within 
cost and schedule constraints. Root causes of acquisition program failures (schedule slips, cost 
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defined requirements, immature technology, integration challenges, poor cost estimating, 
unstable budgets, poor schedule planning, and schedule pressure from annual appropriation 
limitations. But an underappreciated reason for acquisition program failures and understudied 
part of big “A” is the “people part” of defense acquisition, which may have the largest effect on 
improving acquisition outcomes. Behavioral acquisition studies how acquisition professionals 
think, manage, and lead acquisition programs. Behavioral acquisition includes a study of 
organizations and hierarchies, and the intersection of individual behavior, leadership, culture 
and decision-making. In this study, we narrowly focus on how behavior biases affect acquisition 
decision-making at the institutional, organizational, and individuals levels. We recognize that 
decisions at the institutional level (DoD level) are often using a political conceptual model where 
decisions are a result of bargaining games. And decisions at the organizational level (Army level 
or PEO level) are based on the appropriateness of the actions fitting the organizations’ cultural 
norms. Whereas at the individual level (program level), decisions use the rational conceptual 
model where decisions are based on logic and reasoning by assigning pros and cons (or risk 
and rewards) and deciding the best chance of success. We recognize that there may be 
important differences in how biases affect leader decision-making in organizations versus in 
institutions like the DoD. Figure 2 presents the overall model showing the connection of 
hierarchical, leadership, cultural, management, and behavior factors on decision-making and 
program outcomes. The model was adapted from the work of Shore (2000) who studied the 
effect of systemic biases within projects.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Connection of Hierarchical, Leadership, Cultural, Management, and Behavioral Factors on 
Decision-Making and Program Outcomes 
 
Behavioral Biases Relevant to Defense Acquisition 
Research centering on the acknowledgment and study of bounded rationality has long 
recognized that people process information in ways that may lead them to make biased 
judgments (Simon, 1955). Cognitive biases are a two-edged sword: On the one hand they have 
a positive function in helping people to make fast decisions using limited cognitive resources; on 
the other hand, cognitive biases also lead people to make errors in decision-making that 
deviate—often in important ways—from prescriptive (rational) decision-making. It is worth 
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biases is based on comparisons to idealized “small world” rationality whereas in reality all 
decision-making is behavioral (Levinthal, 2011). Furthermore, research has also shown that at 
least some biases are driven by information presentation alone and may be mitigated by 
presenting information in ways that leverage the brain’s information processing skills, rather 
than penalizing them (Gigerenzer, 1991). Nonetheless, a basic premise of research into biases 
is that as the volume and complexity of information increases, people are forced into using 
simplifying tactics that ration the limited cognitive resources they have available (Camerer, 
2011). Hence. they adopt heuristics that ease the cognitive strain they experience. And because 
these heuristics involve rationing how information is processed (in a wide variety of ways) they 
develop systematic patterns of bias in decision-making, as compared to an ideally rational 
baseline (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Research on heuristics and biases is at this point a massive undertaking that has 
identified literally dozens of biases that people are predisposed towards (Kahneman, 2011). The 
objective of this paper is not to review them all but instead to focus on a handful of biases that 
illustrate the value of studying defense acquisition through an explicitly behavioral lens. 
Therefore, we focus on explaining four biases that have been widely studied in the literature 
under various guises: the planning fallacy, over-optimism, recency bias, and difficulty making 
trade-offs. These biases have different roots. Over-optimism and the recency bias are 
straightforwardly cognitive in nature, and their effects manifest in particular ways in acquisition 
programs. In contrast, the planning fallacy and difficulty making trade-offs are the result of how 
human cognitive factors interact with specific group and organizational processes. With all four 
biases, we are ultimately interested in how bounded rationality intersects with complex real 
world settings in ways that deviate substantially from what we might expect based on 
prescriptive rationality. We focus on these biases because the three defense acquisition 
programs we studied are wide open to being affected by all four of them. 
Planning Fallacy 
The planning fallacy addresses the unrealistic optimism about program management 
that numerous studies of program outcomes have documented across many decades in the 
defense, public and private sectors (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Economic theory points to 
multi-level principal–agent issues as a key source of the gap between plans and outcomes. This 
leads economists to suggest that programs typically under-deliver because program managers 
have a vested interest in embellishing program projections to get programs approved through 
specific stage gates (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). Within defense acquisitions, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that PMs are incentivized to develop acquisition strategies 
focused on program approval at the milestone review but not acquisition strategies that could 
later be executed and deliver capabilities (GAO, 2015). There are also behavioral explanations 
for excessive optimism about programs, two of which we explain here: the planning fallacy, 
which occurs as the result of management practices, and dispositional optimism, which we 
discuss in the next section. 
The main claim of the planning fallacy is that independently of other factors, planning 
processes themselves bias manager beliefs and lead them to make program forecasts that are 
too optimistic (Cassar, 2010). Of course, carefully planning projects is essential for good 
management and a legal requirement that establishes the acquisition program baseline of cost, 
schedule, and performance metrics. It is, therefore, problematic (and paradoxical) that planning 
induces a behavioral bias that actually undermines the intended outcome of planning. However, 
the explanation of this behavioral bias is quite simple. Planning processes lead managers to 
build an “inside view” of a project with detailed designs for the implementation of the project 
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). These deep, well-explained designs enhance managers’ 
perceptions of control over the project or program. Thus, they become more confident in the 
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success of their plans (Heath & Gonzalez, 1995; Cassar, 2010). However, planning processes 
inevitably understate unpredictable events that will disrupt and delay the plan. Plans are always 
subject to the dreaded potential of “unknown unknowns” to intervene in what is otherwise 
carefully manicured expectations. Furthermore, the compound probability of even small 
individual disruptions can seriously undermine a program plan (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). 
Hence the fallacy of planning: it actually leads to control expectations and optimism that are 
unwarranted illusions when the context of programs is fully considered. 
It is important to realize that the planning fallacy has deep roots in what are perceived to 
otherwise be good management practices, as well as in cultural characteristics that have their 
origins outside of project management. Control perceptions are central to these roots: managers 
are groomed to believe that their own actions substantially determine the results they get. Our 
accountability systems depend on these beliefs as well as their enforcement through 
bureaucratic oversight hierarchies. Program planning efforts are based on—and tend to 
reinforce—these idealized perceptions of control, resulting in managers typically perceiving they 
have more control over processes and outcomes than they have in reality. These control 
illusions may also lead them to believe they will avoid problems in a project or be able to easily 
overcome problems. What seem like good management practices may just compound the 
planning fallacy. For example, intuitively it seems like a good practice to focus intently on the 
specifics of a particular program, yet this tends to reinforce the “inside view” problem, which 
increases bias. Using incentives also seems like a good idea, yet research indicates that 
incentives also tend to encourage people to focus more intently on their plans, which increases 
bias (Buehler et al., 1997). In reality, the planning fallacy creates biased expectations that mask 
a control gap that will exact a price over the course of most programs. 
Optimism Bias 
In this section we discuss dispositional optimism, which is the tendency of individuals to 
see the world through “rose-colored glasses” or, more formally, their “tendency to expect 
positive outcomes even when such expectations are not rationally justified” (Hmieleski & Baron, 
2009). The extant evidence suggests that in general individuals are over-optimistic, in the sense 
that their expectations for the future are more favorable than they will eventually experience 
(Cassar, 2010). Healthcare studies suggests that a degree of optimism bias is natural and 
healthy, since it tends to be correlated with psychological health and overall well-being. In other 
studies of the general population (Maltby et al., 2008), optimism has been found to be related to 
perceptions of luck (e.g., in global self-assessments luck beliefs are correlated strongly with 
optimism). Optimists expect good things to happen to them; they believe that chance events will 
break in their favor. Furthermore, when chance events happen, optimistic people tend to 
perceive them in a positive light. For example, optimists interpret an event such as narrowly 
avoiding an accident as lucky, whereas pessimists view the same event as unlucky (Hales & 
Johnson, 2018). 
We don’t know of any research that specifically examines the dispositional optimism of 
defense acquisition managers. However, we know that higher than average levels of optimism 
are present among individuals working in other domains that could broadly be construed as 
project or program management. For example, entrepreneurs are involved in start-up projects 
and studies have shown that on average entrepreneurs are distinctly over-optimistic, with some 
studies finding them to be off-the-scales on optimism (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). Scholars have 
related these results to a willingness to initiate action, observing that individuals high in 
dispositional optimism are more willing to forge ahead in the face of daunting obstacles. This 
suggests a distinct selection bias in which optimism bias leads individuals to enter into activities 
for which they have little evidence to base beliefs about their eventual success (Meza & 
Southey, 1996). More difficult programs are more likely to attract more optimistic managers 
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because these managers are more likely to believe everything will work out favorably for them, 
independently of having a plan to achieve success (Scheier et al., 2001). This suggests that 
some degree of optimism bias may be a prerequisite to becoming a program manager, with 
more difficult programs attracting the more optimism biased. 
However, optimism is a double-edged sword. Research suggests that a curvilinear 
relationship between optimism and performance, with a distinct sweet spot. Individuals that are 
low in optimism believe that disaster awaits them in whatever they do. This makes them less 
likely to select into activities with uncertain outcomes in the first place and, if they are selected, it 
leads them to focus on negative information and have low motivation to complete tasks. On the 
flipside, over-optimistic individuals tend to focus only on positive information (they pick out good 
news stories), see positives in ambiguous situations (always look on the bright side), make 
suboptimal decisions such as setting unrealistic goals (the now infamous “stretch” goals), are 
less likely to learn from failure (i.e., update their beliefs), are more likely to persist with failing 
courses of action for longer periods (thus wasting resources) and be more at risk of escalation 
of commitment (another infamous problem in projects). Fundamentally these propensities tie 
optimism bias to less effective program performance. However, the extant evidence does also 
suggest that the same bias contributes positively to resiliency (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). 
Recency Bias 
If you have ever had a project or presentation go badly right before your annual review is 
due, you already intuitively understand the recency effect: the widely recognized bias where 
recent data is given disproportionate emphasis in judgments (Beach & Connolly, 2005). 
Recency effects tend to occur when individuals process large amounts of information over time, 
which leads them to use heuristics to make judgments. This heuristic processing aids in sorting 
through the information but also introduces biases with regards to which information individuals 
pay the most attention. Because of this systematic variation in attention, with only a recent 
subset of all the available information getting the most attention, individuals make suboptimal 
decisions. 
There are a number of explanations for why the recency effect occurs. It is more difficult 
to remember information that is older because of memory decay. In order to access or 
reconstruct information stored in memory, people rely of categorization processes. If information 
necessary for deciding has been stored in faulty or irrelevant categories, it may affect an 
individual’s ability to recall it. Over long time spans, these issues become more pronounced 
compared to the accessibility of recent information, which suggests that this bias worsens if 
recent information is processed alongside much older information. It is worth noting that social 
processes that legitimate newer as compared to older data as more relevant and worthy of 
consideration may add to recency effects deriving from individual bias. In these cases, the bias 
may derive from social, political, and organizational factors, as well as personal ones. 
 While we do not know of any study that has examined the recency bias in defense 
acquisition, there are relevant studies that investigate this bias in the management literature. 
Recency bias has been most studied by accounting scholars interested in the effects that 
information presentation has on accounting judgments. Researchers widely use Hogarth and 
Einhorn’s (1992) belief-adjustment model in these studies. The model proposes that people 
revise their beliefs using an anchoring and adjustment process. Current opinion is the anchor 
and new data potentially causes adjustments. In essence, the model suggests that when 
evaluating mixed information, individuals average the current piece of data and anchor. This 
results in more weight being placed on the latest information received (e.g., a recency effect). 
Accounting scholars find that many accounting judgments do seem to exhibit this effect, unless 
there is some mitigating factor. One review found that 21 out of 25 studies found some evidence 
of recency bias (Kahle, 2005). Studies have searched for factors that mitigate recency bias. 
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Some research has suggested that experience may mitigate recency bias but results of studies 
are inconclusive on this factor. Other studies (e.g., Kennedy, 1993) have found some support 
for accountability as a mitigating factor (e.g., recency effects are reduced when subjects are 
required to justify your decisions to others by explaining your reasoning in writing). These 
mitigating factors should be considered in understanding the complete effects of recency bias in 
the defense acquisition environment. 
Trade-Offs Bias 
Central to program management are trade-offs between program cost, schedule, and 
performance. Normative decision theory has proposed various methodologies for making such 
trade-offs by confronting them systematically and holistically, typically through some version of 
cost–benefit analysis. But as we already observed, the reality is that all decision-making is 
behavioral (Levinthal, 2011), and therefore models premised on idealized rationality quickly 
bump-up against the realities of bounded cognition in organizational settings, which is the 
setting in which defense acquisition processes actually have to work. Under these 
circumstances, it is germane to ask how acquisition managers actually make decisions. A basic 
understanding among behavioral researchers is that individuals avoid making trade-offs 
wherever possible (Slovic, 1975) because conflicting options are difficult to evaluate (Irwin & 
Davis, 1995). The lack of internal capability for judging trade-offs in the ways prescribed (e.g., 
by cost-benefit analysis) is a key reason that these analyses are typically externalized in the 
form of spreadsheets, diagrams, and tables (Clark, 2008). These “decision tools” often involve 
formulating trade-off criteria in numerical values, in order to make options easy to compare. This 
assists in making trade-offs that are otherwise too perplexing for individuals to make based on 
their cognitive capacities. However, behavioral research also notes that the assumptions made 
in financial models are also subject to biases (Lautliev & Menter, 2014).    
Behavioral research suggests that individuals make trade-offs according to a different 
model: reason-based choice (Shafir et al., 1993). In this approach, individuals make conflicting 
choices easier to evaluate by constructing reasons for choices. If necessary, they make a list of 
reasons for choices (a relatively simple mental task) rather than trying to trade off costs and 
benefits across options (a much more complex mental task, typically significantly beyond human 
short-term memory limitations). By constructing reasons, individuals turn difficult-to-reconcile 
characteristics of options into a problem that is more readily comprehensible. Instead of making 
trade-offs, they use the heuristic approach of framing and re-framing an issue until they find a 
dominant option, which avoids the cognitive effort that real trade-offs require. In some cases, 
dominance may be based on a prominent attribute of the options. Hsee (1996) discusses how 
individuals find it easier to evaluate a good reason for purchasing an asset than whether they 
paid the right price for it, which is much harder to discern. If a good reason is not currently 
available for a choice, individuals may simply delay choosing or they may add other options that 
help clarify a dominant option. The essence of reason-based choice is that the human mind 
naturally prefers to find a dominant reason for a choice rather than delving into the complexities 
of cost-benefit analysis. 
Furthermore, it is likely that reason-based choice may be even more important when 
groups are making decisions than when individuals make them. This is important in the 
acquisition world, since programs inherently involve numerous stakeholders and significant 
organizational oversight that means many decisions have to be justified to groups. Therefore, 
while individuals choose using reasons because of cognitive limitations, groups may also prefer 
reasons because of social dynamics (Barber et al., 2003). Accountability and group conflict are 
two explanations why reason-based choice may be affected by social dynamics. Work on 
accountability suggests that reasons become more important when individuals have to justify 
their choices to groups whose respect and approval are important to maintain (Lerner & Tetlock, 
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1999). No one wants to look foolish in front of a group, and good reasons that are simple to 
explain are a way of making sure they don’t. Other work has suggested that reasons based on 
prominent attributes help avoid group conflict because prominent attributes may be less 
controversial (Irwin & Davis, 1995). For example, safety is a prominent and (mostly) non-
controversial attribute in defense acquisition programs; therefore justifying choices based on 
safety (where possible) is likely to cause less group conflict. It is worth highlighting that because 
reasons depend on social legitimacy (i.e., what is accepted and approved of by particular 
groups) navigating organizational landscapes effectively requires having a detailed 
understanding of the nuances about which reasons are broadly acceptable to the community 
(and avoiding those that are likely to cause controversy). 
Acquisition Program Case Studies 
ECH Program 
Combat helmets have evolved over time to offer improved performance because of 
technology advances and manufacturing capability improvements (see Figure 3). Soldiers wore 
the M1 helmet, nicknamed the “steel pot” because it was made from pressed manganese steel, 
from the 1940s through the late 1970s. The M1 helmet was heavy and uncomfortable, and it 
provided little blunt trauma protection. The maturation of ballistic fabrics based on para-aramid 
polymer technology enabled the Army to replace the M1 with the Personnel Armor System for 
Ground Troops (PASGT) helmet in the mid-1980s. These helmets were in the 3–4 pound range 
(lighter than the M1) and provided increased ballistic protection. The shell of the helmet 
consisted of layers of ballistic aramid fabric, the most famous of which is DuPont’s Kevlar®—
resulting in the “Kevlar” or “K-pot” nicknames. The ballistic aramid technology allowed helmets 
to provide not only fragmentation protection from explosions but also small caliber handgun 
protection at a reasonable weight. The Modular Integrated Communication Helmet replaced the 
PASGT helmet on a limited basis. By the mid-2000s, the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) was 
the Army’s primary helmet. The ACH provided Soldiers important performance improvements 
like increased ballistic protection, reduced weight, and better blunt impact protection.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Army research centers teamed with commercial 
industry to mature the next generation of ballistics materials, resulting in the development of 
high molecular weight polyethylene (HMWPE) ballistics fibers that could be weaved into fabrics 
with application to combat helmets. The basis of future combat helmets, both the enhanced 
combat helmet (ECH) and its replacement, the Soldier Protection System future combat helmet, 
rested in HMWPE technology. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of Combat Helmets (Mortlock, 2018) 
 
The ECH effort was driven by the urgent need for a new helmet to address protection for 
Soldiers and Marines against rifle threats in combat and reduce the combat weight. The 
guidance and priorities from the warfighting community and senior leaders were maximum 
protection and weight reduction. HMWPE technology allowed the Army and Marine Corps to 
consider increasing force protection by providing better ballistic protection or decreasing weight 
of the helmets. The basic options considered for the ECH requirements included: (1) maintain 
the protection levels of the current helmets with a reduced weight of up to 20%, or (2) increase 
the protection levels but maintain (or increase) the weight of the helmet. The helmet 
requirements had to balance acceptable minimum risk versus maximum safety for protective 
equipment, and weight reduction (combat load) versus protection (ballistic and blunt force)—not 
be an easy compromise for the program stakeholders. The ECH, however, would not be able to 
address both protection against the rifle threat and reduction in the helmet weight (Trouble 
Making Trade-offs bias). 
To address the schedule aspect of the program, the Army and Marine Corps considered 
the options of pursuing a formal program of record through the deliberate acquisition process 
versus pursuing a rapid acquisition process supported by a directed or urgent requirement 
(Planning Fallacy). Establishing a formal ECH program involved a 4-year time period of 
contracting, development and testing. Year 1 allowed for the refinement, analysis, and approval 
of formal requirement documents and the development of testing protocols. Years 2 and 3 
involved the development and testing of helmet prototypes resulting from competitively awarded 
contracts (cost-plus type contracts) to be awarded to industry companies. Year 4 allowed for the 
Army and Marine Corps to award procurement contracts to the successful companies for the 
manufacture and production of helmets. The alternative to a program of record was to use the 
rapid acquisition process. In rapid acquisition, the Services wrote a directed requirement (within 
a month) for the ECH and awarded competitive contracts (fixed-price contracts for certain 
quantities with production options) to industry within 6 months. Another 6 months would be 
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required to test the helmets. So, ECHs could be on Soldiers’ and Marines’ heads in just over a 
year. With the rapid acquisition option, the new helmet’s requirements would not be 
underpinned by analysis, and the test protocols had to rely on the protocols for current helmets 
because there would be no time to develop test protocols specifically for the ECH (Planning 
Fallacy). This was particularly important for the ECH, which would rely on novel HMWPE 
thermoplastic polymers that might perform much differently than the current para-aramid based 
helmets. For example, ECHs had the potential to lose their rigidity after being shot once and 
potentially offered less protection from multiple shots. Also, the ECH may deform excessively, 
leading to head trauma and skull fractures. There were legitimate testing and safety concerns 
that would have to be addressed during the development, testing, and manufacture of this new 
helmet.  
The ECH program began in early 2009 (as shown in Figure 4) as rapid acquisition effort 
(Planning Fallacy and Over-optimism). The Army and Marine Corps approved urgent 
requirements based on the need for increased protection against enemy rifle threats and set 
broad requirements to include an increase in fragmentation and pistol protection, and rifle threat 
protection—all at the same weight of the current combat helmets. The acquisition strategy was 
a single step development in which competition was encouraged among industry 
manufacturers. The original request for proposal asked for each vendor to deliver test data 
validating their claim that their design met the new ECH requirements for rifle protection. Four 
vendors submitted proposals; however, only one vendor’s design was acceptable. At the end of 
2009, this vendor received a firm fixed price (FFP) contract to produce ECHs to undergo 
government validation testing with contract options for production deliveries after successful first 
article tests. In late 2010, after successful developmental testing, the Army and Marine Corps 
approved the program milestone to enter into low-rate initial production with the selected 
vendor. The decision permitted the production of a small number of helmets to undergo testing 
in order to validate that the contractor could successfully produce the helmets to performance 
requirements. The use of FFP type contracts for the development of the ECH was heavily 
influenced by Better Buying Power (BBP) 1.0, which encouraged a greater use in acquisition 
efforts (Recency Bias). Generally, however, for programs with only top-level warfighter 
operational requirements and with new technology, the use of cost plus–type contracts provides 
industry greater flexibility to innovate, allows the refinement of requirements based on 
knowledge learned in the development, and increases the chance of successfully producing a 
manufacturable, high quality product. In late 2011, the ECH passed the second round of first 
article testing after testing protocols were adjusted appropriately. To meet an aggressive 
production schedule for the Army and Marine Corps, the vendor submitted an engineering 
change proposal for a second and third production line.  It took all of 2012 for the vendor to 
successfully pass the third round of first article testing. 
The testing results demonstrated that the ECH met its requirements and offered Soldiers 
and Marines the potential for greater protection compared to current helmets. After passing 
testing and 4 years since program initiation, in the summer of 2013, the ECH successfully 
received a full rate production decision. The setting of requirements and testing protocols in the 
absence of quantitative analysis led to prolonged schedule, especially important with limited 
funding, intense scrutiny on program cost/schedule overruns, and pressures to field new 
capabilities to the warfighters quickly (Difficulty Making Trade-offs and Planning Fallacy). 
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Figure 4.  ECH Program Timeline (Mortlock, 2018) 
 
The rapid acquisition program required that a directed requirement be written without a 
complete analysis of performance requirements. The new technology leveraged in the ECH 
could provide a 20% lighter (about a ½ pound) helmet while maintaining current protection, or 
could provide limited rifle protection at current helmet weights, or could strive for a substantial 
increase in rifle protection but with added weight. Pressure existed to lighten the fighting loads 
of warfighters in combat with benefits being improved speed and mobility, less fatigue and more 
endurance, and fewer long-term injuries. At the same time, there was the push for more 
capability (in this case, rifle protection), which meant increased weights. The Army and Marine 
Corps struck the easiest most expedient balance of increasing protection while constraining the 
weight to that of current helmets (Difficulty Making Trade-offs and Planning Fallacy)—essentially 
pushing the “easy button” attempting to “go fast” in a schedule-driven effort. 
The testing protocols were important because they were placed in the helmet 
specification in the signed contracts for helmet deliveries and told industry the government 
requirements to be met. This was a typical “chicken or egg” scenario. Helmets with the new 
technology had never been manufactured. The testing protocols can only be established after 
making helmets and fully characterizing those helmets through design limit testing. However, a 
full-scale research and development effort required time and money. The testing protocol for the 
current helmets was refined after more than a decade of development, testing, and 
manufacture. The new technology in helmets behaved differently than the previous technology 
after being shot with a bullet. Thus, the required testing protocols differed. With nothing else to 
go on initially, the ECH testing protocols were set the same as current helmet test protocols 
(Difficulty Making Trade-offs and Planning Fallacy). The subsequent schedule slips in the ECH 
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Programs that involve the application of a new technology inherently include high levels 
of integration, manufacturability, producibility, and quality risk. These programs should guard 
against being primarily schedule-driven (Over-optimism). Time is required to optimize the 
requirements and testing protocols while also encouraging the widest possible participation in 
the program by interested and innovative helmet manufacturers. In this case, an effort that 
originally planned to field helmets within a year took 4 years to reach a production decision—not 
so rapid. The industrial base suffered as the program relied on a sole-source vendor without the 
benefits of competition to keep costs and schedule in check. A program that is knowledge–
driven from a research and development effort that includes many competitors from the 
industrial base may have proven more beneficial and had a similar execution timeline. The 
Services must be realistic about the risks associated with development efforts involving new 
technology and must avoid being primarily schedule–driven rather than knowledge–driven for 
acquisition decision-making. 
The ECH program was initiated as a 1-year rapid acquisition effort that resulted in a 4-
year effort to field a helmet (better than the current helmets) but with less than the theoretical 
possible optimal level of performance at a cost three times that of current helmets because of 
limited competition and low manufacturing levels of a capability and capacity (industrial base 
concerns). The Service’s and the PM’s decision-making in this program was greatly affected by 
Trouble Making Trade-offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism, and Recency Bias. 
JCM Program 
The Joint Common Missile (JCM) program was initiated in the late 1990s. It was a Joint 
(Army, Navy, Marine Corps) effort to replace Hellfire, Maverick, and aviation-launched, tube-
launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles fired from both rotary wing (AH-64 
Apaches, AH-1 Cobras, and MH-60 Seahawks) and fixed wing (F/A18 D/F Super Hornets) 
aircraft. The JCM program had a successful milestone (MS) B in early 2004 with an approved 
capabilities development document (CDD) and subsequently awarded an Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract for a planned 4-year EMD phase. The approved 
JCM acquisition strategy had a planned single-step development approach to meet all required 
capabilities (Difficulty Making Trade-offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism Bias).  
The Army and Navy planned the JCM program for a decade prior to the 2004 Milestone 
B or official designation of the program of record and start of the EMD phase. The science and 
technology (S&T) communities matured the underlying missile technologies through S&T 
objectives and a technology maturation and risk reduction phase. A high-level government work 
breakdown structure described the missile design and used to assess a medium risk 
assessment for the JCM development effort as well as technology readiness level (TRL) 
determinations of 6 for the critical technology elements (CTE) of the missile in support of the 
Milestone B decision. During this same time, the requirements generation system completed 
both a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) and analysis of alternatives (AoA). The CBA and 
AoA supported the approval of the JCM capability development document (CDD), which 
contained key performance parameters (KPP), initial operational capability (IOC) dates, 
acquisition objective (AO), and an average unit procurement cost (AUPC). Simultaneous with 
the technology maturation and requirements solidification, the resourcing plan for a JCM 
program was being worked and funding was planned and programmed. The JCM business case 
analysis supported the JCM program office estimate, the Army and Navy program objective 
memorandum (POM) submissions, and the JCM program was deemed affordable by the Army 
and Navy. However, the independent cost estimate (ICE) by Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(CAIG) that supported the JCM Milestone B decision determined that the effort would take 
considerably longer than planned (from 74–144 months in EMD rather than the planned 48 
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months) and cost considerably more than planned (an AUPC of $153,000 rather than the 
planned AUPC of $108,000) (Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism Bias). 
Despite the ICE conclusions, the JCM acquisition strategy recommended by the Army 
and Navy, supported by the warfighters, and approved by the defense acquisition executive 
(DAE) in the spring of 2004 after a successful Milestone B was a single-step development effort 
that planned to meet all the KPPs (Difficulty Making Trade-offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism 
Bias). Late in 2004 (approximately 6 months after program approval), the JCM program was 
canceled as a program of record, and the effort was eventually renamed as the Joint Air to 
Ground Missile (JAGM) program. In 2015, the JAGM program applied the key lesson learned 
from the failed JCM effort―adoption of an incremental development approach. The JAGM 
program was approved as a program of record and successfully awarded an EMD contract after 
a Milestone B approval in 2015 (11 years after the JCM Milestone B approval). The capabilities 
to be delivered under the JAGM program were greatly reduced from the capabilities desired in 
the JCM program. Figure 5 displays the differences between the JCM and JAGM programs. The 
documented lessons learned emphasized the avoidance of extensive unprioritized 
requirements, multiple threshold platforms, and the fixed-wing F18 platform. The Army and 
Navy lessons applied to the JAGM effort emphasized an incremental development of the 
warfighter’s highest priorities, reduced the threshold platforms, and leveraged the existing 
Hellfire missile warhead and motor to reduce risk, cost, and schedule (Difficulty Making Trade-
offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism Bias).  
 
 
Figure 5. JCM/JAGM Acquisition Strategy Comparison (Mortlock, 2020) 
[note the following acronyms: RW = rotary wing, FW = fixed wing, USA = US Army, USMC = US Marine 
Corps, GFE = government furnished equipment, PPT = precision point targeting, F&F = fire & forget, 
MOUT = military operation in urban terrain] 
 
The plight of the original JCM program approval, subsequent cancellation, and then 
transition to the JAGM program offers an example supporting the GAO (2015) conclusion that 
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the defense acquisition system often provides incentives for Services and PMs to promote 
successful acquisition strategies (defined as approved and leading to successful milestones) 
rather than sound acquisition strategies (defined as executed within cost, schedule, and 
performance constraints, and leading to fielding capability). Difficulty in Making Trade-offs bias 
makes it difficult for the Services and PMs to develop acquisition strategies to optimally balance 
near-term program milestone approval and long-term program executability in terms of 
maintaining cost, schedule, and performance baselines and delivering capability.  
The Services and the JCM PM basically had two choices to reduce programmatic risk 
when formulating the JCM acquisition strategy―plan more time and money for the effort as 
defined by the warfighter or reduce scope (achieve less performance requirements) for the time 
and money planned. Allocating more money or additional schedule was not considered because 
JCM had a TMRR phase deemed successful and planned EMD phase aligned with funding in 
the Service POMs. A reduction in scope by recommending reducing performance capabilities 
was not considered because that risked losing the support of the warfighting communities who 
strongly supported achieving the full required capabilities (Planning fallacy, Difficulty in Making 
Trade-offs).  
The JCM requirements were well established and supported by years of analysis with a 
set capability need date. The technologies needed to turn those requirements into capabilities 
for the warfighter had matured to the point that they were deemed mature (TRL 6) and ready for 
integration and development work. Additionally, the funding to support the JCM program of 
record for a development and engineering work and procurement of missiles was aligned to the 
required need date (IOC). The PM triple constant of cost, schedule, and performance was all 
synchronized and set within the planned acquisition program baseline (APB). However, for the 
JCM program, a single-step acquisition strategy to deliver all required capabilities was 
eventually canceled and the warfighter received no capability. Had an incremental development 
approach like the subsequent JAGM acquisition strategy been adopted initially, the warfighter 
could have received improved capability more than a decade sooner.   
In the case of the JCM program, the cost and schedule constraints and the ICE 
determinations indicated the need to consider an incremental development approach and delay 
some capability to later increments (Planning Fallacy). The JCM program was canceled, and it 
took more than 10 years for the new JAGM program to pass an Milestone B—this time with an 
incremental approach that leveraged existing government furnished equipment (GFE) 
components and non-development item (NDI) technologies. Meanwhile, during this “lost 
decade,” the warfighter got none of the desired capabilities required. The defense acquisition 
system incentivized the Services and PMs to get an approved milestone—but with a program 
that was soon canceled, failed to meet performance requirements, and delivered no capability. 
The JCM program serves as an example of a program in which the cost, schedule, and 
performance constraints were unrealistically established. The Services and the PM decision-
making were affected by the Planning Fallacy, Difficulty in Making Trade-offs, and Over-
optimism Bias.  
Army Infantry Combat Vehicle Programs 
The Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) remains the backbone of the Army mechanized 
infantry warfighter formations. Developed in 1970s, the Bradley has been upgraded several 
times to offer Soldiers enhanced capabilities; however, since the early 2000s, the Army has 
been trying to replace the BFV due to size, weight, and power constraints that severally restrict 
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Figure 6. BFV Over Time (Roth & Hames, 2019) 
 
One attempt at a BFV replacement was the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) as part of a 
family of eight manned ground vehicles (MGV) within the planned Future Combat Systems 
(FCS) Brigade Combat Team construct for the Army Future Force. The FCS program entered 
the acquisition framework as an official program of record at Milestone B to begin engineering 
and manufacturing development (EMD) efforts in 2003 with a planned Milestone C (low rate 
initial production) in 2010, but the program was canceled in 2009. Figure 7 describes the 
planned ICV as presented at the preliminary design review in early 2009. Over the past decade, 
defense acquisition experts have referenced the FCS program as an example of everything 
wrong with defense acquisition―a canceled program that wasted billions of dollars and 
delivered no capability to warfighters (Pernin et al., 2012). The FCS program was an ambitious 
effort that attempted to integrate technologies using a system-of-systems approach to transform 
the way Army brigades would fight. Additionally, the program started as a Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) effort contracted through other transaction authority (OTA) 
with Boeing and its industry teammate, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). 
The OTA incentivized Boeing to get the Army to an approved Milestone B, to start the formal 
program of record and system development and demonstration phase as quickly as possible. 
The Army planned, programmed, and budgeted funding—at risk if the program was not 
executed on schedule (schedule-driven). Boeing and the Army achieved that Milestone B in 
2003. The OTA also enabled Boeing to become the lead system integrator (LSI) for the FCS 
program of record. Despite warnings from the GAO of immature technologies and lack of 
adequate funding, the Army marched forward until 2009, when the Secretary of Defense 
canceled the FCS program because of affordability concerns, immature technologies, and 
requirements not reflecting the current threats faced by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan (GAO, 
2004). The FCS program was an example of a rush to failure and resulted in no capability 
delivered to the warfighter (Planning Fallacy). The program was also hampered by Difficulty in 
Making Trade-offs and Over-optimism (too many requirements, too many immature 
technologies), as well as Recency Bias (use of DARPA, OTA, system of systems approach and 
LSI concept) to use the latest acquisition reform initiatives despite other more suitable, less risky 
acquisition approaches.  
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Figure 7. FCV ICV in 2009 (Adapted from PdM ICV, personal communication, 2009) 
 
After cancellation of the FCS program in 2009, the Army embarked on the Ground 
Combat Vehicle (GCV) program (see Figure 8) to replace the BFV. At the time, Fort Benning 
served as the home of the infantry, and Fort Knox served as the home of armor. All resources 
that had been supporting the oversight and management of the development of a family of eight 
FCS manned ground vehicles were now applied to the development of the GCV. The Army 
designated Fort Knox as the lead in the defining the requirements for the GCV. The GCV 
program pushed for a materiel development decision and Milestone A in 2010 to begin awarding 
technical maturation and risk reduction (TMRR) contracts to industry. The same two industry 
partners that were teamed together in the FCS EMD phase for manned ground vehicles now 
competed against each other in a TMRR phase for the GCV. The Army began the GCV 
program and awarded FFP type research and development (R&D) contracts to BAE Systems 
and General Dynamics for designs and prototypes. The new vehicle’s requirements called for a 
heavy reliance on mature commercial technologies. Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives 
strongly encouraged and incentivized resulted in awarding FFP type R&D contracts (Recency 
Bias) despite the lack of appropriateness based on the level of system integration complexity 
and risk. 
With the Armor School in the lead for defining the GCV requirements for a BFV 
replacement vehicle for the mechanized infantry, the requirements for GCV resulted in mixture 
of requirements from the BFV, the FCS ICV, the recently fielded mine resistant ambush 
protected (MRAP) vehicles, and the M1A2 Abrams tank. Based on the GCV requirements, the 
program office, the interested industry competitors, and engineers at the research, 
development, and engineering center (RDEC) at the Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM), 
determined that the GCV would weigh between 50 and 70 tons—nearing the weight of the 72-
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Figure 8. GCV as depicted in 2010 (Adapted from PdM GCV, personal communication, 2010) 
 
The GCV had force protection, survivability, and lethality requirements for a mechanized 
infantry vehicle written by armor warfighters or tankers. In subsequent reviews with the 
Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) staff (including the Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army), the potential weight of the GCV and excessive requirements were highlighted; however, 
the Army pushed ahead and awarded two TMRR contracts based on schedule pressure for 
protecting the planned and programmed resources of the old FCS MGV program (Planning 
Fallacy, Over-optimism and Difficulty in Making Trade-offs). Four years later, the Army canceled 
the GCV program because the vehicle was going to be too big and heavy and had excessive 
requirements. The GCV effort was not focused on the mechanized infantryman—it was focused 
on other Army priorities.  
In recent years, after several failed attempts of initiating the Next General Combat 
Vehicle because of aggressive requirements and lack interest by industry, the Army is trying 
again—this time calling the BFV replacement the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV). 
The OMFV program is susceptible to same behavior acquisition biases (Planning Fallacy, Over-
optimism, Difficulty in Making Trade-offs, and Recency Bias) as contributed to the failures of the 
predecessor BFV replacement acquisition efforts. How can the design and development of a 
mechanized infantry vehicle be optimized for troop transport and protection, lethality, and 
remote autonomous operations simultaneously? The answer is unfortunately, it can’t—this will 
require difficult requirement trade-offs to avoid the planning fallacy and over-optimism bias. A 
vehicle that is optimized for lethal autonomous operations would be an inefficient combat 
vehicle to protect the crew and protect the troops being transported. It appears that Recency 
Bias has also played a significant role in the OMFV program. Is the Army more interested on 
riding the autonomous vehicle hype wave? Or does the Army have other priorities like proving 
the value of the high-profile, newly established Army Futures Command or Next Generation 
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Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Cross Functional Team (CFT)? The acquisition strategy for the OMFV 
program appears to be heavily influenced by Recency Bias. The acquisition strategy leverages 
the newly formed middle tier acquisition (MTA) pathway to avoid forming an acquisition program 
of record to enter the EMD phase after a successful Milestone B. The OMFV program will use 
MTA authorities to rapidly prototype vehicles for experimentation and demonstration and then 
establish a formal acquisition program of record at Milestone C to enter low-rate initial 
production. This strategy is the exact opposite strategy that the GAO has recommended for 
more three decades for major defense acquisition programs—knowledge-based acquisition 
strategies. Defense acquisition programs have routinely rushed to production decisions without 
well-defined requirements, complete detailed design drawings, fully mature technologies, and 
mature manufacturing processes, and without demonstrating production representative systems 
in a relevant operationally environment. The OMFV program is attempting to do in an MTA rapid 
prototyping effort what a major defense acquisition program achieves in a formal EMD effort—a 
classic “schedule-driven” rush to failure. 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Summary 
We studied three defense acquisition programs and found strong evidence that systemic 
behavioral biases affected the management and decision-making within these programs. Table 
1 summaries the research results. The outcomes of the ECH, JCM, and Army Infantry combat 
vehicles programs were affected by planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-
optimism, and recency bias (except JCM). 
Table 1. Summary of Biases Present in Defense Acquisition Programs 
Conclusions 
The presence of the effect of behavioral biases within the management and decision-
making of acquisition programs comes as no surprise. However, the extent and frequency of the 
planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and recency bias within the three 
acquisition programs studied sharpens the point on which biases are most relevant within 
defense acquisitions. For the past three decades, acquisition management has been highlighted 
on the GAO’s high-risk list for excessive waste and mismanagement. Notable programs have 
failed to deliver capability, and failed to meet performance, cost, and schedule management 
targets. The root causes of program failure vary from ill-defined requirements, immature 
technologies, integration challenges, poor cost and schedule estimating, and the acceptance of 
too much development risk. Underappreciated and understudied is the effect that the planning 
fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and recency bias have in contributing to 
root causes of acquisition program failures. The better we understand the effect of these 
systemic behavioral systemic biases, the better we can mitigate the risks of program failures.  
The complexity of the defense acquisitions makes study of systemic biases interesting. 
The culture and leadership at different levels of the DoD from the institutional level to the 
organizational level to the program level affect the impact of the biases. In the DoD’s 
Programs Planning Fallacy Difficulty in Making Tradeoffs Over-Optimism Recency Bias
ECH Program √ √ √ √ 
JCM Program √ √ √  
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hierarchical chain of command, the PMs are responsible for the program’s cost, schedule, and 
performance (triple constraint). PMs make decisions for the proper management and execution 
of the program within the triple constraint parameters. However, the PMs do not establish the 
performance requirements, cost, or schedule objectives of the acquisition program baseline—
the Services do. Additionally, PMs report to a milestone decision authority (MDA) who approves 
the program and determines overall program strategic direction. The systemic biases at the 
various levels of the chain of command manifest differently in the decision-making models used 
at different levels. Behavioral acquisition explores defense acquisition from a behavioral 
standpoint, including the impact of psychology, organizational behavior, and organizational 
politics on how culture, leadership, and decision-making affect the management and execution 
of program, as well as program outcomes. 
Recommendations 
For further research, we recommend rigorous study of more acquisition programs that 
can clearly show the distinctions we suspect are in play. We recognize that in the real world 
these distinctions are hard to show, even though we all know what’s going on. Surveys of PMs 
and MDAs are an excellent way to get primary data to understand behavioral acquisition more 
fully. Figure 9 to highlights a model designed to study how the chain of command, culture, and 
decision-making moderate the effect of behavior biases in acquisition managers. 
 
 
Figure 9. Moderator effects on acquisition manager behavior that affect program outcomes 
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Abstract 
Current methods of measuring acquisition project performance are based upon generations of old 
cost models that compare budgets with expenditures. These methods provide little in the way of 
forecasting, leaving the project manager to react to past performance rather than making decisions 
of future potential. The principal means of measuring project performance in large complex projects 
is earned value management (EVM), which measures actual work performed to budgeted work 
performed. While this method provides valuable insight into how well a project is doing relative to 
a predetermined plan, new methods of forecasting when projects begin to become volatile are 
needed. Knowing when a project will enter a phase of volatility will provide greater transparency 
and flexibility to decision-makers before critical events have occurred. This paper describes the 
state of current project management theory and how it has driven the project management 
community to a point of stagnation. Additionally, this paper will outline a new and innovative 
approach to forecasting when a project will become volatile long before current EVM and risk 
management tools can today. This research approach proposed in the paper intends to extend 
current theory and practice in project management by examining several information systems 
programs and providing new, more effective decision-making tools for future project managers. 
The methods defined in this research will be known as advanced earned value management 
(AEVM).  
Introduction 
When managers try to develop complex products with many interdependent 
subsystems, the high informational processing load can overwhelm the organization. Errors, 
poor decisions, and bad communication can result in additional levels of effort later in the 
development process leading to inefficiency or failure. Additionally, decision support systems 
currently being used in defense acquisition are focused on analysis of historical cost data rather 
than the effect the volatile environment has on future performance. This problem is particularly 
acute in information-centric acquisition programs in which the boundaries of hardware and 
software are less obvious and where the socio-technical boundaries are critical to successful 
performance of the system being developed. 
Defense acquisition programs remain vulnerable to underperformance and excessive 
cost growth during times of increasingly constrained budgets. History suggests that the “normal” 
condition of complex programs is one of failure in that they typically exceed their preplanned 
cost, schedule, and performance targets. This phenomenon is especially true in large complex 
programs such as information systems and network acquisition programs. Since 1975, an 
annual array of acquisition reform studies, beginning with the Packard Commission, have had 
virtually no impact on the ever-increasing trend of cost growth and substandard program 
performance. The increasing need for complex artificial intelligence and networked technologies 
capability within the DoD portends even more challenges for the defense acquisition process. 
Current management theory reinforces classical approaches to project management in which 
development programs are viewed from a preplanned production process that can be controlled 
through a robust systems management approach. It is critical for the acquisition community to 
examine new analytical and decision-making approaches to managing the acquisition of these 
systems. It is also important to explore the theory of program management and assess if 
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change is necessary to the existing paradigm of managing risk within the iron triangle paradox 
of cost, schedule, and performance.  
Project planning is an output-oriented process that attempts to “decide” future events 
though rigorous advanced planning and process controls. Projects tend to be planned and 
executed using classical methods, in which a project follows a standard system model that 
requires an input, transformation, and output flow model intended to align resources with 
objectives (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Standard System Feedback Process 
 
The process involves problem-solving focusing on “what” and “how” the project will be 
accomplished. All activity in the project is devoted to the accomplishment of the objective 
through planned future time periods. Project performance is typically measured using 
techniques such as earned value management (EVM), which derives perceived “value” from 
planned work relative to actual work performed. While these processes provide historical 
perspectives of a program, they do not provide objective predictive insight by which a program 
management team can make better decisions that lead to higher probabilities of success of a 
development acquisition program.  
Current program management methods are grounded in classical and system 
management theory, which is based on the belief that workers have physical and economic 
needs rather than social needs or job satisfaction and that projects are a system that is 
represented by a collection of parts brought together to accomplish some end goal or objective. 
Classical management theory advocates specialization of labor, centralized leadership and 
decision-making, and profit maximization. In the case of defense program management, 
program teams are focused on budget and cost optimization rather than profit maximization, 
resulting in an approach that assumes a development program can be executed in accordance 
with a centrally derived and executed cost and schedule baseline. Unfortunately, this view of 
project management prevents project teams from adequately anticipating future events that 
could lead to increasing project volatility. Project managers are left to deductive reasoning 
based upon regressive data and experience, significantly increasing the probability that complex 
programs will exhibit unacceptable levels of variability with regard to the planned program 
performance baseline.  
Other scientific fields such as aerodynamics have analogous problems in that prediction 
and forecasting is necessary to improve system design and performance. Using aerodynamics 
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as an analogous benchmark with which scientists have developed methods by which the 
turbulent and volatile fluid environment can be more accurately predicted, there may be an 
opportunity to extend this methodology into program management theory to better understand 
the turbulent and volatile project environment in which program’s flow during the development 
phase of a project life cycle. If it is possible to more accurately forecast the chaotic environment 
in which a program must interact, than perhaps there is an opportunity to fundamentally 
advance the underlying theory upon which project management is based and develop new 
methods to better forecast project performance. 
Statement of the Problem 
 The absence of a strong and inquisitive theoretical base in program management is 
perpetuating a management strategy that is grounded on historical cost accounting and 
traditional manufacturing models rather than methods that offer improved forecasting and 
decision-making approaches. Hence, the problem is that current cost accounting and system 
thinking methods, based upon classical management and system theory, do not provide 
adequate forecasting opportunity for complex acquisition programs during the execution and 
control phase of the program life cycle. Other disciplines such as fluid and thermodynamics 
have similar challenges in that they attempt to predict physical outcomes from complex and 
dynamic environments. This research will show how a complex business environment can be 
treated as a knowledge flow system that moves from calm laminar states to volatile turbulent 
states, much the same as other Newtonian fluid environments. The following research questions 
are proposed to address the problem. 
1. Do current project management and control methods lack the ability to adequately 
forecast project future performance during the developmental phase of the project life 
cycle? 
2. Does the project environment display knowledge flow characteristics similar to other 
Newtonian fluids? 
3. Is it possible to forecast project management performance using turbulent flow theory 
such as the Reynolds-averaged Navier Stokes (RANS)?  
Objective 
The purpose of this research is to advance program management theory and practice by 
applying knowledge flow and turbulence forecasting methods to traditional business decision 
support systems. While traditional decision support systems such as earned value management 
(EVM) provide an accurate accounting view of project performance, turbulent flow modeling will 
allow for improved forecasting, leading to an advanced EVM (AEVM) approach to project 
management. Turbulent flow methods have shown themselves to provide a more predictive 
construct to other disciplines such as weather forecasting, aerodynamics, and hydrodynamics. 
This approach is becoming more relevant to other fields outside of natural physics and is 
revealing itself as a potential framework by which human-centered organizational outcomes 
may be predicted. This research will also be grounded in an information science domain in that 
we will be using structured and unstructured project data in a new way that allows improved 
project forecasting. Additionally, within the information sciences paradigm, business intelligence 
and analytics is gaining an increasing role with regard to how data is transformed into actionable 
insights that inform an organization’s strategic and tactical business decisions. Business 
analytics such as project cost data, lexical link analysis of key project reports, and turbulent flow 
methods may provide predictive project forecasting information, increasing the business 
intelligence environment of the project team and subsequently improve the project decision 
support strategy.  
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Why Is This Research Important? 
This research is important because current methods of measuring project performance 
such as earned value management are not sufficient to adequately provide forecasting insight 
into project volatility, limiting decision-makers’ ability to make informed decisions in a risk-based 
project environment. Current theory and practice are not well suited to managing the complex 
nature of programs intended to develop artificial intelligence and adaptive reality capability. As 
the DoD undertakes ever-increasing complex programs such as Project Overmatch and Project 
Convergence, the need to have more accurate forecasting methods is vital to ensuring success 
and preventing repeating the mistakes of the past. 
Relying on current methods that are based upon a dearth of theoretical explanation is 
not an acceptable strategy if the United States intends to maintain its technological lead into the 
21st century. This research will provide the project team a new tool by which they can more 
accurately predict the impact of planning decisions before the project exceeds its performance 
baseline metrics such as cost and schedule, resulting in a chaotic and volatile program. Current 
models, such as EVM and the risk management framework (RMF) are regressive in nature and 
do not provide adequate forecasting insight into project management performance. A project 
becomes unstable and volatile when it begins to vary off its predetermined performance 
baseline. While there will always be some level of variability relative to the program performance 
baseline, when project variability exceeds its ability to maintain project baseline convergence, 
the decision-making environment becomes chaotic, resulting in an increasingly turbulent project 
with increasing volatility. For the purpose of this research, increasing project volatility is 
considered to be a dynamic state in which project risk realization becomes oscillatory dynamic 
with regards to mitigation strategies. In other words, the risks begin to outpace the project’s 
ability to mitigate them toward an acceptable project conclusion.  
If project teams could accurately diagnose potential areas of failure through improved 
forecasting methods, proactive measures could then be employed to prevent program failure. 
Engineers use the Reynolds number in fluid mechanics as a metric that predicts whether the 
flow of a fluid will be smooth and stable (laminar flow) versus unstable and chaotic (turbulent 
flow). Knowledge flow in an organization acts in the same way. Fyall (2002) argues that 
sufficient organizational capacity may allow for good information flow through a team while an 
overwhelmed group will suffer from turbulent information flow and risk total failure. An 
organizational Reynolds number, for example, could determine if the information flow through 
an organization was going to be efficient and reliable versus volatile and chaotic. This would 
help project teams to better understand the project risk profile and make choices to mitigate risk 
realization. Reynolds number is a value that helps to predict viscous and inertia effects in 
Newtonian fluids in order to characterize the stability of the fluid environment under varying 
conditions.  
Literature Summary 
Organizations across many business sectors and geographic borders are steadily 
embracing project management as a way to control spending and improve project results. 
Executives emphasize that adhering to project management methods and strategies reduces 
risks, cuts costs, and improves success rates. As a profession, project management has gained 
increasing interest over the past several years for both its failures and its relevance (Morris, 
2000). Often referred to as a means for dealing with change (Cleland & Ireland, 2007), project 
management has become a topic of real interest from both the practitioners’ and researchers’ 
perspective (Ika, 2009). Recent trends within the DoD suggest that project management is 
critical to effectively delivering key weapons capability to the warfighter. For example, the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is currently attempting to fundamentally change the 
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pedagogy by which project management training is delivered to the defense acquisition 
workforce. The DoD has identified six critical functional areas, one of which is project 
management, that are necessary as the DoD moves into the next century.  
Additionally, Packendorff (1995) argues that project management is emerging as a true 
scientific discipline with its own academic journals, conferences, and language that are 
characteristic of claiming scientific status. Yet, despite the level of interest and significant 
amount of investment in the profession of project management, its effectiveness remains in 
question. Significant project delays, cost overruns, and underperformance seem to be the rule 
rather than the exception (Ika, 2009). This initial search of the literature will establish the current 
state of project management theory, provide an introduction to the tools by which project 
managers attempt to understand and control their programs, and offer a glimpse into how 
turbulent flow model can help move project management into a more productive management 
paradigm and why this is critical to improving project forecasting.  
The State of Project Management Theory 
There seems to be a growing realization that the fragmented theoretical foundation in 
the field of project management is contributing to the stagnant performance being observed in 
actual project performance (Cicmil, 2006). The prevailing practices that seem to embrace 
project management practices and research are grounded in traditional economic and 
manufacturing methods, which view cost as the dependent variable for project success. The 
foundation of project management theory goes back to Frederick Taylor, Max Weber, and Henry 
Fayol. Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management introduced the concept that 
management can be viewed as a science in which deliberate scientific processes replaced the 
rule-of-thumb method and that work can be divided between workers and managers based 
upon their respective levels of training and responsibility (Taylor, 1911).  
Additionally, Weber (1930) argued that organizations should be hierarchically based with 
decisions and processes that are based upon a prescribed set of rules. Weber argued that 
relationships within an organization should be impersonal and focused on the scope of their 
respective authorities. These classical views are critical to understanding current project 
management in that today’s organizations fundamentally follow these principles of division of 
labor and hierarchical decision-making, which structures a project into discrete packages of 
work that are assigned to individuals in a project office. These work packages are subsequently 
allocated resources in the form of time and money and sequenced into a project schedule 
known as the performance measurement baseline (Brotherton, 2008). The effect of this 
hierarchical and linear management approach suggests that if work can be allocated and 
assigned to competent workers, then projects can be planned to the smallest level of effort, thus 
minimizing uncertainty and potential volatility as the project moves through its life cycle. While 
this is a generally accepted planning framework, this classical method provides little insight into 
uncertainty due to less tangible factors, such as individual behavior and changing environmental 
conditions. 
Classical theories of management needed to be extended to allow for a more human-
centric influence that accounted for human behavior. Behavioral theorists such as Follet, 
Maslow, and McGregor extended the more classical theories by arguing that employees must 
be considered active participants in the decision-making process, thus introducing a new 
dimension of ambiguity into management decision outcomes (Prietto, 2015). McGregor in 
particular theorized that people work for inner satisfaction and are not necessarily driven by 
materialistic rewards (McGregor, 1960). His Theory X and Theory Y introduced the concept that 
a manager’s assumptions about human nature influences how that manager manages the 
workforce (Prietto, 2015). From a program management perspective, the notion that individuals 
within a project environment do not comply with the “economic man” principle and that outputs 
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can be influenced by the bias of both the manager and the worker, opens up the potential for 
arguing that the knowledge flow within a project organization cannot be precisely predicted 
based upon discrete planning processes as suggested in the more classical management 
theories and methods. This leaves us with the dilemma of trying to manage a project based off 
of precise pre-project planning information that could be significantly influenced by less tangible 
factors such as human behavior and project environmental changes. 
Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy introduced the idea that a system could be thought of from a 
more biological perspective which is self-correcting and is made up of processes that transform 
inputs to outputs (Prietto, 2015). From a management perspective, this seems to extend the 
underlying classical theory in that it provides the necessary rigor by which to explain the 
socio/managerial relationship between a hierarchical and human-centered process. His work 
sought to demonstrate the pervasiveness of open systems in nature and the potential of 
reducing human thought into a systems concept (Lopreato, 1970). The idea of viewing 
organizations as systems was not new. The trend, however, was to view management 
processes as closed systems with predictable outcomes. Pareto’s 1897 law, for example, had 
demonstrated a system-like behavior in society by showing how 80% of the wealth belonged to 
20% of the population, regardless of the total amount of available capital (Newman, 2006). A 
systems approach to project management suggests that the boundaries are closed and clearly 
delineated, allowing for well-defined interdependencies (Lorreato, 1970). By suggesting that 
organizations and acquisition projects behave like systems, one must accept the premise that 
the structure and components of an organization are interdependent and therefore affect one 
another.  
If an organization, however, were more like a biological open system, as Bertalanffy 
suggested (Prietto, 2015), then one is left with the challenge of capturing random 
interdependent relationships of highly complex networks within an organization. By entertaining 
the possibility that organizations behave like biological open systems in which people and 
processes impact the preplanned nature of a project, we are able to accept the potential of neo-
classical approaches that provide better real forecasting of project behavior and outcomes.  
Path analysis is used to describe the directed dependencies among a set of variables 
and used to try to understand organizational behavior with regard to independent and depend 
variables. By viewing an organization as a system, path analysis could be considered a viable 
technique by which causal inference can be explored. With regard to organizational analysis, 
however, path analysis is often plagued by intervening variables that significantly influence the 
organizational model’s highest path coefficients. This would suggest that systems modeling of 
project management organizations need additional tools and methods by which to more 
accurately capture the uncertainty of external intervening variables that impact the knowledge 
flow through an organization.  
Classical and systems theory provide a relevant framework by which to begin 
understanding how a project management organization makes decisions and how knowledge 
flows through the organization, but may be limited in its ability to forecast future activities in that 
the complex nature of the project organization appears to behave more like an open system that 
is influenced by a complex network of intervening pathways and variables. The more we 
understand all the pathways of knowledge flow and how they affect the productivity of an 
acquisition project, the more relevant other analogous engineering and physics models could 
help us to improve project performance forecasting. Knowing how to improve the flow of 
knowledge requires a framework that considers all the pathways within a project (Cohen & 
Prusak, 2001). Pathways for knowledge flow are similar to networks in organizations. Within a 
project management structure, knowledge flow can be correlated with the work breakdown 
structure and how efficiently the preplanned work breakdown structure (WBS) is being executed 
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relative to the planned performance measurement baseline (PMB). The use of network ties 
stimulates innovation as an interactive process and represents the main source of competitive 
advantage for an organization (Swan et al., 1999). Viewing WBS productivity as a knowledge 
flow network provides us with the opportunity to explore other models of forecasting within the 
engineering domain. These analogies could allow us to apply theories such as chaos, 
thermodynamics, and fluid dynamics to problems that have heretofore been characterized as 
social constructions measured through the lens of economics and accounting. 
Current Project Management Measurement and Control 
As information-centric projects become more complex, project management must 
become more effective and dynamic in order to keep up with the ambiguity and speed of 
technology. Sociotechnical systems and artificial intelligence will require new ways of 
understanding how future needs will be transformed into real and virtual capability. Cost-based 
manufacturing methods will not provide the necessary agility and insight into how capabilities 
are evolving to meet customer needs and how resources are being optimized to achieve 
maximum return on investment (ROI) within predefined budget constraints. 
Project management methods that are used to control programs are based upon a cost 
management that provides little insight into project value or volatility. Changes in a project's 
requirements, stakeholders, schedule, and budget can cause changes in the broader 
environment just as desperate business processes impact project deliverables. Changes in key 
project metrics such as cost and schedule that vary off the original project baseline create a 
project environment that has the potential to be uncontrollable and results in increasing cost and 
schedule delays (Pitagorsky, 2018). Variance off the PMB is reflected in terms of cost and is 
considered to be increasing in volatility the larger the variance. Degrees of project volatility 
follow a continuum from rapid and unpredictable to infrequent and predictable. Changes in 
project certainty can be the result of many factors such as people, requirements, policies, and 
budget changes. While monitoring cost is an important metric, it does little in terms of improving 
a project manager’s ability to forecast future performance, particularly in terms of future 
volatility.  
There are several methods by which project teams attempt to manage and reduce 
uncertainty in a project. The literature, however, supports the argument that there are principally 
only five tools that are considered most relevant for managing complex acquisition programs 
(Housel & Mun, 2020). These include techniques such as PERT, Lean Six Sigma, balanced 
score card, knowledge value-added (KVA), earned value management (EVM), and integrated 
risk management (IRM). The only methods that seem to suggest some level of forecasting is 
IRM and EVM.  
Project managers typically follow an ongoing risk management process that helps them 
identify, understand, and respond to threats and opportunities (O’Conner, 2020). IRM is a 
forward-looking, risk-based decision support system incorporating various methods such as 
Monte Carlo Risk Simulation, Parametric Forecast Models, Portfolio Optimization, Strategic 
Flexibility, and Economic Business Case Modeling. Economic business cases using standard 
financial cash flows and cost estimates, as well as non-economic variables such as expected 
military value and strategic value (Housel & Mun, 2020). These metrics are often forecasted 
using system dynamic models based upon preplanned hierarchical structures, assumptions, 
and probabilistic models that make assumptions based upon the uniqueness of the project 
under consideration. They generally do not consider the dynamic nature of mediating variables 
over time such as human performance, requirements variability at both the operational and 
project level, and impacts of the bureaucratic and political environment.  
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Risk analysis, real options analysis, and portfolio optimization techniques are enablers 
for estimating ROI and estimating the risk-value of various strategic options. These techniques 
are favored in portfolio management approaches to project management and attempt to provide 
greater insight into future performance in order to optimize project investment. Real options 
theory informs the risk management process in that it provides insight into how to make 
decisions regarding investments in tangible assets when the future is uncertain (Hayes, 2020). 
Current statutory guidance such as the Clinger–Cohen Act of 1996 mandates the use of 
portfolio management for all federal agencies. The GAO (1997) requires that IT investments 
apply ROI measures, and DoD Directive 8115.01, issued October 2005, mandates the use of 
performance metrics based on outputs, with ROI analysis required for all current and planned IT 
investments. The DoD (2017) Risk Management Guidance Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
requires that alternatives to the traditional cost estimation need to be considered since cost 
models do not adequately address costs associated risks across complex projects. This 
admission by the DoD and GAO reinforces the weakness of current risk-based methods with 
regard to understanding project uncertainty, requiring new methods of forecasting. 
Unfortunately, current risk-based methods, including real options methods, are still based upon 
underlying cost analysis techniques, in that risk management processes require mitigation steps 
that show cost potential of each step that is proposed to reduce the potential of the underlying 
risk.  
Risk is the probability that an adverse or opportunistic event will occur sometime in the 
future. Risks are characterized as both the probability and consequence that this event will 
happen and how much it will cost if the risk is realized as well as mitigated (DoD, 2014). To 
better understand the overall risk of a project, the project is reduced into packages of work, 
each having some level of risk associated with its execution. The risk in each package of work is 
represented in terms of the cost and time that is required to mitigate the risk. These packages of 
work are commonly referred to as cost accounts within a project WBS (DoD, 2005). Following 
classical management theory, the WBS represents a hierarchical structure that is subsequently 
aligned within an organization to the various work units and cost account managers. The cost 
and schedule elements for each task are modeled and risk identified within the WBS to 
determine the total cost and schedule risk of a certain program.  
The WBS represents a product-oriented grouping of project work elements shown in 
graphical display to organize and subdivide the total work scope of a project. A WBS is the 
cornerstone of effective project planning, execution, controlling, statusing, and reporting. All the 
work contained within the WBS is identified, estimated, scheduled, and budgeted from product 
start to first article delivery. The WBS is the structure and code that integrates and relates all 
project work with regard to scope, schedule, and cost. Therefore, the WBS contains the 
project’s scope baseline necessary to achieve the technical objectives of the work described. 
The WBS is used as a management tool throughout the life cycle of a project to identify, assign, 
and track its total work scope. The WBS allows the project team to manage a project within the 
framework of EVM, the principal management tool used to assess work performed relative to 
work planned (DoD, 2019). Within the project management profession, EVM is perceived to 
provide the project team with some level of predictivity and is the principal decision support 
system for project management. As we will see, however, forecasting within the EVM framework 
is based upon recursive cost data, and actually provides little insight into future project 
performance or more importantly, the intangible variables that influence a program’s stability 
and performance. 
Earned Value Management 
Current program management practices suffer from deficiencies in its theoretical base, 
creating self-inflicted problems in program execution in addition to hampering the effective 
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professionalization of program management. The predominant metric by which acquisition 
projects are measured based on the belief that complex programs can be precisely planned and 
executed using a classically informed linear cumulative labor curve. The budget at complete 
(BAC) for a project is used as the objective by which resources are acquired and the project 
plan is developed and subsequently put-on contract to a competent developer. The closer the 
actual cost gets to the ubiquitous BAC determines the overall success of the program. As 
projects deviate from BAC, a new cost number to tracked and the variance off the BAC 
determines how well the project is performing. Decisions are made based upon current 
expenditures and future estimates (estimate at complete [EAC]) based upon preplanned 
remaining work. Koskela and Howell suggest that this approach is flawed and is the result of 
overly “narrow" project management theory based upon implicit linearity, which is used but 
rarely acknowledged (Koskela & Howell, 2002).  
Earned value management is a method that allows the project manager to measure the 
amount of work actually performed on a project relative to the amount of work planned (DoD, 
2019). EVM provides a method that permits the project to be measured by progress achieved. 
The project manager is then able, using the progress measured, to forecast a project’s total cost 
and date of completion, based on trend analysis. The relative relation to work performed to work 
planned is known as “Earned Value (EV)” (Reichel, 2006). Value in this sense should not be 
construed as value from an economic perspective. Economically, value is assessed as the ratio 
between revenue and cost. In this context, earned value is simply a misleading analogy that 
suggests that the allocated work on schedule and to cost results in some sort of value to the 
project. Earned value provides very limited insight into future performance and yet project 
managers rely on this process as their principal decision support system.  
EVM is used for providing a disciplined, structured, objective, and quantitative method to 
integrate performance, cost, and schedule objectives for tracking contract performance. The 
term earned value is also defined as the “budgeted cost of worked performed” or BCWP. BCWP 
allows the project manager to calculate performance indices for cost and schedule, which 
provides information on how well the project is performing relative to its original plans. These 
indices, when applied to future work, are used by project managers to forecast how the project 
will do in the future, assuming the cost and schedule indices do not fluctuate. The basis of EVM 
is an accurate plan with completion rates and budgeted costs (Reichel, 2006). This plan begins 
with the program work breakdown structure, in which the estimated cost and schedule is 
allocated to the performance measurement baseline (PMB). Once the PMB is approved, this 
becomes the project Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) from which the project is measured. 
EVM would be most effective to monitor a stable process that has minimal complexity or 
uncertainty. It is not an effective forecasting method for complex programs such as 
hardware/software artificial intelligence or networking projects. Commonly used methods such 
as risk and EVM do not reveal causal chains responsible for management actions, or the socio-
political complexities and interconnectedness within the project environment (Williams, 2018).  
The assumption is that if project volatility is adequately managed, then costs can be 
controlled and therefore preplanned budgeting methods continue to remain a valid technique for 
embarking on projects regardless of their complexity. In other words, if we espouse the belief 
that a project can be decomposed into its smallest unit of value, then we can apply a cost and 
risk variable to these units and manage them accordingly. According to the PMBOK® Guide 
(the Project Management Body of Knowledge), project control is a “project management 
function that involves comparing actual performance with planned performance and taking 
appropriate corrective action (or directing others to take this action) that will yield the desired 
outcome in the project when significant differences exist.” The belief is that management and 
control keep projects on a predetermined track. The PMBOK does not, however, provide an 
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explanation or insight into reliable forecasting; rather, it focuses on measuring planned 
performance relative to actual performance, accurate reporting of cost and schedule data, and 
updating cost information based upon trending information.  
The tools and methods used by project teams are fundamentally grounded in classical 
and system theory that emphasizes planning and cost management rather than data driven 
forecasting of projects that are informed by complex and chaotic environments. With this 
understanding, the nature of the research problem becomes even more relevant. Our problem 
stated that, current cost accounting and system thinking methods, based upon classical 
management and system theory, do not provide adequate forecasting of complex acquisition 
programs during the execution and control phase of the program life cycle. This problem, 
exacerbated by the relative lack of project management theory that focuses on project 
forecasting and future performance, creates a wonderful opportunity to extend theory as well as 
potential opportunities for more advanced processes that will help project management grow as 
a profession. Up to this point, we have examined the theoretical foundation on which project 
management is based. This foundation in classical and systems management theory is reflected 
in the fundamental tools used to plan, resource, and execute acquisition projects designed to 
provide unique products to meet a customer’s needs. We have also introduced the concept of 
network knowledge flow from which more robust theoretical positions can be claimed and 
methods introduced. In the next section of this literature review, we will extend this line of 
reasoning to explore possible physics-based applications that might allow use to develop theory 
and methods that will provide enhanced forecasting in complex and highly volatile project 
environments. Relevant readings and thought into how theories from other fields such as fluid 
dynamics and knowledge value might be used to provide improved forecasting models in project 
management based upon turbulent flow analogies will be introduced. We shall also examine the 
necessary relationship the field of information science has with project forecasting and turbulent 
flow theory. 
Forecasting Project Management Performance 
Project managers need new practices that incorporate data analytics and information 
from the complex and chaotic environments with which to make decisions. These practices 
should also be forward looking with intent to capture future events from a more deliberate and 
information-informed strategy, rather than extrapolation based predominately upon historical 
data. In her article “Making Fast Strategic Decisions In High-Velocity Environments” Kathleen 
Eisenhardt revealed that fast decision-makers use more, not less, information than slow 
decision-makers (Eisenhardt, 1989). Additionally, the greater number of alternatives considered 
simultaneously, the greater the speed of the strategic decision. Her research showed that 
executives immersed themselves in real-time information on their environment and the firm 
operations. The result of this, according to Eisenhardt, was a deep personal knowledge of the 
enterprise allowing for rapid decision-making. Consequently, the greater the speed of the 
strategic decision process, the greater the performance in high-velocity environments 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Developing methods that incorporate structured and unstructured data into 
a more predictive decision-making process provides similar information immersion that 
Eisenhardt identified in her qualitative research on how key business leaders made effective 
decisions. The knowledge-based decision-making required these executives to consider the 
effects of the volatile environment and not just cost and revenue data. In effect, the successful 
leaders were able to quickly integrate and forecast based upon structured and unstructured 
data. New methods by which more information provides better insight into project integrity 
through better volatility management is necessary in order to improve project outcomes.  
While the business community recognizes that project management is critical to 
providing a competitive advantage, the lack of program management theory seems to reveal a 
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lack of theoretical thought in the profession of program management. A sound theoretical basis 
is critical to moving a profession forward, and an absence of theoretical explanation and 
curiosity has the potential of rendering a profession stagnant and task oriented. Defense 
department leadership and non-project management communities within the DoD still regard 
project management as a branch of operations management, and therefore believe that it is 
simply a series of management tasks that are structured within a system engineering construct 
where projects are instruments used to achieve higher-level organizational goals and objectives 
(Kwak & Anbari, 2009). Within industry, however, there is still a belief that project management 
helps create a strategic value chain that gives companies an edge on their competitors, 
particularly in high-risk sectors and markets. Being able to deliver projects on time and within 
budget often determines whether a company will get the next job or whether its new product hits 
the market. Without new theory, project management will reach a natural limit with regard to its 
effectiveness.  
Complex products with many interdependent subsystems and high information 
processing load requirements can cause organizational failure. While there are many decision 
support systems that are designed to interpret historical project data, there is currently no way 
for managers to forecast when the demands placed upon a project have exceeded the risk 
tolerance level of the project team, resulting in projects moving from a somewhat stable state to 
a more volatile and turbulent state. Engineers use the Reynolds number in fluid mechanics as a 
metric that predicts whether the flow of a fluid will be smooth and stable versus turbulent and 
chaotic. Reynolds number is a dimensionless parameter widely used in fluid dynamics and is 
defined as the ratio of inertia force to the viscous force of a fluid. The concept of Reynolds 
number was introduced by George Stokes in 1851 in the development of the Navier-Stokes 
equation intended to solve the complex nature of turbulent flow (Anderson, 2017). 
Fyall (2002) argues that it is possible to establish an organizational Reynolds number 
that estimates when a project approaches a turbulent region, alerting the project team to apply 
proactive measures before project turbulent behavior occurs. Using project workflow networks, 
subtask interdependency can be seen as exhibiting fundamental fluid properties exhibiting 
probabilistic behavior. Routine tasks, for example, may exhibit a higher probability of success, 
whereas more innovative and complex tasks could have a lower degree of success, suggesting 
that the knowledge flow between tasks may vary based upon their relative level of complexity. 
Establishing a metric similar to Reynolds number could provide insight into the nature of 
information flow in an acquisition project, allowing a project team to more reliably forecast if the 
information flow through an organization resulted in a stable predictable environment or one 
approaching turbulence as manifested in increasing project volatility. 
Determining the tripping point at which a developmental program moves from a smooth 
predictable state to a chaotic and turbulent state is conceptually similar to predicting the 
turbulent flow characteristics across an airfoil in flight. By constraining the boundary conditions 
and identifying and measuring the multitude of dynamic variables within the project frame of 
reference, one can begin to define the nature of how these variables transition from a laminar 
(smooth) controlled state, to a turbulent state. The Reynolds number is the ratio of inertial forces 
to viscous forces and is a convenient parameter for predicting if a flow condition will be laminar 
or turbulent. It can be interpreted that when the viscous forces are dominant, they are sufficient 
enough to keep all the fluid particles in line, or in laminar flow (Batchelor, 1967, pp. 211–215). 
The ratio between viscous and inertia properties of a fluid establishes the relative volatility of the 
fluid. A low velocity fluid tends to be more stable than a high velocity fluid, indicating that there 
are increasing eddies being created as a result of specific environmental variables. As the fluid 
increases in velocity, failure to dampen or control these eddies causes the fluid to move from a 
laminar to a turbulent state (Anderson, 2017). Analogously, when a program is moving in a 
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controlled fashion with little unpredictable external or internal variance from the original 
estimates, one could say a program is in a laminar state. However, as the program activity 
begins to increase in both speed and numbers of interdependent and unanticipated inputs, the 
program begins to move toward a turbulent and volatile state. However, stable business 
environments, which control for extraneous factors, could provide stability for acquisition 
projects, leading to less project volatility and a higher probability of success. 
If we consider information flow in an organization to be analogous to fluid flowing 
through a pipe and if the capacity of the organization is large enough to manage and control the 
information flowing through it, then project stability is more likely. However, when an 
organization becomes overwhelmed and demand exceeds capacity, information flow throughout 
the organization becomes less controlled and more ambiguous, resulting in program volatility 
and greater risk of failure. Continued research is necessary to determine whether or not 
information flow through an organization changes from laminar to turbulent at a predictable 
point. Additionally, if an organizational Reynolds number exists, which variables and 
characteristics would define the capacity of the organization and the nature of the information 
being processed? If we are able to identify an analogous Reynolds number for an acquisition 
project, perhaps the project organization and strategy can be designed to produce the greatest 
amount of work in the most efficient way possible without risking chaotic information flow. 
Determining an organizational Reynolds number would provide enhanced understanding of the 
current EVM methods, allowing us to extend both project management practices and theory.  
Method and Scope 
This paper argues for a quantitative study that will use project data from EVM and 
selected acquisition reports (SAR) and correlate these data with Reynolds Averaged Navier 
Stokes (RANS) turbulent flow variables in order to better predict acquisition program 
performance. RANS is a mathematical technique that decomposes flow variables of the Navier-
Stokes equations into their mean and fluctuating components. The Reynolds number is a 
dimensionless number used to categorize fluid systems in which viscosity controls the flow 
pattern of the fluid.  
EVM is a project management methodology that integrates schedule, costs, and scope 
to measure project performance. Based on planned and actual values, EVM provides the 
project team an understanding of how well the project is performing but does not provide any 
real predictive power. The project is expected to perform according to the future plan if the 
project is within a reasonable variance of the project performance baseline.  
Data Sources 
Data will be obtained from the DoD Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE). 
This data repository provides a consolidated source for programmatic data, including earned 
value management and selected acquisition report data. The DAVE database is a registered 
site that requires CAC entry. It can be accessed at: https://dave.acq.osd.mil/. Specific data that 
will be required for this research will be EVM, schedule, and budget data for acquisition 
category I (ACAT I) information technology programs. ACAT I programs are defined to have a 
research and development budget over $250 million. SAR data will provide the qualitative 
descriptions for these programs and will allow the researcher to develop a category that can be 
subsequently correlated to knowledge flow variables.  
Variables 
The Reynolds number helps predict flow patterns in different fluid flow situations. At low 
Reynolds numbers, flows tend to be dominated by laminar flow, while at high Reynolds 
numbers, flows tend to be turbulent. Reynolds number is a measure of volatility. For the 
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purpose of this research the independent variables are velocity, distance, density, viscosity, and 
force. In addition to defining a Reynolds number for the project, the research will identify the 
project drag coefficient (Cd) by which Re will be compared and plotted, creating a Project 
“Moody” plot that reveals the predicted laminar and turbulent regions for the project.  
 
Equation 1. Reynolds Number 
 
Equation 2. Drag Coefficient 
The dependent variables for this research are the Re and Cd, which provide the 
foundation for project turbulent forecasting via the project “Moody” plots. Figure 2 represents a 
notional view of the project “Moody” plot that would clearly identify when a project begins to 
enter the critical zone between a smooth, well-managed project and a turbulent volatile project 
that could become unmanageable. 
 
Figure 2. Sample Moody Plot 
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Figure 3. Flow Transition from Laminar to Turbulent Volatility Begins in Transition Region 
Knowledge Flow 
A necessary component of EVM is the work breakdown structure. Breaking work into 
smaller tasks is used to make the work more manageable and provides insight into the 
complexity of each task and its associated risks. The Project Management Institute (PMI) 
PMBOK defines the WBS as a “deliverable oriented hierarchical decomposition of the work to 
be executed by the project team.” If work packages can be viewed as units of knowledge, then 
as work packages are completed, the flow of knowledge can be mapped across the project as 
the various tasks are completed. For the purpose of this research, a task within a WBS work 
package is considered to be the smallest unit of measurable knowledge, or value, within a 
project, allowing us to measure knowledge flow over time. Figure 4 represents a sample WBS 
with individual task units representing units of knowledge value. 
 
Figure 4: Sample Work Breakdown Structure, AMF JTRS 
As work packages are completed, the knowledge flow of the project increases either 
positively or negatively depending on whether or not the tasks were completed consistent with 
the planned performance baseline. A project completed on time and within its budget profile is 
considered to reflect optimal knowledge flow with no viscous effects, while projects that deviate 
from their baseline are considered to have achieved less than optimal knowledge flow. 
Using basic EVM metrics from existing information technology programs, these metrics 
will be compared to actual work progress as represented by the workflow plan in the project 
WBS. For example, the cost performance and schedule performance indices represent how well 
a project is accomplishing previously planned work. As work begins to fall behind, the CPI/SPI 
reflect the variance and the project’s cost and schedule begins to deviate from the original plan. 
CPI and SPI calculations are represented by 
Schedule Performance Index = Earned Value/Planned Value 
Cost performance Index = Earned Value/Actual Cost 
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Where: 
Earned Value = Budgeted Cost of Work Performed 
Planned Value = Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled 
 
 
Figure 5: EVM Metrics (PMI.org)  
The results of this comparison will represent a knowledge value (KV) variable by which 
knowledge flow can begin to be visualized. Since each task within the WBS represents a unit of 
knowledge, knowledge flow can be accurately determined throughout the project life cycle within 
the context of the accepted performance measurement baseline. Consequently, knowledge 
velocity (KVv) is the speed of actual knowledge value (KVa) relative to planned knowledge 
value (KVp). Additionally, KVv represents the property of the “fluid” environment within the 
developmental phase of the acquisition program. 
Lexical Link Analysis 
While characterizing the knowledge flow provides interesting insight and initial variable 
characterization, it is not sufficient to understanding future performance. Characterizing 
knowledge flow simply provides a visual into a moment in time with little understanding 
underlying nature of the knowledge flow state. In order to gain increased understanding into the 
nature of the knowledge flow, a method known as lexical link analysis (LLA) will be used to 
interpret the nature of the fluid environment at discrete points in time. This will begin to provide 
the researcher with a more coherent understanding of “why” the KVv is behaving in a particular 
manner. Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) is a form of text mining in which word meanings 
represented in lexical terms are treated as if they are in a community of a word network. LLA 
can provide automated awareness for analyzing text data and reveal previously unknown, data-
driven themed connections (Zhao, 2016).  
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Figure 6: Graphical Representation of Lexical Link Analysis 
 
Data for LLA will be obtained from the selected acquisition reports (SAR) from the 
projects under consideration for this research. A SAR is a comprehensive summary of a Major 
Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) ACAT I program that is required for periodic submission 
to Congress by the Secretary of Defense. It’s mandated by Title 10 USC § 2432 “Selected 
Acquisition Reports” (Acqnotes.com) 
The SAR will provide the researcher with a rich understanding of the nature of the 
project’s KVv by identifying key events through LLA that influence the nature of the knowledge 
value fluid. LLA can be mapped similar to scale free networks in which critical hubs that 
influence the network are easily identified.  
 
Figure 7: Nodal Relationship Using Lexical Link Analysis 
Using the Pareto principle, which specifies that 80% of consequences come from 20% of 
the causes, the dominant hubs identified at each phase of the life cycle in conjunction with the 
KVv, key variables can be identified and chosen as candidates for inclusion into a project 
turbulence prediction model known as the Reynolds-averaged Navier Stokes (RANS) equation.  
Finally, an ANOVA and a sensitivity analysis will be conducted to analyze how the 
different values of the independent variables affect the dependent variables at specific times in 
the project life cycle and will compare the variation among the means for the various programs 
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studied. This analysis will improve our confidence in how accurately the turbulent flow advance 
EVM method measures what is intended to be measured.  
Research Scope 
The research scope will be limited to information technology programs that are in the 
developmental stage of their project life cycle. In the DoD acquisition framework, this is defined 
as being a program in the Post Milestone B phase known as the Engineering Manufacturing and 
Development phase. The EMD phase is the start of an official program. The purpose of this 
phase is the development of a capability. This phase starts after a Milestone B review and 
consists of two efforts, Integrated System Design (ISD) and System Capability and 




Figure 8: Defense Acquisition Life-Cycle Framework 
 
The EMD phase is the phase in which EVM data is collected for a program in that the 
specific requirements are clearly delineated in a statement of work in the awarded contract. This 
phase requires that a performance measurement baseline be developed and EVM data 
collected for designated programs. 
Potential Outcomes and Limitations 
Two potential outcomes are the focus of this research. The first and perhaps most 
important is to extend current project management theory from a classical cost-based view of 
management into a more dynamic physics-based view that will more readily lend itself to 
improved forecasting and prediction. The second outcome is to provide a new model for project 
management forecasting and control that will improve decision-making for complex projects 
such as those typically found in information technology systems. Early analysis of this new fluid 
dynamics-based approach provides positive indications that the fundamental theory and method 
are sound. Notional data shows indications of increasing volatility significantly earlier than 
traditional EVM methods. Since this research methods uses traditional EM data and further 
refines the data with novel insight derived from LLA and fluid dynamics theory and methods, the 
methods for this improved measurement approach will be defined as Advanced Earned Value 
Management (AEVM). 
The results of this research will be the basis upon which a library of Reynolds number 
“Moody” plots can be generated that will provide the initial planning tools by which complex 
projects can be architected. Reynolds number “Moody” plots reflect the fully developed flow of a 
fluid within the boundary conditions established for the project. By having these plots, projects 
can more accurately be structured and monitored for conditions that might create instability and 
turbulence or volatility resulting in projects that are difficult to manage.  
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Potential limitations for this project are data quality. The data for this research is 
available in multiple databases across the DoD, and obtaining access requires coordinating with 
multiple organizations willing to release program-specific data. Additionally, defining the 
independent variables will be based upon subject matter expertise and concurrence, leaving 
open the possibility for continued debate from external experts. This debate will subside as 
more data is used to validate the turbulent flow models and the library of Moody plots begins to 
grow over time. 
Follow-on research can focus on moving from a more advanced form of project 
measurement developed in this research effort to application and policy development. As 
project volatility is better understood through this research, project managers will be able to 
more accurately management their projects with increased transparency in budgetary and 
technical decision-making. This increased transparency could provide the basis of fundamental 
reform in how budgets are determined and the flexibilities a project manager can be afforded 
with regard to financial and technical management.  
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Abstract 
In phase one of this research, (Gamble, 2020, Brook 2020), DoD areas on the GAO’s High-Risk 
List (HRL) were compared to similar longstanding high-risk non-Defense programs to determine if 
the DoD is a high-risk anomaly. Three attributes characterizing risk emerged: (1) the more 
technical programs have greater risk; (2) defense and national security areas have greater 
financial risk; (3) larger programs have greater, more prolonged risk. The study concluded DoD is 
a high-risk anomaly as the agency, and every area within, has two of the three attributes; but is 
not an anomaly in one as this attributes are present in non-Defense areas as well.  
From this analysis questions emerged regarding whether the DoD can ever get off the HRL and 
whether the DoD should prioritize getting off the HRL. Additionally, we perceived a theory of 
interaction between the DoD, the GAO and Congress that would influence the answers. To 
explore these questions, we examined the interaction theory and its practice, and interviewed 
over twenty current and former officials and staff experts in the GAO, the DoD and on Capitol Hill. 
The analysis amplifies the earlier findings and reveals mixed and inconclusive views on whether 
the DoD could ever get off or should even prioritize getting off the HRL in its management 
agenda. 
Introduction 
This research report is a continuation of research conducted for presentation at the 17th 
Annual Acquisition symposium exploring DoD management and specifically, the persistent 
presence of DoD areas on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) High-Risk List 
(Gamble 2020).  Efforts to improve DOD management are persistent. Brook (2020) reports that 
proposals and initiatives come from a variety of internal and external sources, including internal 
sources such as politically-appointed leaders including the Chief Management Officer and 
internal advisors such as the Defense Business Board. External sources addressing Defense 
management include special commissions, presidential management initiatives, defense-related 
think tanks, and Congressional mandates.  
The GAO, however, is arguably the source of the largest volume of studies, audits, 
initiatives and recommendations for Defense management. For instance, between 2014 and 
2017 the GAO made a total of 1,122 individual recommendation to the DOD, averaging 280 per 
year. Of those reports, the GAO’s High-Risk List stands alone in that it is a biennial report which 
can be used to track the persistence and prominence of major management issues over time. It 
also can reveal historical changes in the GAO’s approach.  
These GAO reports also provide information to the Congress. They can review and 
recommend actions that the Congress have taken or could take to support DoD management 
reforms. The GAO reports are used for congressional oversight of DoD management through 
committee hearings and they sometimes pique the interests of individual members with 
constituency concerns over the topics addressed. 
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Review of Prior Research 
In phase one of this research, we considered whether DoD’s persistent presence on the 
GAO HRL classifies the Department as a risk anomaly. As of the 2017 High-Risk Update, DoD 
owned half of the high-risk areas that remained on the list since its inception in 1990. The 
Department’s efforts since 1990 have resulted in removal of only two areas:  DoD Supply Chain 
Management recently removed in the 2019 report after 29 years on the list; and DoD Personnel 
Security Clearance Program. But, as of the 2019 HRL update report, the DoD still owns half of 
the areas that have been on the list for more than two decades. The Department’s persistent 
presence on the list brought to question whether the DoD is a risk anomaly. Utilizing comparison 
analysis of longstanding DoD high-risk areas (DoD Contract Management and DoD Weapons 
Acquisitions) with comparable longstanding non-DoD high-risk areas (DoE Contract 
Management and NASA Acquisition Management), we determined that DoD is and is not a 
high-risk anomaly.  The analysis revealed three high-risk trends that assist in answering the 
question: (1) the more technical the program, the greater and more prolonged the risk; (2) 
association with defense and national security lends to greater financial risk; and (3) the larger 
the program and portfolio, the greater and more prolonged the risk (Gamble 2020). The DoD 
meets the anomaly qualification in that its high-risk areas are always related to defense and the 
DoD will always be a large organization managing large and costly portfolios. However, we 
found that “DoD is not a high-risk anomaly in that it is not the only agency that succumbs to 
these high-risk trends” (Gamble 2020). For instance, the DoD is not the only HRL-listed agency 
that deals with highly technical matters or matters related to defense that appear to increase 
their propensity for risk. So, by this analysis, the DoD is and is not a high-risk anomaly. 
These findings led to addition questions. What is the theoretical framework that appears 
to undergird the HRL?1 Does this apparent framework actually work in practice? Is it plausible to 
think that the DoD will ever get off the HRL? Should getting off the HRL be a management 
objective for the DoD’s chief management officer? How do the DoD and GAO view this list and 
the roles they play?  
Methodology 
To explore these and other questions, we first undertook an extensive documentary 
search consisting of GAO reports and Congressional testimony. We then gathered the 
observations, opinions and viewpoints of subject matter experts (SMEs). We analyzed the data 
from these documents and interviews to draw a more complete picture of how the theoretical 
framework operates in practice and to understand the viewpoints of knowledgeable current and 
former officials and staff experts about the DoD’s presence on the HRL. 
We identified a small number of current and former officials and staff experts in the 
GAO, the DoD and on Capitol Hill. In each case we employed the snowball technique asking all 
the interviewees to identify others whom they recommended for interviews. In total, we 
conducted 18 interview sessions involving individuals with a total of a total of 27 organizational 
affiliations, interviewed either singly or in small groups from one office. The tally of interviewees 
by organization is shown below. Some interviewees had experience in more than one 
organization and are therefore counted in more than one category. 
  
 
1 This framework is the authors’ analytical construct derived from this and prior research.  
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Table 1 
Organizational Affiliations of Interviewees 
GAO               13 
DoD               8 
Capitol Hill               2 
Other Agencies               4 
 
Due to restrictions required by COVID-19, all interviews were conducted remotely, most 
on Zoom and a few on conference call. All interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution 
basis so as to encourage open and candid conversations. Thus, interviewees will be identified 
only as “SME #” with the date of the interview.2 The interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
The transcripts were then coded and examined to identify common themes and particularly 
salient statements. Finally, the data was categorized and this categorization is reflected in the 
following discussion and analysis. 
All the interviews were conducted as in-depth interviews, utilizing an interview guide 
from San Jose State University (SJSC 2020).  The expressed purposes of the interviews were 
to generate ideas, test hypotheses from the phase one study, and gain insights based on expert 
opinion. A short list of questions was prepared for each interview and supplementary questions 
and neutral probes were employed to draw out the interviewees’ responses. Each interview was 
closed with a catch-all question, such as: “is there anything else you would like to tell us?”  To 
assure completeness and reduce interviewer bias, both researchers participated in the 
interviews. 
Theory to Practice Construct 
Although not mandated by Congress, GAO publishes the high-risk list “to keep the 
Congress up to date on areas needing attention” within the federal government (GAO 2000). 
Since 1990 the GAO’s process for evaluating areas and making a high-risk designation has 
evolved. Ten years into the high-risk list program, the GAO developed rating criteria, as 
displayed in a five-point star, that shows each area’s progress in leadership commitment, action 
plan, monitoring, demonstrated progress, and capacity. Multiple congressional testimonies and 
reports from GAO contend that GAO’s framework for determining and subsequently addressing 
high-risk areas will result in removal from the high-risk list, provided each participant in the 
process takes the recommended actions. During phase two of this research, we sought to 
identify how GAO’s theory plays out in practice with respect to the DoD. Interviews provided 
more detailed information on GAO’s process and how each member of the process – GAO, 
Congress, OMB, and the agency (the DoD in this case) – experience it.  
The GAO High-Risk List, in Theory 
GAO publications and testimonies dating back to 1990 provide a robust account of what 
the HRL is, why it exists, and how the program is intended to function. An agency of the 
Congress, the GAO is the legislative branch’s “investigative arm” and the HRL provides 
“marching orders” for congressional subcommittees on government oversight (Cummings 2019; 
Jordan 2019). As the investigative arm, the GAO developed a Performance and Accountability 
Series that focused on “major program and mission areas” within each federal agency that 
meets certain criteria (GAO 2000). This Series is managed by the GAO’s Strategic Issues Team 
 
2 Interviews with each SME took place only once. The full and proper citation with the date of the interview is 
included in the first reference to each respective interviewee. For ease of reading, in subsequent references for 
each interviewee, the full citation is omitted and only the SME# is identified. 
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which further designates program or mission areas as high-risk when they meet quantitative and 
qualitative criteria as outlined in our report from phase one. A new addition to the HRL is never 
a surprise, whether added to the HRL as a result of ongoing work that rises to the designation of 
high-risk, such as the recent addition of Veteran’s Affairs Acquisitions added in 2019, or added 
as a new area like The Year 2000 Problem.  
The GAO’s commitment to the high-risk program is based on the belief that it is the 
mechanism needed to address the inaction of federal agencies to correct deficiencies and 
problems within management (GAO 1990). However, during the course of research it became 
apparent that the success of the high-risk program is predicated on underlying assumptions and 
the interplay between participants. One of the underlying theoretical assumptions the program 
operates from is that each area on the list can successfully be removed with improvements to 
agency management of the area. The GAO maintains this assumption despite more than a third 
of the original 14 areas remaining on the HRL after three decades. To identify why success has 
been illusive for most DoD high-risk areas, we must first understand the theoretical framework 
that the GAO utilizes. To do this, we identified what we’ve classified as key principles and 
assumptions, and examined the expectations of interplay amongst participants. 
Key Principles and Assumptions  
During the course of research, we identified several key principles that the GAO applies 
to the high-risk program. The first principle we identified is that the HRL is the mechanism to 
bring about change within the federal government to reduce agency fraud, waste, abuse, and 
mismanagement in high-risk areas. The second principle we saw is that risk does not have to be 
eliminated in order to achieve success. Rather, the GAO views success as risk management 
that results in a reduction in vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement (personal 
communication December 17, 2019). Our third observed principle is that the GAO’s framework 
relies on transparency and cooperation between participants. The GAO’s work is only as good 
as the information it receives from agencies, the OMB, and the Congress. Lastly, the GAO high-
risk program and framework demand a non-partisan approach aimed solely at reducing risk. 
In addition to these key principles, the GAO also employs three key assumptions in the 
high-risk program framework. First, the GAO assumes it is possible for all areas on the list to 
successfully get off the list. Secondly, the GAO assumes that the federal government should 
maintain each of the areas on the HRL and work towards removal from the list as opposed to 
eliminating the area. Finally, the GAO’s framework assumes that agencies want to get off the list 
and will make an effort to do so.  
Participants Theoretical Interplay 
In addition to the principles and assumptions, the GAO high-risk program framework 
relies on an interplay between participants. The high-risk program involves four key participants: 
the GAO, the Congress, the federal agency in charge of the high-risk area, and the OMB. 
GAO’s framework assigns roles and expectations to each of these with the aim of achieving 
success. These roles and expectations are best understood when considering how GAO 
envisions the interactions amongst the participants. 
The GAO and the Federal Agency  
As the creators and managers of the HRL program, the GAO expects to play an active 
role throughout an agency’s tenure on the list. Utilizing core teams for each area, the GAO’s 
Strategic Issues Team engages with agency points of contact for high-risk areas both prior to 
and during tenure on the HRL. By the time an area is added to the HRL, the GAO team is 
expected to be fairly familiar with the area and agency. Likewise, GAO expects the agency to 
have a minimum of one agency point of contact or team to communicate with GAO on the high-
risk issues (personal communication May 29, 2020). The GAO’s framework design expects the 
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GAO and agency teams to meet periodically to review the status of the high-risk area and any 
actions taken by the agency. The GAO’s framework does not prescribe the frequency of 
meetings between the GAO and the agencies, but the GAO’s best practices encourage 
agencies to have regular engagements with GAO teams. The GAO’s best practices for HRL 
progress and removal focus heavily on the agency. Agencies must: 
• Know the criteria for removal and how GAO is assessing them 
• Develop action plans with measures and agreed upon goals 
• Engage with GAO as actions taken 
• Demonstrate sustained senior leadership commitment and build congressional support 
• Ensure support and capacity to execute plans 
• Demonstrate sustained progress, capable of spanning Administrations 
• Coordinate on shared and government-wide areas (GAO 2019a). 
Additionally, The GAO’s dedicated teams and willingness to assist attest to its commitment to 
the high-risk program. The GAO routinely identifies and publishes best practices for high-risk 
and program specific issues, and encourages inter-agency crosstalk to share lessons learned.  
The biennial high-risk updates prepared for Congress are integral to the high-risk 
program framework. GAO has set the precedent to supply agencies with a draft of the updates, 
along with an opportunity to provide feedback, before publication. Agencies are expected to 
provide feedback to ensure an accurate portrayal of progress is captured. In conjunction with 
the biennial reports, the GAO provides additional support to the agencies through detailed 
reports on specific issues within a high-risk area. These reports supplement the high-risk update 
and provide a more detailed account of each area. The GAO’s essential expectation for 
interaction with agencies is that the agencies are willing to cooperate and work toward change. 
The GAO and the Congress  
For over twenty years, the GAO’s framework has included issues requiring 
congressional attention and recommended congressional actions on the high-risk updates (U.S. 
Congress 2005). In a March 2019 House Committee on Oversight and Reform hearing, 
Comptroller General Eugene Dodaro testified that “where we’ve seen progress, congressional 
hand has been at play” (Dodaro 2019). The GAO has no authority in and of itself to mandate 
agency action, but as an agency of the Congress, the GAO’s framework relies on the 
Congress’s willingness to oversee the management of high-risk areas and encourage or even 
mandate action. The GAO’s expectations of the Congress also include cooperation during 
preparation for the biennial report publication by providing feedback on drafted 
recommendations for Congressional actions. With the release of the biennial reports, the 
Comptroller General testifies before congressional committees with a team of experts to provide 
robust assessment and feedback on the state of the HRL. The GAO expects that Congress will 
continue to discuss and act on the recommendations for Congressional action.  
The Congress and the Federal Agency 
 The high-risk framework includes interactions between the Congress and the agencies 
via congressional testimony, correspondence, NDAA mandates, and relationship building. Best 
practices from the GAO include engagement on the side of the agency and the Congress to 
ensure effective change. The framework also requires Congress to conduct the agency 
oversight required to ensure mandates are adhered to by the agencies.  
The Office of Management and Budget 
The GAO has long-held the view that the Office of Management and Budget, in the 
Executive Office of the President, needs to take a more active role in the high-risk program by 
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designating an individual to lead the fight against fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement 
(U.S. Congress 2005). The OMB is seen as a key role player as well by Congress, with Senator 
Voinovich highlighting in a 2005 hearing that the President’s Management Agenda has the 
ability to “create a confluence of ideas and synergy” that can lead to significant reform 
(Voinovich 2005). However, the OMB’s role in the high-risk process was only a recommendation 
until late 2016 with the passing of the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act 
(PMIAA). The PMIAA is an example of Congress fulfilling expectations and acting on GAO 
recommendations. Specifically, the PMIAA mandates the OMB’s Deputy Director for 
Management to review HRL area portfolios and receive recommendations from a Program 
Management Policy Council focused on improving management and high-risk areas (GAO 
2019b). The theoretical GAO framework relies on the active participation of the Deputy Director 
of Management to mandate and oversee the implementation of recommended changes to high-
risk areas. Additionally, the principle of transparency applies to the OMB. Between high-risk 
update issuances, the GAO provides the OMB with a draft of the HRL report and opportunity to 
provide feedback on the assessment and recommendations (U.S. Congress 2019). In order for 
the high-risk program to be successful, the theoretical framework requires OMB’s active 
participation, transparency, and cooperation with GAO. 
In theory then, with a synergistic approach by the GAO, the Congress, the DoD 
(agency), and the OMB, one could expect each evaluation criterion in the DoD’s high-risk areas 
to be eventually satisfied and the areas removed from the HRL. However, five DoD areas 
remain on the list after two decades with progress fluctuating over the course of the tenure. We 
attempt to answer why by assessing how the theory plays out in practice. 
 
Figure 1 
Observed High Risk List Theoretical Framework 
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The High-Risk List in Practice: Challenges to the Apparent Framework 
From the GAO’s perspective, the integrity of the framework is often compromised by 
congressional and agency inaction. GAO officials identified that the HRL is not of the necessary 
level of importance within the DoD to result in the required progress (personal communication 
October 28, 2019). Agencies that have seen great progress, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security, have done so by making the HRL an internal priority and increasing 
cooperation with the GAO (personal communication August 17, 2020). Across various high-risk 
areas, the GAO routinely sees as lack of implementation of best practices and 
recommendations. Agencies may list best practices in their action plan but fail to establish 
measures of accountability for their implementation.  
The GAO, agencies, and the OMB all see leadership as a lynchpin to addressing risk. 
However, all three players acknowledge that leadership transitions, as often a result of political 
appointment, greatly hinder agency efforts (U.S. Congress 2005; U.S. Congress 2019). In 
addition to leadership longevity, much of the effort placed on the HRL by agencies and the OMB 
is driven by leadership priorities and personality. In 2019, the Comptroller General testified to 
Congress on the White House’s unwillingness to cooperate with the GAO, greatly hindering 
GAO’s assessment of cybersecurity and denying the GAO information regarding the 
Administration’s actions to address issues of concern (U.S. Congress 2019).  
From the agency perspective, the framework is unreliable because the GAO fails to 
meet expectations when it comes to expertise in agency operations. While the GAO attempts to 
understand the DoD’s management practices and processes, a lack of understanding can lead 
to recommendations that are not feasible for execution.     
The GAO’s identification of issues requiring congressional attention is necessary, but the 
framework requires congressional action. While the HRL is an effective tool for Congress and a 
helpful reference, individual program reports (often mandated by Congress) often garner more 
attention and subsequent action (personal communication May 27, 2020). Overall, however, 
Congressional interest in oversight of agency reform is often limited to just a few members and 
occasional subcommittee hearings. 
After considering challenges of executing the theoretical framework, we took the next 
step to explore the findings through interviews with subject matter experts. Our purpose was to 
test and validate the analysis and conclusions that were derived at this point in our research. 
We sought to determine how the theoretical construct of the HRL plays out in actual practice. 
Theory to Practice – The Viewpoints of Experts 
Data gathered from interviews, presented below, was categorized and analyzed based 
first on questions that arose from the phase one study and secondly based on topics which 
arose in the course of the interviews. The interview data fall into five identifiable categories of 
research questions: how is the theory of interactions between agencies, GAO, and Congress 
put into practice concerning the DoD; could the DoD ever get off the HRL; should the DoD 
prioritize getting off the HRL and, if so, what are proven strategies and best practices for making 
progress on HRL areas; and ultimately, is the DoD an anomaly? 
Interactions Between Agencies, GAO and Congress 
The interactions between the three major actors concerned with the HRL, the agencies, 
the GAO and Congress, reflect the roles each plays in public management. Concerning 
specifically the DoD’s presence on the HRL, the DoD is responsible for the day-to-day and long-
term management of the department; the GAO conducts management audits and provides 
evaluations and advice on management improvement; and the Congress provides oversight, 
receives reports, and can mandate management actions. Both the bilateral relationship between 
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the GAO and the DoD, and the trilateral interaction between the GAO, the DoD, and Congress, 
were explored in interviews with current and former officials associated with each participant. 
Bilateral Interaction between the GAO and the DoD  
The foundational theory behind the HRL suggests that the three actors – the DoD, The 
GAO and the Congress play specific and complementary roles in a collective effort to reduce 
the high-cost risk of fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement. Our interviews indicated that both 
bilateral and trilateral relationships exist in this framework. The most frequently observed 
relationship is that between the GAO and the DoD. We explored the nature of that relationship 
with SMEs from the two organizations. SME 2 (personal communication, July 1, 2020) said that 
in the early periods of the HRL the relationship between the GAO and the DoD was mostly 
adversarial, but other interviewees said the relationship today has more interaction and 
collaboration. For instance, SME 6 (personal communication, May 25, 2020), a GAO source, 
observed that DoD and GAO teams touch base several times a year to discuss high risk issues 
with senior DoD personnel and that GAO meets nearly weekly with mid-level personnel. SME 8 
(personal communication, October 28, 2019) cited quarterly senior level meetings between the 
DoD and GAO and saw there was “a lot of good interaction throughout the year.” SME 12 
(personal communication, July 3, 2020), a DoD source, described reaching out to establish 
relationships with senior staff and instituting consistent ongoing dialogue. 
Notwithstanding this current collaborative environment between the DoD and GAO, 
there are issues. One is the extent to which DoD believes the GAO understands its business 
operations. SME 2, a GAO official, said “We know DoD’s business very well from an outsider’s 
perspective. We will never say that we know the things from the inside.”  SME 9 (personal 
communication, June 15, 2020) a DoD official, claims that the GAO’s findings often tend to 
corroborate what DoD knows internally but that sometimes GAO recommends actions that DoD 
probably cannot do; “the organization of the department doesn’t always allow certain solutions 
for complex problems.” The DoD does attempt to explain its operations to the GAO. SME 12 
says the DoD does make an effort to explain the way they do business to the GAO. But, SME 8 
is not quite so patient: “When it is just an academic exercise and people don’t have the 
experience, DoD is not going to listen to them.”  
Bilateral Interaction between the GAO and Congress and between the DoD and Congress 
A second set of bilateral relationships exist between the GAO and the Congress 
independent of the DoD and between the DoD and the Congress independent of the GAO. 
The GAO was created in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as the General 
Accounting Office to be the principal financial analytical agency of the Congress. Over time its 
work expanded to include monitoring executive branch agencies’ programs and spending. In 
2004 its name was changed to the Government Accountability Office. The GAO is an agency of 
the legislative branch and reports to and takes direction from the Congress. (GAO 2020). 
As an agency of the Congress, the GAO has a relationship with the Congress and key 
congressional committees well beyond the topic of the DoD and the HRL. GAO conducts other 
audits of the DoD, either self-initiated or requested by Congress. The GAO issues individual 
reports on these audits and its officials testify frequently before congressional committees.  
Between 2014 and 2017 the GAO made a total of 1122 individual recommendation to the DOD, 
averaging 280 per year. For this period, it identified 68 priority recommendations in the areas of 
acquisition and contract management (25 priority recommendations), readiness (14), financial 
management (11), health care (7), cyber security (5), headquarters management (3), support 
infrastructure (2), and information technology (1) (GAO, 2018, p. 25). 72% of the GAO’s 
recommendations in this four-year period addressed management issues in categories both 
similar to and different from those found in the HRL. Any of these reports could become the 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 143 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
topic of congressional oversight hearings or a source for legislation. Thus, GAO has much 
greater potential for interaction with the Congress on DoD-related topics other than the HRL. 
The biennial HRL, however, is always a subject of congressional hearings with the GAO upon 
release of the report. 
The DoD was formulated with the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947 
and eventually as the Department of Defense in an amendment to the 1949 National Security 
Act (DoD, 2020). The organization and functions of the Department are codified in law in USC 
Title X. Like the GAO, the DoD has multiple interactions with the Congress outside the scope of 
the HRL. Many of the interactions deal with national security issues, such as the annual posture 
statement testimonies by DoD and the military departments, but many of them also address 
management topics. Congress directly addresses DoD management issues when it reviews 
funding and program authorizations through the annual Defense Appropriations Act and the 
National Defense Authorization Act, both of which can include mandates and requirements 
concerning Defense management.  In fact, as shown in charts 1 and 2 below, Congress has 
been steadily increasing its organizational and management mandates through the general 
provisions of the annual appropriations act in the overall increase in the size of the annual 
authorization act. 
Chart 1 
Number of General Provisions in the Defense Appropriations Acts, 1970-2019 
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Chart 2 
Number of Pages in the NDAA 
 
Source: Candreva (2017), p.49. 
Trilateral Relationship Between the Congress, the GAO and the DoD 
How then does Congress exercise oversight of the DoD and the GAO within the context 
of the HRL? SME 1 (personal communication, June 10, 2020) explained that the HRL 
assessment is not “sponsored” (i.e., directed) by Congress. Rather it is an initiative of the GAO 
(as contrasted with individual studies that are directed by or sponsored in Congress). 
Nevertheless, the entire biennial HRL update is always the subject of Congressional hearings. 
These hearings generally take place before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform and 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. In addition, HRL areas 
specific to the DoD can be the subject of hearings before the respective House and Senate 
armed services committees. SME 4 (personal communication, November 12, 2019) said there 
were times when the Senate Armed Service Committee would hold a hearing on the HRL, but it 
was more likely for the committee to hold a hearing on a set of specific defense management 
issues arising from individual GAO reports where the HRL would come out in discussion. 
What then is congressional interest in the HRL? SME 11 (personal communication, May 
27, 2020) explained that some HRL-related areas have been included in the NDAA. Sponsors of 
the legislation will cite the HRL when they put something into the NDAA. In hearings, when GAO 
wants to make a recommendation, it would have some members of Congress reach out and ask 
about that recommendation and what they could put in the NDAA to fix it.  Sometimes Members 
will have a political agenda that coincides with what is on the HRL and they will use the list to 
assert their agenda is credible because GAO is producing these reports. SME 9 identified that 
Capitol Hill interactions on the HRL depend on the broader congressional agenda, explaining 
that there is no separate callout in saying that “this is on the HRL,” but sometimes there is a 
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pointing out the 2019 HRL report acknowledges the involvement of Congress, saying “Congress 
also continues to take important actions. For example, Congress has enacted a number of laws 
since our last report in February 2017 that are helping to make progress on high-risk issues.” 
(GAO, 2019b, p. 1) SME 11 noted that the HRL is mostly used as a “helper tool,” not as a 
standalone product that the Committees look at. Instead, it appears the committees are more 
interested and responsive to individual GAO reports rather than the broader HRL.  
Congressional interest, sometimes encouraged by GAO, can be used to motivate DoD 
to address areas on the HRL. SME 6 thinks the committee hearings have great impact if the 
Administration and Congress both support a recommendation. SME 10 agrees, saying when 
Congress holds hearings, they are well-attended and, in some cases, GAO’s presentation of the 
HRL to Congress gives reason for DoD to act on its own internally-generated management 
reforms. Thus, both the GAO and the DoD can use Congress to leverage action on topics in the 
HRL but according to SME 4, the DoD doesn’t come to the Senate to ask for legislation to help it 
in dealing with a high-risk program just because it’s on the HRL.  
Role of the Office of Management and Budget 
The GAO framework envisions a significant role for the Office of Management and 
Budget. We explored this issue with SMEs knowledgeable about the OMB’s involvement with 
the HRL. SME 7 said there were times when OMB tried to broker agreements on some 
management issues in sessions with the GAO and the DoD. SME 9 said it depended on who 
the “risk owners” were. The DoD owns the risks specific to it and OMB is more concerned with 
government-wide risks. SME 17 (personal communication, July 20, 2020), an OMB official, 
agreed that OMB’s interests were in management themes crosscutting across agencies but said 
there was “no systematic connection between HRL and the OMB-managed President’s 
Management Agenda.” Nor has OMB analyzed what would be required to get off the HRL. In 
fact, the President’s Management Agenda addresses only some of the GAO’s high-risk issues. 
In summary, it seems clear in the interviews that there is a good deal of HRL-related 
interaction between staffs of the GAO and the DoD, including periodic meetings at very senior 
levels. If the relationship between them was once adversarial it appears to be more 
collaborative today, though not without some friction points. Collaboration can vary by high-risk 
area and in some cases the collaboration amounted to periodic pro forma meetings, after which 
both the DoD and GAO returned to doing things their own way. There also appears to be 
significant bilateral interaction between the GAO and Congress, as one might expect. As an 
agency of Congress, the GAO reports regularly to the relevant committees about Defense 
management issues including the HRL. But the greater attention seems to be paid to individual 
GAO studies and reports rather than to the every-two-years HRL. The GAO can also leverage 
its position with Congress to motivate the DoD to address certain issues including those on the 
HRL. There seems to be less bilateral direct interaction between the DoD and Congress 
regarding the HRL outside of committee hearings and periodic meetings with congressional 
staff. Finally, there is scant evidence from the SMEs to suggest much productive trilateral 
collaborative interaction on HRL areas between the three entities. 
Getting Off the HRL 
A second theme that arises deals with the issue of getting off the HRL. This theme 
considers questions about (1) whether the DoD could ever really get off the list, and (2) whether 
the DoD’s management agenda should prioritize getting off the list, and, if so, what successful 
practices could the DoD employ to make progress toward removal from the HRL. 
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Could the DoD Ever Get Off the HRL? 
The long-tenure of some of the DoD’s areas on the HRL raise questions about whether 
the DoD could ever get completely off the list. Some of the interviewees were skeptical, others 
were more optimistic. Virtually all of the GAO officials we interviewed expressed the opinion that 
the DoD could get its areas off the HRL. Some in the DoD, principally those who had been 
involved with a successful effort to get an item off the list were also somewhat optimistic. But 
most DoD officials we interviewed saw the DoD’s HRL areas to be inherently risky and costly, 
and thus think the DoD will always be on the list. GAO officials, however, tended to 
acknowledge that risk exists in the DoD’s areas and cannot be eliminated completely, but with 
proper management reform the DoD can come off the list. SME 4 acknowledges that good 
Defense management is important but that the HRL is largely not a list of solvable problems for 
the DoD. SME 7 agrees, saying everyone wants the DoD to be more efficient but the complexity 
of everything that DoD manages is going to bring risk.  
On the other hand, SME 3 and SME 2, both of them GAO officials, are more positive. 
They point out that the DoD has recently had two high-risk areas removed from the list - 
personnel security clearances and supply chain management - and other complex HRL areas 
like terrorism and information sharing have come off the list. High-risk areas don’t have to 
eliminate risk to get off the HRL, they need only to move from “high risk” to “risk”. SME 9 a DoD 
official, somewhat concurs, observing that the Department’s management agenda now is 
looking more closely at HRL areas in addition to individual GAO reports. So, there is a 
perceived difference in perspective here. While the GAO views getting off the list as managing 
the risk so that it is lower, the DoD perspective seems to some to mean eliminating the risk. 
Should the DoD Prioritize Getting Off the HRL? 
If there is at least disagreement over whether DoD could ever get off the list, the obvious 
next question is whether the DoD should prioritize getting off the list. This question involves both 
the probability of success and the incentives for trying.  There is some disagreement among the 
SMEs interviewed about the extent to which the DoD should prioritize getting off the HRL in its 
management agenda.  SME 5 makes the case for trying, saying that being on the HRL is fair but 
that getting off the list is not really central to the DoD management agenda. Both SME 10 a 
GAO official and SME 12, a DoD official answered simply “yes” to a question about whether 
DoD should be trying to get off the list, SME 12 adding emphatically, “I want to get off the list.” 
SME 8 believes the DoD just isn’t going to prioritize the HRL. Instead, they are going to 
do things aligned with executing the national security strategy, prioritizing the mission over the 
HRL. Added to the negative argument now is the disestablishment of the Office of the Chief 
Management Officer in the FY 2021 NDAA. Some SMEs had pointed to the CMO as the logical 
responsible party to take ownership of the high-risk areas. Furthermore, neither the incentives 
nor disincentives clearly align with getting off the list. There seems to be little penalty for being 
on the list, except for some discomfort in occasional congressional hearings on the subject of 
the HRL. SME 16, a DoD official said “Congressional pressure has been the biggest” incentive 
to get DoD off the HRL. Conversely, SME 15, a GAO interviewee said “It should be in their 
(DoD’s) interest because they could get more money.” There is little indication however that 
Defense appropriations decisions are influenced by the HRL; SME 8 argued that the DoD did 
not receive any more money for recently getting areas off the HRL. Even though SME 15 said it 
is “embarrassing” to be on the HRL, there are few rewards for getting off the list aside from the 
intrinsic reward felt by individual managers whose areas make progress or get off the list. SME 
8 said the only incentive was “personal satisfaction and that is it.”  
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Successful Practices Toward Removal from the HRL 
If DoD were to prioritize getting areas off the HRL are there successful practices that it 
might follow? Reflecting on the early days of the HRL, SME 2 said that at the time DoD contract 
management and weapons systems came onto the HRL, a lot of the decisions about what to put 
on the list were judgement calls, not very objective or methodical. In some cases, such as 
weapons systems acquisition, size and visibility were the major factors in getting on the list. 
SME-10 (personal communication, December 17, 2019), speaking from a GAO perspective, 
admitted that when the HRL began there were also no clear criteria for getting on or off the list. 
Now, however, the GAO’s use of the five-pointed star rubric for measuring progress provide 
some credit for DoD efforts. SME 5 (personal communication, June 8, 2020), a DoD official, 
doesn’t disagree that the DoD belongs on the high-risk list, but just wants the GAO to “give us 
credit for where progress is being made.” 
And, in fact, the DoD has been successful recently in getting two areas off the HRL. 
SME 13 (personal communication, July 30, 2020) explained the DoD’s process for getting 
supply chain management off the HRL. It essentially involved attacking each element of GAO’s 
five-star evaluation system separately or sequentially. Initially the focus was on leadership, 
getting the two-star logisticians to establish a plan. Next came a comprehensive action plan and 
the dedication of resources. Metrics were established and periodic monitoring took place and 
policies were changed as needed. DoD was transparent throughout the process with the GAO 
in attendance for the DoD’s internal meetings. 
Goal setting and accountability are cited by SME 1 (personal communication, June 10, 
2020) pointing out that the Department of Homeland Security has prioritized getting off the HRL 
within three years. They hold their executives accountable toward addressing the GAO’s 
recommendations. SME 16 (personal communication, August 17, 2020) said Congress played a 
role in motivating DHS by requiring DHS to cooperate more with GAO. DHS thus realized over 
time that the HRL was going to be the cause of a lot of congressional pressure so the 
department’s leadership there got pretty serious about it. With DHS’s approach being mentioned 
multiple times as a model, the question arises: are the DoD and DHS analogous when it comes 
to the HRL? SME 3 answered “yes” but was quick to point out the difference in scale. For 
instance, both agencies have business systems modernization on the HRL but DHS’s total IT 
budget was $9 billion while DoD’s spending for business systems alone would exceed that 
amount. SME 16 however, thought DHS is just as complicated if not more than DoD. SME 16 
went on to say that the argument that DoD is unique is convenient, getting off the list is just a 
matter of how much the leadership in each department wants to take it seriously. 
Is the DoD making any progress toward getting more high-risk areas off the list? SME 6 
currently sees a strong commitment in DoD to address high risk issues. There is more 
leadership commitment scored in the latest report and they are trying to create robust action 
plans. That is what is needed now. SME 17 advises that if DoD wants to prioritize getting off the 
list it should work to get specific language in support of those efforts into the NDAA. 
In summary, the SMEs who participated in the interviews reflect mixed views of the 
questions about whether the DoD could get off the HRL and if it should even prioritize doing so. 
Strong arguments suggest that the DoD’s size, complexity and the nature of its programs will 
always result on exceeding the GAO’s threshold for high risk. Other equally powerful 
arguments, that an agency consuming half of the nation’s discretionary budget has a 
responsibility to strive for better management and that success is possible as seen with the 
removal of two DoD areas from the HRL, prove that it should and can be done. In either case, 
it’s clear that there are steps that the DoD could take to make progress on HRL areas, get credit 
for progress, and work toward getting at least some of them off the list.  
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Again, the question of getting off the HRL and whether the DoD should prioritize it 
seems highly influenced by the perspectives of DoD and GAO officials. The GAO perspective is 
that the DoD doesn’t need to eliminate risk, just manage it to a lower, more acceptable level. 
But the apparent DoD perspective is that its programs are inherently risky because they are 
large in scale, high cost, and usually involve development of new technologies and new 
products. The perspective of those SMEs who were involved with areas that got off the list, saw 
it as possible and worth striving for. Perspective seems to be a material consideration in this 
question. 
Is DoD an Anomaly? 
To return to our original research question, is the DoD a high-risk anomaly? We end up 
in the same position as in the first phase of this research (Gamble 2020) as indicated in the 
views of three SMEs: SME 6 says yes, DoD is huge in scope and that makes it different; SME-
12 (personal communication, June 30, 2020) disagrees, at least when compared to some other 
large complex agencies like DHS; SME 17 cautions that the DoD’s scale may be a factor in 
GAO’s capacity for analyzing defense management even though it devotes more of its capacity 
to national security than to any other area. 
Conclusion and Observations 
The answer to the question of whether the DoD is a high-risk anomaly remains 
ambiguous. The DoD is certainly characterized by the three main attributes of high-risk. But, so 
are some other agencies on the HRL. On the other hand, some DoD areas have managed to 
get off the HRL. When asked about the DoD’s presence on the HRL, GAO, DoD and 
Congressional subject matter experts disagreed, with most GAO experts and a few DoD experts 
believing that it would be possible for the DoD to get off the list. More DoD experts thought the 
DoD could never get completely off the list owing to its size, complexity and high-dollar 
programs. 
Our analysis concludes the theoretical framework of the HRL, with its expected roles and 
responsibilities for the GAO, the DoD, the OMB and the Congress is not fully functional in 
practice. It is true that there is cooperation and collaboration between the GAO and the DoD at 
both the functional and senior leadership levels that can lead to management improvement 
even if not achieving complete removal from the HRL. But the roles of the OMB and the 
Congress seem less active. The OMB’s response to the PMIAA by citing the HRL in its circular 
A-11 doesn’t appear to actually require the agencies or Deputy Director to do anything to further 
the goal of getting off the HRL other than to make a report. Similarly, the interest of Congress in 
the HRL seem only episodic and person- or constituency-driven. Interviews across the agencies 
suggest that the individual GAO audit reports receive more attention and prompt more 
corrective action than does the HRL. In the absence of tangible incentives there seems to be 
little in the way of motivation for the DoD to prioritize getting off the HRL. Instead, as more than 
one DoD SME argued, if the Department just works to improve its management policies and 
practices, making progress on the HRL and perhaps even getting off the list, would be a 
pleasant by-product. 
Finally, it is clear that the HRL is an invention of the GAO. The HRL was not mandated 
by Congress nor does it have a particular congressional owner, either a committee or individual 
legislators. The GAO also lacks enforcement authority beyond persuasion and the public 
scrutiny that comes from biennial congressional hearings. 
Ultimately, though the DoD is and is not a high-risk anomaly, whether or not it prioritizes 
making progress and getting off the HRL is a question that characterizes all of the DoD’s 
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management initiatives. The DoD will undertake to respond to the HRL when doing so directly 
serves the mission of the Department. 
Works Cited 
Brook, Douglas A. (2020). Persistent Perspectives on Defense Management Reform. In 
Proceedings, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 17th Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium. Monterey, CA. May 13-14, 2020. 
Candreva, Philip J. (2017). National Defense Budgeting and Financial Management. Charlotte, 
NC, Information Age Publishing, 2017.  
Cummings, Elijah (MD). (2019) Quote from U.S. Congress: Hearing before the Committee on 
Oversight and Reform. House of Representatives. “GAO’s 2019 High Risk Report.” 
(Date: 3/6/2019). Retrieved from 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190306/109019/HHRG-116-GO00-
Transcript-20190306.pdf, October 10, 2020. 
Dodaro, Eugene. (2019) Quote from U.S. Congress: Hearing before the Committee on 
Oversight and Reform. House of Representatives. “GAO’s 2019 High Risk Report.” 
(Date: 3/6/2019). Retrieved from 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190306/109019/HHRG-116-GO00-
Transcript-20190306.pdf, October 10, 2020. 
Gamble, Danelle (2020). Is the Department of Defense a High-Risk Anomaly? An Analysis of 
the Government Accountability Office’s High-Risk List’s Persistent Residents. In 
Proceedings, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 17th Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium. Monterey, CA. May 13-14, 2020. 
Jordan, James (OH). (2019) Quote from U.S. Congress: Hearing before the Committee on 
Oversight and Reform. House of Representatives. “GAO’s 2019 High Risk Report.” 
(Date: 3/6/2019). Retrieved from 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190306/109019/HHRG-116-GO00-
Transcript-20190306.pdf, October 10, 2020. 
U.S. Congress (2005). Hearing before the Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee. “Programs in Peril: An Overview 
of the GAO High-Risk List.” (Date: 2/17/2005). Retrieved from 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg20174/html/CHRG-
109shrg20174.htm, October 10, 2020. 
U.S. Congress (2019). Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Reform. House of 
Representatives. “GAO’s 2019 High Risk Report.” (Date: 3/6/2019). Retrieved from 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190306/109019/HHRG-116-GO00-
Transcript-20190306.pdf, October 10, 2020. 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD 2020). About the Department of Defense – History. Retrieved 
from https://archive.defense.gov/about/#history, December 3, 2020. 
U.S. GAO (GAO 1990). High Risk: Letter to Congressional Committees Identifying GAO’s 
Original High-Risk Areas. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659029.pdf, 
November 7, 2019.  
U.S. GAO (GAO 2000). Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 
Risks. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/200448.pdf, June 15, 2020. 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 150 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
U.S. GAO (GAO 2020). History at a Glance. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/about/what-
gao-is/history/, December 3, 2020. 
U.S. GAO (GAO 2019a). Slide presentation. Making Progress on High-Risk Issues.  
U.S. GAO (GAO 2019b) HIGH-RISK SERIES: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater 
Progress on High-Risk Areas. Retrieved from 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/697245.pdf , January 8, 2021. 
U.S. GAO. 2018. Status of GAO Recommendations Made to the Department of Defense (Fiscal 
Years 2014-2017). Washington, DC: GAO. Retrieved from 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/696753.pdf , January 3, 2021. 
San Jose State University (SJSU 2020). In depth Interview Guide. Retrieved from 
https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/weinstein.agrawal/urbp298_phI_handout_Interviews.pdf. 
Voinovich, George (OH). (2005) Quote from U.S. Congress: Hearing before the Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 
Subcommittee. “Programs in Peril: An Overview of the GAO High-Risk List.” (Date: 
2/17/2005). Retrieved from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
109shrg20174/html/CHRG-109shrg20174.htm, October 10, 2020. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors appreciate the substantial contribution in data organization and analysis 
provided by undergraduate research assistant, Kyle Melatti; and the institutional support 
provided by Michele Grow, senior grants and contracts administrator in the Duke Campus 
Grants Management Team. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 151 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Fire Scout: The Navy, Northrop Grumman, and Acquisition in 
Adversity: A Case Study 
Amir Etemadi—received a Doctor of Philosophy degree in electrical engineering from the University of 
Toronto, Toronto, Canada, a Master of Science degree in electrical engineering from Sharif University of 
Technology, Tehran, Iran, and a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering from the University 
of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. He joined the faculty at the George Washington University in 2013 where he is 
currently an Assistant Professor in the School of Engineering and Applied Science in the Department of 
Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Department of Engineering Management and Systems 
Engineering. He teaches master- and doctorate-level courses in electrical engineering and engineering 
management.   
Etemadi’s research interests include distributed generation, power system dynamics and control, 
quantitative risk analysis, and engineering management. He is the Principal Investigator on several 
current research projects, including a National Science Foundation project on geomagnetic disturbance 
impacts on power system operation, and an Acquisition Research Program grant on defense acquisition 
strategies. In addition, he is also a faculty graduate research advisor in the School of Engineering and 
Applied Sciences, and has supervised more than 50 masters and doctoral candidates for degrees in both 
electrical engineering and engineering management. Etemadi is a member of the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). [etemadi@gwu.edu] 
John Kamp—received a Doctor of Engineering in engineering management from the George 
Washington University in 2019, a Master of Engineering in nuclear engineering from Iowa State 
University, and a Bachelor of Arts in mathematics and French from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. 
Kamp joined the George Washington University research staff in 2019 and is supporting Etemadi’s 
acquisition strategy research project. He is a retired naval submarine officer with extensive experience in 
research and development and program management. His research interests include engineering 
management, maritime systems, and acquisition system research. Kamp is a Fellow in the Royal 
Institution of Naval Architects and a member of several professional associations.  
[jckamp2018@gwu.edu] 
Abstract 
The Department of Defense is experimenting with how to deliver new capabilities in 2 to 5 years. 
Program offices recognize that they are dependent upon their contractors for successful delivery. 
The MQ-8 Fire Scout started in 1999 and achieved initial operational capability of the MQ-8C in 
2019, after 20 years and effectively three program restarts. After each restart, the contractor 
developed, manufactured, and delivered a functional product deployed by the Navy within 5 years 
of contract award.   
Conventional wisdom says that senior leadership support and customer urgency are critical to 
fast delivery. This study shows how a program office and prime contractor were able to deliver a 
new capability despite changes in procurement objectives, evolving technologies, and 
requirements.   
Results Statements 
This research developed a case study from publicly available sources. This case study highlights 
how intangible assets such as prime contractor employee intellectual capital, goodwill, and a 
sustained corporate interest in strategically positioning for a future market sector are 
complementary to a program’s acquisition strategy and essential to program execution.   
Research Limitations/Implications   
This research used publicly available data from budget submissions, program-related reporting, 
contractor annual reports, and contemporaneous press releases. The findings are specific to the 
Fire Scout program, and suggest that factors previously considered in industrial base arguments 
are relevant to rapid product delivery. 
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Disclaimer 
This material is based upon work supported by the Acquisition Research Program under Grant 
No. HQ00341910004. The views expressed in written materials or publications, and/or made by 
speakers, moderators, and presenters, do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the 
Department of Defense nor does mention of trade names, commercial practices, or organizations 
imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense (DoD) buys products and services collectively described as 
a capability. Acquisition strategies are business plans developed by program offices and 
approved by senior leadership, containing a statement of need for the capability, estimated cost 
and schedule, and the contracting and support plans (General Services Administration, 2019, 
pt. 7). The rate of change of both technology and adversary capabilities is pushing the DoD and 
defense contractors to speed capability development and delivery. MDAP capability 
requirements such as maximum speed, endurance, and payload capacity change over time. 
Programs proceed in phases from program start through program decision and assessment 
gates1 to initial operational capability (IOC).   
This research was part of a 2019 Acquisition Research Program grant study. We 
developed a case study from the 1999 Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Air Vehicle 
(VTUAV) development through the delivery of the MQ-8 Fire Scout in 2019. The development 
and delivery occurred within the context of a defense-unique market defined by the contractor 
and a government stakeholder. Major policy changes enacted during the Fire Scout program 
include the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and the 2016 Section 804 Middle 
Tier of Acquisition2 and had little effect on Fire Scout.   
Contemporaneous news articles and press releases provide the context for Fire Scout 
development. Programmatic information is from contract award data from FPDS.gov and 
publicly released Selected Acquisition Reports.   
The research examined contractor acquisitions and teaming on program outcomes. 
These affect not only market competition by changing the numbers of buyers and sellers, but 
also represent long-term contractor strategies faced with substitute goods, regulation, and 
peripatetic demand3.   
Background 
Northrop Grumman History 
Northrop Grumman has a long history of aviation innovation. The company designed the 
first flying wing bomber in the 1940s, produced lightweight fighters such as the F-5 and target 
drones in the 1960s, and the B-2 stealth bomber in the 1980s. Northrop acquired Vought in 
1992 and Grumman Aerospace in 1994, bringing additional product lines such as the F-14 and 
E-2 into the company and consolidating aerospace market position45. 
 
1 Examples include Engineering and Manufacturing Development, Critical Design Review, and Milestone C 
approval for production and deployment. Most but not all MDAPs have these gates as part of their acquisition 
strategy. 
2 For example, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Section 804 changes requires capability delivery within 5 
years of program start to use these authorities.   
3 Porter (2008) discussed these as market forces. 
4 See https://www.northropgrumman.com/who-we-are/northrop-grumman-heritage/. 
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Today’s Northrop Grumman corporation resulted from a series of strategic acquisitions 
by the former Northrop Corporation beginning in 1992, when the company acquired a 49% 
interest in the Vought Aircraft Company, a designer and builder of commercial and military 
aerostructures. In 1999, Northrop Grumman acquired Ryan Aeronautical from Allegheny 
Teledyne for $140 million. Ryan was a small company of about 300 employees, but was one of 
the national leaders in Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) development, designing the U.S. Air Force 
Global Hawk and the DARPA Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (Muradian, 1999).   
With the Ryan acquisition, Northrop Grumman had product lines and revenue from 
operational Navy and Air Force drone target and reconnaissance systems, becoming the prime 
contractor (through Ryan) on the Global Hawk, the Miniature Air Launched Decoy and the 
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, and now had organic capability to design and produce 
unmanned air systems, and active development and delivery contracts (Kresa, 2001).   
Northrop Grumman also acquired advanced electronics and radar expertise and radar 
contracts with the purchase of Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s defense electronic systems 
group, and information systems expertise by acquiring Logicon, a leading defense information 
technology company. By 2007, Northrop Grumman had established themselves as a key 
supplier of UAV and defense electronic systems. Table 1 provides a summary of Northrop 
acquisitions. 
Table 1. Northrop UAV-Related Acquisition Actions. (Northrop.com). 
Year Company Action Notes 
1992 Vought Aircraft Acquisition Aerostructures manufacture 
1994 Grumman Aerospace Acquisition Aircraft and Apollo Lander expertise, 
F-14 support 
1996 Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation 
Acquisition Defense Electronic Systems Group, 
aircraft radar systems 
1997 Logicon Acquisition Information technology and battle 
management systems 
1998 Inter-National Research 
Institute 
Acquisition Command and Control, data fusion 
expertise 
1998 California Microwave Acquisition Airborne ISR, mission planning 
1999 Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Acquisition UAV expertise 
2000 Vought Division Sale Divest—metal structures production 
2001 Aerojet General Acquisition Smart Weapons expertise 
2007 Scaled Composites Acquisition Specialty composites and flight test 
expertise 
 
These were part of and in response to the larger consolidation of the defense aerospace 
industry.6 These acquisitions allowed Northrop Grumman to acquire not only production 
contracts, but also the tacit knowledge necessary for creating autonomous unmanned air 
vehicles (UAVs). Northrop Grumman acquired the remainder of Vought Aircraft in August 1994, 
and sold the metal structures expertise to Carlyle Group,7 allowing Northrop Grumman to 
concentrate on composite structures.   
 
6 In 1999, Northrop Grumman noted the intense competition from this consolidation in its annual report to the 
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Merger and Acquisition Literature Overview 
There is extensive literature on corporate mergers and acquisitions. Bertoncelj and 
Kavcic identify three types of corporate relationships, namely ad-hoc teaming, contractual, and 
ownership, and qualitatively characterize these relationships in terms of relative trust, protection, 
control, and learning (Bertoncelj & Kavcic, 2011). In any merger, be it two households or two 
companies, a fundamental issue is what to do with the combined assets. Anand identifies two 
approaches—redistribution or consolidation (Anand, 2004, p. 387).   
Hensel (2016) argued that defense industry consolidations are a response to cost 
pressures on contractor workforce and facilities. Zullo and Liu (2017) described major contractor 
responses to budget reductions as expansion-merger, expansion-diversity, consolidation—focus 
on core or consolidation-specialization. Smaller suppliers, or subprime contractors, tended to 
develop strategies that exploited unique or proprietary capabilities or advantages (Zullo & Liu, 
2017, p. 363). Jackson (2007) adds another strategy, that he calls strategic market positioning, 
where acquisition decisions are enhance an existing competitive advantage. He argues that this 
strategy drove the Northrop Grumman decision to buy Ryan Aerospace in 1999 (Jackson, 
2007). 
Brock (2009) considered the effects of consolidation on contractor economic power, 
arguing that concentration prevents economic efficiency gains passing to the buyer, suppresses 
innovation, restricts buyer choice, and protects sellers from market penalties for poor 
performance. His point is the market acts to limit the power of a single buyer or seller (Brock, 
2009, p. 397).   
A company has tangible and intangible assets. Tangible assets are physical property 
owned by a company, and used to produce a product or service. Intangible assets are non-
physical assets (such as a patent) that create value for the company. Allen (2010) describes 
three classes of intangible assets—intellectual capital, intellectual assets, and intellectual 
property. In her model, intellectual capital represents the employee’s inherent knowledge and 
skill; internal processes, methods, are formulations are intellectual assets; and intellectual 
properties are those intangible assets with legal protections for right of use (Allen, 2010).  
Company annual financial reports reflect intangible assets as goodwill (brand recognition 
and loyalty) or purchased intangible assets (patents, trademarks, and such). Ievdokymov et al. 
(2020) showed that intangible asset value8 is related to company market value and this relation 
is stronger for larger companies (Ievdokymov et al., 2020, p. 169). Bollen et al. (2005) used 
surveys to analyze the relationship between intellectual capital and company9 performance. 
They followed Bonti and used three elements—human, structural, and relationship capital and 
showed statistically significant but indirect relationships between each intellectual capital 
element and aspects of company performance. In particular, they found intellectual property, but 
not the supporting intellectual capital significantly related to company performance (Bollen et al., 
2005, p. 1180). 
The DoD has a renewed emphasis on intellectual property (IP).10 Defense acquisition 
programs are required to have a life cycle IP plan, codified in an new policy requiring intellectual 
property planning throughout a program life cycle for both for acquisition and sustainment, 
balancing DoD technology needs with fair intellectual property owner treatment (Lord, 2019). 
 
8 The conclusions are specific for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
9 Conclusions are specific to the pharmaceutical industry. 
10 DODI 5010.44 defines IP as “Information, products, or services that are protected by law as intangible property, 
including data (e.g., technical data and computer software), technical know-how, inventions, creative works of 
expression, trade names.” 
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A common belief is that vendors use intellectual property to extract economic rents and 
impose switching costs that cause the government not to compete work, called vendor “lock-in.” 
Berardi and Cameron (2019) considered under what conditions software architectures and 
intellectual property rights favor vendor lock-in. They found that open software architectures are 
sufficient to prevent intellectual property or rights-based lock-in (Berardi & Cameron, 2019, pp. 
69–72)   
The Navy and Unmanned Helicopters 
The DoD uses UAVs today for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
missions and strike operations (USD AT&L, 2012). Unmanned air vehicles in the military were 
initially used as targets and as weapons and were derived from multiple enabling technologies, 
including propulsion, navigation, and controls (Erhard, 2000).   
The Navy experimented in the 1950s with using shipborne helicopters for airborne anti-
submarine warfare, but shifted to remotely piloted systems fielding the first maritime UAV 
weapons platform, called DASH,11 in 1962. DASH operated from Navy ships until 1971 and 
were commonly used for naval gunfire spotting, surveillance, and torpedo or depth charge 
delivery (Gyrodyne Historical Foundation, 2020). The DASH control system suffered reliability 
and operability problems; controllability was so bad that few personnel could operate the system 
(Erhard, 2000, Chapter 7).   
In 1998, the Navy posted a solicitation to develop an unmanned vertical takeoff and 
landing vehicle (VTUAV). A 1998 Navy press release named several teams intending to bid on 
the solicitation; one was led by Schweizer Aircraft Corporation (Lopez, 1998). At the same time, 
Northrop Grumman was acquiring Ryan Aerospace, a small 300-person company with more 
than 20 years’ history in the development of unmanned aircraft. Northrop Grumman and Ryan 
Aerospace decided to submit a joint bid with Schweizer Aircraft on the VTUAV (Norris, 2003). 
Northrop Grumman and Ryan defined unmanned flight control as the critical development for 
program success. Northrop Grumman bought a Schweizer helicopter in advance of contract 
awards and worked with Ryan to develop a flight control system demonstrator (Norris, 2003).  
The Navy canceled the program in 2002 and restarted the program in July 2003. 
Northrop restructured their efforts, moving prototype demonstrations to Patuxent River, MD, and 
redesigning the prototype for a more powerful engine (Norris, 2006). In July 2005, Northrop 
Grumman conducted flight and live fire testing at Yuma Proving Grounds (Paynter, 2005), and 
demonstrated autonomous landings on USS Nashville (LPD-13) at-sea in January 2006 (Staff 
Writers, 2006).   
Northrop Grumman sought new customers and new roles for the Fire Scout, including 
the Army, Coast Guard, and foreign governments. The Army included Fire Scout in the Future 
Combat System, and procured eight systems before canceling the Future Combat System 
program.12 Other prospects were interested, but generated no additional sales.   
The program office and Northrop Grumman developed a plan to get early production 
systems to the fleet, which would accelerate identification and correction of design and 
employment issues. The Navy canceled procurement of five Littoral Combat Ships between 
2006–2008 (O’Rourke, 2019), resulting in Fire Scout procurement deferrals (Smith, 2013). The 
Fire Scout program reached Milestone C in May 2007, allowing low-rate initial production. On 
December 10, 2008, Fire Scout embarked on USS McInerney (FFG-8) and deployed in 2009 
 
11 Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter, manufactured by Gyrodyne Company of America. 
12 The Navy converted these systems to fit Navy specifications. 
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(Northrop Grumman, 2009). During the deployment Fire Scouts were used in intercepting drug 
smugglers (Evans, 2014). 
In 2009, Defense Secretary Gates directed cancellation of the Future Combat System 
(Robinson, 2009). In 2011, Fire Scouts deployed with Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 
Light (HSL) 42 Detachment 2 aboard USS Halyburton (FFG-40; HSL-42, 2011), and provided 
forward observation and targeting over Libya (Axe, 2020).   
According to the 2012 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) the inventory objective was 
168 production systems by 2032 (Dodge, 2013). However, the same SAR shows a two year gap 
in procurement after ordering 23 systems, reportedly to align with Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
delays (Dodaro, 2013). The Fire Scout program saw user demand but procurement quantities 
decline. 
Some Key Corporate Actions 
Northrop Grumman had some corporate expertise in unmanned systems with their target 
drone product lines. They did not have extensive vertical flight experience, so they teamed with 
Schweizer Aircraft on the Vertical Takeoff UAV (VTUAV) solicitation. Northrop’s acquisition of 
Ryan Aeronautics immediately them design and production expertise with the Global Hawk and 
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle UAVs, but also experience with vertical takeoff and landing 
platforms. Combined with prior acquisitions of airborne sensor, command and control, and 
mission planning companies, Northrop had the experience within the company for adapting a 
commercial helicopter into a VTUAV system. 
Northrop Grumman (Ryan) focused on the historical problem with remotely piloted 
systems—flight control (Erhard, 2000). They eliminated significant technical challenges by 
scaling to a proven commercial platform—the Schweizer 330—with known performance 
characteristics. Schweizer had already modified the helicopter and redesigned the transmission 
to accommodate a 420-horsepower turboshaft engine, and developed a 4-blade hub, allowing 
for future growth in lift capacity (Norris, 2006).   
The program office supported Northrop Grumman’s efforts and helped create new 
capabilities. The Navy made significant design choices, including adaptable interfaces and 
payloads, ground systems and datalinks (NAVAIR, 2000), a common launch and recovery 
system, and a ground control system that could operate from land or ships and feed existing 
data networks (Smith, 2013). The Fire Scout was re-designated as a multi-mission platform, and 
in July 2005, a Fire Scout fired rockets during flight testing at Yuma Proving Grounds (Paynter, 
2005). The final variant had increased payload and sensor capacity (Soderberg, 2019).  
Figure 1 shows the acquisition and teaming relationships Northrop Grumman continued 
with commercial helicopter manufacturers after acquiring Ryan, enabling an organizational 
balance of expertise between the platform and the unmanned system. 
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Figure 1. Fire Scout Teaming Arrangements 
Findings 
Fire Scout Budgets and Procurement Objectives 
The Fire Scout budget profiles from 2000 to 2020 show the effects on research and 
development from program cancellation in 2002 and 2012 procurement cuts.13 The two 
procurement budget phases in Figure 2 are related to conversion of Army-configured systems in 
2008 and MQ-8C procurements in 2016. 
 
 
Figure 2. Fire Scout Budget Profiles. (FPDS.gov). 
 
Contract work continued at about this same rate through 2020, in part due to the 
company continuing to develop new capabilities ahead of demand.14 Notwithstanding the 
program office and contractor efforts, the program delivery was limited by funding, the realized 
 
13 Due to Future Combat Ship program reductions, which was to use the Fire Scout in mission packages. 
14 For example, the ability to launch weapons, the upgraded turboshaft engine system, and the adaptation of a new 
airframe to create the larger and more capable MQ-8C. 
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annual production capacity of about six systems per year, and the dependency on other 
acquisition programs.   
Two events affected production quantities. The first was the Army’s 2010 decision to 
cancel MQ-8 procurement plans with the Future Combat System termination. The second was 
the 2011 restructuring of the Littoral Combat Ship program and resulting delay of Fire Scout 
production. The reduction of both ship and mission module inventory objectives reduced 
required buys (Smith, 2013). The loss of Littoral Combat Ship demand contributed to a Nunn–
McCurdy Breach (Smith, 2013). By 2019 the Navy inventory objective was reduced to 68 
platforms (9 development and 59 production) as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Procurement Quantities. (MQ-8 SARs). 
 
The final SAR showed required  production quantities dropped from 168 in 2013 to 61 in 
2015 (Soderberg, 2019). The red dashed line (2012 SAR data) shows the short-term result of 
the Future Combat System termination and Littoral Combat Ship procurement delay. The blue 
lines (2015 and 2019 SAR data) reflect the reduced procurement quantities (blue lines) to 61 
plus 9 developmental units (Dodge, 2015) resulting from the decision to truncate Littoral Combat 
Ship procurements.   
Northrop Grumman Impacts 
Northrop Grumman is a diversified technology company, with multiple government and 
commercial customers. Contract award data between 1977 and 2020 shows obligations to 
Northrop Grumman in 200 different Product and Service Codes (PSCs). The Navy had the most 
overall contract activity with Northrop Grumman, in part due to Northrop Grumman shipyard 
ownership.   
Figure 4 shows Northrop Grumman government-reported obligations for specific aviation 
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Figure 4. Northrop Grumman Obligations by Date Signed for Aviation PSCs. (FPDS.gov). 
 
The figure highlights Northrop Grumman’s base aircraft and airframe work activity, and 
shows the significant and increasing work in these areas in all services. While Northrop 
Grumman provided drone and unmanned systems and support to all services, the Navy had a 
long-term relationship covering multiple platforms, including Fire Scout early and later Triton (a 
Global Hawk variant). The drone and unmanned aircraft work (purple and grey triangles in 
Figure 2) became important after 2000.   
The results of Northrop Grumman’s strategy to establish a market position in unmanned 
air systems are shown by contract award data. Northrop Grumman earned twice the revenue on 
Fire Scout related contract work as other performers. The Ryan acquisition cost was recovered 
in 5 years and was a steady revenue source for the next 15 years as shown in Figure 5.   
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In 1998 Northrop Grumman had one flagship aircraft acquisition program—the E-2 
Hawkeye. By 2018, unmanned air systems had become major acquisition programs with annual 
budgets exceeding $1 billion per year. After years of strategic acquisitions and sustained 
activity, Northrop Grumman was one of the major unmanned air systems (the Global 
Hawk/Triton) manufacturers for the Department of Defense as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Selected Major Weapons System Summary 
System Name 1998 ($M) 2018 ($M) NOC 
AH-64 Longbow Apache (C/D/E/reman) 609.2 1,441.9 Sub 
E-2 Hawkeye (C//D) 374.8 1,116.4 Prime 
F-18 Hornet (E/F) //Super Hornet 3274.6 1,253.1 Sub 
B-2 Spirit 307.6 0 Prime 
E-8 JSTARS 850.3 0 Prime 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter//Lightning II 909.1 10,837.9 Sub 
V-22 Osprey 985.1 961.8 Sub 
F-15 Eagle 274.8 963.1 Sub 
F-22 Raptor 2,406.5 915.5 Sub 
C-130 Hercules 0 886.1 Sub 
P-8 Poseidon 0 1,609.4 Sub 
MQ-1 Predator UAS 0 174.4 * 
RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS 0 1,282.3 Prime 
MQ-9 Reaper UAS 0 1,009.8 * 
UAV Smaller UAVs 0 129.7 * 
 
Northrop Grumman was the prime contractor of four systems in Table 2—the E-2, B-2, 
E-8, and RQ-4. Only acquired programs were receiving production funding in 2018. Northrop 
Grumman’s long-term acquisition strategy helped them remain a significant military aircraft 
producer. 
Discussion 
The Department of Defense is experimenting with how to deliver new capabilities in 2 to 
5 years. Conventional wisdom says that senior leadership support and customer urgency are 
critical to fast delivery. This case study shows how contractor decisions and actions satisfying 
long-term strategic interests of the company affected program office success. 
The program started in 1999 as the VTAUV and achieved initial operational capability as 
the MQ-8C in 2019, after 20 years of change and several programmatic restarts and changes. 
The Navy and Northrop Grumman were able to sustain program progress despite adversities 
such as program defunding in 2002, loss of a customer in 2008, and early operational 
deployments.   
Northrop Grumman’s long-term strategy to acquire a market presence in unmanned air 
systems aligned with the program office objectives. Their strategy ensured that the people with 
the experience and understanding to address the critical technical needs behind emerging 
government requirements. They anticipated government requirements evolution. Northrop 
Grumman and the program office kept finding new user bases and made critical adjustments to 
satisfy operational requirements. They transformed assets built for the Army Future Combat 
System into Navy assets, and deployed them for operational use. The sustained emphasis on 
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operational use and future markets created confidence in system capabilities and identified new 
modifications meeting emerging needs. 
The MQ-8 Fire Scout remains an unusual program. Navy program office and contractor 
tenacity and complementary objectives mattered in final program outcomes. This study shows 
how a program office and prime contractor were able to mature and deliver a new capability 
despite changes in procurement objectives, evolving technologies, and requirements. The 
Program Office benefitted from Northrop’s experience and willingness to assume risk. Early field 
deployment and operational is a high-risk, potentially high-reward strategy. The Navy and 
Northrop Grumman had to respond when systems failed or were lost in combat (Axe, 2020). 
This required extraordinary dedication, but resulted in an extraordinary record of development 
and delivery—in the face of adversity. 
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Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
Washington, D.C. He is responsible for all aspects of contracting relating to the acquisition of weapon 
systems, logistics, and operational support for the Air Force and provides contingency contracting 
support to the geographic combatant commanders. He leads a highly skilled staff of mission-focused 
business leaders supporting warfighters through $825 billion of Space, Global Power/Reach and 
Information Dominance programs. He also oversees the training, organizing and equipping of a 
workforce of some 8,000 contracting professionals who execute programs worth more than $65 billion 
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Abstract 
The Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) market is a monopsony facing oligopoly. In the 
last four decades, the Department of Defense has placed a great deal of emphasis in its 
acquisition reform efforts on the power of competition to help control cost overruns and cost 
growth. In this research, quantitative analyses were used to determine the effect of two reform 
measures—competitive prototyping and competitive contracting—on cost overruns and cost 
growth during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the acquisition 
life cycle. We performed a case study of 63 hardware MDAP contracts from all services. The 
findings show that while competitive prototyping and competitive contracting lead to greater 
competition, as the defense acquisition community believes, they fail to control cost overruns and 
cost growth, just as microeconomic theory predicts. 
Introduction 
Concerns over the increasing cost of U.S. defense programs are not new. In fact, 
according to Cancian (2010), these concerns date back as far as the earliest days of our 
republic when Congress, in its oversight role, began questioning the rising costs of the first 
naval ships, which it authorized in 1794 (Cancian, 2010). Since then, there have been 
numerous attempts at defense acquisition reform with the goal of controlling cost overruns and 
cost growth. Two of the most recent and significant acquisition reform initiatives are Congress’s 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 and a series of U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) initiatives championed by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Frank Kendall, called Better Buying Power (BBP). Both the 
WSARA and BBP place a great deal of emphasis on the power of competition in controlling 
defense acquisition costs and in particular, the cost of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs).  
Despite decades of effort and frequent attempts to control cost overruns and cost growth 
in MDAPs, these latest initiatives and their predecessors have failed to achieve their objectives 
regarding cost (Ritschel et al., 2019). Defense acquisition reforms based on competition fail to 
control cost overruns and cost growth in hardware MDAPs. The question is why. The 
straightforward answer is microeconomics.  
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Extensive research exists studying defense acquisition program costs—both overruns 
and growth. Most studies focused on program management techniques and acquisition policies 
from the point of view of the government customer with scant attention to defense acquisition 
reforms from the perspective of industry and the market (i.e., microeconomics). This research 
uses quantitative analysis to provide insight into whether reform initiatives based on competition 
contribute to the reduction of cost overruns and cost growth in MDAPs. 
Background 
To meet the performance requirements, engineers must work within specific design 
constraints such as system weight, size, and shape, but ultimately systems are constrained by 
fundamental laws of nature such as the laws of motion, gravitation, and thermodynamics. 
Similarly, there are many constraints imposed on cost, but ultimately cost is subject to the laws 
of economics such as the law of supply and demand.  
Summarizing from Edwin Mansfield’s (1982) undergraduate-level textbook, 
Microeconomics Theory and Applications, economics is in two broad branches—
microeconomics and macroeconomic. Microeconomics deals with how individual consumers, 
firms, and resource owners behave, while macroeconomics is concerned with the behavior of 
economic aggregates such as inflation, gross national product, and level of employment. In 
microeconomics, firms operate in markets that are a collection of buyers and sellers for a 
particular good or service, and the behavior of each market type can be modeled by a demand 
side and a supply side—the market structure.  
According to microeconomics, there are four types of market structures: perfect 
competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. How the price (cost) of a good 
or service is determined is different depending on the market structure. In perfect competition, 
the equilibrium price—the price at which there is no tendency to change—is determined where 
the quantity versus price schedule of buyers (i.e., the demand curve) crosses the quantity 
versus price schedule of sellers (i.e., the supply curve). In an oligopoly, the equilibrium price 
occurs at the profit maximizing quantity where the marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Firms 
in an oligopoly adjust their outputs to gain a share of the profit maximizing quantity (Mansfield, 
1982). 
A key component of many cost control strategies involves the use of measures to 
increase competition based on the idea that competition leads to lower price (cost) or can 
control cost overruns or cost growth. Competitive contracting has been required by law since 
2000, and in 2009, WSARA included a requirement to use competitive prototyping to promote 
competition and control cost despite microeconomics suggesting otherwise.  
Our belief was that this confidence in the power of competition is based on a 
misapplication of microeconomic theory. It assumes that the perfect competition model, where 
there are many buyers and many sellers, is representative of the MDAP market.  
The U.S. economic system is built on the concept of free enterprise 
regulated by competition. ... The defense industry does not fit that model. 
Many defense acquisition problems are rooted in the mistaken belief that 
the defense industry and the government–industry relationship in defense 
acquisition fit naturally into the free enterprise model. (Fox, 2011) 
However, the MDAP market has a monopsony–oligopoly structure, so the perfect 
competition model does not apply. The supply side of the MDAP market is an oligopoly, and 
according to microeconomic theory, firms in an oligopoly market do not compete on price. This 
is because, as Fudenberg and Tirole (2013) explained, if one firm cuts price to gain market 
share, this tends to lead to a price war where others in the market react by cutting their price. 
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The result hurts all players, since “the long-run costs of the price war outweigh any short-run 
gain” (Fundenberg & Tirole, 2013). 
Competition in the defense market is so often cited as an important tool in fighting cost 
overruns and cost growth that it appears to have become a matter of faith that few bother to 
challenge. Typical examples include the Government Accountability Office’s claim that 
“competition is the cornerstone of a sound acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving 
the best return on investment for taxpayers” (GAO, 2015). The enormous confidence that 
government places in competition comes despite what O’Neil (2011) points out when he notes 
that in a pair of foundational studies of defense acquisition from 50 years prior, Merton J. Peck 
and Frederic M. Scherer of the Harvard Business School revealed significant issues that are still 
largely unaddressed by intervening management efforts (Peck & Scherer, 1962; Scherer, 1964). 
In particular, Peck and Scherer (1962) argued at length that price competition, which is widely 
favored as a mechanism for controlling costs, is almost certain to be largely ineffective in major 
defense system acquisition and is actually much more likely to be counterproductive (O’Neil, 
2011). We contend that, while measures to stimulate competition may result in an increase in 
the number of bids received for MDAP Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
contracts, that increase in competition will not result in cost control. 
To establish which is correct—Congress and the DoD’s faith in competition or our belief 
in microeconomic theory—we sought the answers to the following questions: 
1. Does competitive prototyping lead to more competition (an increase in the number of 
bids) in the MDAP market?  
2. Does competitive contracting lead to more competition (an increase in the number of 
bids) in the MDAP market?  
3. Does more competition lead to lower cost growth or overruns in the MDAP market?  
If market competition does not control cost overruns in MDAP hardware acquisitions, then the 
defense acquisition community must devise and adopt strategies that do not need competition 
to reduce cost overruns and cost growth. 
Methodology 
This research is a case study of 36 MDAP hardware programs of various types and from 
all the services. We performed a quantitative analysis to determine the answers to our questions 
by testing the following research hypotheses:  
1. Research Hypothesis 1 (RH1): In the MDAP market, competitive prototyping leads to 
more competition. 
2. Research Hypothesis 2 (RH2): In the MDAP market, competitive contracting leads to 
more competition. 
3. Research Hypothesis 3 (RH3): In the MDAP market, competition does not lead to 
lower cost growth or lower cost overruns. 
Research Logic Flow 
As a framework for our analysis, we devised a research logic flow to describe the potential 
outcomes (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Research Logic Flow 
Table 1 shows the potential outcomes. 
Table 1. Potential Outcomes Logic Table 
Result 
Measure 





Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
Competitive 
Contracting 
Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
 
Data 
The data for our analysis came from six sources covering the years 2003 through 2019:  
1. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected 
Major Weapon Programs reports,  
2. DoD Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs),  
3. Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS),  
4. Corporate 10-K reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC),  
5. Kamp (2019), and  
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The first step in our analysis was to confirm that the MDAP market is, in fact, an 
oligopoly. We accomplished this as described by both Hayes (2020) and Kenton (2020) by 
calculating the standard CR4 concentration ratio, which is the ratio formed by taking the sales of 
the top four firms and dividing by the total industry sales, which gives us the strength of the 
oligopoly power in the market. Concentration ratios range from 0.00 to 1.00 where 0.00 
indicates perfect competition and 1.00 indicates a perfect monopoly. Table 2 lists typical rules of 
thumb that characterize the level of concentration. 
Table 2. Mapping of Market Concentration to Market Structure and Concentration Indicators (Hayes, 
2020; Kenton, 2020) 
Level of 
Concentration 
Market Structure CR4 
Low Perfect Competition to Oligopoly 0.00–0.40 
Medium Oligopoly 0.40–0.80 
High Oligopoly to Monopoly 0.80–1.00 
 
The higher the market concentration, the less competitive the market. Table 3 shows the 
authors’ calculated CR4 MDAP market concentrations for the years 2003 to 2018, which shows 
market concentrations typical of an oligopoly market as described by (Hayes, 2020; Kenton, 
2020). 
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Once we confirmed our initial premise—the MDAP market is an oligopoly—we then 
proceeded with our data analysis.  
Next, we performed correlation analysis to verify our hypothesized relationships between 
our variables. The relationships of interest are between the measures claimed to increase 
competition—competitive prototyping and competitive contracting—and the change in 
competition and between the change in competition and cost overruns and cost growth.  
Additionally, we looked to see if there was a relationship between competitive 
prototyping and competitive contracting and between cost overruns and cost growth directly 
(i.e., due to some cause other than a change in competition). For the purposes of this research, 
we define competitive prototyping like Fast (2016)—as prototyping where two or more 
contractors develop prototypes prior to Milestone B (MS B), which are tested or demonstrated to 
the government to verify that they meet requirements. In addition, we define competitive 
contracting, in accordance with U.S. law, as a contracting strategy that relies on full and open 
competition. According to the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA, 2000), a procurement is 
considered as competed under full and open competition if all responsible sources are permitted 
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to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals. Further, we define cost overrun as described by 
Cancian (2010)—as costs that exceed the estimate for a contract, in our case the EMD phase 
contract. EMD begins with a MS B decision to continue with development and ends with the 
Milestone C (MS C) decision to proceed into the production phase. Also, we define cost growth 
for all cost growth variables as an increase in cost from the estimate at program start to MS C. 
Finally, we use the definition of competition as “the attempt by two or more companies or other 
organizations to secure the business of a customer” (Farlex, n.d.). In this research, we measure 
the degree of competition by the number of bids received for the MDAP’s EMD phase contract. 
Therefore, the greater the number of bids received for the EMD contract, the greater the degree 
of competition.  
The cost overrun variables are Cost Overrun (Cost Overrun $M) and Percent Cost 
Overrun (% Cost Overrun). Cost growth variables are Percent Change in Unit Cost 
(UC.M.PCT), Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC), Total Procurement Cost (TPC), and 
Percent Change in Total Procurement Cost (TPC.Pct). We calculated Cost Overrun $M by 
taking the difference between the baseline estimate at MS B and the current estimate at MS C 
in Base Year millions of dollars (in BY $M) from the SARs. Base Year is the prescribed DoD 
reference for measuring cost change because it removes the effect of inflation (Defense, 2020). 
% Cost Overrun was calculated by dividing Cost Overrun $M by the baseline estimate at MS B. 
UC.M.PCT came from the Kamp data set and is the percent change in the unit price since 
program start as reported in the GAO reports at MS C. It includes research and development 
(R&D) and procurement costs. A broader variable, PAUC, is the Program Acquisition Cost 
divided by the Program Acquisition Quantity as reported in the SAR reports at MS C. It includes 
all costs involved in the acquisition, not just R&D and Procurement. TPC was derived by adding 
the R&D funding (RD.M) and Procurement funding (P.M) since the program start to MS C. 
RD.M and P.M were included in the Kamp data set and came from the GAO reports. TPC.Pct 
was taken from the GAO report for MS C and is the percent change in total program cost from 
program start without regard to changes in quantity. 
For our correlation analysis, we used the Spearman rho correlation because it is useful 
for both linear and nonlinear relationships. There are no universally accepted ranges for weak, 
moderate, and strong correlation coefficients. For our purposes, we were simply looking for an 
initial way to focus our analysis. Therefore, we used the following rules of thumb in our analysis: 
Strong correlations are those relationships with a Spearman correlation coefficient greater than 
or equal to 0.667; moderate correlations are indicated by Spearman rho values greater than 
0.333 but less than 0.667; and weak correlations are those with coefficients that are less than or 
equal to 0.333. In addition, we considered significance levels for α = 0.05 and 0.01. We found 
that there is a strong relationship between our competition variables pair combinations of 
competitive prototyping and competitive contracting and Num_bids that is statistically significant. 
This indicates that the use of competitive prototyping and competitive contracting is related to 
an increase in the number of bids. However, there appears to be no relationship between 
number of bids and our cost variables: Cost Overrun $M, Pct Cost Overrun, RD.M, RD.M.Pct, 
UC.M.Pct, and PAUC Chg from SAR. These results are favorable to our hypothesized 
proposition that while competitive prototyping and competitive contracting may increase the 
number of bids, the increase in competition does not lead to a reduction in cost overruns or cost 
growth. Armed with this information, we proceeded with our statistical analysis. 
Statistical Analysis 
We selected the Mood’s Median Test as our analysis method because a visual 
examination of the histograms of our response data and probability plots from the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests revealed that our data are not normally distributed. This indicates that a 
nonparametric method is called for, and the Mood’s Median Test is a particularly good choice 
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because our visual inspection also indicated the presence of outliers in our response data, and 
Mood’s is insensitive to outliers. To test our research hypotheses, we evaluated 20 predictor–
response variable pairs summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of Test Pairs 
Predictor Variables Response Variable 
Competitive prototyping (CP) Number of bids 
Competitive contracting (CC) Number of bids 
CP 
 
Cost Overrun $M 







Cost Overrun $M 





Number of bids 
 
Cost Overrun $M 






From our hypothesis testing, we found that there is evidence to support the claim that 
competitive prototyping leads to greater competition in the MDAP market, as seen by the 
statistically significant higher number of bids received on EMD contracts that included 
competitive prototyping versus those that did not. Similarly, the evidence supports the 
hypothesis that, when used, competitive contracting also increases the number of bids received 
and thus the degree of competition on MDAPs. However, we found no evidence to support the 
claim that an increase in competition (i.e., an increase in the number of bids received for an 
EMD contract) led to a decrease in cost overruns or cost growth. Furthermore, we found that 
there is no evidence to support any suspicion that competitive prototyping and competitive 
contracting themselves affect cost overruns or cost growth in MDAPs with one exception. 
Competitive contracting does appear to lead to a reduction in PAUC. There is enough evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis that the median PAUC for MDAPs that used competitive contracting 
and those that did not are equal. As a result, we can conclude that competitive contracting does 
lead to a reduction in PAUC. Since we also found that competitive contracting leads to an 
increase in competitions, one might conclude that this leads to Research Logic Flow Outcome A 
from Figure 1. However, we believe this would be a mistake. PAUC is the total of all 
development, procurement, and military construction cost divided by the number of units 
procured, and since we found no correlation between an increase in competition and 
procurement cost (P.M), nor did we see evidence that competition reduced development cost 
(RD.M, RD.M.PCT, UC.D.PCT), we must conclude that this reduction in PAUC is due to the 
portion from military construction. This seems reasonable because the construction industry is 
characterized by many small buyers and sellers more closely described by perfect competition 
where competition does influence price. A summary of these results is provided in Table 5.  
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H0 p Value Conclusion 
RH1 CP (0) 
CP (1)  
# of bids Medians 
equal 
0.000 CP leads to greater 
competition 
RH2 CC (0)  
CC (1) 
# of bids Medians 
equal 
0.004 CC leads to greater 
competition 
RH3 # of bids  Cost overruns Medians 
equal 
0.166 More competition does 
not lead to lower cost 
overruns 




0.360 More competition does 
not lead to lower % cost 
overruns 
RH3 # of bids  R&D cost growth Medians 
equal 
0.480 More competition does 
not lead to lower R&D 
cost growth 




0.145 More competition does 
not lead to lower % 
change in R&D cost 
growth 




0.802 More competition does 
not lead to lower % 
change in unit cost 
growth 
RH3 # of bids  PAUC Medians 
equal 
0.298 More competition does 
not lead to lower PAUC 
Similar results for CP and CC versus cost variable except CC versus PAUC 
 
CC (0) 
CC (1)  
PAUC Medians 
equal 
0.006 CC leads to lower 
PAUC 
Research Hypothesis 1 (RH1): In the MDAP market, competitive 
prototyping leads to more competition. 
Research Hypothesis 2 (RH2): In the MDAP market, competitive 
contracting leads to more competition. 
Research Hypothesis 3 (RH3): In the MDAP market, competition does not 
lead to lower cost growth or lower cost overruns. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The subject of cost overruns and cost growth in weapon systems programs is clearly not 
new; nor is defense acquisition reform. These topics reach back to the earliest days of our 
republic. A major theme of the modern defense acquisition reforms is that competition is good 
and will control cost. This may be true for items purchased by the DoD that are in a perfect 
competition market, such as copy paper and other consumables, where there are many buyers 
and sellers in both the civilian and defense sectors. However, attempting to apply the price 
minimizing characteristics of perfect competition to the oligopoly structure of the MDAP 
market—which behaves much differently—is inappropriate. The literature discusses some 
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virtues of competition in the MDAP market, such as helping to maintain the defense industrial 
base and improving innovation, but cost control is not among them.  
Our research shows that for the 63 hardware MDAPs we investigated in this case study, 
our assertion regarding the response to competition is correct. We demonstrated that the MDAP 
market is an oligopoly and that, while it may be possible to increase competition, the resulting 
competition will not lead to lower cost overruns or cost growth as Congress and the DoD 
believe. 
Moreover, we answer all three of our research questions. Competitive prototyping does 
lead to more competition (an increase in the number of bids) in the MDAP market. Additionally, 
we show that competitive contracting also leads to more competition (an increase in the number 
of bids) in the MDAP market. Finally, we demonstrate that more competition does not lead to 
lower cost growth or cost overruns in the MDAP market. Table 6 and Figure 2 show these 
results in terms of our Research Logic Flow. We believed that either Outcome B or C from our 
Research Logic Flow would be proven to be correct. Our results show that Outcome B is the 
correct logic flow path as we proposed.  
Table 6. Logic Table Outcome 
Result Measure Increase Competition? Reduce Cost Overruns/Cost Growth? Outcome 
Competitive Prototyping 
Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
Competitive Contracting 
Yes Yes A 
Yes No B 
No Yes C 
No No D 
 
 
Figure 2. Research Logic Flow Outcome 
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Lastly, our analysis shows that, in addition to competition not affecting cost 
outcome for the hardware MDAPs we studied, competitive prototyping and competitive 
contracting themselves do not affect cost outcomes. 
Unfortunately, the DoD’s confidence in the power of competition to control cost in 
MDAPs appears to be based on the perfect competition model rather than the 
appropriate oligopoly model. This is a misapplication of microeconomic theory. We have 
shown that for our case study programs, competition does not control cost under 
oligopoly as microeconomic theory predicts. Therefore, we suggest that the DoD and 
Congress must look elsewhere for solutions to the problem of cost overruns and cost 
growth in MDAPS. 
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Abstract 
In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) set a goal of paying small business contractors 
within 15 days of invoice receipt rather than the standard 30 days. In 2012, other federal 
agencies also set a goal of accelerated payments to small businesses, and all agencies later 
expanded this goal to include all contractors regardless of size. We study whether small 
businesses benefited from these accelerated payment goals. Using a difference-in-difference 
design, we find that small business participation in government contracts rose following the 
setting of accelerated payments goals. Importantly, contracts for perishable foods and 
construction services, which were unaffected by the new accelerated payments policies, did 
not see an increase in small business participation. We also find that the benefits of 
accelerated payments are concentrated among small businesses with a backlog of ongoing 
projects. This is consistent with the hypothesis that accelerated payments alleviate the 
liquidity constraints that may be particularly acute for small businesses. 
Introduction 
The federal government has long been interested in supporting small businesses. An 
often-used policy lever is the intentional purchasing of goods and services from smaller, as 
opposed to larger, businesses, commonly by setting aside prime contracts for small 
businesses or by requiring that prime contractors utilize small business subcontractors. 
However, simply directing more purchases toward small business may not be sufficient on 
its own if other challenges that are faced by these firms are not addressed. Credit 
constraints are one such challenge. Access to credit could be costly, and small businesses 
often do not have sufficient cash reserves to smooth short-term liquidity requirements. Cash 
constraints may, therefore, limit the amount of business that can be undertaken by small 
contractors, and this will limit the effectiveness of programs meant to increase small 
business purchases. 
One specific difficulty that contributes to the cash crunch faced by small businesses 
is the mismatch between when firms incur costs and when they receive payments for the 
goods and services provided. One way to improve the cash flow of small businesses is to 
reduce the amount of time between when goods and services are provided and when 
payment from the government for those goods and services is received. Accelerated 
payments have recently received substantial interest, with several federal policy actions 
calling for the acceleration of payments to small business contractors. In this report, our 
objective is to evaluate whether small businesses performed better when payments were 
accelerated, which we measured by the degree of participation by small businesses as 
prime contractors in federal procurement. 
In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a policy of accelerated 
payments to small business contractors. Under this policy, payment to small businesses 
occurs within 15 days of the receipt of invoice, rather than the standard 30-day payment 
period. Over the months following the initial announcement, the DoD phased in the policy 
into its major payments systems beginning in June 2011 with the DoD’s largest payment 
system, the Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) system. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in September 2011 outlined a goal to pay invoices 
within 15 days for all federal procurement. The policy of accelerated payments was later 
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expanded to include all prime contractors regardless of size. Neither the DoD, nor the 
broader federal policy, altered the penalties the government faced for late payment; these 
penalties continued to only be incurred after the standard 30-day payment period. While it is 
clear that the DoD implemented the accelerated payments policy as intended, we are 
uncertain about the extent to which the other federal agencies complied with the OMB’s 
directive to apply accelerated payments for all federal procurement. 
To evaluate whether accelerated payments achieve the goal of positively impacting 
small businesses, we utilize data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), which 
contains the universe of nonclassified federal contract actions. These data do not contain 
information regarding direct measures of firm success such as employment, investment, or 
profits. Instead, we examine whether participation by small business prime contractors 
increased when accelerated payments were in place. While this is an indirect measure, as 
we discuss in more detail, this is an appropriate measure of the benefits to small businesses 
from accelerated payments. One reason is that encouraging small business participation is, 
in itself, often a goal of procurement policy. Moreover, economic theory suggests that by 
examining participation we can provide indirect evidence about whether small business 
performance is aided by accelerated payments. This is for two reasons. First, small 
businesses are more willing to enter the competition for contracts if they benefit from 
accelerated payments. Second, conditional on entry, they will be willing and able to bid more 
competitively to win the contract. 
Our empirical approach utilizes the change in accelerated payments policy over time, 
as well as the differential impact that accelerated payments have on affected relative to 
unaffected products. Not all products were affected, since the payment period for 
construction contracts and for some food products was already less than 15 days. Contracts 
for these products were, therefore, unaffected by accelerated payments. The empirical 
approach is a difference-in-difference design, where we consider the change in the number 
of contracts awarded to the average small business after the implementation of accelerated 
payments to the similar change for the average large business. Furthermore, this differential 
change for small versus large firms can be compared between affected and unaffected 
products, since contracts for construction services and many types of food products already 
had payment periods of less than 15 days. The appeal of this approach is that it can control 
for a myriad of factors that affect small businesses at a given time, so long as those 
economy-wide shocks similarly affect firms that provide affected and unaffected products. It 
can also account for changes over time that might affect all firms, both large and small. 
Early payment receipt can help small businesses in several ways. First, accelerated 
payments increase the present value of contract payments, which results in a small benefit 
to contractors. Second, and likely more importantly, accelerated payments help the cash 
flow of a business. Prime contractors have obligations to their subcontractors and other 
suppliers and must manage the cash flow necessary to make on-time payments. Either 
suitable cash reserves, or lines of credit, must be maintained to meet short-term obligations. 
Firms may face borrowing constraints that limit their ability to meet short-term needs, 
necessitating holding cash reserves. This constraint may be particularly acute for small 
businesses, which have less access to both external and internal capital, which could be a 
barrier to taking on new work on top of ongoing projects. Accelerating payments could, 
therefore, assist small businesses in participating in government procurement and in 
supporting their growth. Encouraging small business participation and growth may, in fact, 
be cost effective for the government, as current small businesses become future, possibly 
more efficient, competitors. 
For two similar reasons, helping small businesses through accelerated payments 
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could be costly. First, the present value of contract payments is higher under accelerated 
payments. Given the favorable terms of federal borrowing, this is a lesser issue for 
government agencies than it is for the seller, though in the aggregate the impact is 
nontrivial. To get a sense of the scale of this cost, consider the thought exercise of 
advancing the payment on all DoD contracts by 2 weeks.1 DoD contracts in 2017 were 
worth $320 billion, and advancing the payment on these contracts by 2 weeks increases the 
present value of this expenditure by around $300 million.2 Second, the procuring agency 
must itself also manage cash flow, and the DoD has raised concern that the expansion of 
accelerated payments has created cash constraints for some defense activities. Such 
constraints may pose a greater challenge for agencies than the increase in the present 
value of contract payments. 
This report proceeds as follows. In the Literature Review section, we review the 
evidence regarding small businesses and government programs to assist them. We then 
describe the accelerated payments policies and the time line of their adoption in the section 
titled Accelerated Payments Policy. The next section contains a description of the data used 
in this study. Then, we provide a model that motivates the empirical specifications. Next, we 
specify our empirical approach and present the results. Finally, we provide our conclusion. 
Literature Review 
It is often argued that small businesses are important because of their role as job 
creators and innovators (Birch, 1979) and because entrepreneurship is a potential pathway 
out of poverty (Glazer & Moynihan, 1970). Based on these arguments, lawmakers often 
enact public policies meant to help small businesses, commonly through public procurement 
programs that steer contracts or by providing terms that are particularly favorable to small, 
rather than large, businesses. The efficacy of these policies rests (1) on their ability to 
address the factors that contribute to the success of small businesses and (2) the cost that 
the policies impose on the government. Our research fits within a robust literature in 
economics, which examines the factors that influence the success of small businesses and 
entrepreneurship as well as the subset of this literature that examines the costs and benefits 
of small business policies implemented via public procurement. Such policies may target 
small businesses generally, or they may take the form of affirmative action programs 
specifically intended to benefit minority- and women-owned enterprises. 
Several factors may influence entrepreneurial activity and the formation, expansion, 
and survival of small businesses. Liquidity is a key constraint faced by small businesses, as 
it determines the access to capital needed to start a business and to meet short-run cash 
flow needs. It is also, therefore, closely related to accelerated payments. Fairlie and 
Krashinsky (2012) documented that easing liquidity constraints significantly boosts 
entrepreneurship. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (2005) also found 
 
1 We do not attempt a cost–benefit analysis in this report. A proper measure of the cost of the 
program would require data on exactly how much more quickly payments were made. These data exist 
but are not publicly available. A proper measure of benefits would require dynamic estimates of how 
firm survival and efficiency may positively impact the operation of the procurement market. As we 
discuss in the conclusion, this is outside of the scope of our research. 
 
2 This is likely an overstatement of the costs of the program that we consider for two reasons. First, the 
accelerated payments policies we consider here are not expected to affect contracts for food or 
construction, which indicates that less than $320 billion in DoD contracts were impacted. Second, 
compliance may not have been complete, signaling that some payments that should have been accelerated 
were, in fact, not accelerated. 
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similar effects of liquidity on entrepreneurs. 
Most firms that qualify for minority- and women-owned business subsidies are small 
businesses, and so the constraints faced by these firms will be highly relevant for small 
business policy. Fairlie and Robb (2007) studied minority-owned enterprises and examined 
the factors that contribute to the disparities in business outcomes experienced by these 
firms compared to white-owned firms. Related to the role of liquidity in small business 
success, they found that these disparities are influenced by access to startup capital. Black-
owned businesses may face lending discrimination, as found by Blanchflower et al. (2003) 
and Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) and may also have less family wealth (Bates, 1997). 
The costs and benefits of small business subsidies and affirmative action 
implemented through public procurement have been examined by several authors. Chatterji 
et al. (2014) examined the effects of affirmative action in city contracting on minority 
entrepreneurship, and Marion (2011) studied how affirmative action affects government 
purchases from minority- and women-owned enterprises. Nakabayashi (2013) examined the 
set-aside of government contracts for small enterprises in Japan, finding that approximately 
40% of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) would exit the procurement market if set-
asides were removed. This would lead to a lack of competition that would ultimately 
increase government procurement costs. Marion (2007), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), 
and Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) studied bid preferences for small businesses in 
government contracting. Denes (1997) assessed the cost of small business set-asides in 
federal contracting. Finally, Marion (2009) and Rosa (2020) examined the effect of 
affirmative action via subcontracting goals on government procurement cost. 
Accelerated Payments Policy 
Prompt Payment Act 
The Prompt Payment Act (PPA), originally enacted in 1982 and subsequently revised 
in 1988, set several standards with respect to the speed at which federal contractors are 
paid for work performed or orders fulfilled (FAR 52.232-27, 2021). This act addressed the 
typically slow rate of payment by many federal agencies by setting a maximum time 
between receipt of invoice and payment, while including a series of exceptions that would 
provide even faster payments for particular types of goods. In this section, we describe 
these regulations, as well as the more recent efforts to further accelerate payments to the 
benefit of small business enterprises. 
The PPA specified that for most government procurement, the due date of contractor 
payment is the latter of the “30th day after the designated billing office receives a proper 
invoice from the contractor” or “the 30th day after government acceptance of supplies 
delivered or services performed” (Prompt Payment Act [PPA], 1988). Should the payment 
occur after the 30-day window, the contractor is automatically due interest penalties from the 
federal agency, and the calculation of those penalties is also codified into law. Furthermore, 
the PPA also governs payments by the contractors to its subcontractors. The contractor has 
7 days upon receipt of payment from the government to pay its subcontractors or suppliers, 
provided that the subcontractor has provided satisfactory performance. The subcontractor in 
turn has 7 days to pay its own lower-tier subcontractors or suppliers. 
For some types of goods and services, payments must be made in a much shorter 
time frame than the standard 30-day window, and these exceptions play a key role in 
identifying the impact of accelerated payments in our empirical work. Broadly speaking, the 
exceptions apply to all construction contracts and many types of food products, particularly 
perishable foods. For construction contracts, the payment deadline is 14 days after the 
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payment request is made. For food products, suppliers of poultry, eggs, and frozen fish must 
be paid within 7 days. Suppliers of perishable agricultural commodities must be paid within 
10 days. Finally, dairy products and those foods made from edible fats or oils must be paid 
within 10 days.3 For products with a payment period of less than 15 days, the new 
accelerated payment goals should have, at most, a small impact on payment speed. 
Accelerated Payments Policies 
In early 2011, the DoD announced that it was setting new guidelines for the speed of 
payments to its contractors. This policy is codified into Subpart 232.9 of the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulations System (DFARS). Initially, the policy applied only to invoice 
payments to small business contractors. Soon after the adoption of accelerated payments 
by the DoD, guidelines from the OMB extended this policy to federal contracting more 
broadly, and accelerated payments were later further expanded to apply to all contracts 
regardless of the size of the contractor. Here, we describe the time line of the policy 
announcement and implementation. 
Defense Acquisition Regulations System (DARS) Memorandum 2011-O0007 was 
issued on April 27, 2011, announcing that the DoD would commence implementation of 
DFARS 232.9303 accelerated payments to small business contractors (Assad, 2011). The 
new policy described a plan to pay contractors within 15 days of submitting a proper invoice. 
The implementation would occur in phases, with the initial phase focusing on the 
modification of the DoD’s largest payment system, the MOCAS system. On June 28, 2011, 
the DoD announced in DARS Memorandum 2011-O00013 that “the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service has completed modifications of MOCAS to provide for these accelerated 
payments to small business” (Ginman, 2011). Payment systems that account for a smaller 
share of DoD contracts followed. The list of payments systems and the dates they were 
implemented is listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Dates of DoD Payment System Implementation 
 
 
3 This rather broad category includes “liquid milk, cheese, certain processed cheese products, 
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In September 2011, after the initial DoD announcement, the federal government 
announced a directive for all agencies to make accelerated payments to small business 
prime contractors within 15 days of invoice (Lew, 2011). Then, in July 2012, the federal 
government extended the accelerated payments policy to include all federal prime 
contractors—not just small businesses—including those vendors selling to the DoD.4 While 
it is not clear when each particular agency implemented this in practice, the DoD announced 
that its payment systems had incorporated this change in August 2012 (Ginman, 2012). In 
February 2013, the DoD canceled the accelerated payments for large prime contractors, 
and the policy reverted to only accelerating payments for small businesses, though it was 
required to reinstate accelerated payments for large prime contractors in July 2014 (Ginman, 
2013). In summary, accelerated payments was the stated policy of the DoD from April 2011 
onward for small businesses, and from July 2012 until February 2013 and from August 2014 
onwards for large businesses (see Table 2). Accelerated payments was the stated policy of 
federal contracting more broadly from September 2011 onward for small businesses and 
from July 2012 onward for large businesses. 
Evidence presented by the DoD indicates that they complied with the policy: “In 
practice, the Defense Financial Accounting Service (DFAS) currently provides accelerated 
payments to nearly all DoD contractors, as permitted by law” (DoD, 2019). The average time 
to pay an invoice by MOCAS was under 15 days, as of early 2018 (McDuff, 2019). 
Unfortunately, we were not able to find direct evidence about whether other federal agencies 
complied with the policies. The issue of whether or not federal agencies strictly adhered to 
the accelerated payments policies is important and potentially relevant. These policies did 
not carry with them financial penalties for noncompliance. Neither the DoD in its actions 
previously described, nor the broader federal action, altered the rules regarding interest 
penalties for late payments by agencies. Some federal agencies may have, therefore, 
viewed accelerated payments as nonbinding and may not have implemented the policy as 
directed. Only for the DoD, with the pronouncements that MOCAS and other key payments 
systems had been altered, can we say with confidence that the accelerated payments 
policies were in fact implemented. To assess compliance more thoroughly, we would need 
to observe data on time-to-payment. Such data are likely contained within the Contract 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), but these data are not publicly 
available, and we were not able to gain access in the time frame of the current project. 
Table 2. Time Line of Accelerated Payments Policies 
 
Date Action Referenced order 
April 2011 DoD accelerated payments for SB primes DARS 2011-O0007 
June 2011 DoD implements acc. pay in MOCAS DARS 2011-O00013 
Sep. 2011 Acc. pay for federal SB primes OMB M-11-32 
July 2012 Acc. pay for all federal primes OMB M-12-16 
Aug. 2012 Implements M-12-16 for DoD primes DARS 2012-O0014 
Feb. 2013 Cancels acc. pay for DoD large primes DARS 2012-O0014 
Aug. 2014 Reinstates for DoD large primes DARS 2014-O0019 
Qualifying as a Small Business 
Which firms qualify as a small business varies substantially across product types. 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) outlines the criteria that are used to determine 
qualification as a small business in federal contracting. The SBA defines threshold values 
 
4 This policy change also inserted a clause directing the prime contractor to accelerate payments 
to their small business subcontractors. It is unclear whether this additional clause was binding, since 
prime contractors were already required to pay any subcontractors within 7 days. 
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for employment and revenue that vary by industry classification of the firm. If either 
employment or revenue exceed these values, the firm does not qualify as a small business. 
The most common thresholds for manufacturing companies are 500 employees and 
average annual revenues of $7.5 million. A majority of firms in the FPDS at one time or 
another are listed as a small business, and small business status can, therefore, change 
over time as a firm expands or contracts. In our empirical work, rather than using a 
dichotomous indicator for small business status, we instead use the fraction of contracts in 
which the firm participated as a small business across all years of the data. 
Data 
Our data come from the universe of contracting actions for Fiscal Years 2010 to 
2015, obtained from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS). All 
unclassified contracts above a mandated minimum value must be reported in this system. 
Contracts are identified by the contracting firm’s Data Universal Number System (DUNS) 
number, a unique firm identifier that allows us to track firms across procurements and form 
firm-specific measures of contract backlog. As mentioned above, backlog is a measure of 
how many contracts a firm has underway at any point in time, and high backlog can limit 
firms’ ability to take on new work. Other important characteristics of a contract that are 
reported in the FPDS are the number of offers, whether the firm is a small business, the 
agency requesting proposals, whether the contract was competitively awarded, the date the 
contract was signed and the date it was effective, and the expected completion date. There 
are also several variables that we use to determine the type of action, including any 
referenced indefinite delivery vehicle (IDV), whether the referenced action is a modification, 
and the reason for this modification. 
These data also provide the product service code, describing the type of product 
provided and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for the 
associated industry. The good or service being purchased can then be categorized as food, 
construction, or some other type of good, which allows us to determine whether the 
accelerated payments policy was likely to be binding or if the product already had a payment 
time under 15 days. The focus of our empirical work is on new contract awards—not 
revisions, change orders, or exercised options of existing contracts. Our objective is to 
evaluate how accelerated payments affect small business willingness and ability to take on 
new work. This is best reflected in new contracts. For the summary statistics presented in 
this section, and for all the other empirical estimation that follows, the sample of contract 
actions are only new contract awards. 
Types of Contracts 
There are two broad categories of federal contracts, direct contract awards (DCA) 
and task order awards (TOA). A DCA is the simplest type of contract. It is awarded to a 
single vendor, with specifications set by the agency to which funding has been obligated. 
DCAs can be either a definitive contract, which is typically a contract agreeing to purchase a 
good or service that is noncommoditized (i.e., unique), or it can be a purchase order for a 
commoditized good or service. The initial agreement is recorded in FPDS, as well as any 
further modifications to that agreement. 
A TOA is also with a single vendor but is awarded under a broader contract or an 
IDV with that vendor. The IDV is with a particular vendor, and then the vendor can be issued 
delivery orders or purchase agreements under the IDV. The IDV will typically have a ceiling 
on the amount of the order. The FPDS lists detailed information about the broader IDV with 
which the order is associated, as well as each order against that IDV. 
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The distinction between TOAs and DCAs is important to note, as these two types of 
actions need to be treated differently. For the empirical analysis, the most appropriate focus 
is on new DCAs and on orders against existing IDVs that are not simply fulfilling an already-
agreed-upon delivery. The objective of this report is to document whether small businesses 
are able to take on more work and participate in more contracting when accelerated 
payments are in place, and DCAs clearly reflect this. However, it is ambiguous whether a 
new delivery under an existing IDV represents a willingness to take on new work or a vendor 
simply fulfilling prior obligations. On one hand, some IDVs may be under a broader federal 
supply schedule, and when a federal agency orders under this supply schedule, it will buy 
from vendors that are willing to sell. This type of order will, therefore, reflect the firm’s 
contemporaneous interest in supplying the good. On the other hand, with other forms of the 
IDV, such as an indefinite delivery contract, the vendor may have agreed in advance to 
deliver the goods to an agency on demand up to a cap. New orders against this IDV, 
therefore, do not reflect the willingness of the contractor to participate in that moment but 
rather their willingness to participate when the IDV was entered into. 
To evaluate whether an order against an IDV is appropriate for inclusion in the 
empirical analysis, we consider the extent of competition. Specifically, if an order was 
subject to competition, then it suggests that the order was effectively new, and participating 
in the competition reflects the firm’s contemporaneous interest in taking on further work. 
As was described previously, payment periods shorter than 15 days already applied 
for construction services and many types of food products. For procurement of these goods, 
accelerated payments should have no effect. The product and service code (PSC) of the 
product is listed in the data, which allows us to identify those products for which the 
treatment is expected to have no effect. The codes for food are 8905 (meat, poultry, and 
fish); 8910 (dairy, foods, and eggs); 8915 (fruits and vegetables); and 8945 (oils and fats). 
Similarly, accelerated payments policies were not binding for construction contracts, which 
already had payment time frames shorter than 15 days. The PSC can also be used to 
distinguish these contracts. The code Y1 (construction of structures and facilities) includes 
all federal construction work, from roads, bridges, and buildings to fuel supply facilities and 
heating and cooling plants. 
In Table 3, we present the composition of federal IDV contract awards across the 
relevant product categories separately for DoD and non-DoD procurement. In Table 4, we 
present similar figures for DCAs. In the DoD, most new IDV contract actions are not food or 
construction and are, therefore, covered by accelerated payments. The average year sees 
63,351 new IDV food awards and 2,904 construction awards compared with 534,151 
contracts for other types of goods. The dollar value of new IDV contracts is also heavily 
tilted toward non–food and construction, though not to quite the same degree the number of 
contracts. For non-DoD contracts, we see that most IDV awards are neither food nor 
construction. The average year sees 449,104 new IDV awards for goods that would be 
affected by accelerated payments and only 2,439 between perishable food and construction. 
When considering DCAs, we again see that most new contract awards are affected by the 
accelerated payments policy. Within the DoD, only 193 DCAs were made in an average 
year for food products that would be unaffected by accelerated payments. Only 1,696 new 
DoD DCAs are for construction contracts in the average year. These compare to an average 
of 273,825 awards that are affected by accelerated payments.  
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Table 3. Average Annual IDV Actions by Product Type 
 
 
Table 4. Average Annual DCAs by Product Type 
 
Small business participation declines substantially as the size of the award grows. 
Table 5 shows the share of federal contracts awarded to small businesses separately for 
DCAs and IDVs. Across all action types, small businesses are awarded 47% of contracts. 
For most contracts (98.8%), the obligated amount is below $1 million in value. For contracts 
between $10 million and $20 million, 31% go to small businesses. Contracts between $20 
million and $30 million are awarded to small businesses 21% of the time, and this drops to 
just 12% of contracts over $30 million. The pattern is highly pronounced for both DCAs and 
IDVs, though overall IDVs are less frequently awarded to small businesses. 
 
Table 5. Small Business Share of Awards by Obligated Amount 
 
Model of Contract Participation 
In this section, we present a simple model of contract participation. This provides the 
theoretical basis for examining participation as an outcome. In a competitive procurement, 
winning a government contract reflects two factors, the likelihood of entry into the 
competition for the contract and the likelihood of winning the contract conditional on entry. If 
small businesses benefit from accelerated payments, then both of these dimensions will be 
affected. 
A firm’s decision to enter the competition for a contract depends on their expected 
profits. The expected profits are the likelihood that the submitted offer is successful 
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multiplied by the profits the firm will earn if it is awarded the contract:  
E[Π] = Pr(win) ∗ (Π|win). 
If it were costless to participate in the competition for contract, then the firm would 
submit an offer for all contracts where it stood a chance to earn positive expected profits. 
However, submitting an offer is not costless. In addition to the administrative cost of 
preparing a bid, the firm needs to invest time and resources in understanding the contract 
requirements and the cost of meeting those requirements. Let the cost of participating in the 
competition for a contract be K. Entry will occur if the expected profits of entry exceed these 
fixed costs: 
 
E[Π] = Pr(win) ∗ (Π|win) ≥ K. (1) 
Accelerated payments improve both the probability of winning and the profits of the 
firm conditional on winning. In a first-price auction, a commonly used mechanism to award 
government procurement contracts, the probability of winning is Pr(bi < b−i), where b−i 
represents the lowest bid of the firm’s competitors. A widely accepted result in the auction 
literature is that the firm’s optimal bid is monotonically related to its cost (Krishna, 2009). In 
other words, as the firm’s costs decline, the firm is able to submit a lower bid, and the lower 
the bid is, the higher the likelihood that b<b−i. Under accelerated payments, the bidder can 
complete the project more inexpensively because the bidder’s cost of capital is lower since 
they receive payments more quickly. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of taking on the 
project has gone down by expanding the firm’s capacity constraint. Put differently, receiving 
a contract may reduce the firm’s ability to take on other work. This opportunity cost will be 
incorporated into the firm’s bids. So, we expect that if small businesses benefit from 
accelerated payments, then the probability of winning increases for those firms. 
Similarly, the firm’s profits conditional on winning could positively depend on 
accelerated payments as well. The profits upon winning a first-price auction are 
Π|win = b − c 
which is the firm’s bid less its cost. For all the reasons just described, firm cost c declines 
with accelerated payments and, therefore, Π|win increases.  
We also now discuss two added dimensions that we do not model directly. First is 
the role of project backlog. A common finding in the procurement literature is that firms have 
limited capacity, and firms with a backlog of incomplete projects have difficulty taking on new 
work; this can interact with programs that affect the volume of business.5 We anticipate that 
firms with existing projects underway will find accelerated payments particularly valuable, as 
they can take on new work with additional confidence that cash flow will be sufficient to meet 
obligations to suppliers on projects that are already underway. 
A second dimension that we do not model is the possibility that firms may substitute 
across contracts in response to incentives that vary across contracts at a point in time. 
Limited productive capacity to complete the work in the contract, or limited managerial 
capacity to prepare bids, require firms to be selective about the contracts for which they will 
 
5 For instance, Balat (2014) estimated how the effectiveness of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act was affected by the sudden surge of projects when highway construction firms 
have upward sloping marginal cost curves. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) estimated the response 
of forward- looking firms, where contractors anticipate the effect that winning an auction today will 
have on the likelihood of winning future contracts via increased backlog. 
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compete. If the accelerated payments policy makes one type of procurement contract more 
appealing, then this could induce a substitution across procurement auctions. While we do 
not model this phenomenon directly, we will discuss the empirical implications of this issue 
below. 
Empirical Implications 
This simple model illustrates how we can uncover the benefits of accelerated 
payments for small businesses in the federal procurement data. Using the FPDS, we cannot 
measure the profitability of the firm. Nor can we directly measure other outcomes of interest 
that relate to accelerated payments, such as the firm’s cash flow. However, the model 
suggests that we can study the benefits of accelerated payments by examining contract 
awards. Consider again Equation 1. Accelerated payments can increase both terms on the 
left-hand side of the inequality. As both Pr(win) and Π|win increase, the likelihood that the 
firm participates in the bidding for an auction increases. As both participation in competition 
for contracts and the likelihood of winning those contracts increase, then firms will win more 
contracts. Looking at the number of awarded contracts is, therefore, a valid measure of 
whether the accelerated payments policy increases the profits of small businesses. In 
the empirical section, we connect this to the data in two ways. First, we examine the number 
of contract awards by month at the firm level. The hypothesis that we test is whether the 
average small business receives more government contracts in months where accelerated 
payments were in place. In light of the theory discussion above, we separately consider 
firms with and without a backlog of existing projects in order to test whether the benefits of 
accelerated payments depend on the backlog.  
The second outcome we examine is the number of offers made by firms for contracts 
set aside for small businesses. As suggested by Equation 1, the desire to participate in an 
auction should increase under accelerated payments. In general, the data do not contain 
information about the bidders for a contract, only the number of offers submitted. Therefore, 
we are not able to observe the number of bids by small businesses. Many contracts are 
specifically set aside for small businesses. Others are set aside for disadvantaged business 
enterprises, which are a subset of the small businesses. Thus, we can observe the number 
of small businesses that enter the competition for set-aside contracts. 
The question of substitution across auctions is highly relevant here. It is possible that 
accelerated payments increase auction participation of small businesses across the board, 
which would show up in the data as an increase in the number of offers for set-aside 
contracts. Alternatively, accelerated payments could allow small businesses to be more 
competitive for procurement contracts that are open to general competition. Small 
businesses might substitute toward general competition auctions, and set-aside participation 
could, in fact, decline. Even if the accelerated payments policy raises the desire of small 
businesses to participate in the competition for contracts, the predicted impact on the 
number of set-aside offers is ambiguous. 
Empirical Approach 
Using these policy changes described above, we can estimate the effect of 
accelerated payments on small businesses. We do so by examining the participation of 
small businesses in federal contracts and determining whether participation becomes more 
likely when accelerated payments are in place. We take a difference-in-difference (DD) 
approach, examining the difference in small business participation on contracts when 
accelerated payments are in effect compared to times when they are not, and we compare 
this difference to the same difference for large businesses. We also conduct this exercise 
separately for affected and unaffected products. We expect no effect for unaffected 
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products, so performing this estimation is a placebo exercise. If other factors aside from 
accelerated payments were affecting small business participation, then these should be 
witnessed in participation in contracts for placebo products as well. 
We aggregate the data to the firm-month level, so that the variable of interest is the 
number of contracts that a firm is awarded in a given month.6 Doing so creates a data set 
that is too large to be practical—approximately 28 million observations. We therefore take a 
25% random sample of the firms in the data, which leaves 7.2 million firm-month 
observations. Let yit denote the number of contract awards received by firm i in time period 
t. Let YS0 be the average level of participation of small businesses prior to the adoption of 
accelerated payments, and let YS1 be the participation after. The change from the period 
without accelerated payments to after is given by ΔYS = YS1 − YS0. The DD estimate of the 
effect of accelerated payments on small business participation is the difference in this 
change between small and large firms: γ = ∆Y S −  ∆Y L. The linear regression 
specification that yields the DD estimates is as follows: 
yit = β0 + γAt ∗ Si + ρi + φt + ǫit (2) 
 
In this regression, the variable At is an indicator for being in a period of time where 
accelerated payments are in effect, and Si is an indicator for whether firm i is a small 
business. Since small business status can change over time endogenously, when we 
implement this regression specification we instead include the fraction of contracts in which 
the firm participated as a small business. The parameters ρi and φt represent firm and time 
fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient of interest is γ, which is the DD effect of 
accelerated payments on small business contract awards. 
To connect this regression equation to the intuitive description of the DD estimates 
above, the first difference for small firms is ∆YS = E[yi|A = 1,S = 1] − E[yi|A = 0,S = 1], 
with a similar definition for large firms. This difference removes the firm fixed effect, ρi, 
which accounts for all differences across firms that are fixed over time, including any time-
constant effects of being a small business. The second difference is E[∆Y S ] − E[∆Y L]. 
This difference removes any time-specific factors, φt, that affect all firms equally. 
The main confounder in a DD specification is the presence of unobserved time-
varying shocks that differentially affect the treated group. Put differently, if an unobserved 
variable increases small business participation in contracting (and does not impact large 
business participation), and this variable happened to increase in the accelerated payments 
period, then the DD results would be biased in favor of finding an effect. As an example, 
changes in credit availability may differentially affect small businesses, and if credit 
availability changed for some reason during the accelerated payments period, then the 
impact of accelerated payments would also include this effect of credit on participation. This 
concern is difficult to address directly, though it can be addressed indirectly using a placebo 
exercise. We estimate the parameter γ for food and construction contracts separately, 
 
6 We measure participation using the number of contracts rather than the dollar value of those contracts. 
We do so for two reasons. First, there is a close connection between this measure and the theoretical 
concepts discussed above. Second, the measures of contract value in the data may not reflect the 
expected value of the contract. Contractors form expectations regarding change orders, whether the 
options in the contract will be exercised, whether they intend to agree to extra work, and so on. 
Expectations about these variables may be influenced by the accelerated payments policy itself. For 
these reasons, measuring participation by the number of contracts has a clearer interpretation and is 
likely to more accurately measure the underlying theoretical concepts. 
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which should be affected little by accelerated payments, if at all. If there was an unobserved 
shock affecting small businesses in the accelerated payments period, it should show up in 
this estimate. If the estimated γ is instead small and statistically indistinguishable from zero 
for food and construction, then we can rule out this source of bias under the assumption that 
unobserved small business shocks that are correlated with accelerated payments impact all 
firm types equally. 
In practice, there are two treatment periods that are relevant—the time where 
accelerated payments applied only to small businesses and the period where the policy 
applied to all firms. We, therefore, introduce two separate indicators for the accelerated 
payments treatment period rather than a single indicator, Ait. Our expectation is that small 
businesses are impacted more by accelerated payments and, therefore, should see a 
benefit relative to large businesses even when the policy applies to all firms. That said, the 
effects of these two periods on small business contract participation could be different. On 
one hand, expanding the application of accelerated payments to large businesses may 
reduce any advantage in bidding that small firms enjoyed when they alone received 
accelerated payments. On the other hand, the period of time where accelerated payments 
applied only to small businesses was fairly brief. If the policy took time to have an effect, 
then the impact may only be observed during the later treatment period. The reason for a 
delayed impact could be because some DoD payment systems were slow to be converted. 
Alternatively, as previously described, one mechanism for the effect of accelerated 
payments that we explore is the role of a firm’s backlog. Faster payments may improve a 
firm’s ability to take on multiple projects, so the effects of the policy could amplify over time. 
Results 
Small Business Contract Awards 
In this section, we present our main set of results. We show how small business 
contract awards changed during the period of accelerated payments, providing separate 
estimates for DoD contracts versus awards by other federal agencies. We begin by 
providing estimates for all product types together, and we subsequently break the data apart 
by broad product category. 
In Table 6, we present the results for contract awards made by the DoD. In the first 
column of this table, we present the results from regressing the logarithm of the number of 
contract awards made to a firm during a month on the interaction between the small 
business indicator and the two treatment windows. We find very little impact for the average 
small business of the accelerated payments program. The interaction between the small 
business indicator and the first treatment window was negative and very small in 
magnitude.7 It is statistically significant, but it is important to note that this is because the 
coefficient is precisely estimated with over 7 million observations. With 95% confidence, we 
can rule out an effect size smaller than −0.009 log points, which is less than a one 
percentage point effect on contract participation by small businesses. 
The main result masks a heterogeneous effect depending on firm backlog. In 
Columns 2 and 3, we split the sample between firms with and without unfinished contracts. 
For small businesses with a positive amount of backlog, there is a positive and statistically 
significant effect of accelerated payments. The first treatment window has a moderately 
small positive effect—0.026 log points—on the contract awards to small businesses. During 
 
7 In this section, we refer to the period where accelerated payments applied only to small businesses as 
the “first treatment window” and the period where accelerated payments applied to all firms as the 
“second treatment window.” 
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the second treatment window, small businesses saw higher contract awards of 0.064 log 
points compared to when accelerated payments were not in place. For firms without 
backlog, the estimated impact was nearly zero. Compared to the period without accelerated 
payments, the difference in contract awards to small businesses was virtually zero—around 
0.0005 log points. 
In Table 7 we present a similar set of results for other federal agencies. The pattern 
of results is similar, though the effects are much smaller in magnitude than for DoD small 
business contractors. Accelerated payments are associated with a small negative effect on 
log contract awards to small businesses. Though statistically significant, the effect is very 
small and precisely estimated. The difference in small business participation from the time of 
no accelerated payments to the first treatment window is just −0.005 log points, and small 
businesses in the second treatment window receive only −0.0024 fewer log points of 
contracts. As was the case for DoD contractors, any positive effect of accelerated payments 
is observed for firms with a backlog of incomplete contracts. The first treatment window 
effect is 0.011, and the second treatment window effect is 0.026. These point estimates are 
statistically significant and meaningful, yet they are smaller in magnitude than for the DoD. 
The smaller effect of accelerated payments in non-DoD contracts is likely due to the clearer 
implementation of accelerated payments. 
By Product Type 
As previously discussed, accelerated payments policies should have little effect on 
construction contracts and many types of food contracts; these already are paid inside of 15 
days, so a policy of accelerating payments will not be binding. This fact can be used as a 
placebo exercise to verify the results. 
Table 6. Log Participation by Firm-Month, DoD Contracts 
 
In Table 8, we present the results of estimating our base specifications separately for 
contracts for affected versus unaffected products. In the first three columns, we present the 
results for unaffected food and construction contracts. For these contracts, the effect of 
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accelerated payments is extremely small for the average small business. The point 
estimates of the coefficient on the interaction term between the small business indicator and 
the first and second treatment windows are 0.00025 and 0.00018. These coefficient 
estimates are small and precisely estimated. In Column 2, we present the estimates for firms 
with backlog. We see that there is an effect of accelerated payments on the participation of 
small businesses for food and construction contracts. The effect is not as large as the main 
effect found earlier, but it is noticeable. The estimated treatment effect of accelerated 
payments on the participation of small businesses on these contracts is 0.0064 during the 
first treatment window and 0.011 during the second treatment window. It is worth noting that 
even though these products did not directly benefit from accelerated payments, it is still 
possible that firms with backlog could benefit. Such firms would more quickly receive 
payment for the backlog contracts. In Column 3 of Table 8, we find that small businesses 
without backlog had virtually the same likelihood of contract participation during the 
accelerated payments period as when it was not in place. 
In Columns 4 through 6 of Table 8, we present the results for contracts for non–food 
and construction products—those directly affected by the change in payments policy. We 
see that the effects of accelerated payments are strongest for these types of contracts, and 
in particular for participation by firms with backlog. Small businesses with backlog 
experienced an increase in participation by 0.022 log points during the first treatment 
window and 0.056 log points during the second treatment window. It is not surprising that 
these values are close to the main findings presented in Table 6, as most contracts are not 
for construction products or for the subset of food products that already had accelerated 
payments. The important point is that the effect for the affected products is approximately 5 
times as large as the effect for unaffected products. 
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Table 8. Log Participation by Firm-Month, DoD Contracts 
 
Restricting to Active Firms 
One concern with the results just presented is that many firms are not active at a 
particular point in time. Inactive firms will not be affected by accelerated payments, and the 
overall effect of accelerated payments may be larger than what we estimated. In this 
section, we restrict the estimation sample to only active firms, which we define as firms who 
won at least one contract within the same year as the sample observation. In other words, if 
a firm did not win a contract in 2012, we do not include that firm’s 2012 observations in the 
regression. 
In Table 10, we present the base results for the DoD using this restricted sample, 
separately for food/construction and for other types of goods. The results mirror the 
estimates presented in Table 8 but are larger in magnitude. The average effect of 
accelerated payments is estimated to be small and insignificant for food and construction 
products for the average firm. For firms with backlog, there is a statistically significant 
increase in small business participation. Firms without backlog do not witness an increase in 
participation for food or construction contracts. 
In the final three columns of Table 10, we present similar estimates for non–food or 
construction contracts. For the average active firm, the estimated effect of accelerated 
payments is small in magnitude. The active firms with backlog have a substantial increase in 
participation, particularly in the second transfer window. This estimate is larger in magnitude 
than the estimate for all firms. Active small businesses without backlog do not witness an 
increase in contract participation. 
Offers on Set-Aside Contracts 
In this section, we examine the number of offers by small businesses on set-aside 
contracts. If accelerated payments benefit small businesses, we expect that the desire to 
participate in auctions increases. In general, it is not possible to determine the number of 
bids submitted by small businesses by action. Only the total number of offers can be 
determined. With small business set-asides, all bids are presumably from small businesses. 
By examining the number of offers for set-asides, we can then determine whether the 
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Table 9. Log Participation by Firm-Month, Non-DoD Contracts
 
Table 10. Log Participation by Firm-Month, DoD Contracts, Active Firms 
 
One disadvantage of this approach is that it cannot account for substitution across 
set-aside contracts and those with open competition. In particular, accelerated payments 
may allow a small business to participate to a greater extent in open competition auctions. 
However, we expect that accelerated payments should lead to greater bidding participation 
in both set-aside and non–set-aside contracts rather than a substitution between the two. 
Table 11 presents the results. We do not find evidence of an increase in the offers 
for set-aside contracts. This is true when considering all federal set-aside contracts or when 
estimating the effect specifically for DoD contracts. In fact, the opposite held true during the 
second transfer window. For DoD set-aside contracts, fewer offers were made during the 
second treatment window than during the time when accelerated payments were not in 
effect. To the extent that accelerated payments increase the desire of small businesses to 
compete for government contracts, this result suggests that small businesses are 
substituting toward the open competition auctions. 
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Table 11. Number of Offers for Contracts Set-Aside for Small Business 
 
Conclusion 
In this report, we consider the impact of a federal procurement policy that 
accelerated payments to contractors. The policy was initiated by the DoD, first applying only 
to small business contractors. It was later adopted by all federal agencies and subsequently 
extended to all federal contractors regardless of size. Reducing the time between invoice 
and payment is desirable for contractors because of the lag between when costs are 
incurred and payments are received. Firms rely on internal and external sources of capital to 
fill this gap. This poses particular challenges for small businesses, which are likely to have 
lower cash reserves and less access to inexpensive credit. The impact of accelerated 
payments will likely be largest for this set of firms, allowing them to be more competitive for 
contracts and take on additional work. 
Our findings indicate that small businesses participated in more contracts during the 
time when accelerated payments were in place. The estimated effect was stronger for DoD 
contracts, for which the adoption of accelerated payments was apparently more widespread. 
Our empirical design exploits the fact that accelerated payments did not affect all products 
equally; invoice payments for contracts for perishable foods and construction services were 
already accelerated, and the policy should not affect the payment of these goods. We find 
that the modest rise in small business participation after the introduction of accelerated 
payments was observed only in contracts not involving food or construction. 
Our findings lend support to the contention that small businesses benefit from 
accelerated payments. More generally, our findings are also consistent with the hypothesis 
that liquidity constraints pose a greater challenge for small businesses, which suggests that 
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policies such as set-asides that direct more contracts to small businesses may be more 
effective if coupled with policies that alleviate constraints faced by small businesses. 
Further research is called for along two dimensions. First, our conclusions would be 
bolstered by evidence of how the payment behavior of agencies responded to the 
accelerated payments policies. We currently have only indirect evidence on this point. 
Second, evaluating the costs and benefits of accelerated payments would be a key input 
into policy discussions. Conducting such an analysis may require an understanding of the 
long-run effects of policies on small businesses. If the survival and growth of firms is 
enhanced by accelerated payments, then this improves the operation of federal 
procurement markets and should therefore be counted among the benefits of the policy. 
This is a nontrivial exercise that is outside the scope of this report. 
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Abstract 
Discerning, negotiating, and communicating priorities are necessary tasks for the U.S. defense 
acquisition system to effectively implement its portion of the National Defense Strategy. One of 
the Department of Defense’s central tools for doing so is the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), 
a projection of the cost and composition of the force over the next 5 years. This project created a 
dataset and employs it to study FYDP reliability, focusing on two sources of uncertainty: 
differences in approach between military departments and differences in volatility between those 
line items in the base budget and those that include contingency operation spending.  
Introduction  
For the U.S. defense acquisition system to properly implement its portion of the National 
Defense Strategy, it must effectively discern, negotiate, and communicate its priorities. One of 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) central tools for this process is the Future Years Defense 
Plan (FYDP), a projection of the cost and composition of the force over the next 5 years. 
Annually updated and submitted as part of the president’s budget submission projection, 
the FYDP provides important insights into the DoD’s priorities and projections of the future, both 
internally and externally. Internally within the DoD, wherein the FYDP is constructed, the 
process forces the stakeholders involved to debate tradeoffs and outline their visions of the 
future. Externally, it lays out for Congress a vision of how U.S. national security strategies could 
be implemented in practice, which the legislature must then choose whether to fund or alter. It 
helps the U.S. defense industry understand where the DoD plans to invest and thereby allows 
companies within the industry to align themselves with current priorities. It helps scholars 
identify trends and do research on major capital-intensive projects, which can be used to inform 
future projects, both defense and nondefense. It helps U.S. citizens identify how the government 
plans to spend its taxpayers’ dollars. However, the FYDP has a few major drawbacks for these 
stakeholders that undercut its ability to communicate priorities. 
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The first drawback is the inherent tension between the FYDP’s role expressing the 
funding amount that the executive branch deems necessary to support the strategy and its role 
in creating a plan that can be implemented within the funding amount authorized and 
appropriated by Congress.  
A second, related, shortfall is the absence of any measure of reliability or predictive 
intervals for the projections. Some parts of the DoD budget are easier to predict than others, but 
the point estimate provided by the FYDP does not differentiate between known quantities, like 
the purchase of uniforms, and cutting-edge technology, like the development of a next-
generation alloy. That said, by design, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgets 
operate as a pressure valve for uncertainty by taking some of the most volatile spending out of 
the base budgets and FYDP and managing them through OCO methods instead. However, the 
intended functionality of the OCO accounts is muddled when predictable spending is moved to 
OCO accounts to avoid budget caps. 
Third, the unclassified FYDP is released in a form that makes it straightforward to study 
topline spending or individual line items or programs but challenging to analyze anything in 
between. This is because the FYDP is released in dozens of PDFs through separate justification 
books, and not as a centralized database or even in summary documents. Collectively, these 
limitations present a higher barrier to entry to stakeholders and make it laborious for specialists 
and unappealing for anyone else to put investment plans in a meaningful context.  
The FYDP is a system for planning rather than a forecasting tool, but there are 
nonetheless multiple benefits to understanding the relationship between its projections and 
actual spending. First, stakeholders can better employ the system and its results if its strengths 
and biases are more transparent. Second, this analysis can put common assumptions to the 
test, for example, the volatility of OCO spending or if the long-term Navy Shipbuilding planning 
process results in more accurate projections of future needs. Third, for the defense industry, the 
difference between projected and actual spending can be a key indicator of risk and aid in 
investment planning. Finally, defense spending must often respond to external changes and 
updated strategies; large gaps can indicate not just failure of prediction but also speed in 
adapting the larger defense enterprise to new priorities. 
This project has created a dataset to ease research of the FYDP and uses that dataset 
to address the question, How reliable are projections within the FYDP as an indicator for actual 
spending? It tests the value of the unclassified FYDP for investment spending, RDT&E and 
Procurement, as a bottom-up indicator of DoD priorities by comparing cumulative projections 
through fiscal year (FY) 2019 spending from 1, 3, and 5 years in advance with the actual 
cumulative spending. In addition, the paper examines whether there are differences between 
military departments and between line items that do and do not include OCO spending.  
Literature Review 
There are a multitude of challenges in defense planning even within the base budget. 
The United States, despite its resources and robust analytical staff, faces more difficult 
challenges than those of many of its peer countries. First, the United States is a presidential 
system with projections prepared by the executive branch but funding authority resting with 
Congress. A projection process could be designed that does more to incorporate congressional 
opinions into the planning process, but the role of two co-equal branches of government means 
that some degree of uncertainty for both the topline funding and for individual projects of interest 
to the legislature is irreducible. 
Second, the United States is the global leader in defense research and development, 
and as Light et al. (2017) find, “there is a considerable amount of cost and schedule growth risk 
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facing all [Major Defense Acquisition Programs] at [Milestone] B” when the DoD commits to 
significant development spending (p. 44). Even a better estimation approach would be highly 
unlikely to eliminate uncertainty in defense research and development. 
In analyzing the 2020 President’s Budget (PB2020), Matthew Woodward and David 
Arthur (2019) draw on the FYDP and project specific reporting. Employing historical factors 
developed from studies by the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis, 
including those referenced previously, they find that “using the resulting cost estimates instead 
of DoD’s cost estimates raises total projected acquisition costs by 3.5 percent over the FYDP 
period and by 6.1 percent over the 2026–2035 period” (p. 16). 
The relationship between these project estimates and the larger FYDP projections is 
complex, with estimated cost influencing budget requests and a sense of total available funds 
influencing what the budget is able to fund and at what level. For example, the CBO estimates 
explore the cost implications of the President’s Budget by keeping present plans constant. In 
practice, MDAPs and other budget lines can be descoped, slowed down, or canceled outright.  
Topline FYDP projections should not be treated simply as a sum of composite budget 
lines but as a consequential form of estimating in their own right. As Todd Harrison and Seamus 
Daniels (2020) note, 
Previous inflection points in the defense budget, both up and down, have been 
influenced by wars, shifts in strategy, changes in the threat environment, and 
economic conditions. ... While there does not appear to be appetite to cut the 
defense budget in the remainder of FY 2020 or in FY 2021, as is evident by the 
inclusion of additional defense funding in stimulus bills, the political environment 
could shift markedly once an economic recovery is underway in FY 2022 or FY 
2023. (pp. 57–58) 
While the pandemic makes the present particularly challenging to forecast, the problem has 
never been an easy one for the DoD. Kevin Lewis (1994) finds that plans routinely expect small 
incremental changes, but in practice, changes, in topline spending or individual programs, are 
regularly more dramatic and often cyclical (pp. 110–113). Leland Jordan (2015) goes further 
and argues that historically most administrations project more funding than materializes, 
showing “systematic fiscal optimism” (p. 274). Jordan (2015) analyzed budgets from 1975 to 
1995 and discovered that 70% of the projections exceeded the appropriated amounts (pp. 282–
283). 
Effective projection should introduce difficult choices in the present, before expensive 
commitments have been made, rather than in the future, where cost overruns or budget 
shortfalls may lead to the termination of programs experiencing difficulty or redirection of funds 
from programs that are presently successful. Jordan (2015) concludes that “those 
administrations having demonstrated the greatest bias in their real growth projections also most 
seriously handicapped program managers” (p. 288).  
Enduring Budget in Overseas Contingency Operations 
As mentioned in the introduction, OCO budgets acknowledge the existence of 
uncertainty due to external events such as wars or other cases where events beyond the control 
of the DoD require rapid responses. However, the distinction between the base budget and 
OCO has been undercut by budgetary maneuvering since the passage of the Budget Control 
Act (BCA) of 2011. In an attempt to reduce federal budget deficits, the BCA established 
spending limits on discretionary budget authority, applying to both defense and non-defense 
programs. These limits do not apply to the OCO budget. Subsequently, the executive and 
legislative branches have evaded the caps by transferring some predictable enduring spending 
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out of the base budget and into OCO spending. This approach has been criticized by some 
defense experts and government officials from both parties. Katherine Blakeley and Lawrence 
Korb (2014) from the Center for American Progress voice their concerns that “financially, the 
free flow of war funding has decimated any pretense of fiscal discipline at the Pentagon. … 
Unclear budget guidance and poor financial management have allowed DoD to pay for 
substantial enduring costs with war funding rather than the base budget, further muddying the 
waters” (p. 28). Then Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney also criticized in strong 
terms the “use of OCO funding for base budget requirements” (McGarry & Epstein, 2019, p. 9).  
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that from 2006 to 2018, more than 
$50 billion in OCO funding per year (in 2019 dollars), on average, has gone toward the costs of 
enduring activities rather than the temporary costs of overseas operations. This is particularly 
transparent in the FY 2020 President’s Budget. As Harrison and Daniels (2020) report, “the 
request shifted entire categories of funding, such as Army Ammunition Procurement, from the 
base budget into OCO” (pp. 4). With the coming expiration of the BCA caps in FY 2021, the 
FYDP released with the FY 2020 budget request then shifts all the money back to base 
spending after the expiration.  
The insertion of enduring items within the OCO budget does not necessarily undermine 
the value of OCO in those cases where it is still used as intended. Andrew Hunter (2019) 
defends OCO by noting that in the last decade, a major portion of OCO funds was used to 
support the operations of Afghan security forces. As the actual size, operational employment, 
and equipage of these forces have changed rapidly, OCO funds were extremely useful to 
sustain the mission. Due to the fact that the levels are not planned out a full 5 years in advance, 
OCO allows the performance of missions that might be practically impossible otherwise. 
Moreover, the origin of OCO was an attempt to bring more oversight and transparency to 
wartime emergency supplemental bills. Senator McCain, objecting to the inclusion of non-
emergency procurement in a supplemental bill,  
demanded that DoD submit its request for war funding along with the regular 
budget so that it might receive a similar level of congressional scrutiny as the base 
budget and so that it would be less easy to embellish with non-war-related funding. 
(Hunter, 2019)  
The Strategic and Communication Role of the Future Years Defense Plan  
The FYDP helps the executive branch make strategic choices and communicates them 
to internal and external audiences. Critically, the FYDP is released as part of the President’s 
Budget and thus linked to the negotiation between branches of the U.S. government. The 
numbers are provided to justify the funding requests the executive branch is making to 
Congress. As Todd Harrison and Seamus Daniels (2020) put it,  
The FYDP is therefore best understood as a statement of policy rather than a 
prediction of where the budget is headed. It is an indication, with considerable 
detail, of the Defense Department’s priorities and trade-offs among modernization, 
force structure, and readiness. (p. 11) 
This emphasis on policy and strategy provides another set of criteria that can be used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the FYDP. In particular, Thomas-Duerrel Young (2018) is critical of 
long term defense planning as practiced in the United States. While other authors have 
emphasized the benefits of budgetary stability making efficient choices, Young believes this fails 
to acknowledge the way adversaries can unpredictably shape choices. Instead, Young 
highlights two tasks that defense planners can achieve: “to produce costed priorities” and 
“creating an understanding of future financial projection of current obligations” (p. 366). For 
Young, the quality of cost estimates matters for costing priorities, but the value of the FYDP is 
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not to provide reliable predictions. Instead “the utility of these financial projections should be 
judged by how much flexibility they can provide ministers and senior defense officials to change 
the way money is being spent to produce relevant defense outcomes” (Young, 2018, p. 370). 
While strategic flexibility is inherently appealing, it does still face challenges noted by 
Kevin Lewis (1994) in his argument for defense planning humility. Lewis (2014) observes a 
range of cyclical factors in the defense budget and a shrinking portion of the budget going to 
combatant forces. He cautions, “we should expect inefficiencies, and substantially more 
negative effects on capability than might be expected from these inefficiencies, because of the 
increasing role of ‘fixed-cost’ overhead items” (p. 132). That said, the larger emphasis on the 
FYDP’s role in achieving flexibility harks back to Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith (2005), 
who reject the idea that long-range plans limit the president’s ability to implement a new strategy 
and argue that “an organization's flexibility to move in a new direction is greatly reduced if it 
lacks a clear picture of the direction in which it has been heading” (p. 50). 
Young’s (2018) emphasis on the strategic flexibility provided by the FYDP presents a 
challenge; while there has been extensive research comparing projections to actual costs, 
measuring the agility of the acquisition enterprise is a less intuitive problem. Will Domke (1984) 
provided one possible answer by analyzing how the Defense Budget responded to presidential 
priorities going back to the Eisenhower administration by analyzing the winners and losers 
among DoD funding accounts. He found that the balance between military departments change 
most at the start of an administration and more popular president’s have greater influence (p. 
389).1  
Picking up on Domke’s (1984) approach, Travis Sharp (2019) argues that what the 
current debate on gaps between strategy and resources “generally [does] not provide, however, 
is any objective sense of whether DoD is doing relatively better or worse aligning resources with 
strategy” (p. 9). Sharp (2019) considers three diagnostic tests including a Winners test that 
looks at whether spending has shifted into areas identified by the National Defense Strategy as 
priorities.2 He looks at the FYDP’s Major Program Categories and investment areas, with the 
latter only available through the President’s Budget. In both cases, Sharp (2019) finds that the 
2020 President’s Budget failed this test (p. 24). 
Data and Methods 
Data Sources and Structure  
This project focuses on budget lines rather than major programs for both financial and 
policy reasons. Todd Harrison (2016) reports that as of the FY 2016 President’s Budget, “these 
smaller programs account for an average of 57 percent of the total acquisition budget over the 
FYDP” (p. 24). Moreover, during the study period, the DoD is increasingly experimenting with 
alternate channels, including mid-tier acquisition and other transaction authority, responding to 
pressure from the Executive Branch and Congress to pursue speed and innovation. 
To better understand this era of reduced reliance on the major weapons system pipeline, 
this report chooses to focus its attention on procurement line items and RDT&E program 
elements. This is not the most detailed level of analysis available; however, it has the advantage 
of being available from multiple sources. The first pair of these sources are the P-1s for 
Procurement and R-1s for RDT&E. These budget documents are provided as spreadsheets that 
 
1 Domke (1984) does not include FYDP data in his analysis. 
2 “Instead, a winner is best defined as one that receives the largest increase in its proportional share of DoD’s total 
spending compared to what DoD’s prior outyear plans forecasted” (Sharp, 2019, p. 45). 
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cover the entire DoD enterprise, going back to the 1998 President’s Budget (DoD Comptroller, 
2020). However, these detailed and convenient documents do not include FYDP’s out years. 
Instead, for detailed future year projections at the procurement line item (P-40) and 
RDT&E program element (R-2) level, it is necessary to turn to the Justification Books. In these 
documents, the military departments and agencies lay out their spending request and describe 
what is being bought as well as providing program management details. A major challenge for 
open-source researchers is that for investment spending alone, each President’s Budget is 
accompanied by dozens of PDF files, splitting the information based on organization and 
funding account.  
This project overcomes the limitations of the justification books and does so with the 
benefit of two external sources. First, a predecessor FYDP analysis led by Gabriel Coll bulk laid 
the foundation for this project by downloading many of the justification books and conducting an 
initial analysis. A parallel effort by the CSIS’s Defense Budget Analysis (DBA) group greatly 
accelerated this effort with the discovery that the justification books, starting with the FY 2013 
FYDP, have included XML encoded spreadsheets that do not require the intensive data 
cleaning effort necessary when scraping PDFs. This past and parallel work assisted in the 
creation of the dataset, and, in the DBA case, provided a valuable source for cross checking 
totals and budget line classifications. 
To allow for cross-comparisons, the team has imported R-1 and P-1 budget requests 
from FY 2011 to FY 2021, using the most recent files and most recent columns within those 
files. Much of the effort of the dataset focused on the creation of unique identifiers, called CSIS 
budget line keys, that ease the process of tracking a budget line across different sources and 
over time. While many of the same columns are available in the R-1s and R-2s as well as in the 
P-1 and P-40s, there are discrepancies in the labels used, which are more challenging in early 
years and with procurement data in particular. For example, in some years and for some 
agencies, the line number, that is to say, the order in which it is presented in that PB, is the 
same as a line item. This causes problems as P-1s and P-40s include slightly different budget 
lines, leading to misalignment, and because order regularly changes from year to year. 
Moreover, line item standards change over time, with many budget lines changing from having a 
six-character line number to a 10-character one while still having the same broad topical focus. 
For procurement, for the analysis in this paper, all cost types pertaining to a single program are 
combined.3 
A related challenge is that in a typical year, a few score PEs and LIs will cease to 
receive funding or be tracked for the first time. This is a natural outflow of changes in strategy, 
priorities, and technology. However, some of the time, a new PE or LI does mean a genuinely 
new project but may instead reflect a change in identifiers for an existing budget line of greater 
magnitude than just an increase in the length of the identifier used. This may be a matter of a 
change of agency, such as the move from the Defense Health Agency to the Defense Health 
Program, or a reclassification, such as in the lead-up to the creation of the Space Force.  
The ties between the original sources and their unique identifiers are recorded within the 
dataset’s repository for transparency and reproducibility reasons. The study team has taken the 
additional step of classifying budget lines based on our confidence that potential confounding 
factors have been removed.  
 
3 In the early years of the dataset, Advanced Procurement LIs sometimes had a different line item than the rest of a 
program. These divergent advanced procurement budget lines have been combined by the study team with the rest 
of their program under the same CSIS budget line key. 
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Figure 3 shows a summary of the R-1 and R-2 portions of the dataset by confidence 
level in the left and right columns, respectively. The top row shows the total actual spending 
associated with the projections of each PB. For the R-1, this includes only the actual spending 
for the budget year in question. The R-2s show substantially more spending because their 
projection window covers the President’s Budget and four out years. For those cases where 
projections go beyond FY 2019, the spending amount projected is shown in gray.  
Focusing on those projections for which we know the actual spending, there are five confidence 
levels of interest: 
● No FYDP Expected: This covers budget lines, such as classified spending, that are 
typically not included in the unclassified FYDP as reported by the R-2s or P-40s.  
● Unanticipated Budget Line: This covers budget lines that did not yet exist when the PB 
was published. They may be a genuinely new budget line, or perhaps a transfer whose 
predecessor was not identified by the study team.4  
● Not Confident: This category covers budget lines that are present in one source but not 
in the other.5  
● Semi-confident: This category covers budget lines that are present in both sources but 
that have one of a range of known discrepancies. This includes having a difference 
projection between the two sources of more than $2,000. In the case where there is a 
missing cost type, budget lines are reported as semi-confident if there is a net difference 
between the two projections of $2,000 or less but the spending occurs in different years 
depending on the source. Finally, if a budget line projected spending in a future year, but 
the budget line was not reported in the year in question, it is marked as semi-confident.  
● Confident: This is the category that is the basis of most of the charts in this paper. To be 
classified as confident, both sources must report projections within $2,000 of one 
another. A budget line may end during the projection period and still be classified as 
confident, but only if the ending was anticipated by the President’s budget. These strict 
criteria are intended to limit the sample to those budget lines that are genuinely starting 
and ending rather than having overlooked connections. 
Turning again to Figure 1, the larger light blue blocks present in the R-2 column indicate that 
there is a substantial amount spent by PEs that the FYDP does not see coming years in 
advance. The lower row of Figure 1 shows the same budget lines, but using the metric of the 
count of lines rather than the amount of actual spending.  
 
4 Unanticipated Budget Line is smaller in more recent years because it is a lagging indicator and only available once 
actual spend figures are known. 
5 For procurement, this also covers cases in which there is a cost type under the budget line, for example, advanced 
procurement, that is not present in the other source and there is a net difference in projection of more than $2,000 
between the two sources. 
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Figure 1. RDT&E Actual Spending and Budget Line Count by Level of Confidence 
 
The Procurement dataset is summarized in Figure 2, and by the prevalence of red and 
yellow, shows that there are more disagreements between the P-1s and P-40s than between 
the R-1s and R-2s. There were multiple contributors to these problems. First, there were gaps in 
reporting on the P-40 side, though some of this the study team has already overcome by 
manually transcribing the PDF files that were missing XML files.6 Second, cost type categories, 
particularly reductions to adjust for prior year past procurement, were sometimes missing from 
P-40 reporting and merit closer examination.  
 
6 The most problematic absence in dollar terms had been in the Navy Shipbuilding and Construction account. For 
some President’s Budgets, key columns went unreported, but these were overcome by imputing the values using 
other available data. For both the R-2s and P-40s PB2014 and PB2015, the justification books did not include OCO 
spending with a note that those figures were to be released later. The study team imputed these values from the P-1s 
and R-1s. In PB2016, the total President’s Budget spending column was missing from the P-40s, but the study team 
imputed that number by adding base and OCO spending together for each row. In PB2017, both base and OCO 
spending were amended after the R-2s and P-40s were published, and the study team again drew from the R-1s and 
P-1s to impute the amended values. 
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Figure 2. Procurement Actual Spending and Budget Line Count by Level of Confidence 
 
All dollar amounts in this report represent current dollars. Although changes in spending 
timing (delays, shifts, etc.) occur throughout the time period, much of the FYDP estimations 
themselves have inflation concerns built into their reasoning. For statistical purposes, values 
across multiple-years have been aggregated into a cumulative expenditure; for example, 
analyzing the full 5-year window involves comparing the sum of 5 years of projection and 5 
years of actual spending. 
There are several tradeoffs to this methodology. The analysis is exchanging year-
specific sensitivity for a more robust measurement better representative of the discrepancies 
being assessed over the time periods in question. This sacrifices the ability to directly compare 
the predictive strength of different FYDP years (i.e., testing the extent to which the second and 
third out years are more reliable than the fourth and fifth out years). Likewise, this approach 
makes it harder to account for any single year having an abnormal occurrence, such as 
sequestration. In return, the variables being compared serve as a much more accurate 
representation of what is being estimated in total. From an industrial standpoint, this serves as a 
more natural portrayal of how spending is being looked at overall. 
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Results 
How Reliable Are FYDP Projections? 
Figure 3 shows cumulative FY 2019 actual spending plotted against FYDP projections 
starting in 2015.7 The Y-Axis is the Total Spend, the logged set of actual expenditures fully 
realized as outlays over given years. The X-Axis is the Projected Budget, the logged set of prior 
expenditure estimates for all budget lines expected to exist in those future actual spending 
years. The black diagonal lines represent the boundary where the projected budget is exactly 
equal to the total spend. Points to the upper left of the line have more spending than expected, 
and points to the lower right projected more spending than actually occurred. Points lying on the 
axes are the result of projected budget lines that ended up having no actual spend (x-axis) or 
budget lines appearing with actual spend that projected no spending or were unanticipated (y-
axis). The graph's different columns correspond to different comparison periods: the PB2015–
PB2019 graph includes 5 years of projections, while the PB2019–PB2019 graph includes only 
the first year with no out years. The upper row covers all budget lines, while the lower row 
includes only those budget lines where the study team is confident in the data quality. 
3
 
Figure 3. Scatter Plot showing FYDP projections versus Actual Total (Investment) 
Each of the plots has a blue regression line of best fit that estimates the relationship 
between the projections and the actual spend. The closer the line is to the black diagonal line, 
the better the projections. When limiting the sample to those budget lines where the study team 
is more confident of the data's quality, as shown in the second row of Figure 3, the quality of the 
relationship strengthens.  
Figure 4 compares the projected and total values shown in Figure 3 but uses a 
histogram to focus on the differences between the projected and total values. Only the 5-year, 
3-year, and 1-year projections are shown in this and subsequent graphs to allow the display of 
more detail. The X-Axis denotes the relative difference between projected expenditure on any 
 
7 Due to the extreme range in spending across different items, all figures will employ logarithmically transformed axes 
for statistical purposes. Logging both sides results in more normalized sets, rather than most of the points falling into 
the lower left corner due to the great variation in size of budget lines. 
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single budget line and the actual spend on that same budget line in FY 2019. Relative difference 
is used to allow the scale to include cases where the projected or the actual spending figures 
are zero.8 The Y-Axis denotes the count of budget lines with that level of difference.  
 
Figure 4. Budget Line Distribution by the Relative Difference Between Cumulative Projection and Actual 
Spending 
 
For those points in the center of each histogram, the difference between actual and 
projected values is small. The chart’s left side indicates budget line items where the projected 
value was much higher than what was eventually spent, and the right side of the chart shows 
budget line items where the estimated value was much lower than what ended up being spent. 
The groupings all display normal distribution, with the same previously mentioned 0 spend 
outliers showing on the edges, with the left edge representing cases where spending was 
projected but none took place and the right edge representing cases where zero dollars were 
projected, or the budget line was unanticipated by the PB, but spending took place nonetheless. 
The first row of the graph shows all data, and the second row shows only confident budget lines; 
note that far fewer budget lines fall at either end of the scale in the confident dataset. 
Blue dashed lines indicate the X-Axis median. The closer the estimations are to the 
actual spending, the more accurate and center-oriented the estimations end up being. There is 
a distinct drop-off in overall accuracy from the PB year estimation to the out-year estimations, 
which results in significantly wider tails for the histograms that include more out-years.  
 
8 Relative difference, for the purposes of these charts, is calculated by dividing the numerator of (Cumulative Actual 
Spending - Cumulative Projected Spending) by the denominator of (Cumulative Actual Spending - Cumulative 
Projected Spending) / 2. Relative difference is not defined in those cases where both the actual spending and the 
projected spending values are zero. 
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Which Services and Budget Categories Have the Most and Least Reliable Projections? 
This section examines whether the reliability measures discussed previously vary 
between OCO and base budget lines and when looking across military departments. For 
context, the count of P-40 and R-2 budget lines for each category is shown in Figure 5. The 
following analysis is limited to the confident budget lines, shown in dark blue. While most budget 
lines merit the confident description every year, the semi-confident and not confident categories 
can account for a reasonable amount of spending. For example, for the Navy, shipbuilding 
procurement line items, complicated by advanced procurement, have been a regular source of 
data import problems. While the number of items is small, those budget lines are of high value.  
 
Figure 5. Budget Lines by Military Department and OCO 
 
Influence of Overseas Contingency Operations 
When considering the influence of OCO, this paper classifies budget lines based on 
whether they contained any enacted OCO spending or whether the President’s Budget included 
any OCO spending. This method assumes that budget lines with planned or recent OCO 
spending may be more likely to have it in the future. A limitation of this method is that 
sometimes a budget line will add OCO spending even if it had not included it in the past. As is 
shown in Figure 5, the number of OCO line items experienced a small decline after 2013. 
However, since PB2016, the number of budget lines including OCO has increased across the 
military departments.  
When examining changes in individual budget lines, as shown in Figure 6, the first year 
of estimates, PB2019 versus PB2019, shows little difference in distribution between base-only 
lines and other lines. However, in the 3-year and 5-year projections, shown in the middle and 
left columns, respectively, the difference is much starker. The first row’s base-only budget lines 
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have peaks centered around 0 proportional difference between projected totals and actual 
spending. In contrast, that is still a high point for the budget lines including OCO, but the 
frequency is notably lower, resulting in a more rounded dome shape. Instead, a greater portion 
of budget lines are spread to the right, indicating growth. This can also be seen in the dashed 
blue lines, which show the median growth and are shifted to the right, indicating a higher 
median increase in budget lines. Note that unlike in Figure 5, this graph is simplified by only 
displaying the confident budget lines due to their superior reliability for analysis. 
 
Figure 6. Budget Line Distribution by the Relative Difference Between FY 2019 Actual and FYDP 
Projection by OCO 
Military Services 
The differences between Military Services are more subtle than those between base-
only and OCO including budget lines, and Figure 7 thus compares the median relative 
difference between projected and actual spending. Positive values are associated with more 
spending than projected, while negative values indicate projections exceeded spending. Each of 
the graphs covers a complete PB year, working from the President’s Budget only on the left to 
the 5-year FYDP on the right. The Military Departments show similar trends within each PB, as 
assumptions about topline spending levels have widespread influence. PB2013 was devised 
under the explicit assumption that a budget deal would be reached that would have reduced the 
strictness of budget caps, a belief that proved optimistic, and as a result, actual spending was 
consistently below projections. PB2014 still proved optimistic in the early years, though by the 
fifth out-year, FY2018, Army and Air Force budget lines began to spend more than had been 
projected. The last three PBs of the Obama administration all proved to underestimate eventual 
spending. In the latter two budgets, the administration transition for the FY2018 budget leads to 
particularly stark changes. Finally, the PB2018 projections also proved to underestimate future 
spending, which may be in part the result of the limited attention top-level leadership in the 
incoming administration was able to give the FYDP.  
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Figure 7. Median Relative Difference by Military Department in Confident Budget Lines 
The Army, since PB2015, has had the highest relative difference, and is also the service 
that most relies on OCO spending. The Air Force has also had relatively higher shifts in median 
spending, although these Air Force estimates are more reliable in dollar terms, suggesting that 
Air Force changes are concentrated in lower value budget lines. The pairing of the two services 
is somewhat surprising, as the Army and Air Force make the most and least use of OCO, 
respectively. 
To better understand the interplay between OCO inclusive budget lines and military 
department projection reliability, Figure 8 examines both. It shows that across the services, 
budget lines including OCO, shown in red, tend to underestimate out-year spending to a much 
greater extent than base budget lines. Indeed, the median relative difference for OCO including 
lines is repeatedly more than 20%. This unpredictability aligns with expectations, as OCO 
spending is only reported through the first year of the FYDP. So any OCO spending in 
subsequent years inherently results in the base budget figures underestimating the eventual 
funding. There are exceptions to this trend; for example, for the Army and Navy, the PB2013 
OCO budget lines consistently overestimated the spending to a greater extent than did base 
budgets. This spending reduction may be due to the greater variability of OCO-related budget 
lines, making them a more likely target for cuts once the budget caps arrived in full force.  
For both the Army and Air Force, their comparatively high medians shown in Figure 9 
can be traced to those years in which OCO inclusive budget lines rocket above 20%. Both the 
Army and Air Force have been increasing the number of OCO involved budget lines. 
Interestingly, for the Air Force, this expansion has correlated with a reduction in the degree to 
which OCO budget lines underestimate actual future spending, suggesting that these new 
OCO-involved budget lines may be easier to predict. On the other hand, the Army stands out in 
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Figure 8. Investment Military Department Topline by OCO Cumulative Percent Difference 
Discussion and Conclusions 
How Reliable Are Projections Within the FYDP as an Indicator for Actual 
Spending? 
Cumulative investment FYDP projections and actual spending highly correlate, albeit 
with generally reducing accuracy further out into the out years. Nonetheless, the bottom-up data 
does replicate previous findings regarding the top-level FYDP: There are notable differences 
between presidential budgets that with the relationship administration’s approach to the budget 
caps and the level of support from Congress pushing toward overestimation of future funding in 
PB2013 and PB2014 switching to underestimation in the later years of the Obama 
administration.  
How Does OCO Spending Relate to Projection Reliability? 
In keeping with expectations, budget lines that include OCO had less reliable out-year 
projections compared to projections by base-budget lines. As Figure 4 shows, OCO budget 
lines typically underestimate future spending, with greater than projected actual expenditures 
occurring in the out years for which OCO does not project. That said, in PB2013, Army and 
Navy OCO budget lines were particularly optimistic and experienced more significant funding 
shortfalls than other budget lines. In part, this reflects OCO serving its intended purpose of 
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Which Military Departments Have the Most and Least Reliable Projections? 
The Army, across multiple measures, has had the most substantial difference between 
total projected spending and actual spending, as shown in Figure 7. Separate analysis has 
confirmed that the correlation between Army projections and actual spending is lower than for 
the other services. As is shown in Figure 5, the Army is the predominant user of OCO-related 
budget lines. 
What Are the Unclassified FYDP’s Biggest Data Quality Problems? 
The process of building the dataset highlighted problems that the FYDP presently faces 
that undercut the applications of data science approaches to develop better forecasts and for 
analysts to track spending plans to strategy. Most noteworthy is the absence of unique 
identifiers that make it easy to speak the same language across years and sources. Budget 
lines regularly appear, disappear, and change labels. This is not inherently a problem; budget 
lines are sometimes abruptly cut and a new, and perhaps unexpected priority, receives funding. 
More challenging are the cases where funding may have shifted to a different line or the 
Justification Books or Comptroller documents have budget lines not present in the other source. 
The FYDP is a tool intended to aid defense planning, which often means changing priorities, 
and thus shifts are not just expected, but desirable. However, the data’s usability would be 
enhanced if the newly appearing budget lines reported predecessor lines in a machine-readable 
manner or indicated if they were a genuinely new initiative. 
This project takes a step to increasing the usability of FYDP data in analysis by deriving 
unique identifiers from labels in the budget documents and managing discrepancies. This 
dataset’s confidence labels are meant to be a stopgap that shows where contradictions are 
present between sources and track transitions between budget lines where identified.  
How Could FYDP Projections be Improved? 
The unclassified FYDP has the potential to be used as the basis for better projections. 
The study team held a workshop with leading practitioners and analysts to present initial results 
from this dataset. Participants made various valuable suggestions, including separately 
modeling base and OCO budget lines and looking for known budgeting foibles, such as zeroing 
out of accounts in the President’s Budget that are subsequently restored in congressional 
enactments. Modeling experiments also found that it was helpful to separately model if a budget 
line was likely to be funded at all. Unfortunately, the bottom-up approach to modeling is only half 
of the challenge, as exogenous fiscal factors can matter more than the given budget line’s 
specifics.  
Is the FYDP Fulfilling its Purpose? 
The period from PB2013 to PB2021, which covers both a significant downturn in 
spending and a large upswing, offers lessons with relevance beyond the budget caps’ 
expiration. These results demonstrate a critical strategic communication limitation of the FYDP 
during this period. OCO allows greater flexibility but is not well suited to demonstrate 
commitment, as the PB2013 experience shows that future funding assumptions may not 
manifest and budget lines that included OCO spending took more significant cuts than those 
using the traditional FYDP process. 
For those seeking budgetary tools offering both flexibility and fiscal discipline, Light et al. 
(2017) may offer a better alternative: reserve funds. For example, “funds might be held in 
reserve to address anticipated further growth within an MDAP portfolio (rather than for any 
single program)” (p. 44). Their proposal focuses on insulating the overall budget from project 
uncertainty. Still, if the reserve portfolio’s scope matches an area of strategic focus, setting 
reserves aside could be a powerful priority-setting mechanism. Such dedicated funding could 
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insulate a key strategic priority from cost increases or topline pressure and leave room for 
innovation even in the face of fiscal headwinds. 
Well-designed reserve funds may offer a way to provide flexibility while mitigating 
uncertainty but would certainly need support from key congressional committees. A more minor 
change would be to embrace Travis Sharp’s (2019) approach to measuring strategic shifts and 
to specifying priority areas within the FYDP that align with existing or new publicly available 
categories of FYDP budget lines. Updated and clearly labeled strategic capability areas or other 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive categorization systems could overcome many of the data 
quality limitations documented in this paper and would make it easier to mark a strategy to a 
budget and serve what Enthoven and Smith (2005) describe as key to the FYDP’s value: the 
way the FYDP forces “the Secretary to make controversial decisions explicitly” (p. 52). 
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Abstract 
Over the last 30 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) slowly became compliant with the Chief 
Financial Officers Act of 1990, which required federal agencies to undergo an annual financial 
audit. In 2018, the DoD finally completed its first audit and continued this trend in 2019. This 
paper seeks to understand the benefits of producing auditable financial statements, their costs, 
and any impacts on the DoD’s acquisition system. We describe the several forms of accounting 
and review the academic accounting literature that examines the value of audits. We describe the 
DoD’s preparation for and analyze the results of the two completed audits to look more broadly at 
the benefits. These include uncovering previously unaccounted inventory and improvements to 
internal accounting systems, even as no instances of massive waste or fraud were identified. 
Finally, the utility of management cost accounting is discussed. 
Introduction 
In September 2018, the Department of Defense (DoD) completed its first full audit, which 
analyzed over $2.7 trillion in assets, about 70% of the federal government’s assets (DoD, 
2018a). The audit was the synthesis of 24 separate audits of the DoD’s components and was 
monitored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness (FIAR) Directorate, which was established by the DoD comptroller over a decade 
ago. The FIAR Directorate was created to improve the department’s accounting practices and to 
plan for the successful audit of the DoD as a whole. This move was in response to the Chief 
Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, which required that all executive agencies have their 
financial statements independently audited. Since 2011, the DoD was the sole agency that 
continually failed to audit its financial statements in their entirety (Miller, 2011).  
The first DoD audit cost taxpayers between $918 million and $972 million, accounting for 
direct costs to independent auditors, indirect costs of government support during the audit 
process, and remediation costs to improve errors uncovered by the audit (Browne & Starr, 2018; 
Fine, 2019). Additional costs not accounted for in the $900+ million are compliance costs 
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associated with changing internal DoD processes, hiring additional labor, and other changes to 
become ready for a complete audit.  
Analyzing the costs and benefits will provide a fuller understanding of the value of 
auditing the DoD. FIAR compliance costs are likely made up of fixed and variable costs. Initial 
costs to hire and change processes will incur large start-up, fixed costs during the first few 
audits. For example, over $500 million was spent in remediation following the first audit. This 
number will likely decrease as accounting and cost reporting processes improve, but the 
number of improvements required is currently growing faster than the DoD can remediate them. 
The cost of maintaining FIAR compliance will likely fluctuate, requiring a reallocation of scarce 
DoD resources.  
As the DoD continues to update its financial management practices and alters its cost 
reporting processes in hopes of receiving an unqualified opinion, this report seeks to answer the 
questions:  
• What are the impacts associated with FIAR?  
• What are the benefits to taxpayers of government entities producing financial 
statements?  
Further, we hope to identify the broader implications of FIAR compliance on the DoD.  
Other important questions considered relate to the effectiveness of public audits: Do 
public audits provide valuable information to agency executives to improve processes? More 
generally, what are the benefits of auditing the DoD?  
At large, this report seeks to better understand the value provided to the DoD and its 
stakeholders. After the completion of the second DoD audit in November 2019, over $2 billion 
dollars were spent in hopes of improving the financial management of the DoD. While this 
amount is a drop in the bucket relative to the DoD budget, it is important to constantly question 
and improve the way the federal government is spending taxpayer money. Further, we will 
examine impact may have on DoD’s acquisition system.  
Background 
For the past several decades, Congress has struggled to obtain better visibility into the 
government’s financial position. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report in 1985 put a 
spotlight on the problems; it concluded that these were numerous issues that called for an 
overhaul of the government’s financial management system (Bowsher, 1985). The GAO 
believed that successful reform would require a major initiative with a comprehensive, integrated 
approach (Bowsher, 1985). As a result, Congress—in its oversight role of federal agencies and 
programs—passed a series of laws and mandates designed to improve the accountability and 
management of appropriated resources and to form the conceptual foundation of a new 
financial management structure, as well as additional conditions, requirements, and due dates 
for the DoD’s efforts to become auditable. These included the CFO Act, the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the Government Management Reform Act (GMRA), the 
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA), and a series of provisions in the 
National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) of Fiscal Years (FY) 2010, 2014, 2016, and 2018.  
Perhaps the most impactful of these was the CFO Act of 1990, described by the GAO as 
“the most comprehensive and far-reaching financial management improvement legislation … 
since 1950. [It] will lay a foundation for comprehensive reform of federal financial management” 
(Bowsher, 1991). The most noteworthy part of the act was the requirement for every executive 
agency to be audited annually. 
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Prior to the CFO Act, “Government reports found that agencies lost billions of dollars 
through fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement” (GAO, 2020b, p. 3) These concerns 
continued to grow as Americans and congressmen began to doubt the government’s ability to 
properly manage programs, protect its assets, or wisely use taxpayer dollars in an effective and 
efficient manner (GAO, 2020b). In 1988, the GAO reported numerous internal control problems, 
specifically in the DoD, which resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars unaccounted for. In 
response to these growing concerns, the CFO Act hoped to introduce some accountability for, 
and effective tracking of, how the federal government spent money.  
The CFO Act enjoyed widespread congressional support. Within 2 months of its 
introduction in the House, the act was amended, voted on by both chambers, and signed into 
law in late October 1990. Thirty years later, the Senate Committee on the Budget held a hearing 
looking at the impacts of the CFO Act of 1990. In a show of bipartisanship, members 
complimented the effectiveness of the act, anticipating continued and improved federal financial 
management (Dodaro, 2019). Unfortunately, while anecdotal evidence was used throughout the 
hearing to support the act, quantitative evidence of its effects was absent.  
In 1991, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) was created by the 
GAO, the Treasury Department, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop 
the necessary accounting systems. The GMRA of 1994 required the FASAB to develop a 
system that would produce government-wide financial statements and required the first 
statements to be published for FY1997 (Anthony, 2005).  
As a result, FASAB developed and published its standards in the FASAB Handbook of 
Accounting Standards (FASAB Handbook). The FASAB Handbook outlines the objectives for 
producing the federal government’s financial statements and their audits and is the most 
authoritative source of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)1 for federal entities. 
Federal government agencies, contractors working with federal government agencies, and 
accounting firms auditing federal government agencies all consult the FASAB standards on a 
regular basis. The FFMIA of 1996 strengthened the requirements of the 1994 act.  
By FY2003, 20 of the 24 federal CFO Act agencies had been able to produce financial 
statements backed up with unqualified opinions from auditors. However, the DoD was not one 
of them. There was increasing significant pressure from the President, the OMB, and Congress 
for DoD to achieve auditability (Candreva, 2004).  
The CFO Act and the other associated legislation ushered in an era of improved 
financial management of the federal government. Today, however, it may be that the CFO Act 
of 1990 was too wide-reaching, causing the DoD to spend nearly a billion dollars annually 
without any fraud, waste, or abuse found. While the exact effects of the large-scale changes 
imposed are next to impossible to quantify, it is important to understand the value of continuing 
this process.  
Types of Accounting 
The CFO Act of 1990 requires executive agencies to conduct financial audits based on 
financial accounting procedures. The DoD maintains the position that financial auditing is 
improving their internal business processes and saving money (Cronk, 2019c). Although the 
government generally uses budgetary accounting, and in some cases managerial accounting, it 
is important to understand the differences between the accounting types when considering the 
value of the DoD audit. 
 
1 GAAP refers to a common set of accounting principles, standards, and procedures issued by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Public companies in the United States must follow GAAP. 
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Financial accounting is required to produce the statements needed to comply with the 
CFO Act. Widely used in the private sector, it is the type of accounting used to produce a 
corporation’s annual report: balance sheets, income statements, and statements of cash flow 
and owner’s equity. It accounts for assets, liabilities, and cash flows. With financial accounting, 
revenue is recognized when realized, and expenses are recognized when incurred; this is 
known as accrual basis (Gibson, 2011). With private sector corporations, the audience is 
potential lenders and investors (i.e., the capital market). On the other hand, the audience for 
audits of government agencies is legislators and taxpayers—stakeholders with a financial 
interest (Candreva, 2004).  
The objective of financial accounting is to capture and accurately present past events. 
There are strict rules, and the statements produced have governmental oversight. Public 
companies will publish results of their financial audits to comply with regulations but also to 
assure the public—beyond managements’ own assertions—that a company’s financial 
statements are accurate and can be relied upon. Financial accounting, therefore, looks at the 
big picture of a company or organization over the last year or more. This distinction makes 
financial accounting backward-looking. Critics of financial accounting argue that the backward-
looking nature of financial accounting makes it inadequate to inform and support future 
decisions. Finally, financial accounting must follow GAAP, which is a combination of standards 
that are commonly accepted for presenting financial information.  
Although financial accounting is required to produce auditable financial statements, 
government agencies primarily use budgetary accounting to manage their finances. Budgetary 
accounting is used to justify and account for appropriations; this type of accounting is not used 
in the private sector. There are rigid rules stipulated in laws and guidance from the comptroller 
general. The objective is to ensure that the government spending complies with the associated 
restrictions; there is significant oversight to ensure this is the case. The focus is on ensuring that 
appropriated funds have been spent in accordance with the purpose, time, and amount to meet 
the terms of the restrictions attached to the appropriation and is used by both internal and 
external audiences (Candreva, 2004). 
Finally, there is managerial-cost accounting, sometimes referred to as cost accounting. 
This type of accounting is used for internal analysis conducted by corporations to evaluate 
different options, such as whether to lease or buy a facility. Managerial-cost accounting is 
intended for internal stakeholders. Moreover, the forward-looking nature of managerial-cost 
accounting makes it attractive to managers looking to make real-time decisions. For example, 
managerial-cost accounting may have current information on the cost of production for a certain 
good to determine if continued production is worthwhile, whereas financial counting may have 
more accurate data but would only be able to look at the historical cost of production during a 
past time span. Finally, since the focus is on internal management decisions about the 
organization’s mission and scope of operations, there are no set rules or government oversight; 
consequently, the management decides what to count and the basis for accounting. This type of 
accounting enables DoD’s working capital fund activities to set their rates based on unit cost 
(Candreva, 2004). 
Auditor Opinions 
When an organization’s financial statement is audited, a formal report is provided by the 
auditing entity. This auditor’s report is a formal assessment of the financial statement, resulting 
from their independent examination of the information provided, using a formal set of rules 
(Gibson, 2011). The audits of federal agencies are conducted using generally accepted 
government auditing standards (GAGAS; Comptroller General, 2018). When the audit is 
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complete, the auditors can render one of four opinions; these are summarized below (Gibson, 
2011). 
• Unqualified: This opinion states that the financial statements represent fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of the organization and are in keeping with the 
appropriate principles (Gibson, 2011). Within the federal government, these are 
sometimes referred to as unmodified opinions. 
• Qualified: This o p in i o n  states that—except for the effect of matters pertaining to 
qualifiers—the financial statements represent fairly, in all material respects, the 
financial position of the organization and are in keeping with the appropriate principles 
(Gibson, 2011). 
• Adverse: This opinion states that the financial statements do not represent fairly the 
financial position of the organization due to nonconformance with appropriate principles 
(Gibson, 2011). 
• Disclaimer of opinion: When the scope of the audit is not sufficient to provide enough 
information to render an opinion, this opinion is rendered (i.e., the auditor does not 
express an opinion on the examined financial statements; Gibson, 2011). 
Audits can also identify weaknesses and inefficiencies in the financial management and control 
systems based on the severity of the weakness; these classifications include material weakness 
and significant deficiency (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB], 2004),  
Literature Review 
The value of audits within the private sector is long established and well documented. 
Some of the benefits often cited are increased accountability to stakeholders and investors, 
feedback to improve business processes, and ensured compliance with financial regulations. 
While there are other benefits, these three encapsulate much of the benefit auditing has for 
public companies. Similarly, private companies also benefit from auditing.  
First, auditing may reduce the likelihood of fraud by management and others because it 
introduces additional accountability to management. Second, auditing may reduce agency 
conflict between owners, managers, and banks. Third, audits may be used to evaluate 
managerial performance given the lack of market measures to the firm’s and manager’s 
performance (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008; Vanstraelen & Schelleman, 2017). Perhaps 
most importantly, audits may reduce the cost of capital for companies being audited by 
anywhere between 1% and 3% (Elliot, 1994). Other empirical studies suggest that this number 
may be overstated, but the general effect does exist (Hay & Cordery, 2018). Additional benefits 
include reducing the likelihood of fraud by management and others because it introduces 
additional accountability to management, and it may be used to evaluate managerial 
performance (Vanstraelen & Schelleman, 2017). 
While there are numerous benefits for public and private businesses, it may be that 
auditing government organizations includes different calculations between costs and benefits. 
Research on public sector accounting is now also a well-established field with publications in 
numerous academic journals (Goddard, 2010; Hay & Cordery, 2018). Even though government 
bureaucracies are not accountable to investors or stakeholders, audits of government 
organizations have also been examined by looking at different principal–agent relationships 
present between the legislature, the government, and the electorate. Principal–agent 
relationships are defined by the agent’s ability to take actions on behalf of the principal that 
ultimately affect the principal. In the case of the DoD, the legislature (Congress) is the principal, 
and the government is the agent (Streim, 1994). Streim argues that auditing can help improve 
these principal–agent relationships because external accountability is introduced. With this new 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 217 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
external accountability, the agent is discouraged from acting in a self-interested way and instead 
works in a manner more in line with the objectives of the principal (i.e., the legislature). Auditing 
can also reduce the associated agency costs. Based on this analysis, requiring an annual DoD 
audit could incentivize the DoD to be more transparent and communicative with Congress.  
Within the private sector, as the complexity of business transactions and accounting 
standards grows, the potential of audits to add value increases (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). It may 
be that the legislation requiring audits saves money for some agencies but increases costs for 
others. Accordingly, the DoD’s complexity makes it likely that auditing could save money. Its 
large and multifaceted environment increases “auditing’s potential to add value” (DeFond & 
Zhang, 2014, p. 275) because it protects against possible financial mistakes that can quickly 
add up. As DoD Comptroller David Norquist often mentions, the first DoD audit was likely the 
largest audit in history, making it a prime example for possible cost savings (DoD, 2018b). 
Studies also suggest that auditing and other financial reporting requirements help add 
credibility to the organization. In the case of the DoD, credibility may be valuable to both 
Congress and the public. With numerous anecdotal cases of valuable DoD equipment going 
missing, improved public trust surrounding how the DoD spends taxpayer dollars could be 
incredibly valuable (Hay & Cordery, 2018). Additionally, although regulations may already 
protect against fraud and mismanagement of money, a recent study finds that U.S. 
municipalities that conduct audits are associated with fewer internal control problems (Rich & 
Zhang, 2014). 
Challenges with DoD’s financial management, and the federal government at large, are 
not new. Former DoD Comptroller and Harvard professor Robert N. Anthony2 reviewed the 
history of the federal government’s accounting practices, which originally developed with a focus 
on obligations that aligned with the budgeting and appropriation process rather than on 
expenses (used for financial statements), which he believed would provide more useful for both 
planning and control purposes (Anthony, 2000). Anthony described the tension between these 
two approaches, since both systems are used to some degree in federal departments and 
agencies. Anthony believed that neither accountants nor managers would pay attention to the 
information in the expense-based accounts and, consequently, that system would simply 
atrophy (Anthony, 2000, 2005).  
On the other hand, others also question the benefits of financial accounting. Robert 
Kaplan and Robin Cooper, Harvard University professors, have asserted that financial 
accounting systems are “completely inadequate” for either “estimating the costs of activities and 
business processes” or for “providing useful feedback to improve business processes” (Kaplan 
& Cooper, 1998, p. 14). Further, they argue that financial statements are used primarily to 
demonstrate to shareholders that a firm is operating profitably. In the case of a government 
agency, which is neither a business nor does it earn a profit, one may question the value of an 
audit. 
Finally, it is important to understand the limitations of any audit. Soon after the first DoD 
audit in 2018, numerous articles claimed the audit was a failure due to the DoD’s disclaimer of 
opinion. While the DoD quickly refuted this claim, the DoD did have to deal with numerous 
questions about the benefits of any such audit (Cronk, 2019b). The public generally has a 
different expectation of the results of audits. There is a widespread belief that “a person who 
has any interest in a company … should be able to rely on its audited accounts as a guarantee 
of its solvency, propriety and business viability” (Koh & Woo, 1998, p. 147). Consequently, when 
 
2 Anthony was a Harvard faculty member from 1940 to 1982. When requested by Defense Secretary 
Robert S. McNamara, he took public service leave from the school in 1965 to serve as the DoD 
comptroller (Hevesi, 2006). 
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the public has different beliefs about the auditors’ duties and responsibilities and what the audit 
reports really mean, a gap in understanding is created. Koh and Woo refer to this gap between 
the limitations of an audit and the public expectation of auditing as the “expectation gap” (Koh & 
Woo, 1998). This gap may still persistent today, and it is important to recognize it when 
contextualizing the usefulness of the DoD audit. 
The DoD Prepares  
The DoD is significantly different from the other executive agencies. The DoD is a large, 
complex organization with annual budgets approaching $700 billion in FY2021 and total assets 
that exceeded $2.7 trillion in FY2018 (House Committee on Appropriations, 2020; Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller; OUSD(C)], 2019). In FY2010, for example, the DoD 
processed more that 11 million commercial invoices and approximately 198 million payment-
related transactions, disbursing over $578 billion (Khan, 2011).  
Financial management reform has been an issue the DoD has struggled with for many 
years. While the audit looks at the department as a whole, the DoD is made up of 24 component 
parts. Most of these had been audited at different times and at different frequencies due to a 
variety of factors. Therefore, the DoD had not been ignoring the mandate from the CFO Act of 
1990 for 30 years. Instead, its component parts made progress toward fulfilling the audit 
requirement, but the sheer size of the organization made progress slow. The DoD audit 
discussed in this paper refers to the complete DoD audit, or a compilation of all component 
audits.  
The NDAA FY20103 required the DoD to have a financial statement audit-ready no later 
than September 30, 2017. The minimum requirements for audits of federal financial statements 
are contained in OMB Bulletin No. 07-04; it implements audit provisions from the CFO Act of 
1990, the GMRA of 1994, and the FFMIA of 1996. OMB Bulletin No. 07-04 requirements include 
performing an audit annually (Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2007). 
Additionally, the NDAA FY2010 also contained a requirement for the DoD to develop a 
FIAR Plan; the DoD Comptroller established the FIAR Directorate to lead that effort and 
manage and integrate department-wide financial improvement efforts and help the DoD get 
audit-ready. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller; OUSD[C]) developed 
and revised the FIAR Guidance. This handbook was intended to serve as a guide for all the 
organizations involved in the department’s audit readiness initiatives. It is updated periodically to 
ensure it aligns with all applicable federal and departmental financial management 
requirements. The guide outlined the FIAR strategy, developed to serve as the roadmap for the 
department to become audit-ready. The guide also defined audit readiness “as having the 
capabilities in place to allow an auditor to scope and perform a full financial statement audit that 
results in actionable feedback” (OUSD[C], 2017). 
The guide presented a phased methodology for the DoD to become audit-ready by 
FY2018. The initial three waves were performed concurrently, focused on OUSD(C)’s initial 
priorities, that is, budgetary information and mission critical asset information. For Wave 4, the 
DoD’s components incorporated the expanded priorities, proprietary information, and valuation 
into their audit readiness efforts and focused on full financial statement audits. This 
methodology defined the key tasks, the underlying activities, and the work products required 
from reporting organizations to become audit-ready. It considered the methods financial 
statement auditors use to assess financial statement accuracy in accordance with auditing 
 
3 Section 1003 of the FY2010 NDAA required the DoD’s chief management officer, in consultation with 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to develop and maintain a plan to be known as the 
“Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan” (NDAA, 2010). 
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standards, in order to maximize the potential for successful financial statement audits 
(OUSD[C], 2017).  
The FIAR Plan also described specific corrective actions to achieve reliable, accurate, 
and complete financial data for use in key management decisions. It focused on problems such 
as weak internal controls, incomplete or inaccurate information, and systems that cannot 
properly process data and information. By establishing and monitoring critical milestones for 
resolving these problems, the FIAR Plan gave decision-makers better information and more 
options. Implementing this plan, after decades-long changes to internal processes, the DoD 
became compliant with the requirement of the CFO Act in September 2018 and had become 
audit-ready. The audit, however, returned a disclaimer of opinion.  
On November 14, 2018, the DoD released its audit-ready Agency Financial Report for 
FY2018 (DoD, 2019), which presented the consolidated financial information for 63 DoD 
entities. The DoD report contained the following major sections: 
• Management’s Discussion and Analysis: This section summarized the DoD’s 
mission and structure and the current state of financial management systems. This 
section also included a discussion regarding the DoD’s compliance with certain 
laws and regulations. There was also a short discussion of improvements to internal 
controls that resulted in cost savings and increases in efficiency and effectiveness. 
• Financial Statements: This section provided consolidated financial information on the 
DoD’s financial operations, condition, and position for all DoD entities. Note 1 
acknowledged that, due to the limitations of financial and nonfinancial processes and 
systems, the department was unable to fully comply with all of the required elements of 
U.S. GAAP and OMB Circular No. A-136. Many of the reported values for major asset 
and liability categories were derived largely from nonfinancial systems, such as inventory 
and logistics systems.  
• Required Supplementary Stewardship Information: This section identified 
significant DoD investments that have long‑term benefits to the public, such as 
investments in research and development, which may include the development and 
testing of prototypes for weapon systems. 
• Required Supplementary Information: This section provided information on other 
topics to improve the understanding of the DoD’s financial operations, condition, and 
position, such as delayed or deferred maintenance on real property.  
• DoD OIG Audit Report: This report includes the DoD OIG’s overall audit opinion on 
the basic financial statements.  
The FY2019 Agency Financial Report for FY2019 was released on schedule, on November 14, 
2019 (DoD, 2019). 
The Audits 
FY2018 
The audit of the DoD Financial Statement for FY2018, which identified $2.8 trillion in 
total assets, is almost certainly one of the largest and most complex financial statement audits 
ever undertaken. The comprehensive audit included 24 standalone audits that were conducted 
by independent public accounting firms; the DoD OIG performed the overarching consolidated 
audit. More than 1,200 auditors were involved in the effort. The results were mixed; six 
organizations received the highest grade—unmodified audit opinions—and two received 
qualified opinions. All of the other organizations received a disclaimer of opinion. Perhaps the 
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most reassuring finding was that no fraud was identified, and no organization received an 
adverse opinion (Fine, 2019).  
For the issues identified, the auditors issued more than 2,300 Notices of Findings and 
Recommendations (NFRs) and identified 20 material weaknesses. Almost half of these 
addressed findings with departments’ financial management systems and information 
technology. To track and respond to the identified NFRs, DoD established a NFR database to 
capture, prioritize, assign responsibility for, and develop corrective action plans for the audit 
findings (OUSD[C], 2019).  
The direct audit-related costs exceeded $973 million, which includes supporting the 
audits and responding to auditor requests; achieving an auditable systems environment; and the 
cost of remediating audit findings. The remediation cost,4 approximately $559 million of the total, 
included government and contractor costs for correcting findings and the costs of achieving and 
sustaining an auditable systems environment (OUSD[C], 2019). 
FY2019 
The audit of the DoD’s FY2019 Financial Statement was completed in November 2019, 
the second full financial audit. Although some progress was made, no audit opinions changed 
from FY2018 for the 23 DoD reporting entities that received audits overseen by the DoD OIG. 
The overall result, a disclaimer of opinion on the Agency‑Wide Basic Financial Statement, also 
remained unchanged (Fine, 2020). The cost of the FY2019 DoD audit once again approached 
$1 billion, which included the costs of the DoD personnel who prepared for the audit and 
remediated deficiencies identified during the previous audit (about $770 million) and about $190 
million for the five independent public accounting firms that performed stand-alone audits of 
DoD components (CSPAN, 2019). Between 2018 and 2019, the DoD made progress in many 
areas, even while auditors found additional issues elsewhere.  
Summary of Material Weaknesses and NFRs  
Material weaknesses are the largest issues that need to be addressed, defined as 
“weaknesses in internal controls that result in a reasonable possibility that management will not 
prevent, detect or correct, a material misstatement in the financial statements in a timely 
manner” (Fine, 2020). In 2018, auditors identified 20 material weaknesses, which subsequently 
increased to 25 in the 2019 audit. This uptick is mostly due to the auditors being able to conduct 
a deeper financial analysis of the DoD during the second audit. Hopefully, uncovering issues 
like this will help improve long-term financial management within the DoD.  
The material weaknesses are large, systemic financial management issues. Thus, the 
DoD prioritizes only a few of them annually (Fine, 2020). In 2018, the DoD prioritized six 
different material weaknesses. Of the six, all saw significant progress, and only two of them 
were reissued during the 2019 audit. Further, reissuing of any material weakness does not 
mean progress was not made. Any reissuing or the addition of new material weaknesses simply 
means that additional progress is needed before it is at a satisfactory level for the auditors. 
Two examples of material weaknesses are General Property, Plant, & Equipment and 
Fund Balance With Treasury. The first material weakness means that the DoD could not 
accurately value its property, plant, and equipment in accordance with GAAP. Second, the DoD 
has an ineffective process for reconciling its fund balance with the Treasury Department. In 
2019, there were 23 other material weaknesses. These examples are given to the scope and 
seriousness of different material weaknesses. It will take the DoD many years to improve the 
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existing material weaknesses, and that is not accounting for additional findings by auditors. 
Given all this information, material weaknesses will likely be a helpful metric for defining the 
success or failure of the audits in the long-term. 
Looking at a more granular level, an important metric for improvement of the DoD’s 
financial management is the NFRs published in each audit. In 2018, auditors found a total of 
2,595 NFRs; of these, 23% were closed by the FY2019 audit. The acting DoD comptroller, 
Elaine McCusker, remarked that this was “solid progress for our first year” and that the NFR 
number will grow as the auditors continue to delve into DoD’s systems and processes (Mehta & 
Judson, 2019). In 2019, a total of 3,472 NFRs were identified (1,300 were new), showing a 
significant uptick (Fine, 2020). McCusker believed that this increase was not all bad news. With 
each audit, auditors can better understand and analyze the DoD, which is reflected through the 
uptick in NFRs (Mehta & Judson, 2019). In a larger context, this improvement and constantly 
uncovering problems has nothing to do with managerial decisions. The issues the NFRs 
identified were generally limited to problems of financial management and reporting issues. 
Fixing these problems shows movement toward improved financial management but are 
significantly smaller in nature compared to material weaknesses. Therefore, positive movement 
in both material weaknesses and NFRs will be a good predictor of the progress of DoD’s 
financial management. 
Analysis  
All business systems have a balance sheet; therefore, the government should have one. 
I think this assumption is unfortunate. (Anthony, 2005, p. 9) 
It took 30 years after the enactment of the CFO Act of 1990 for the DoD to finally 
become compliant. As previously stated, both audits received disclaimers of opinion (i.e., no 
opinion could be given due to the financial statements not providing adequate information). 
Elaine McCusker, the Pentagon’s acting comptroller, reassured reporters that the overall 
disclaimer of opinion was expected (Mehta & Judson, 2019), and she expected that the DoD will 
likely continue to receive disclaimers of opinion for some time to come.  
If the first two audits are any signal for what lies ahead, then the DoD will spend billions 
within the next decade for a very slow, steady progress toward achieving an unqualified opinion 
on its audit. While many of the identified NFRs and material weaknesses from the first audit 
were improved, with the second audit the auditors found far more issues, often dwarfing the 
improvements. There is no sign that this trend will slow down; the next few years will help give a 
clearer idea of the depth of financial management problems within the department.  
Supporters of the CFO Act of 1990 anticipated numerous benefits would result from the 
audits. First, since the act was in response to numerous wasteful spending problems that were 
uncovered in the 1980s, auditing promised a way for the DoD to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse 
of taxpayer dollars. Another anticipated benefit was improved taxpayer transparency for how 
their money was being spent. Finally, many supporters argued that the information gained from 
the audit would help inform decisions made by managers in the DoD to improve processes 
(Hanks, 2009). 
Benefits 
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist, the former DoD comptroller, oversaw the 
initial audit and constantly emphasized numerous benefits associated with improving the 
financial management of the DoD at large. He believed the most important benefit was 
accountability to the taxpayer, to ensure that their money was spent appropriately, without any 
going missing. While the audits finally meant that the DoD was compliant with a specific 
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regulation, it did not mean that the work was finished. During multiple trips to congressional 
committees, Norquist defended the value of the audit and gave examples of different benefits 
and cost savings that the DoD already recognized. However, even with these savings, there is 
no clear evidence that the recognized benefits of the audit have outweighed the annual costs. 
The principal supporter within the government of the CFO Act of 1990, however, is the 
GAO. The GAO cites five areas that have improved since its inception, including leadership, 
financial reporting, federal workforce, internal control, and financial management systems 
(GAO, 2020b). All these benefits were realized as executive agencies became audit-ready. 
Further, the GAO often uses issues within the DoD to highlight the problems that can be 
attributed, in part, to not being able to be audited successfully. While the GAO discusses the 
benefits of the CFO Act broadly, the implication is that similar benefits are likely to be realized 
by the DoD.  
Despite the failure to receive an unqualified opinion, the supporters of the financial 
audits believe that the effort and expense will, in the end, be beneficial. The DoD’s auditable 
financial statements have already made progress and have produced some benefits. The audits 
have provided insight into areas where processes and procedures are working well, as well as 
areas that need to improvements. As these improvements are made, the cost of the audits 
should decrease. The DoD comptroller testified that “we don’t have to wait for a clean opinion to 
see the benefits of the audit. The financial statement audit helps drive enterprise-wide 
improvements to standardize our business processes and improve the quality of our data” 
(Testimony, 2018). The benefits include improved internal control, financial management, and 
inventory control. These are summarized below. 
Improved Internal Control  
Internal control is a policy or procedure put in place by management to safeguard 
assets, stop fraudulent behavior, promote accountability, and increase efficiency. One of the key 
objectives is to put in place a process to prevent employees from misappropriating assets or 
committing fraud. Effective internal control also provides reasonable assurance that an 
organization is complying with all the applicable laws and regulations and can perform its 
mission efficiently and report its finances reliably (which requires cybersecurity). Effective 
internal controls are essential to achieving and sustaining an efficient and effective organization. 
As previously stated, the two audits found no indications of fraud or abuse. 
During the FY2019 audit, 20 agency‑wide material weaknesses in internal controls were 
identified. These errors created the potential for errors in the financial statement to not be 
detected (Fine, 2020). As a result of the audits, the DoD initiated remediation efforts that have 
resulted in significant improvements. For example, enhanced internal controls in the U.S. Pacific 
fleet resulted in freeing up purchasing power to fund the $4.4 million repair costs of the USS 
Paul Hamilton (DoD, 2019).  
Moreover, a significant part of the audit involves reviewing information technology and 
cyber security. Since many of the same systems used for financial management are also used 
for operational purposes, identifying vulnerabilities in these systems will also result in 
recommendations that improve the DoD’s overall cybersecurity posture across different 
networks and systems (Fine, 2019). Mitigation for these shortfalls is underway with the transition 
to cloud architecture with the ongoing Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure procurement 
(Williams, 2018). The DoD will also work to improve cybersecurity by updating the policy on 
shared file and drive protection to include encryption use, authentication, and minimum 
password protection requirements and stringent password protection (Williams, 2018). The 
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audits also identified five instances of noncompliance with laws and regulations across the 
DoD.5  
Improved Financial Management 
Within the DoD’s complex structure, financial transactions often involve several 
information technology (IT) reporting systems to go from the initial transaction to the point where 
they are captured in the component’s financial statement; often the components do not own and 
operate all of the IT systems that are used to process these transactions. In 2016, 400 separate 
IT systems were used to process the DoD’s accounting data. The audits identified wide-ranging 
weaknesses in these systems that prevented the accurate, reliable, and timely reporting of 
financial data (Fine, 2019). Some of these were identified years prior (Williams, 2018).  
A significant benefit is the savings generated from improved efficiencies and better 
financial operations since real-time improvements were made. For example, in response to the 
FY2018 audit, the Army implemented a new automated solution for data entry into the U.S. 
Standard General Ledger, saving 15,500 labor hours (Mehta & Judson, 2019).  
Another benefit from the audit requirement is the initiation of financial management 
improvements that would otherwise take longer or not occur at all. Then the subsequent public 
reporting enables the tracking by both management and oversight agencies (Brook, 2011). As a 
result of the audits, several initiatives are being pursued by the DoD to address the weaknesses 
related to the IT systems. For example, the DoD has plans to eliminate 26 legacy IT systems by 
FY2022. Additionally, the DoD has established a database to identify IT applications that impact 
DoD financial statement audits and to track the auditor feedback regarding the system controls 
(Fine, 2019). During the FY2019 financial statement audits, additional improvements were made 
by the DoD’s components. They were to provide more segments of transactions for testing, 
along with better supporting documentation for those selected for testing. This meant auditors 
were able to expand testing to new areas (Fine, 2020).  
For example, for the first time ever, the Army was able to provide auditors with 
transactions for Army Working Capital Fund inventory work in progress, which consists of raw 
materials that are used to make a finished product, valued at $952 million. Auditors were able to 
reconcile these transactions to the balances in the accounting system and will also be able to 
test these in the FY2020 audit. Auditors also found the Army’s IT controls over its Logistics 
Modernization Program system to be effective; no exceptions were identified by the auditors 
during testing (Buble, 2019). In another case, the Army created a computer application to store 
and analyze its transactional data for audit, increasing its visibility into its cost drivers and 
enabling its leadership to commit resources to the highest priority programs (Fine, 2020). 
In response to the issues identified, other improvements are planned. The DoD will 
develop and implement a plan for an integrated pay and personnel system to report financial 
management data, capture and store key documentation, and determine pay and benefits 
(Williams, 2018).  
Improved Inventory and Property Management 
The military services and other DoD components own $291.5 billion in Inventory and 
Related Property Inventory, which then must be reported on their financial statements. The 
auditors identified material weakness related to Inventory and Related Property in both audits. 
Auditors found that numerous DoD components were unable to provide assurance over the 
existence, completeness, and valuation of inventory. For example, items may have been moved 
 
5 Specifically, the audits identified that the DoD did not comply with the Federal Managers’ Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982, the FFMIA of 1996, the Antideficiency Act, the Federal Information Security 
Modernization Act of 2014, and the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (Fine, 2019). 
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or used but were still in the inventory records; other items were found in the warehouse but 
not listed in the inventory records; and some items were recorded as in good condition but 
were unserviceable (Fine, 2020). An accurate accounting is necessary. For example, it is 
important that the number of spare parts in inventory is accurate to ensure the ability to support 
operational requirements, as well as to preclude the ordering of unnecessary inventory.  
As a result of the FY2018 audit, the Air Force redesigned the process for validating the 
condition of assets in property systems at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, enabling the accurate 
capture of approximately $53 million in assets that would have otherwise been misstated. In 
another example, $280 million of items that were not properly tracked were at Naval Air Station 
Jacksonville. As a result, $81 million of material, that the service had no idea it had on hand, 
was identified as available for immediate use. Additionally, the inefficient use of assets was 
identified, and getting rid of old, unusable material freed up approximately 200,000 square feet 
of storage space (Mehta & Judson, 2019). With the FY2020 audit, the Navy was able to 
complete a full inventory of real property assets, resulting in a 98% accuracy rate; and the Air 
Force completed floor-to-book and book-to-floor inventories of over 96% of its buildings (Buble, 
2019). 
Audit Opponents 
However, this effort is not without its detractors. Challengers of the benefits of 
auditing DoD’s financial statements contest the value of financial statements and the 
audits, citing numerous issues. Some have argued that the DoD’s financial accounting 
processes have been flawed from their inception. Others argue that financial audits will 
incur significant costs but do not provide the information necessary to effectively make 
better managerial decisions. They believe the DoD would be better served with a shift 
toward managerial-cost accounting. These positions are reviewed below. 
Once the FASAB developed the federal governments accounting processes and 
standards, Professor Anthony was one of the earliest critics. He assessed that “few 
managers in the executive branch and few legislators or their staffs will use the accounting 
information developed in the new system” (Anthony, 2005). Since there is little evidence, they 
used information provided by previous systems.  
As discussed previously, the accounting system, as developed by FASAB, was 
composed of two “separate, uncoordinated systems” for budgeting and accounting in the federal 
government. The House Appropriations Committee makes its appropriations on an obligation 
basis, and most other committees also accept the obligation format. The Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee, on the other hand, mandated an expense-based format; however, this is in 
addition to, rather than instead of, the obligation basis. Anthony believed the obligation system 
could be easily manipulated. When an obligation authority exists, contracts can be charged to it, 
even if the goods or services are not actually needed. Since funds continued to be appropriated 
on an obligation basis, government leaders and managers would not pay much attention to the 
expense-based financial information. He concluded that since the FASAB system continued this 
separation, the financial management systems would not assist managers and other decision 
makers in making decisions the way a good accounting system should (Anthony, 2000).  
A 2011 Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) assessment of the DoD’s Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) Business Systems judged that making the department an auditable 
enterprise was a “wicked problem.”6 When it comes to financial statements, the IDA highlighted 
 
6 The term wicked problem was coined by Rittel and Webber. In their paper, they detail 10 characteristics 
that describe a wicked problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973)—these complex policy and planning problems 
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the differences between the DoD and those of commercial businesses, the principal users of 
audited financial statements. The DoD’s primary stakeholders are not shareholders, but 
taxpayers. Moreover, the DoD is not concerned with making a profit, remaining solvent, limiting 
risk/liability, and developing tax incentive-based strategies involving the valuation and 
depreciation of assets, since these have minimal operational value. The IDA concluded that the 
DoD should discontinue their attempt to achieve comprehensive financial statement audits, and 
the operational value of audit readiness activities should be assessed before additional 
resources were expended. The IDA believed that a much more meaningful accounting of the 
DoD would be a managerial-cost accounting approach (Ketrick et al., 2012). 
Many other critics of the DoD’s financial statement audit believe that managerial-cost 
accounting would better provide many of the benefits promised by the supporters of the auditing 
of DoD financial statements. Consequently, the differences between financial and managerial 
accounting are important for understanding the value of the DoD audit and the CFO Act of 1990. 
As describe above, financial accounting is concerned with income statements, balance 
sheets, and journal entries. Financial accounting is used to serve external stakeholders. For 
example, public companies will publish results of their financial audits to comply with regulations 
but also to assure the public—beyond management’s own assertions—that a company’s 
financial statements are accurate and can be relied upon. Financial accounting, therefore, looks 
at the big picture of a company or organization over the last year or more. This distinction 
makes financial accounting backward-looking. Critics of financial accounting argue that the 
backward-looking nature of financial accounting makes it inadequate to inform future decisions. 
Finally, financial accounting must follow GAAP, which are commonly accepted standards for 
presenting financial information. Managerial-cost accounting, on the other hand, is intended for 
internal stakeholders. Additionally, the forward-looking nature of managerial accounting makes it 
attractive to managers looking to make real-time decisions, and the forward-looking nature 
would greatly help the DoD plan, rather than recounting the past like financial accounting.  
It is important to note that many experts consider managerial-cost accounting the best 
way to improve businesses practices. While both play an important role, managerial accounting 
provides the information necessary to create the change that is intended by auditing the DoD, 
according to many experts. David Norquist, the DoD comptroller who oversaw the first 
consolidated DoD audit, consistently used language similar to supporters of managerial 
accounting, even though the DoD is conducting a financial audit. It is unclear who is correct. 
Experts expect financial audits to affect business decisions little, but Norquist consistently 
reported improvements in the DoD’s business practices. 
Consequently, improving financial accounting practices within the DoD may not achieve 
the accountability that Congress often espouses in support of the CFO Act of 1990 and the DoD 
audit. Given their rhetoric, it seems that managerial accounting may be more in line with their 
objectives. Financial accounting is central to an audit, but audits only certify the organization’s 
financial statements are accurate. Managerial-cost accounting, on the other hand, uses financial 
information to inform internal managerial decisions. If Congress is concerned with the 
wastefulness of the DoD at large, shifting focus to managerial-cost accounting may provide 
senior leader managers with information needed to make better decisions.  
Resolving this conflict will be central to understanding the costs and impacts of 
financially auditing the DoD. In October 2019, the GAO released a report discussing the 
progress in financial management for the federal government (GAO, 2020b). One of the 
 
lack clarity in both their goals and solutions. IDA concluded that achieving auditability in the DoD meets 
most or all of the 10 characteristics of wicked problems.  
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recommendations moving forward was that the executive agencies still needed to “better link 
performance and cost information for decision-making.” This recommendation suggests that the 
DoD may be improving internal financial management systems, along with other executive 
agencies, but struggling to monitor program performance and implement appropriate changes. 
Finally, the cost to achieve DoD auditability may be understated. A major part of the 
DoD’s strategy to achieve auditability has been to modernize its business systems. The GAO 
has designated the department’s business systems modernization efforts as high-risk since 
1995 and continues to find weaknesses in the DoD’s implementation of business systems. 
Since 2005, the GAO has issued 12 reports and has made 29 recommendations, and as of 
June 2019, only 15 of the 29 recommendations contained in the 12 reports have been 
implemented by the DoD (GAO, 2020a). As part of its business modernization efforts, the DoD 
has fully implemented several new ERP systems, while others have been cancelled by the DoD 
or the military service after multibillion-dollar investments, and other projects have been plagued 
with delays and cost overruns. In FY2012, the DoD invested almost $18 billion to operate and 
modernize its business systems (Crawford, 2015). The DoD continues to make investments in 
its business systems; in FY2019 the figure was almost $9 billion (GAO, 2020a). It may not be 
unreasonable to question if these investments have produced the envisioned value. 
Does Auditing the DoD Increase Costs to the Contract Acquisition System? 
There was some concern that FIAR requirements would increase the cost of goods and 
services that the DoD procures. By default, these the financial management requirements flow 
down to vendors selling to the DoD. To adequately support the DoD requirements, the vendor 
must have a system of record in place capable of maintaining appropriate controls and 
processes and be able to produce the necessary supporting documentation to validate the cost 
charged to the DoD. However, the DoD already had in place an extensive financial 
management regulation regime prior to the CFO Act of 1990, which already imposed a 
significant additional cost on contractors.  
In 1994, the accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand (now PricewaterhouseCoopers, or 
PwC) completed the most authoritative study of the costs associated with the DoD regulatory 
burden contractors’ costs. They analyzed over 100 different regulations that increased costs to 
contractors. Out of the 100 regulations analyzed, three of the top 10 that drive costs were 
related to finance and accounting (see the inset). Specifically, these three accounted for a 2.9% 
increase in costs for DoD contractors. Property and equipment management added another 
1.2%, for a total of 3.4% of the total 23% cost burden, or approximately one-fourth of total 
compliance costs. These costs may have a type of spillover effect and mask any small cost that 
may come from providing any additional financial data, not already required, to comply with 
FIAR. 
A nonfinancial requirement imposed on contractors by the DoD that trickles down costs, 
in part to improve the DoD’s audit readiness, is the DoD’s item unique identification (IUID) 
Cost Accounting Standards. Directed the establishment of cost accounting standards required. 
FAR Part 30 outlines policies and procedures for applying the Cost Accounting Standards Board 
(CASB) rules and regulations (48 CFR Chapter 99) to negotiated contracts and subcontracts. DFARS 
252.242-7006(a)(1) further defines an acceptable accounting system.  
Cost/Schedule Control Systems. The DoD established use of EVM as a requirement for periodically 
measuring linear programs with firm baselines established prior to starting development.  
The Truthful Cost or Pricing Data Act. Commonly referred to by its historical name, the Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA) requires contractors to submit certified cost or pricing data if a procurement’s 
value exceeds the specified threshold and no exceptions apply.  
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system, which requires businesses to provide a unique identification of all delivered end items 
with a unit acquisition cost of $5,000 or more (DFARS 252.211-7003, 2020). Although this policy 
increased the cost for contractors, OEMs have presented data to show that identification 
technology reduces costs through improved data quality and enhanced quality control during 
product planning, development, life cycle, and inventory control, and the Aerospace Industry 
Association developed a common supplier flow-down requirement to further expand IUID use as 
the single identification across industry and the DoD for supply-chain management. IUID was 
identified as the single best practice for item management across the corporate spectrum for 
both commercial and government business by industry groups (Bradford, 2012).  
Finally, there is no evidence directly linking the nearly $1 billion annual investment in the 
financial audits to increased costs to contractors. Based on the data collection and reporting 
requirements already in place, it is unlikely that auditing the DoD increases costs to the contract 
acquisition system. Further, while there does not seem to be any direct connection between 
FIAR compliance and increased acquisition costs to the contract system, there is, however, an 
opportunity cost. Any monies devoted to audit readiness and compliance are not available to 
fund other initiatives. 
Conclusion 
The DoD has spent billions in meeting the congressional mandate to have audit-ready 
financial statements by September 30, 2017 and must now continue to produce annual financial 
statements and undergo audits as required by law. With two audits completed, the DoD has 
identified many shortcomings in the process and has corrected some of these. It will take some 
time to tell if an unqualified opinion can ever be achieved. In the interim, the DoD’s interest and 
commitment may fade, since within the department, financial management will always cede 
priority to the operational mission.  
The DoD has recognized some benefits as a result of the audits, primarily uncovering 
inventory that was previously unaccounted for, including helicopters, buildings, and munitions 
(Cronk, 2019a). Uncovering this additional inventory can help managers be better informed 
about resources on hand, but it is unlikely that these discoveries will continue beyond the first 
few audits. More importantly, the DoD is also improving internal accounting systems so that they 
will represent the state of their finances more accurately and is strengthening these systems 
against cyberattacks. These improved accounting and financial management systems will be 
able to provide better financial information to decision-makers and may reduce the cost of future 
audits. Even though no instances of massive waste or fraud have been identified, the audits will 
potentially provide a political benefit; they can help provide the desired transparency and 
demonstrate that the DoD is exercising sound financial management.  
Finally, although one of the objectives for the audits is to improve management 
decisions, the financial accounting and auditing literature rarely, if ever, mentions a connection 
to these. As could be expected, the information derived from the audits has not impacted the 
rationale for, or the management of, any major DoD program. Since financial accounting and 
auditing has demonstrated little practical value in making future decisions, it is unlikely that the 
DoD will be able to improve its decision-making concerning its programs with financial 
accounting and audits alone. Greater emphasis on improved managerial-cost accounting would 
provide longer-term benefits in this regard, by better informing future decisions. In this 
challenging budgetary and national security environment, the nation and its leaders need help to 
ensure that they do the right things, and not only do things right.7 
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Abstract 
Today’s missions rely on highly integrated and complex technology that must be protected 
from a wide range of adversaries in a very dynamic and contested cyber environment. The 
predominant response to the growing, shifting cyber threat has been to apply cyber hygiene 
best practices and focus on satisfying compliance mandates for an authority to operate. 
While necessary, these steps alone are not sufficient, given the pace of technology change 
and the increasing abilities of our adversaries. 
For organizations developing or acquiring complex, software-enabled technologies, a 
cybersecurity strategy provides a critical set of guidelines that enable intelligent, risk-based 
decisions throughout the life cycle. The strategy identifies planning, design, monitoring, and 
enforcement considerations for integrating cybersecurity into all products, processes, and 
resources. As such, it defines expectations for how the individual technology components, 
their assembled configurations, and their interactions will meet the security requirements of a 
mission.  
Effective cybersecurity requires the application of engineering rigor to the process of defining 
security requirements in the context of other system imperatives. Cybersecurity engineering 
is a discipline focused on analyzing and managing mission and system cyber risk and trade-
offs across the life cycle. Cybersecurity engineers evaluate interactions, dependencies, and 
system response to attacks. They identify security practices and mechanisms that need 
coordination across the life cycle, spanning components, people, processes, and tools. They 
prepare the technology to handle the operational environment where it will ultimately reside. 
In this paper, we introduce the purpose of a cybersecurity strategy and describe the role of 
cybersecurity engineering in implementing it. We identify six key cybersecurity engineering 
activities and share observations on how these activities can be used to address the 
challenges acquisition programs face as they work to improve cybersecurity under resource 
and time constraints. 
A Strategy for Cybersecurity in Acquisition 
Most acquisition programs currently address cybersecurity by relying on a small 
cadre of security experts that is not adequately integrated into the acquisition and 
development life cycle. These security experts are often tasked to evaluate compliance with 
mandates and to assure good cyber hygiene. Called upon only to address security, they 
may have limited systems and software domain knowledge. 
While compliance mandates must be met for an authority to operate and good 
cybersecurity hygiene is necessary, these alone will not ensure sufficient security for a 
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mission. Today’s missions call for a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy, built and 
implemented with extensive collaboration among participants in a variety of roles throughout 
the life cycle.  
What Is an Effective Cybersecurity Strategy?  
A cybersecurity strategy is a critical element of an acquisition program’s Program 
Protection Plan (DoD, 2020), establishing a foundation for full life cycle cybersecurity 
assurance. An effective cybersecurity strategy defines acquisition and development life cycle 
activities, roles, and responsibilities essential to ensure the system can be fielded with an 
acceptable level of risk. The cybersecurity strategy identifies planning, design, monitoring, 
and enforcement considerations for integrating cybersecurity into technology at and across 
all levels of a system with a goal of exposing and removing  
• gaps that allow unexpected and unwanted interactions among components and 
between components and external systems. 
• weaknesses in the design and implementation that make the system vulnerable. 
• opportunities for processes or people to bypass controls, allowing attackers to impact 
mission success. 
To accomplish this goal, the cybersecurity strategy expands activities, roles, and 
responsibilities for a program’s cybersecurity experts far beyond compliance and hygiene, to 
owning and leading execution of the strategy itself. The strategy’s owner is responsible for 
defining how a system’s cybersecurity must perform to meet the system’s mission, even when 
under attack. These responsibilities include activities that achieve the following:1 
• Plan and design trusted relationships.  
• Negotiate appropriate security requirements to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability with sufficient monitoring in systems and software to identify problems. 
• Plan and design a system with sufficient resiliency to be able to recognize, resist, and 
recover from attacks. 
• Plan for operational security under all circumstances, including designed-in methods of 
denying critical information to an adversary to avoid or minimize mission impact. 
• Evaluate alternatives to select an acquisition option with an acceptable level 
cybersecurity risk. 
As is evident from this list of activities, building a cybersecurity strategy is a 
challenging effort that touches every aspect of the life cycle. Participants contributing to the 
strategy come with a variety of backgrounds and frequently, different vocabularies. They 
must build a shared understanding of the mission, how security risks can impact mission 
success, and the cybersecurity activities, roles, and responsibilities needed to mitigate the 
risks. More details about defining the cybersecurity strategy are available in the paper 
“Building a Cybersecurity Strategy” by Carol Woody and Robert Ellison, published in the 
Special Issue on Rigor and Inter-Disciplinary Communication of the Journal of Systemics, 
Cybernetics and Informatics (Woody & Ellison, 2020a). 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
1  Key elements of an effective cybersecurity strategy were introduced in a webcast delivered in November 2020 (Woody & 
Creel, 2020). 
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To effectively execute a cybersecurity strategy, a high level of collaboration is needed 
across acquisition and development roles. Cybersecurity engineering is a full life-cycle 
discipline that operationalizes the cybersecurity strategy and orchestrates collaboration 
across acquisition program stakeholders. The next section of this paper describes 
challenges in six key cybersecurity engineering activities related to strategy execution. 
Executing the Strategy: Cybersecurity Engineering Challenges 
Cybersecurity engineers are experts who own and lead execution of the 
cybersecurity strategy. They articulate the roles, responsibilities, and collaboration 
touchpoints across the life cycle needed to assure system security for the mission. Their 
knowledge and experience, a combination of operational security, systems engineering, and 
software engineering, is difficult to find, but increasing demand is stimulating interest and 
growth in the discipline. 
Cybersecurity engineers working on an acquisition program must understand 
systems, software, and cybersecurity. In addition, they must be sufficiently committed to the 
program to have impact. Attending occasional meetings is insufficient; rather, they must 
engage early in the life cycle to affect requirements and design trade-off analyses, risk 
assessments, and where possible, contract language. Focusing on code and other 
downstream artifacts—which most security analyses and verification tools target—is too 
little, too late. Flaws and weaknesses can be introduced early in the life cycle even before 
code is introduced. 
Finally, cybersecurity engineers must consider the overall engineering and 
operational context, the system’s engineering, operational, and sustainment environments. 
In addition to operational threats, sources of risk include software-enabled tools used to 
build, test, or maintain hardware, software, and firmware; communications between 
suppliers, and between acquirers and suppliers; and people who may unintentionally or 
intentionally compromise the acquisition program. Cybersecurity engineers develop and 
analyze scenarios for what could go wrong; recommend modifications to products, 
processes, and resources to mitigate risks; and monitor system development and 
verification to confirm that the system can withstand operational misuse and abuse. 
The following six key cybersecurity activities are important to executing the cybersecurity 
strategy:  
• determining risk 
• defining and monitoring system and component interactions  
• evaluating trusted dependencies 
• anticipating and planning responses to attacks 
• coordinating security throughout the life cycle 
• measuring to improve cybersecurity  
What Makes Effective Cybersecurity Engineering Challenging?  
Cybersecurity engineering is challenging because it attempts to change existing 
patterns in the way security’s role is perceived and executed on acquisition programs, and 
because it requires a combination of knowledge and expertise that is rare. Where 
cybersecurity engineers are found, they often represent a lone voice in a sea of technical 
experts and managers where they struggle for inclusion.  
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In the remainder of this section, we review the six key cybersecurity engineering 
activities, exploring challenges and lessons learned to date in changing existing patterns and 
increasing cybersecurity engineers’ involvement in early acquisition activities. We also share 
effective approaches we have seen in each of these areas that can help address the 
challenges. 
Challenges in Determining Risk 
Perceptions of risk drive assurance decisions, and the lack of cybersecurity expertise 
in acquisition and development risk analysis has led to poor assurance choices. Involving 
participants who have knowledge about successful attacks and how threats can impact a 
system’s operational mission can be very useful in the decision-making steps for 
determining appropriate prioritization. However, to effectively communicate cybersecurity 
issues to leadership and systems and software engineers in the program office, these 
participants must have more than a rudimentary understanding of the system and software 
acquisition and development life cycle.  
Risk considerations must start with good cybersecurity requirements, but simply 
providing a list of standards and policies—an approach too frequently used by programs—
does not ensure that risks to the specific mission and technology are addressed. New 
versions of standards and policies are now appearing so fast that programs have little time 
to respond to them; they then continue working with outdated versions until contract 
modifications can be made. We have also seen programs fail to establish even minimum 
cybersecurity or compliance requirements in the contract and the vendor plans to deliver a 
system that will not be implementable without contract modifications and further 
development. When developing good cybersecurity requirements, participants must do the 
following: 
1. understand how the many layers of technology to be implemented to address a mission 
can be compromised; 
2. define requirements that enable consideration of the broad and ever-increasing threat 
environment; 
3. clearly define how success will be verified. 
Requirements for many aspects of a system contribute to cybersecurity. The 
structure of these requirements affects how the vendor will respond. When requirements for 
anti-tamper, supply chain, information security, software assurance, cybersecurity, and 
safety controls are developed by independent teams that do not collaborate, the contractor 
cannot clearly propose a system that meets what could be conflicting needs. The vendor will 
make choices based on their perspective, which will likely differ from the intent of the 
program. Adjustments must be made later in the life cycle as time and funding permit, and 
the results will vary widely depending on the knowledge of the decision makers involved at 
each subsequent stage. Security teams are usually too small to support all of the 
interactions needed for this approach to cybersecurity risk decision-making. 
In many cases, the cybersecurity risks and potential mission impacts of choices 
made in design and engineering are not well understood by system and software engineers 
who (1) were not trained in cybersecurity and (2) do not understand the capabilities of 
attackers in the contested environment where the systems are fielded. The program too 
frequently accepts risks without understanding the mission impact. 
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Challenges for Defining and Monitoring System and Component Interactions  
In systems design, we see engineers rush to decompose the system into technology 
components and delegate requirements to these various pieces. Interface protocols and 
application programming interfaces (APIs) are defined to provide mechanisms for data 
sharing among components. Cybersecurity controls are selected from a wide array of 
sources and sprinkled like “fairy dust” among the components. However, nowhere is there a 
coherent plan for how the overall system cybersecurity will operate across the attack surface 
of the system. Views of the hardware, network interfaces, software interfaces, and mission 
capabilities are provided, but the operational aspects of cybersecurity are fragmented. 
To address this void, programs must define how the technology will support mission 
execution and evaluate how information flows and data exchanges can be attacked. To 
conduct a cyber-threat analysis of a system, we applied the Security Engineering Risk 
Analysis (SERA) Method (Alberts et al., 2014). The SERA Method defines a scenario-based 
approach for analyzing complex security risks in software-reliant systems and systems of 
systems. The SERA Method incorporates a variety of models that can be analyzed at any 
point in the life cycle to (1) identify security threats and vulnerabilities and (2) construct 
security risk scenarios. An organization can use those scenarios to evaluate whether 
planned controls will be sufficient and focus its limited resources on enhancing how to meet 
the needs of mitigating the most significant remaining security risks.  
For the most part, we see programs failing to assemble the information they have in 
ways that enable their overall cybersecurity to be evaluated. System and software 
engineering analysis does not consider the real threats and the ways their designs and 
selected controls can be compromised. In many cases, these acquisition and development 
technology teams do not include resources that understand how technology can be 
attacked, and they do not sufficiently consult external resources with this knowledge to help 
support the design analysis. By the time the separate security team sees the design, 
development is typically already underway. Design weaknesses are left in place because 
they are discovered too late to be corrected without major cost and schedule impacts. 
Challenges for Evaluating Trusted Dependencies 
Security dependencies relate to components that some build for others to use or 
connect with (i.e., inherited risk). The following are known areas of concern for 
inherited/dependency risk: 
• Each dependency represents a risk (e.g., reuse, open source, collaboration 
environments). 
• Dependency and trust decisions should be based on realistic assessments of 
the dependency’s inherent risks and opportunities. 
• Dependencies are not static, so trust decisions must be re-evaluated regularly to 
identify changes that warrant reconsideration. 
• Using shared components to build technology applications and infrastructure 
increases the dependency on and potential mismatch of others’ decisions (i.e., 
supply chain risk).  
Layer on layer of reused software is integrated into systems based on the way the 
software is built and fielded. Code libraries allow developers to quickly assemble 
functionality, reusing language constructs and functionality constructs for frequently applied 
program actions. Tools for automating many of the development and testing steps are 
assembled into integrated development platforms (IDPs) for ease of use.  
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It is cost effective to reuse components and code previously developed for other 
projects to save time in development. However, that material was not created to meet the 
specifications of the current system and could have vulnerabilities introduced by the original 
developer; in these cases, the new system will inherit these vulnerabilities. Reuse practices 
that minimize the impact of this risk must be established. Since the current developers may 
not be familiar with the code, addressing vulnerabilities may be more time-consuming than 
rewriting. In many cases, reuse is not cost effective when total costs are considered. 
The reuse challenge also applies to commercial-off-the-shelf products and other 
third-party code used to address needed system functionality. Shared infrastructures, such 
as cloud environments, fall into this category. In some cases, the responsibility for 
addressing cybersecurity risk falls to programs when they are incorporating reused 
components into the system; sustainment planning for the system must reflect these issues. 
Using patching to address known vulnerabilities must be scheduled in a timely manner to 
minimize attacker opportunities—during both development and operations. In other cases, 
the responsibility of handling the risk must be spelled out in contracts or service level 
agreements (SLAs) established with the provider of services. We see lack of clarity in who is 
responsible for addressing risks from these sources and the timeliness in which 
cybersecurity issues will be addressed. Programs consider cost savings for services without 
establishing the critical mechanisms needed to ensure that the trust relationships that need 
to be established will operate with sufficient cybersecurity.  
A cybersecurity strategy should provide plans for implementing and monitoring 
cybersecurity risk for each type of reuse implemented by a program. (Our experience is that, 
in practice, there is little planned, and response is primarily reactive.) Each plan involves 
establishing a vendor relationship that must be managed. Recent increases in supply chain 
risk show that this is an area where programs need to improve greatly.2 Further information 
about inherited risk is available in an SEI white paper on reducing the attack surface for a 
system (Woody & Ellison, 2020b). 
Challenges for Anticipating and Responding to Attacks 
A growing and diverse population of adversaries uses both simple and increasingly 
sophisticated capabilities to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of 
technology assets. Adversaries often use a combination of technology, processes, 
standards, methods, and practices to craft a successful attack (i.e., socio-technical 
responses). Attacks are designed to take advantage of the ways users normally use 
technology or to contrive exceptional situations where users’ defenses are circumvented. 
Attackers’ profiles, capabilities, and methods are continually evolving. 
To be successful, an attacker must bring together three key pieces: 
• a weakness in the design, coding, or implementation of the system that can be 
triggered to promote unexpected and unwanted execution capabilities that can 
compromise confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of the system; 
• access to that weakness through connected trusted systems, compromised 
authentication and authorization capabilities, or other attack vectors; 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
2  See the SEI webcast, SolarWinds Hack: Fallout, Prevention, and Recovery (Software Engineering Institute, 2021).  
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• tools that enable the attacker to exploit the weakness, bypass security controls, 
and gain unauthorized system capabilities to trigger unwanted system 
behaviors. 
Much attention is focused on potential vulnerabilities in code, and extensive effort 
has been expended to improve and implement a wide range of code analysis capabilities to 
reduce the availability of weaknesses for attackers to exploit. However, design weaknesses 
introduced in architecture and design implementation represent well over half of the top 25 
common weaknesses and enumerations (CWEs; Common Weakness Enumeration, 2020).  
These weaknesses, which are prevalent in today’s systems and software 
engineering, result from insufficient security requirements and insufficient understanding of 
how that technology can be compromised. Knowledge about the ways that technology can 
be compromised is still rarely taught in college and university curriculums; therefore, it may 
not be a part of the technical knowledge of someone with a background in computer science 
or system engineering.  
As reuse continues to expand (see the “Challenges for Evaluating Trusted 
Dependencies” section above), broad availability of code increases through open source and 
acquisition sources as well as theft. The same tools that can be used to remove weaknesses 
can also be used by attackers to identify unmitigated weaknesses to exploit. There are also 
tools for reverse engineering operational modules to recover the source. Versions of these 
tools are free, so the capabilities available to an attacker to discover and exploit weaknesses 
are extensive. 
With both the level of software and the pool of potential exploits expanding, it is critical 
to update code as soon as new exploits are identified. Too much software was not designed 
and implemented to be effectively maintained for cybersecurity. Costly and cumbersome 
certification processes have not kept up with the realities of attacker capabilities, and some 
system engineers may not understand the attack potential of the software they implement. As 
a result, the cybersecurity strategy is too limited to address the critical realities of system 
vulnerabilities. 
Challenges for Coordinating Security Throughout the Life Cycle 
Assuring the security and resiliency of a system’s mission-critical functions requires the 
following activities: 
• Plan for what might go wrong; develop requirements for misuse/abuse cases 
with corresponding system and software requirements for secure, resilient 
response and operation. 
• Build security and resiliency into the system. 
• Verify that expected security and resiliency characteristics were actually built 
into the system. 
• Establish clear authority and responsibility for coordination at an appropriate 
level in the organization to ensure effective participation and coverage. 
The lack of attention on misuse and abuse cases is increasingly a major gap in 
system requirements. Some programs leverage reusable components and shared platform 
capabilities as they rush to define functionality and identify ways that cost and schedule can 
be reduced to deliver results as quickly as possible. However, in their rush, they often fail to 
sufficiently specify how the system should perform under attack and compromise. Even 
when threat modeling is well established, system requirements lack the sufficient integration 
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of threat knowledge to drive planned capabilities. Reliance is placed on selected compliance 
controls, but these are not tightly coupled with system operational capabilities, leaving gaps 
where unexpected behaviors and attempts to bypass controls are supported. Completeness 
of system capability is assigned to the system engineering team to ensure the system meets 
its requirements. However, from what we have seen, no one is formally given the 
responsibility for developing a complete set of misuse and abuse cases to ensure all 
reasonable threats are addressed.  
With the transition to iterative development and an increased adoption of 
DevSecOps, the development approach and environments now become a permanent part 
of the operational system. These must be in place to support the creation and fielding of new 
functionality and updates for long periods of time. Hence, they must be treated as part of the 
operational environment and hardened sufficiently to ensure they do not become conduits 
for attack of the system and its components. Traditionally, development environments do not 
have this level of rigor applied to them since they were thought of as temporary. For many 
programs, this perception of transience still remains.  
For every system, cybersecurity is not the only critical quality. Reliability, 
maintainability, usability, safety, anti-tamper, and other system attributes, as well as cost and 
schedule, are equally important. Program management must establish how cybersecurity 
experts will collaborate with those addressing these other important attributes to define how 
trade-offs will be managed and identified. Choices that impact mission risk should not be 
made without careful thought and consideration. We see too many programs that fail to 
establish coordination mechanisms among the various groups, managing each attribute and 
determining trade-offs considering only cost and schedule. As a result, mission-critical 
capabilities can be jeopardized. 
Challenges for Measuring to Improve Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity attributes of critical products, processes, and resources must be identified, 
measured, and monitored throughout the life cycle. The best means for identifying metrics is 
by using the Goal-Question-Indicator Measure (GQIM) method, which identifies and defines 
meaningful indicators that align management, engineering, and improvement with business 
goals.3  
The cybersecurity strategy should describe how a program will measure improvement. 
Opportunities would include the following: 
• Use risk assessments that consider both current and potential threats, 
vulnerabilities, and impacts to identify critical goals for attributes to be measured 
and monitored. 
• Develop and consistently apply well-formed measurement definitions and 
procedures to establish the credibility of the measurement and analysis results. 
• Include all elements of the socio-technical environment that touch engineering 
and acquisition activities (e.g., processes, procedures, products, and 
resources). 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
3  SEI training materials are available for GQIM. For more information, see Goal-Driven Measurement (IGDM) SEMA 
Course on the SEI website (https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=635664). 
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• Support measurement with robust engineering planning; define a security 
measurement plan that spans the life cycle, and develop requirements for any 
needed instrumentation. 
Every activity within the life cycle as well as each process and tool can produce data 
to feed a measurement effort. The challenge is determining where improvements in current 
practice would be useful for mission success and identifying the information that can help 
determine if a change has been successful.  
We see programs measuring lots of individual activities, but many programs are not 
defining how these low-level metrics are useful to management to determine if expected 
cybersecurity results will be achieved. As a start, the strategy must define a vision of 
successful cybersecurity for the program. If the team assembled to address cybersecurity is 
sufficiently diverse, there will be several visions of success. The plan must consider ways to 
measure against each of these visions to provide a broader view of the potential goal. To 
date, we have seen many metrics collected, but little planning for what is needed. Common 
activities we have seen include using checklists for compliance and counting vulnerabilities; 
however, these activities alone will not provide a means for measuring cybersecurity 
improvement. 
Summary 
Building a cybersecurity strategy is challenging, and applying it to a system under 
acquisition and development is even more so. We have been working with a broad range of 
acquisition programs to tackle this important need, but changing the existing patterns of 
cybersecurity neglect is extremely difficult.  
A cybersecurity strategy is a critical planning document for program security. It must 
define the actions a program plans to perform to address cybersecurity. The strategy must 
clearly establish who is responsible for its success and the range of personnel resources 
that should be used to support its success. Those who implement the plan are a key 
element to its success. They must be knowledgeable in cybersecurity and system and 
software engineering and sufficiently focused on the need to provide results. They must be 
able to navigate the program’s acquisition and development life cycle and keep the plan 
current with trade-offs that are made across the life cycle that expand potential risk. These 
plan implementers must be invested in ensuring that cybersecurity is addressed for the 
program; they should not just be brought in periodically to glance at materials and sit 
through a few meetings.  
The cybersecurity strategy will not remain static. Recognizing when changes are 
needed is a critical aspect of monitoring change and improvement. Metrics can play a 
valuable role in this aspect. 
The strategy must cover more than just compliance; it must address the system’s 
attack surface and make every effort to limit risks from all forms of technology (e.g., 
hardware, software, and firmware) and all sources of technology (e.g., reuse, third-party 
components, and external services).  
On the whole, programs continue to react to cybersecurity instead of building it into 
all aspects of the system and its life cycle. A well-planned cybersecurity strategy can help 
bridge this gap to support improved mission success. 
We hope this paper will motivate cybersecurity strategy owners to refocus their 
efforts on delivery of effective cybersecurity results. They should ensure the right resources 
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are empowered to drive cybersecurity improvement throughout the acquisition and 
development life cycle. 
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Abstract  
Engineers responsible for evaluating tactical and weapons systems for system safety will need a 
new approach for evaluating emerging artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems, since these 
systems leverage machine learning (ML) techniques. For many reasons, ML algorithms are often 
difficult to diagnose for safety purposes. For instance, they did not lend themselves easily to 
codebase inspections, thus necessitating the reduction in “autonomy” of the ML-enabled 
component. By modifying Interdependence Analysis (IA) techniques, a more rigorous approach to 
evaluating AI/ML-enabled weapons can be found. The IA process produces a rigorous 
exploration based on observability, predictability, and direct ability, highlighting the key 
requirements that encapsulate all interactions between human and machine. This paper explores 
using IA to define the interaction requirements for human–machine teaming, employs those 
results to identify key critical functions, and leverages those findings to reveal how “autonomy” 
reduction might be employed.  
Introduction 
Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly is used in many regimens. When AI is used in 
weapons systems, are there new considerations the tester, certifier, and operators should 
consider? If so, how should they handle them? Let us define AI. AI is “the theory and 
development of computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require human 
intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation 
between languages” (“Artificial Intelligence,” 2021). 
Johnson (2021) describes two types of AI. The first is handcrafted knowledge systems 
that use traditional rules-based software to codify subject matter knowledge of human experts 
into a long series of programmed rules (Johnson, 2021). These are simply just what we have 
always called computer applications. Various test and certification agencies execute well-
developed procedures for assessing these applications and are not considered. 
The second kind of AI becoming more prevalent is machine learning (ML) and this 
demands investigation. In ML, test data trains an algorithm to identify something or some 
pattern. Once the system has learned, it is ready to identify similar or the same things or 
patterns from more incoming data. There are variations on exactly how this works. One 
important variation is that if one is trying to find a specific thing or pattern in the real world, the 
system must have “seen” that data in the training data set.  
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These types of ML capabilities have improved accuracy, often in many cases achieving 
90% success in identifying the object. That is a great accomplishment for the ML algorithm, if it 
is designed to recommend possible work shoes when one is shopping for new shoes. However, 
if the algorithm is distinguishing between a church steeple, the tower of a hospital, and a 
medium range ballistic missile launcher, 90% does not inspire user confidence, when destroying 
the missile launcher is the goal. Moreover, the ML algorithms work in mysterious ways, 
processing a myriad of complex mathematical equations, meaning it is often unrealistic to 
determine how the algorithm succeeds. For ensuring the safety of weapons that include ML-
enabled components, evaluating ML functions in detail is important. This paper identifies the 
potential challenges of employing ML and how human–machine teaming engineering design 
techniques contribute to a rigorous ML system safety assessment.  
Safety Failure Modes of Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning  
The Navy organization responsible for certifying weapons as system safe is the Naval 
Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA). They employ the MIL STD 882E as their rule 
book (DoD, 2012), and the Joint Software System Safety Guide as their compass (Joint 
Services-Software Safety Authorities, 2016). As part of that review, evaluation, and certification 
process, they conduct hazard analyses of the weapons system under test and associated 
supporting elements. Their intent is to identify all possible outcome likelihoods and their 
consequences for every system function. 
An example from the previous section highlighted a 10% likelihood that the AI ML 
algorithm would identify a hospital or church as the target, with the loss of many innocent lives, 
waste of an otherwise good weapon, and a black eye for the United States. That is just one 
example of possible AI ML failures. Others are listed in Table 1 (Faria, 2017). They break into 
three categories: system failure, human–machine interaction issues, and active sabotage. 
Examples of each might be: 1. ML training data set has inherited biases that skew results; 2. 
humans assume ML algorithm is always right and do not apply critical thinking to results; and 3. 
an adversary manipulates the training data set. 
TABLE 1. EXAMPLES OF AI SYSTEM FAILURE MODES (Faria, 2017). 
Failure 









Operators have lack of trust in the system 
Operators are overly trusting (overreliant) in the system 
Operators ignore the system 
Operators misunderstand the system recommendations/predictions  
Operators introduce errors into the system 
System Under Attack 
(Cyber attack) 
System is overtaken by adversary/adversary is controlling system 
System and its outcomes are corrupted by adversary 
Adversary jams or shuts down system 
Adversary gains access to system; decision information/knowledge is compromised 
The consequences of these failures depend on which part of the kill process of the 
weapons was affected. Table 2 provides a functional view of general weapons. 
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TABLE 2. GENERAL WEAPONS FUNCTIONS 
Functions Details 
Transport Truck, Rail, Ship, Aircraft 
Storage Bunker, Warehouse, Environment 
Load on Platform Pier side, Unrep, Cranes, Vertrep 
Maintenance Power, BIT, Lubricants, Fueling 
Readied Power on, Check out 
Placed on Launcher Movement, Rails, Hoists, Handled 
Launched Fire, Released, Sent 
Navigate Waypoints, Terrain 
Avoid Terrain, Weather, ESM 
Deceive ECM, ESM, Cloaking, IR 
Identify Target Recognition, Human Input, Sense Laser Illumination 
Fuze/Arm Timing, Mechanical, Human Input, Sensing 
Effects Detonation, Dispersal, Virus, Programs 
Observation shows that many of the functions in the table could be supported by ML 
tools. Navigation and target recognition could be aided by an ML computer vision tool, as well 
as avoiding other platforms or specific topographical entities. It stands to reason that NOSSA 
needs to consider all of these failure modes for each weapon function that uses a ML 
component. 
Each failure mode is comprised of possible root causes, as seen in Table 3 (Johnson, 
2021). With 31 root causes and at least 15 functions, there are at least 465 possible failure 
combinations to assess in NOSSA’s failure analyses.  
TABLE 3. EXAMPLES OF ROOT CAUSES OF AI SYSTEM FAILURES (Johnson, 2021) 
Type of 
Root Cause Root Cause Examples 
Issues within the 
training datasets 
Biased training datasets 
Incomplete training datasets 
Corruption in the training datasets 
Mis-labeled data 
Mis-associated data 
Lack of rare examples—data doesn’t include unusual scenarios 
Unrepresentative datasets 
Issues with the 
process of data 
validation 
Poor data collection methods 
Poor data validation methods 
Improper data validation criteria 
Insufficient data validation  
Issues with the ML 
algorithms 
  
Underfitting in the model—when the model does not attain sufficiently low error on the training data 
Overfitting in the model—when the model presents very small error on the training data, but fails to 
generalize to new data 
Cost function algorithm errors—when the trained model is optimized to the wrong cost function 
Wrong algorithm—when the training data is fit to the wrong algorithmic approach or mathematical 
model 
Issues with the 
operational datasets 
Uncertainty/error in the operational datasets (Epistemic uncertainty) 
Corruption in the operational data 
Introduction of datatypes that the AI system is not designed to handle 
The pace of the situation overwhelms the human–machine decision process 
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Type of 
Root Cause Root Cause Examples 
Operational 
complexity 
The decision space overwhelms the decision process (the number of options is too large or a viable option 
does not exist) 
Operator trust issues 
Lack of explainability 
Lack of confidence 
Overreliance 
Insufficient operator training or experience with system 
Operator induced 
error 
Inverse trust issues in which the AI system loses “trust” in the human operator or identifies operator 
problems 
Operator misuses the system accidentally or intentionally 





Inserting false or corrupt data 
Gaining control of the AI system 
A weapon uses radar computer vision to identify a turn point as part of its navigation. A 
possible root cause for failure might be mislabeled data. In this case, the turn point is mislabeled 
as 1,500 feet in elevation, when it should be labeled 1,500 meters in elevation. The likelihood 
that the weapons might fly into the terrain is high, with the consequence that the weapons 
effects are not delivered.   
Here is a more insidious example. A weapon requires a system update, for instance, a 
new load of training data. The weapon is already loaded onboard a ship, so the ship’s weapons 
maintenance team is assigned the task. Their communications connection to the shore base 
where the file will be downloaded is sketchy. Despite best efforts, the download is interrupted 
several times due to latency and signal jitter (common occurrences underway). Even the 
checksums that ensure a good transmission are misplaced, leading the ship to think it has a 
good download, when it really does not. Now there is an unknown likelihood the weapons could 
malfunction, and unknown consequences, and no way to check. 
Understanding every function in the life cycle of a combat or weapons system is critical. 
Existing procedures already account for the vast number of functions that are not related to any 
ML support and are not addressed in this paper. However, there needs to be a way to 
determine how ML-related techniques impact the weapons and associated operators.  
Tables 1–3 list many ways that ML functions cause safety issues. If their likelihoods and 
consequences are significant, these functions can be designated critical, which by the MIL STD 
requires applying a scrupulous code check process. This is impractical for ML functions, so 
reducing the criticality of the ML functions remains paramount.  
Criticality is associated with “autonomy,” which in this case means that the function will 
operate automatically without human intervention. Thus, if the function can be modified to 
include human involvement, then the criticality is not rated as high, and no code check is 
required, which then resolves the evaluation conundrum of critical ML functions. One proven 
way to investigate human–machine interaction is through a system engineering technique called 
Co-Active Design, especially a key component called interdependence analysis (IA). Does 
applying IA to the ML functional evaluation help? 
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Co-Active Design 
The purpose of IA is understanding how people and an agent (in our case the ML 
function) can effectively team by identifying and providing insight into the potential 
interdependent relationships used to support one another throughout an activity (Johnson et al., 
2014). One of the IA tool’s strengths is that it can guide the initial design and anticipate how the 
tool or system will be used by the warfighter. In this specific case, though, NOSSA is most 
interested in how humans can be involved in the application of a ML algorithm so as to ensure 
that it is not deemed a critical function. As we have seen, critical functions require a software 
code review, which is problematic, since advanced ML algorithms are complex, especially in the 
mathematics involved, and a software code review is not practical. 
The IA tool is in the form of a table, as shown in Figure 1. IA breaks the planning 
process down hierarchically into specific tasks. Those tasks are analyzed to determine the 
necessary capacities needed to conduct each function, using cognitive task analysis techniques 
(Annett, 2003; Bolte et al., 2003; Chapman et al., 2009; Crandall et al., 2006). Once capacities 
are identified, the next step is assessing each performer’s (ML component or human) ability to 
provide that capacity. The assessment process uses a color-coding scheme, as shown in Figure 
2. The color scheme is dependent on the type of column being assessed. The color assessment 
is subjective, but the process compels the analyst to carefully consider the algorithm and human 
interactions. Under the “performer” column, the colors are used to assess the individual’s 
capacity to perform the activity specified by the row. The green color in the “performer” column 
indicates that the performer can do the task. Yellow indicates less than perfect reliability. 
Orange indicates some capacity, but not enough for the task. Red indicates no capacity. 
 
Figure 1. Explanation of the Different Areas of the Interdependence Analysis (IA) Table 
(Johnson, 2014) 
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Figure 2. Color Dey for Team Member Role Alternative Capability Assessment 
(Johnson, 2014). 
Once completed, careful analysis of the results displays or infers several key design 
inputs for the human–machine teaming involved in the robot delivery process: 
1. From the color schemes, analysts determine how many possible paths exist between 
the users and the systems to accomplish the tasks. This identifies areas where 
multiple paths are availability (improving reliability), and where single points of failure 
may compromise success (and require further design attention). And indeed, may be 
showstoppers to the NOSSA evaluators.  
2. Analysis shows where the system is required to either ensure effectiveness or 
improve efficiencies. Teaming is achieved by practicing three actions between the 
performer and the supporting team members: staying observable, predictable, and 
directable (OPD). Where there are opportunities for a team member to assist the 
performer, and vice versa, engineers and designers can brainstorm ways to achieve 
that teaming through the lens of OPD. In this case, NOSSA evaluators seek ways for 
the AI-enabled function to be either supported by or monitored by humans. This 
reduces “autonomy” and the criticality of the system function.  
3. Combining these first two results helps designers and developers prioritize efforts on 
the machine’s development. Which capacity executed by the performer adds the most 
value? This establishes a context for organizing work efforts and resources. From a 
NOSSA perspective this analysis helps focus on potential ML-enabled trouble areas. 
As described in Table 1, three areas of potential issues exist: system failure, human–
machine interaction issues, and active sabotage. As evaluators use the IA, when they 
evaluate the OPD between the ML algorithm and the humans, they should also 
consider these three possible failure mode areas, associated possible root causes 
from Table 3, and which general functional area is impacted from Table 2.   
Applying IA to ML Safety Use Case 
Nagy (2021) created an unclassified use case for exploring system safety aspects of 
ML-enabled systems (see Figure 3). We use that scenario as a use case for the IA. The results 
are depicted in Table 4. In this scenario, a truck is loaded with two robots, which are then driven 
to a point, then unloaded. For simplicity, assume predecessor functions such as storage and 
maintenance (from Table 2) have no ML components. The robots proceed via another route to 
deliver packages to one or two recipients. As will be introduced in the analysis, at several 
stages in the process ML-enabled techniques are used to conduct activities or make decisions. 
Understanding how the human–machine teaming is associated with those activities and 
decisions is critical to the evaluation process that NOSSA uses. Many of the other functions 
normally considered in an IA were skipped as not relevant to the AI safety discussion.  
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FIGURE 3. AI-ENABLED ROBOT DELIVERY SAFETY USE CASE (Nagy, 2021) 
The above use case supports two functions. The first involves mission planning, defining 
the route and robots to use. The second function involves the management of the robot. There 
are two performers of interest in the scenario, the robot and the user. For the first system, the 
user must agree to both the route and robots to use. In the second system, the user interfaces 
with the robot through a graphical user interface (GUI). In most IA, two options are available. 
One where the unmanned system is chosen to perform functions, and humans provide support, 
and vice versa. In this case there is just one option, that the robot traverses a route and delivers 
the packages. This simplifies the IA.  
In column D, we designate which part of the robot is executing that capacity. For 
example, route movement is the role of the stabilizer and propulsion mechanisms, while identify 
customer is a segment of the computer vision ML module. These distinctions are crucial, since if 
an ML module is involved, NOSSA evaluators need to up their awareness. The supporting 
performer is either the mission user, but in NOSSA’s case, the evaluator. Column F describes 
the interactions between the robot and human, described by the three OPD characteristics. In 
this column we evaluate how the human uses those techniques to work with the robot. As one 
can see by examining the Column F, OPD in this scenario is accomplished through the GUI. 
The GUI is well designed and enables specific windows for observing location and robot state, 
provides a route details window which predicts the robots next moves, and specific robot and 
route approval buttons to provide direction. An additional geography map provides back up 
situation awareness for users. A final feature, crucial for NOSSA evaluators, is that the 
geographic map on the GUI can also be toggled to a statistical display. 
Details associated with the GUI’s capabilities are relevant to the interdependence 
possibilities for the ML-enabled components of the overall system. They enable the GUI to 
reduce the autonomy ML related functions within the delivery robot. These specific GUI 
functions are listed in Table 5.   
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TABLE 5. SCENARIO GUI FUNCTIONS 
Number Scenario GUI Function Details 
1 Enables manual take over control, e.g., direction, speed, avoidance 
2 Provides awareness of autonomous system’s actions—and change through “Affiliation” 
designation—who receives package 
3 Option to cancel delivery actions  
4 Verify recipient visually  
5 Abort operations if needed 
6 Change the success threshold (a statistic identifying the likelihood of success) when selecting 
recipient and related package delivery approach 
7 Modify methods for recipient recognition or navigation method, from a ML function to traditional 
approach  
Figure 4 pictures the GUI and highlights its Markov Decision Process (MDP) State 
design. A MDP is a way to model discrete, stochastic-based actions, popularly used in 
engineering and data science disciplines. In the Figure 4 example, the GUI allows the user to 
observe each state of the robot (and the actions associated with the state), displays the route 
prediction of where the robot is planning to go (actions that move to a different state), and ways 
to move from state to state by directing the robot to make task changes, if necessary. 
IA examines the process defined between the human user and the automated system 
for analysis. The MDP GUI in Figure 4 shows how a user can track the progress of the robots 
(following a process), as they take various actions from state to state (the process flow). The list 
of seven ways to reduce autonomy, described above, emphasizes how IA can analyze process 
states and their related actions, as well as defining where user intersession (monitoring and 
decision override, etc.) can occur to ensure autonomy reduction of the robots’ critical functions 
during mission execution. 
 
FIGURE 4. MARKOV DECISION STATE GUI DESIGN (Nagy, 2021) 
To understand this analysis process, let us examine several capacities and the 
associated analysis. In capacity row 1 in Table 4, the evaluator learns that OPD is executed 
through the GUI and is straight forward. The function reflects a standard database look up call, 
and it is clear that it is not ML-related. Normal NOSSA procedures will apply. In capacity row 4, 
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the capacity is the application of a naive Bayes algorithm to determine best input attributes. This 
sounds very ML-like, so the analyst should enlist two sets of questions. First, what are the OPD 
interactions between this algorithm and the humans? The GUI provides a view into the 
statistical data. This enables evaluators to ascertain whether the algorithm is working properly. 
The second set of questions addresses the three areas of ML failure modes. From Table 1, the 
first is “Does the algorithm produce faulty/poor decision recommendations?” The second is “Are 
there human–machine operation issues?” and the last is “Is the system under (cyber) attack?” 
Our goal is not to resolve these questions directly, though at some point that will be required. 
Rather, are there human interventions that prevent these issues that by reducing the 
“autonomy” of the algorithm? Because if there are, then the function is not so critical as to 
require a code base check. 
TABLE 4. IA FOR SYSTEM SAFETY USE CASE 
. TASKS . SUB 
TASKS 








F. OBSERVABILITY, PREDICTABILITY, AND 
DIRECTABILITY ASSESSMENT WRT NOSSA EVALUATIONS, PLUS 
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1. Use leg route & 
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nB, DB 




Leverage statistical output part of GUI to verify inputs for 
attributes make sense.  
(2, 3, 6)  
5. User Random Forest 
(RF) to estimate probability and missing 
attributes 
RF, DB 




While RF is a black box to evaluators, in this case techniques 
exist to prove that the results are useful. Evaluators  need to understand this 
proof and how to apply.   




6. Apply temporal greedy 
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success 
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OPD-thru GUI and MDP; CV is ML, so a human on the loop 
checking the identity as seen by the robot reduces “Autonomy.” In other 
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14. Check time so 
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(1, 4, 7) 
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If we review these questions from that lens, what do we learn? First, because the 
evaluator employs the seven GUI functions to explore the algorithm outputs, that means the 
evaluator or user could be involved in directing the rerunning of the algorithm so that it could 
succeed (see functions 2, 6, and 7 in Table 5). Alternatively, the user may be able to insert data 
directly (functions 1 and 7). Because the user, using the GUI, can modify robot data and inputs, 
question number two comes into view. Can the human introduce errors into the statistics so that 
the system is not functioning properly? Yes, this is possible, but can be addressed through 
proper training, something Navy systems scrupulously employ. Finally, the fact that humans can 
view the algorithm output means that they could detect adversary or insider activity disrupted 
the data (in this case, all the GUI functions apply). Yes, there are procedural implications for 
using this part of the system. One can also surmise, though, that because of the human ability 
to address all three types of failure modes, that an evaluator could conclude that the software 
criticality of this particular algorithm is relatively low. That is, the algorithm’s “autonomy” is not 
high. 
Capacity row 5 is similar to row 4, but there are interesting differences with regard to 
“explainable” AI—explaining the AI decision. For example, when using a Random Forest (RF) 
algorithm (an advanced ML technique based on many variations of a single decision tree), the 
user interface might consider a design that supports the strength of the algorithm—this is 
referred to as a symbiosis. For example, the GUI might be designed to show the user when 
there is a gap in the existing input data to the RF (a potential “real world issue”) and how this 
data gap is being estimated/compensated by the RF algorithm, along with providing the user 
with a statistical explanation of the algorithm’s estimation approach and solution. Further, Nagy 
(2021) shows that an RF algorithm can be used to estimate missing statistical data, including 
statistical data describing highest success in supporting a final decision (e.g., routes and robot 
selection). This type of statistical explanation for critical decision-making data provides the user 
with increased confidence as to whether to accept or reject the estimations of an RF algorithm. 
This raises another key point. If possible, GUI design and algorithm selection should be 
symbiotically determined, facilitated by the IA results. For the RF example, selection of an ML 
algorithm’s capability to compensate for “real world issues” through statistical understanding of 
how the data was estimated should influence the GUI design with the end goal of reducing the 
autonomy of an ML algorithm. The design supporting the expandability strength of the ML 
should provide visibility into potential “real world issues” and how the selected algorithm 
compensates with statistical insight for the user. This IA driven, symbiotic GUI to ML algorithm 
design ensures that the user has the knowledge needed to make a final approval regarding any 
data estimated, thereby assisting in answering the first question, “Does the algorithm produce 
faulty results?” When symbiosis of design and algorithm occur, as provided in the RF example, 
there is greater confidence that the answer will be “no.”  
When symbiosis does not occur, there is a greater chance that system safety risks 
increase. Again, using the RF algorithm as an example, through its estimation process and 
statistical explanation, the user is provided with the necessary data to have confidence in 
approving or rejecting the route and robot selection during a “real world issue” lack of available 
data. Providing the necessary “knowledge” for a user to have confidence in the final approval 
becomes a key requirement necessary to maintain overall system performance and adequately 
reduce autonomy of an ML algorithm. Without the user having confidence in how well the 
algorithm is addressing “real world issues,” final approval authority is meaningless. This is 
because the man-in-the-loop is not achieving the designed result of autonomous reduction of 
the ML algorithm. When things go wrong during deployment, it is about making sure that the 
user has the necessary “knowledge” provided by the ML algorithm (or other means) to make the 
final approval decision.  
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In this example we use the three general fault areas for ML. Table 3 adds root causes. In 
this particular example, the possible root causes that might require deeper examination would 
include training dataset corruption, mis-validation of data set, overfitting of the ML model, 
operator overreliance, or adversarial deception. These are just two examples of how to use IA to 
support NOSSA critical function analysis for ML-enabled functions. A complete IA would yield 
far more insights into potential problem areas and root causes.   
Next Steps and Recommendations 
After considering the analysis conducted above, one asks, “Does IA serve to solve the 
challenges of evaluating ML based components in weapon systems?” “Not completely,” the 
authors argue. However, what IA does do is to add detail to those functional areas that need to 
be evaluated. IA helps identify specific ML components, which humans might be involved in the 
process to reduce “autonomy” and suggest which mechanisms amongst the OPD triad might be 
best employed, such as GUIs and their design. Moreover, not all designers appreciate the 
interdependence that should exist between user and the algorithm and therefore build no OPD 
connections. This makes reducing “autonomy” infinitely harder. Conducting IA rapidly speeds 
that discovery, which might suggest necessary rework by the original developer.   
By adding the three main fault areas of ML use to the IA, very specific evaluation details 
and questions are raised. While it may not solve the emerging ML evaluation conundrum, it 
does add considerable detail to the kinds of discussions that system developers and NOSSA 
ought to consider, especially when evaluators use the root cause details to inform their 
questions. Further, the authors recommend adding a seventh column to the IA table, which 
would include what root causes were suspect and why. Here are several specific considerations 
that also emerged from developing this work.  
As a nascent requirement for the NOSSA evaluators, recommend careful consideration 
of each function using these techniques, plus frequent review of deployed system performance. 
Specifying a special follow up with operational users may be required for the first years of use. 
While Nagy’s scenario benefits from a very capable GUI already informed by a knowledge of IA, 
NOSSA evaluators should expect that not all systems submitted for such review will be as well 
developed. In fact, NOSSA may want to consider making an IA a requirement for submission of 
a system for certification.  
We recommend not updating training data sets to the deployed edge, which is to 
platforms deployed in actual operations. At this point, the processes that support such updates 
are not well understood. Any updates to training data sets ought to be reexamined by NOSSA. 
However, as the use of ML devices becomes prevalent, NOSSA will not be able to maintain the 
pace to evaluate these changes. New procedures will need to be considered, developed, 
evaluated, and then adopted. We recommend tasking the Naval Postgraduate School, the Joint 
AI Center, or the Navy’s Digital Software Engineering Transformation Working Group to start 
this work. 
In many respects, updating training data sets is like the Navy’s development security 
operations (DEVSECOPS) efforts to update patches to the Fleet in hours, not weeks. NOSSA 
should learn from those lessons, though recognizing that the size of most training data sets 
makes over the air updates challenging and unreliable. NOSSA and training data set updaters 
should consider leveraging standard storage device deliveries. This would include ways to 
secure the data on those storage devices.  
Introducing ML techniques into systems, because of the importance of the training data 
sets, means that changes to the system engineering processes are necessary. In the past, the 
SE “Vee” diagram is a set of procedures that are executed to an end state, normally at the end 
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of a variety of test and evaluation events. This includes operational test, security and weapons 
certification, and in NOSSA’s case, safety certification. According to Johnson (2021), this new 
SE “Vee” may change to be continuous for the entire life cycle of a system. This means, in 
theory, that NOSSA has a continuous responsibility to monitor system safety. That is a 
significant change, and worth thinking about. It may be that IA provides at least a way to wrap 
one’s head around this potentially new responsibility. IA could be used to identify those 
functions that do require continuous evaluation.  
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Abstract 
Department of Defense (DoD) activities are pursuing innovative solutions to communication and 
electromagnetic warfare challenges, especially for contested electromagnetic (EM) environments. 
Candidate technologies suitable for this environment are in a state of near-constant change. 
Current approaches for selecting these technologies for investment of limited resources can be 
inconsistent and based on subjective assessments and biased decision-making processes. 
Decision-makers require a structured and objective approach to technology selection and 
investment decision-making. Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) methods provide this 
structured, consistent, and repeatable approach (Georgiadis et al., 2013). 
To improve return on investment (ROI) of increasingly limited resources, candidate technologies 
and associated enabling products must be objectively evaluated against relevant measurable 
criteria. Implementing MCDM methods as part of the technology investment decision-making 
process increases consistency, objectivity, and repeatability of the process, leading to increased 
ROI of limited resources. 
To research applicability and value of MCDM to technology investment decisions, this paper 
focuses on technology evaluation within a single domain, Private Cellular Networks, for use in 
U.S. and mission partner tactical operations. A decision framework for Private Cellular Network 
technology investment decision-making is presented to serve as a model for larger and more 
complex technology investment decisions using MCDM methods.  
Introduction 
Organizations within the DoD are engaged in capability modernization initiatives where 
potential candidate technologies and their enabling products are in a state of near-constant 
change. These technologies span multiple technical and operational domains to include 
wireless and cellular communications, Electro-Optical (EO), Free Space Optics (FSO), Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communications, and other means of electronic information 
transmission, receipt, processing, and storage. In this highly complex, dynamic environment, 
often the approach to identifying, evaluating, and selecting technologies for investment of 
scarce resources is inconsistent and largely based on subjective assessments and decision-
making processes. In this environment characterized by rapid technology evolution and 
capability enhancement, decision-makers require a structured and objective approach to 
technology selection and resource investment decision-making.   
To improve return on investment (ROI) of limited resources, candidate technologies and 
associated enabling products should be objectively evaluated against relevant measurable 
criteria. A structured decision-making model enables development of relevant criteria against 
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which candidate technologies and enabling products can be assessed. Implementing multi-
criteria decision-making (MCDM) methods as part of the technology investment decision-making 
process increases consistency, objectivity, and repeatability of the process leading to increased 
ROI of limited resources. 
Research Issue Statement 
Current approaches to identifying, evaluating, and selecting emerging technologies for 
investment of scarce resources can be inconsistent and based largely on subjective 
assessments and unstructured decision-making processes. To ensure that technology 
investment decisions are properly aligned to organizational goals and objectives, decision-
makers require a structured and objective approach to technology selection and investment 
decision-making. 
Research Questions 
The research introduced in this paper focuses on answering the following questions 
regarding technology investment decision-making: 
• Can appropriate technology investment decision criteria be identified? 
• What technology investment decision criteria can be appropriately quantified? 
• How can technology investment decision criteria be quantified? 
• Can statistical analysis be used to accurately develop weighted decision criteria? 
• Can the technology investment decision-making process be made more objective, 
consistent, and repeatable? 
Multi-Criteria Decision-Making 
Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) is a method to help decide when there are 
multiple alternatives, with each alternative having several characteristics and attributes (Yoon & 
Hwang, 1995). MCDM methods are sufficiently flexible for application to simple decision-making 
scenarios with binary decision alternatives as well as complex, multi-criteria, multi-alternative 
scenarios. MCDM is well-suited for technology investment decisions because those decisions 
routinely include criteria that must be identified, weighted, and compared to generate priority 
rankings for each decision alternative. 
Methodology 
The five phases in the proposed research methodology presented in this paper are 
briefly described in the following paragraphs and shown in Figure 1.  
Phase 1, Preliminary Investigation, focuses on capability gaps identified by a Capability-
Based Assessment (CBA) or similar activity. Phase 1 produces the problem statement and 
research objectives. It also produces the research questions whose answers help mitigate or 
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Phase 2, Initial Model Development, focuses on the problem statement, research 
objectives, and research questions formulated during Phase 1. Outputs from Phase 1 research 
are used to build the initial version of the MCDM model to include identifying the Goal, Criteria, 
and Criteria Attribute components of the MCDM model. The decision model goal is the selection 
of the most appropriate technology and enabling a product consistent with organizational 
objectives, areas of greatest need, and highest possible ROI. 
During Phase 2, several candidate MCDM methods were considered for applicability to 
the technology investment decision-making environment. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was 
selected as an appropriate MCDM method for the technology investment decision-making 
environment because of its ability to consider a set of evaluation criteria and a set of alternative 
options, from which the most appropriate decision can be made. Another factor in selecting AHP 
is that it is a “fast and understandable method for people who are not familiar with multi-criteria 
decision support methods” (Tscheikner-Gratl et al., 2017).   
Phase 3, Data Collection, focuses on qualitative and quantitative data relevant to the 
decision environment. Qualitative and quantitative data on candidate technologies and enabling 
products must be collected to support development of the decision matrix, decision criteria, 
decision weights, and decision alternatives used in the model. 
Phase 4, Data Analysis and Model Refinement, focuses on analyzing collected data to 
refine model components and relationships proposed in the initial model. 
Figure 1. Methodology Map 
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Phase 5, Model Run and Results, is where the decision model is run using as input the 
qualitative and quantitative data analyzed in Phase 4. The analyzed data is input into the model 
to calculate decision criteria weights using AHP. Decision criteria weights are tested for 
consistency using Saaty’s Random Index before use as the basis for generating a ranked order 
of decision alternatives (Saaty, 1980).  
Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Methods 
Several MCDM methods exist and have been applied to a wide range of decision-
making scenarios. Each MCDM method has strengths and weaknesses relative to the decision-
making environment for which its application is considered. 
A short description of frequently used MCDM methods is provided in the following 
paragraphs. 
• Weighted Sum Model (WSM): WSM is designed for single-dimensional decision-making 
problems. WSM is a value-measurement MCDM method with criteria assigned a weight 
to represent relative importance for comparison to other decision criteria (Tscheikner-
Gratl et al., 2017). Simple in design and application, WSM is not well-suited for multi-
dimensional decision-making problems such as technology investment decisions 
because of its limitations for addressing multiple decision criteria scenarios 
(Triantaphyllou et al., 1998). 
• Weighted Product Model (WPM): WPM is like WSM but uses multiplication rather than 
addition to calculate the sum for each decision alternative. WPM is suitable for single 
dimensional decision-making problems where the solution sought is that with the largest 
value relative to the other candidate solutions. WPM is not well-suited for multi-
dimensional decision-making problems such as technology investment decisions 
because of its limitations for addressing multiple decision criteria scenarios 
(Triantaphyllou et al., 1998). 
• Simple Additive Weighting (SAW): SAW is based on simple addition of scores assigned 
to different criteria associated with accomplishing the goal of the decision-making 
process. Though SAW calculations are simple and do not require complex computer 
algorithms, the results produced with SAW do not always realistically reflect the 
complexity of the multi-criteria technology investment decision-making process 
(Adriyendi, 2015).   
• Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS): TOPSIS is an 
MCDM method based on the concept that the alternative chosen should be the one 
having the shortest distance from the ideal solution and furthest distance from the 
negative ideal solution. The ideal and negative ideal solutions are unique to the decision 
that must be made and can be based on quantitative or qualitative factors. TOPSIS is a 
calculation-intensive MCDM method whose proper application is dependent on accurate 
identification of ideal and negative ideal solutions (Gavade, 2014). 
• Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP): AHP decomposes complex MCDM problems into 
hierarchical relationships between decision criteria and their attributes. AHP allows the 
decision-maker to view the decision in terms of a hierarchy of criteria. AHP is a value-
measurement MCDM method with criteria assigned a weight to represent its relative 
importance for comparison to other decision criteria (Tscheikner-Gratl et al., 2017). AHP 
considers qualitative and quantitative criteria when building decision criteria and 
developing criteria weights. AHP’s framework for establishing relationships between 
goals, criteria, criteria attributes, and decision alternative weights makes it well-suited to 
the technology investment decision-making process. 
• The MCDM methods briefly described previously share common components for intent, 
design, and application discussed in the following section. 
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Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Components 
Though different in design and application to decision-making scenarios, MCDM 
methods share several common characteristics, as described here (Mocenni, 2018): 
• The decision context must be identified. The decision that must be made, the decision-
maker, and key contributors are identified as the first step in the MCDM process 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009). 
• Decision options are identified before being assessed or evaluated for suitability. 
Decision options are eventually assessed against weighted decision criteria as the 
MCDM process is applied. Decision options can be the selection of the most appropriate 
solution or elimination of one or more candidate solutions from further evaluation and 
consideration. 
• Independent decision criteria are identified. The decision criteria should be independent 
of each other to avoid introducing inconsistencies in the criteria weighting results. The 
relevance of the criteria to each identified option is also identified. The decision criteria 
are those factors against which potential solutions are evaluated for acceptance or 
rejection (Vargas, 2010). 
• Weights are developed for each of the decision criteria to establish the relative 
importance of the criteria when evaluated against each other. The weights can be 
developed through qualitative methods, quantitative methods, or a combination of both 
methods. Decision criteria weights are applied during the evaluation of potential 
solutions to create a rank order of all evaluated solutions. Subject Matter Expert input is 
a critical component of developing credible criteria weights. 
• Each potential solution, or decision alternative, is assessed against criteria and assigned 
a value using criteria weights. 
• Options are rank ordered to help the decision-maker either select one option or eliminate 
one or more options from further consideration. 
Figure 2 shows MCDM components and their relationships in helping the decision-maker reach 
an evidence-based selection from available alternatives. 
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Applying Multi-Criteria Decision-Making Methods to Decision-Making Processes 
Since MCDM methods incorporate computational tools to weight and assess decision 
options, they are well-suited for application to complex, multi-dimensional decision-making 
scenarios such as technology investment decision-making. 
The goal of a decision-making process is to provide the decision-maker with the ability to 
investigate the future and to make the best possible decision based on past and present 
information and future predictions (Georgiadis et al., 2013). MCDM methods accomplish this 
goal by considering quantitative data, qualitative data, and expert judgment to assess and rank 
decision options from which the decision-maker can select the most appropriate option. 
MCDM methods integrate quantitative and qualitative data analysis as components of 
the decision-making process. MCDM methods align closely, and are appropriately applied, to a 
decision-making process with the following characteristics (Foote, 2010): 
• Decision objectives are identified. A decision results from comparing one or more 
alternatives against one or more criteria relevant to the decision-making environment. 
• Decision options available to the decision-maker are identified. 
• Decision criteria upon which the decision will be made are identified. The decision 
criteria are independent of one another. 
• Decision criteria weights are developed for use in evaluating and comparing decision 
alternatives. The weights are developed using a combination of quantitative and 
quantitative data sources. Expert judgment provided by subject matter experts is a 
critical success factor in determining a criterion’s weight relative to other decision 
Figure 2. MCDM Components, Levels, and Relationships 
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criterion. Qualitative subject matter expert judgments are transformed into numerical 
values (quantitative data) using a pairwise comparison scale (Saaty, 1980).  
• Decision options are evaluated against the weighted criteria. Each option is evaluated 
against the weighted decision criteria independent of other decision options. 
• Decision options are rank ordered to help the decision-maker either choose the most 
appropriate alternative or to eliminate one or more alternatives from further 
consideration. 
• A decision is made by selecting the most appropriate alternative from among all ranked 
alternatives. 
By integrating quantitative and qualitative data analysis into the decision-making process, 
MCDM methods strengthen the technology investment decision-making process by 
• Removing subjectivity in decision criteria weight assignments. 
• Improving documentation and communication of all components of the decision-making 
process. MCDM methods facilitate documentation and communication between the 
decision-maker and stakeholders impacted by the decision. 
• Calculating and analyzing the decision criteria weights and alternative rankings to 
generate an audit trail for future analysis or refinement as appropriate. 
• Providing a platform for sensitivity analysis and “What-If” studies 
The technology investment decision-making process is a multi-criteria environment 
where MCDM methods can be applied to identify decision goals, identify decision criteria, 
develop decision criteria weights, and assess available options against the weighted criteria to 
help the decision-maker select the most appropriate option. 
The next section of the paper presents a case study for applying a selected MCDM 
method, Analytic Hierarchy Process, to the decision-making process for investing resources to 
pursue Private Cellular Network Technology and enabling products. 
Case Study: Applying Analytic Hierarchy Process to Investment Decision-Making 
for Private Cellular Network Technology 
AHP is a structured MCDM method well-suited to organize and analyze complex 
decisions. AHP uses qualitative and quantitative data as critical components of the decision-
making process. In AHP, decision alternatives are identified along with criteria relevant to each 
decision alternative. AHP reduces complex decisions to a series of pairwise comparisons, which 
allow the decision-maker to establish priorities to support the decision-making process. AHP 
establishes weights for decision criteria, which are then applied to evaluate and prioritize 
decision alternatives (Mocenni, 2018). 
Because of its ability to create a decision hierarchy identifying the decision objective, 
decision criteria, decision criteria weights, and decision alternatives, AHP is well-suited to 
technology investment decision-making processes. Relevant qualitative and quantitative data 
can be collected from technical research, subject matter expert judgment, formal testing, or 
capability demonstration events. 
Figure 3 shows the MCDM components and levels presented in Figure 2 tailored to the 
decision-making process for determining appropriateness of Private Cellular Network 
technology as an investment initiative.  
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For the Private Cellular Network Technology case study, the Goal, which represents the 
desired outcome or impact of the decision, is to make an investment decision on pursuing the 
technology and, if yes, identifying the most appropriate material solution. 
Decision Criteria for the Private Cellular Network Technology Case Study are 
Technology Maturity, Signature, Network Profile, and Range. These criteria are the standards or 
measurements against which the decision will be made and candidate solutions will be 
evaluated. The four Criteria provide sufficient depth and granularity to define the technology and 
to differentiate candidate enabling products if the decision is made to pursue this technology as 
an investment initiative. 
The Attributes listed for each criterion are qualities or characteristics associated with that 
criterion. Attributes add depth and identify characteristics of interest to help establish weights for 
each criterion. Attributes can focus on technical, operational, security, cost, supportability, or 
other characteristics that help describe the criteria. 
In the Private Cellular Network Technology Case Study, Decision Alternatives are a 
binary yes or no decision to pursue the technology and a multi-criteria decision to evaluate 
candidate enabling products. Two candidate material solutions, Product 1 and Product 2, are 
shown as decision alternatives in Figure 3. These two material solutions will be evaluated 
against the weighted criteria established by AHP’s Pairwise Comparison Matrix shown in Figure 
4. 
It is important to note that a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) analysis should be performed prior to 
pursuing a material solution to mitigate or close a capability gap. The DOTMLPF-P Analysis will 
determine if a non-material or material approach is required to mitigate or close a capability gap. 
The technology under consideration, and the products that realize the technology’s capability, 
are material solutions to mitigating or closing the capability gap. 
Figure 3. Applying AHP to the Private Cell Technology Investment Decision-Making Process 
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Qualitative and quantitative data are used to establish criteria weights, which are applied 
to rank order the decision alternatives of Product 1 or Product 2.  
The qualitative data component of the AHP model identifies decision criteria and 
associated attributes in the Criteria component of the AHP hierarchy structure. Qualitative data 
can be collected from technical research and subject matter expert judgment. Figure 4 shows 
how Saaty’s (1980) Pairwise Comparison Scale is used to translate qualitative verbal judgments 
to quantitative numeric values. 
 
 
The criteria weights developed through Saaty’s (1980) Pairwise Comparison Scale are 
tested for consistency as the final step in the pairwise comparison. The Consistency Ratio (CR) 
compares the Consistency Index (CI) of the Subject Matter Expert–generated judgment matrix 
against the consistency index of a random matrix (RI). The random matrix is one where 
judgments have been entered randomly and therefore are expected to be highly inconsistent. 
The RI is the average consistency index of 500 randomly populated matrices. As shown in 
Figure 4, if the Consistency Ratio is < 0.10, the judgment matrix is assumed to be reasonably 
consistent and is acceptable for use in the AHP model (Saaty, 1980).  
With criteria weights established and verified for consistency against the Random Index, 
the Product 1 and Product 2 material solutions can be evaluated against the weighted criteria. 
Figure 5 shows the final steps in the Case Study, which produce a rank ordered list of 
decision alternatives from which the decision-maker can select. 
Figure 4. Developing Decision Criteria Weights Using Pairwise Comparison 
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Evaluating Product 1 and Product 2 against the weighted criteria produces an aggregate 
score that can be used to rank order the decision alternatives. In the Private Cellular Network 
Technology Case Study, there are only two products from which the decision-maker can select. 
Though the number of decision alternatives can be sufficiently larger than shown in the Case 
Study, the AHP process steps and application are consistent with the two-decision alternative 
Private Cellular Network Technology Case Study.  
Findings 
Key findings from MCDM method research and selection, model development, decision criteria 
research, and criteria weighting are presented in the following paragraphs. 
• Criteria identification and weighting are heavily influenced by the quality of subject 
matter expert judgment. Pairwise comparisons used to translate qualitative data to 
quantitative data can be influenced by the breadth and depth of knowledge and 
experience of subject matter experts providing the qualitative assessments. 
• Decision criteria should be limited to those that clearly enable differentiation of decision 
alternatives. As the number of criteria increases, the difference in their respective 
weights becomes increasingly smaller and potentially less meaningful. 
• The criteria may be sensitive to unique characteristics of the environment in which the 
technology and enabling product is intended to operate. Criteria and associated 
attributes must be considered in the context of the environment in which the technology 
or product will operate. Criteria with absolute measurements, such as weight or cost, are 
less susceptible to operating environment influences than more dynamic criteria such as 
electromagnetic spectrum and channel interference criteria. 
• An Acceptance Threshold should be established as a value that must be equaled or 
exceeded for any decision alternative to be selected. Determining an Acceptance 
Threshold for selecting one of the decision alternatives can help avoid the scenario 
where even the highest ranked alternative fails to perform in a manner that mitigates the 
targeted capability gap. 
• The mission owner’s risk tolerance can impact the choice between decision alternatives. 
Risk tolerance is based on the mission owner’s assessment of the impact if the 
technology and enabling product fail to perform as expected. Different mission owners 
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can have different risk tolerances when addressing suitability of similar technologies and 
products for investment decisions. 
• The MCDM approach to technology investment decisions is not a substitute for a formal 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and subsequent formal source selection evaluations. 
However, the MCDM approach proposed in this paper is well-suited to rapid capability 
testing and fielding as a first step in large-scale system evaluations and investment 
decisions. 
• Improvement in the ROI for technology initiatives attributed to applying MCDM methods 
is difficult to measure until a robust body of data is collected and analyzed. The ROI for 
applying MCDM methods should include factors such as cost avoidance of pursuing 
technologies that do not mitigate or close capability gaps, pursuing technologies that 
have no measurable contribution to mission success, and pursuing technologies for 
which enabling products do not yet exist. 
Conclusion and Practical Application 
The MCDM model presented in this paper meets the proposed research objectives and 
answers the research questions. The MCDM model can produce a consistent and repeatable 
technology investment decision-making process that removes subjectivity and decision-maker 
bias, either intended or unintended, from the decision-making process. The structured and 
objective approach to technology selection and investment decision-making ensures that 
technology investment decisions are properly aligned to organizational goals and objectives. 
The application of MCDM methods to technology investment decision-making 
researched and summarized in this paper removes inconsistency and subjectivity from that 
decision-making process. Removing inconsistency and subjectivity results in a reduced level of 
risk potentially introduced to mission success by adopting technology and enabling products 
that fail to perform as required in the anticipated operating environment. The decision support 
model presented in this paper, based on the AHP MCDM method, can be applied by 
organizations pursuing technology-based solutions to their most critical operational challenges 
and capability gaps. 
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Abstract 
Topological data analysis (TDA) is an unconventional machine learning technique that is used to 
understand the underlying topology of data. The premise is that data has shape. The two 
methodologies used in TDA are persistent homology and the mapper algorithm. Traditional 
machine learning techniques include supervised unsupervised methods such as clustering, 
Bayesian networks, neural networks, support vector machines (SVM), and random forests. The 
goal of this study is to apply TDA methods in conjunction with traditional machine learning 
algorithms to Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) data to determine if TDA helps to 
improve prediction measures (accuracy, f-measure, sensitivity, and specificity) over using 
traditional methods only when predicting program manager ratings from Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). We show that TDA when used in conjunction with traditional 
machine learning models at a local level of the DAES data improved the accuracy of predicting 
PM cost ratings of MDAPs at 80% of all nodes in training and testing as compared to 
implementing these models without TDA at the global level. 
Keywords: Topological data analysis, machine learning, prediction measures 
Background/Research/Business Need 
The Data Analytics Division of Acquisition Enablers (AE) within the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment OUSD(A&S) has been developing 
machine learning model minimal viable products (MVP) to assist in prioritizing analysts’ focus on 
which major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) may become problematic. Human 
resources have been reduced in A&S to perform analytic tasks of determining problematic 
programs in the program assessment process in the Acquisition Data Analytics Division of the 
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AE Directorate since the reorganization of OUSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics into 
OUSD(A&S). As such, prioritizing problematic programs using machine learning models 
efficiently assists analysts in performing program assessment for executive leadership. There is 
anecdotal evidence that has shown that TDA, when used in conjunction with traditional machine 
learning models, improves overall accuracy of these machine learning models at localized 
sections of the data. SymphonyAI (2021) in a white paper discusses how traditional machine 
learning models use global optimization that assumes/guesses the shape of the data to derive 
parameters to approximate the dataset which often produces errors in some regions of the data. 
TDA in contrast creates separate models of the underlying data based on the output network 
topology that is responsible for different local sections of the data. This technique produces a 
better representation than a single globalized model. Therefore, we wanted to test whether this 
localized modeling methodology of TDA is more efficient and improves accuracy of predicting 
program manager ratings in DAES data. 
Machine Learning 
Machine learning is binned into unsupervised and supervised learning. Unsupervised 
learning uses methods such as clustering to segment data into smaller datasets and 
dimensionality reduction to make it easier to visualize data that are high dimensional (e.g., 25 or 
more features). Clustering models include hierarchical and K-Means. Supervised learning 
consists of regression and classification models. The classification models used to assist in the 
prioritization effort are neural networks, random forests and single tree models, and SVM.  
Supervised Learning Classification Models 
Random forests are an ensemble technique analogous to bagging trees. It works by 
collecting a bootstrapped sample of identical and independently distributed trees and 
conducting recursive partitioning on them. Classification is based on a majority vote of the 
aggregated trees. The beauty of this technique is that it obtains an estimate of the 
misclassification error and also performs random feature selection to estimate the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables (Friedman et al., 2009).  
Support vector machines are large-margin powerful predictive models that can be 
utilized for classification or regression. They are a class of distance-based classifiers that 
attempt to use hard margins for stability in classification. They can be linear or nonlinear in form. 
The beauty and utility of SVM is the implementation of kernel methods that transform vectors 
from the input space and calculate their inner products in the feature space therefore bypassing 
the calculation of the function Φ in the input space, which would be untenable. This allows the 
SVM to perform classification of datasets in which the underlying boundaries of the classes are 
not readily clear. Some examples of kernels are the Gaussian radial basis, Laplace radial basis, 
and the hyperbolic tangent kernels. The use of kernels offers a rich model class to essentially 
tune the SVM (Clarke et al., 2009).  
Neural Networks are extremely powerful classifiers as they can be tuned by many 
different parameters. They are also heavily nonlinear classification models. The sigmoid 
function ψ that defines the neural net may be modeled using the logistic, hyperbolic tangent, or 
heavy side step sigmoid functions. These sigmoid functions in conjunction with the size of the 
hidden layers offer ways to tune the neural network as a more robust classifier (Clarke et al., 
2009).  
TDA 
TDA is an emerging and exciting form of unsupervised learning. Georges (2019) states 
that TDA is based on topology, a branch of mathematics that examines the notion of shape. 
TDA attempts to analyze highly complex data and draws on the notion that all data has a 
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fundamental shape and that shape has meaning. Figure 1 below is an illustration of some 
common shapes of data, which include regressions, clusters, flares, and loops.  
 
Figure 1 . Common Shapes of Data (Ayasdi, 2020) 
The two methodologies used in TDA are persistent homology and the mapper algorithm. 
Persistent homology provides a framework and efficient algorithms to quantify the evolution of 
the topology of a family of nested topological spaces. Persistent diagrams are used to capture 
and visualize the birth and death of homological features over a specific period of time (Fasy et 
al., 2015). The mapper algorithm is a tool used to visualize the topology of the data under 
consideration. This method of TDA will be used for this research. The inputs to the algorithm are 
a point cloud of data, a filter function, a covering of a metric space, a clustering algorithm, and 
tuning parameters. Figure 2 depicts an illustration of the mapper algorithm and filter function. 
 
Figure 2. Mapper Algorithm and Filter Function (Chazal & Michel, 2016) 
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The output is a network graph that represents the topology of the data (Herring, 2018). 
Figure 3 below illustrates the steps to implement the mapper algorithm. It shows that the 
notional data to be mapped is a hand. Next, a filter function is identified. In this research, a 
kernel distance estimator will be used as the filter function. Third, determine the number of 
overlapping bins to map the input data. In this case, six bins are selected. Finally, create a 
network topology representation of the original dataset using nodes and edges (Lum et al., 
2013). The nodes represent the clusters of local regions created by the binning. It is important to 
note that information from one node can be contained in another node as a result of overlapping 
bins. The edges connect clusters to display the overall topology. 
 
 
Figure 3. Implementation Steps of Mapper Algorithm (Lum et al., 2013) 
Research Question 
Can TDA in conjunction with traditional machine learning models improve the accuracy 
of the predictions of those machine learning models when used without TDA? 
Hypothesis 
H0: Traditional machine learning algorithms (neural network, random forest, recursive 
partitioning, and SVM) have higher predictive accuracy when combined with TDA in at least 
70% of nodes for training and testing sets. 
Ha: Traditional machine learning algorithms (neural network, random forest, recursive 
partitioning, SVM) have higher predictive accuracy when not combined with TDA in at least 70% 
of nodes for training and testing sets. 
Related Work 
Chazal & Michel (2016) demonstrate how to use the mapper algorithm in R’s 
TDAMapper package to construct topologies of any data set into network graphs, as well as 
how to label the categories of each node by a specific color to assist with understanding the 
data’s topology better. Riihimaki et al. (2020) used a TDA classifier to determine if it provided 
better accuracy than a SVM classifier when modeling repeated measures data. The results of 
this experiment are that their TDA classifier outperformed the SVM classifier in accuracy 96.8% 
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to 68.7% respectively in one of three use cases. Kindelan et al. (2021) used persistent 
homology to build a TDA classifier that provided superior accuracies on eight separate data sets 
than traditional k-NN classifiers. Wu and Hargreaves (2020) implemented a TDA classification 
model on mixed data (numerical and categorical) using persistent homology of heart disease 
data. The results were that the TDA classification model performed better in accuracy than 
traditional state-of-the-art machine learning models such as decision trees, logistic regression, 
naïve Bayes, neural networks, single trees, and SVM in predicting heart disease. Joseph and 
Sconion (2020) used sentiment analysis to extract average sentiment of selected acquisition 
report executive summaries to determine if the average sentiment was highly correlated to be 
viable as a predictor feature/variable in predicting unit cost growth of MDAPs. Joseph and 
Hastings (2020) derived new schedule features/variables (months to threshold, difference from 
current to next DAES, difference from previous to current DAES, and previous milestone slips) 
from schedule milestone and APB schedule data gathered from DAES data to predict and 
understand the factors that may cause schedule slips in MDAPs. 
Methodology 
Four traditional machine learning classification models are initially applied to DAES data 
in order to predict future program manager cost ratings. PM cost ratings are the target variable 
and 10 other attributes (consisting of schedule, unit cost, and average sentiments of DAES 
executive summaries) are used as features for these models. The classification models used in 
this research are neural network, random forest, recursive partitioning (single tree based), and 
SVM. The accuracies of these models are recorded. Next, TDA is applied to the same DAES 
data using the mapper algorithm in R programming language to create a network topology of 
the data. This is an implementation of the localized modeling discussed above. The contents of 
each resulting network node of the TDA model are then modeled using the previous traditional 
machine learning classification models, and the resulting accuracies of each model are 
compared to the results of the globally optimized machine learning models when not used in 
conjunction with TDA to determine if accuracies improve more at the local node level over the 
global level of the DAES data. The null hypothesis is tested, and conclusion is drawn to answer 
the research question. 
Data Collection and Preprocessing 
Data for this research was collected from Defense Acquisition Management Information 
Repository (DAMIR) and the Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment databases. Unit cost, 
schedule, PM rating, and DAES executive summary data was extracted separately from the 
database and then joined by PNO, Schedule URI. Next, the data was cleansed to remove 
missing values. The next step was to remove unnecessary html tags from the executive 
summary and PM rating explanation text variables. The average sentiment variable was derived 
from previous research conducted by Joseph and Sconion (2020). Schedule slip features were 
derived from research conducted by Joseph and Hastings (2020). Further cleaning of text was 
done using R programming language’s TM package to remove punctuations, stop words, 
conduct stemming, and convert all words to lower case to remove duplication during future text 
classification analysis. Average sentiment was extracted from DAES executive summaries using 
the sentimentR package and R programming language. The final dataset contained 10 feature 
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Analysis 
Classification without TDA 
Globally optimized supervised machine learning using the four classification models 
discussed above were implemented on the DAES data set with PM rating for cost as the target 
variable. Tables 1 and 2 show the confusion matrix outputs for the SVM model. The training set 
produced an accuracy of 79.3% while the test set provided a 73.7%. This is consistent with 
typical training and test sets. The accuracies of the training set are usually higher than those of 
the test set. The training accuracies for the random forest, recursive partitioning, and neural 
network models are 99.1%. 64.1%, and 60.6% respectively. The testing accuracies for the 
random forest, recursive partitioning, and neural network models are 98.3%, 62.6%, and 56.7% 
respectively.  
 
Classification with TDA 
The TDA mapper algorithm was implemented on the data set in R programming 
language using the following parameters: a sample size of 4,000 rows of data with 10 features, 
a Euclidean distance similarity function, the kernel distance estimator (KDE) filter function, and 
bins with 10 intervals overlapping at 50%. Figure 4 illustrates the resulting network graphing 
output from the mapper algorithm in R programming language. Figure 4 also depicts that the 
network shape of the underlying original DAES data is a regression type. Other renderings were 




Figure 4. Network Topology Output of Mapper Algorithm in R of DAES Data (Shape Regression) 
Green NoRating Red Yellow Green NoRating Red Yellow
Green 444 20 56 76 Green 195 19 30 40
NoRating 63 618 17 19 NoRating 55 293 17 10
Red 22 16 503 24 Red 16 7 241 26
Yellow 130 16 92 551 Yellow 75 11 44 254
Accuracy = 79.3%
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Figure 5 illustrates the number of rows of data assigned to each node from the mapper 
algorithm. There are 10 nodes because 10 bins were requested in the input of the mapper 
algorithm parameters. We notice that the sum of the row contents does not sum to the 4,000-
sample size. This is due to the 50% overlap in the binning where some row IDs of one node 
may be included in other nodes. An extraction of that row ID information can give context to how 
each node can be described by an analyst and subject matter expert of the data.  
 
Figure 5. R output of TDA Mapper Network Graph Nodes 
Tables 3 and 4 depict the confusion matrix and accuracy produced by implementing the 
SVM machine classification model on the contents of node 1 of the resulting TDA mapper 
algorithm network topology output data. Tables 5 and 6 depict the confusion matrix and 
accuracy produced by implementing the SVM classification model on the contents of node 10 of 
the resulting TDA mapper algorithm network topology output data. In both cases, the accuracy 
results of SVM when used with TDA at the local level is an improvement over the accuracy of 
the SVM model when implemented globally on the data set. The results of the other 




Green NoRating Red Yellow Green NoRating Red Yellow
Green 54 1 3 2 Green 22 1 1 76
NoRating 3 42 0 0 NoRating 2 27 1 19
Red 8 0 179 10 Red 5 0 87 24
Yellow 10 2 2 58 Yellow 3 3 0 551
Table 3. Confusion Matrix SVM TDA Training Node 1 Table 4. Confusion Matrix SVM TDA Testing Node 1
Accuracy = 89.0% Accuracy = 85.6%
Green NoRating Red Yellow Green NoRating Red Yellow
Green 133 4 10 11 Green 64 3 6 11
NoRating 1 18 0 0 NoRating 1 7 0 0
Red 3 0 41 2 Red 1 0 16 0
Yellow 11 0 15 131 Yellow 9 0 9 63
Accuracy = 85.0% Accuracy = 78.9%
Table 5. Confusion Matrix SVM TDA Training Node 1 Table 6. Confusion Matrix SVM TDA Testing Node 10
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Results 
Table 7 shows the results of implementing machine learning classification models with and 
without TDA to predict future PM cost ratings. It can be seen that 
 80% of all training and testing models have improved accuracy when used in conjunction 
with TDA 
 85% of the training models from traditional machine learning methods produced 
improved accuracy when used in conjunction with TDA vice using the traditional 
methods independently 
o Random Forest model improved in 40% of the training nodes 
o All other models improved in 100% of the training nodes 
 75% of the testing models from traditional machine learning methods produced improved 
accuracy when used in conjunction with TDA 
o Random Forest model improved accuracy 0% of the TDA produced testing 
nodes 
o All other models improved accuracy 100% of the TDA produced training nodes 
 Weaker learners improved in training and testing accuracy while the strongest learner 
(Random forest) decreased by 0.4%-6.2% accuracy in testing performance when used 
with TDA.  
 There may be a point of diminishing returns on increased accuracy if traditional models 
already perform at 98% accuracy 
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Table 7. Accuracy Results of Machine Learning With and Without TDA 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Based on the results of the analysis in 80% of training and testing cases, we can fail to 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that traditional machine learning algorithms (recursive 
partitioning, SVM, and neural networks) have higher predictive accuracy when combined with 
TDA at least 70% of all nodes. The random forests improved accuracy 40% of time in training 
instances and is the only model that did not improve with TDA Mapper implementation in all 
cases, although it does at nodes 1, 5, 6, and 9 for the training set 
Machine learning at the local network group level appears to improve classifier 
performance than if done solely at the global level in this use case and from literature on TDA. It 
is recommended that TDA be used in conjunction with traditional machine learning models 
when predicting targets for other acquisition-related use cases. 
Continuing and Future Work 
Based on the above research, my data analytics team in ADA (lead by Trami Pham) has 
implemented a random forest model with and without TDA to predict future PM ratings in the 
DoD Comptroller’s Advana environment. This model has more feature variables than the MVP 
discussed above, so accuracy results are slightly different. Additionally, the team is working to 
implement long-short-term-memory (LSTM) neural network and SVM models in conjunction with 
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TDA. Table 8 depicts the results of the comparison of the random forest model with and without 
the use of TDA. The use of TDA has improved the accuracy of the random forest model by over 
6.5% in all prediction periods.  
 
Figure 6 is an illustration of TDA used in conjunction with a random forest classification 
algorithm implemented as part of the Advanced Analytics application housed in the 
OUSD(Comptroller) Advana environment and displays the network graph produced by the 
mapper algorithm. It is interactive so if one clicks on a node in the application, the contents of 
that node can be displayed. The confusion matrix, prediction accuracies, and other model 
prediction performance scores such as precision, recall, and f-measures are presented for each 
node.  
 
Figure 6. TDA With Random Forest Model Confusion Matrix and Network Graph Application in the 
USD(C) Advana Environment (Advana, 2021) 
Figure 7 displays the predictions of future MDAP PM cost ratings in 30/60/90-day 
intervals for individual MDAPs that are currently reporting in the DAMIR/DAVE databases. As an 
example, it can be seen that the MQ-4 Triton is currently reporting a red PM cost rating but is 
predicted to turn green in 60 to 90 days. The analyst may decide based on current red and 30-
day red predictions that this program may need some attention. Leadership, however, may 
determine that since the program is set to trend green in 60 to 90 days that it does not require 
attention. As another example, if programs are currently rated green and are projected to trend 
green over the 30/60/90-day time horizons, there is no need for the analyst or leadership to 
waste valuable time in conducting a program assessment for that MDAP. Better use of their 
time can be used prioritizing those programs that are green and yellow and trending to red. 
30 days/1 time step 60 days/ 2 time steps 90 days/3 time steps
Random Forest 90.9% 89.1% 90.0%
TDA + Random Forest 97.9% 97.4% 97.9%
30/60/90 Day Model Predictions
Table 8. Prediction Accuracy comparison of A&S' Advanced Analytics MVP App in Advana
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Figure 7. Actual PM Cost Rating 30/60/90-Day Predictions for MDAPs in the Advanced Analytics 
Application of the Acquisition Analytics Dev Stream in Advana (Advana, 2021) 
Finally, we are investigating the use of TDA to predict duration lengths in MTA programs. 
Besides improving the accuracy of machine learning models, we also plan to use the TDA to 
understand the relationships and topology of MTA program data. 
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Abstract 
This paper offers an economic model to assist public procurement officials in ranking competing 
vendors when benefits cannot be monetized. An important defense application is “source 
selection”—choosing the most cost-effective vendor to supply military equipment, facilities, 
services, or supplies. The problem of ranking public investment alternatives when benefits cannot 
be monetized has spawned an extensive literature that underpins widely applied decision tools. 
The bulk of the literature, and most government-mandated decision tools, focuses on the demand 
side of a public procurement. The “economic evaluation of alternatives” (EEoA) extends the 
analysis to the supply side. A unique feature of EEoA is to model vendor decisions in response to 
government funding projections. Given a parsimonious set of continuously differentiable 
evaluation criteria, EEoA provides a new tool to rank vendors. In other cases, it offers a valuable 
consistency check to guide government supplier decisions. 
Keywords: defense acquisition, decision analysis, multi-attribute auction 
Introduction 
As nations struggle to recover from a global pandemic that devastated lives and 
destroyed economic activity, massive government spending aimed at limiting the damage has 
shattered fiscal balance sheets. Record deficits and debt will place nations under enormous 
pressure to trim defense expenditures. To preserve capabilities, hard choices lie ahead that 
require a sober assessment of security challenges, and robust methodologies to prioritize 
defense and other public investments.  
Defense procurement is big business. Recently the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
spent over $300 billion on acquisition, research, development, test, and evaluation, most of it 
sourced to the private sector (Schwartz et al., 2018). The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development reports member countries spend more than 12% of their 
cumulative GDP on public purchases (OECD, 2016). Significant academic effort has been 
focused on the defense acquisition process through an economic lens; these include theoretical 
studies (Cavin, 1995), experimental studies (Davis, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 1995), and empirical 
studies (Horowitz et al., 2016). Indeed, understanding and improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public procurement is of utmost practical and academic importance. 
One of the biggest challenges for public procurement officials is to rank vendors when 
benefits cannot be monetized. Indeed, government benefits are often depicted as bundles of 
desirable characteristics or attributes that cannot easily be combined with costs into a single 
overall measure such as profitability. The problem of ranking public investment alternatives 
when benefits cannot be monetized has spawned an extensive literature generally referred to as 
multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM). A proliferation of applications of decision tools derived 
from this literature has appeared in the fields of management science, operations research, and 
decision sciences (prominent examples include Keeney & Raiffa [1976]; Kirkwood [1995, 1997]; 
Clemen [1996]; Parkes & Kalagnanam [2005]; Ewing et al. [2006]).  
Today, widespread application of MCDM tools and techniques is mandated through 
various laws, rules, and regulations that govern public procurement, though the specific 
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approach is not prescribed. For example, the main guide for federal procurement officials in the 
United States is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).1  
Evaluation criteria are the factors an agency uses to determine which of several 
competing proposals submitted in response to an RFP [Request for Proposal] 
would best meet the agency’s needs. In establishing effective evaluation criteria, 
an agency must clearly identify the factors relevant to its selection of a vendor 
and then prioritize or weight the factors according to their importance in satisfying 
the agency’s need in the procurement. …This allows the agency to rank the 
proposals received. (FAR, Proposal Development, Section M-Evaluation Factors 
for Award) 
Similar source selection techniques are frequently applied in the United States at state and local 
levels, and in the private sector.  
While demand side developments of MCDM models have been extensively studied in 
the academic literature, the literature is mostly silent about the supply side (vendor) problem. 
Vendor decisions (bid proposals) are generally treated as exogenous in the Decision Sciences 
and Operations Research literature. In contrast, the economic evaluation of alternatives (EEoA) 
captures both demand side—procurement official decisions—and supply side—vendor 
optimization decisions. Our model formulation is in the spirit of Lancaster’s (1966, 1971) 
“Characteristics Approach to Demand Theory” as modified by Ratchford (1979), and closely 
corresponds to the third of six approaches to structure an EEoA introduced in Chapter 4 of 
“Military Cost–Benefit Analysis: Theory & Practice” (Melese, 2015, p. 96). 
EEoA encourages public procurement officials to carefully consider the impact on vendor 
proposals of announced priorities (i.e., desired criteria, characteristics, or attributes for solicited 
quantities of products, services, or projects, such as computer systems, vehicles, weapon 
systems, logistics packages, and buildings). Officials should also consider the impact of 
anticipated future budgets. In response to government-issued priorities—evaluation criteria, 
quantities, and funding—competing vendors, with different input costs and technologies 
(described using “engineering production functions”)2 maximize their production offers—bid 
proposals that consist of bundles of non-price characteristics or attributes.  
EEoA models public procurement official decisions in two stages. In the first stage, along 
with the requirement (quantity demanded), and funding guidance, the procurement official 
reveals desired evaluation criteria (characteristics or attributes) of the product or service (but not 
the relative importance/weights). Given this information, competing vendors engage in 
constrained optimizations based on their respective production technologies (“engineering 
production functions”), and input costs, to generate proposals that match anticipated future 
funding. Since input costs and production functions vary among vendors, they play a critical role 
in their bid proposals—interpreted as bundles of non-price characteristics or attributes 
embedded in each identical unit offered by a particular vendor. In the second stage, the 
 
1 Note the exclusive focus on the demand side in the FAR (i.e., ranking exogenously-determined bids received from 
vendors; see https://www.acquisition.gov/browse/index/far). Also note that standard practice for U.S. military (and 
other procurement officials) is to: 1) announce factors (“evaluation criteria”) relevant to the selection, but then only 
after receiving vendor proposals, 2) assign specific relative importance/weights to those factors to rank vendors. 
This practice is modeled in the economic evaluation of alternatives (EEoA). 
2 For interesting discussions of “engineering production functions,” see Chenery (1949), Kurtz & Manne (1963), 
Wibe (1984), Charnes et al. (1991), and Hildebrand (1999). 
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procurement official ranks competing vendors according to the government’s utility function over 




FIGURE 1. The Two-Stage Procurement Process 
 
The dual objective of EEoA is to encourage governments: 1) to consider the supply side 
(i.e., to recognize the importance of modeling vendor responses to information provided or 
inferred in public procurements); and 2) to offer an alternative to the standard MCDM approach 
when benefits cannot be monetized. An attractive feature of EEoA is that it offers a novel 
technique to measure “benefits” that serves as a valuable consistency check for MCDM 
preference trade-offs among key attributes.4 We explore assumptions under which the two 
decision models (MCDM and EEoA) are isomorphic from a procurement official’s perspective. In 
practice, however, we demonstrate how EEoA can yield significantly different solutions (rank 
orderings of vendors) than the standard MCDM approach.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the two-stage economic 
evaluation of alternatives (EEoA) model. On the supply side, two cases are presented to 
illustrate the model: 1) where vendors have identical attribute costs, but different production 
technologies (“engineering production functions”); and 2) where vendors have different attribute 
costs, but identical production technologies. A simple example serves to integrate procurement 
official (demand) considerations, with vendor (supply) decisions, under varying (probabilistic) 
scenarios. The next section contrasts an application of EEoA, with the standard textbook 
application of MCDM. The last section concludes with recommendations for future research. 
 
3 Note this is analogous to steps mandated in the FAR, except that, since funding is fixed in EEoA (i.e., the unit 
price is the same for each vendor), the second step involves the submission by vendors of sealed non-price bids for 
the announced level of funding, interpreted and evaluated by procurement officials as bundles of characteristics and 
attributes that respond to previously announced evaluation criteria (for example, see FAR 14.5). 
4 Both Australian and Canadian Ministries of Defence are considering implementing this consistency check for the 
MCDM component of their portfolio decision models. (Personal correspondence with fellow NATO SAS-134 
Defence Official Panel Members studying Defence Portfolio Management for NATO; emails received 11/2018) 
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The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) Model 
The challenge for our public procurement official is to select a competing vendor that 
delivers the best performance (combination of desired non-price attributes) for each identical 
unit of a requirement (e.g., 100 ventilators, or 50 computers, or 20 drones, or 2 hospital ships), 
at affordable funding levels. The EEoA framework can be thought of as a multi-attribute sealed 
bid procurement auction that extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition 
among 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] vendors (bidders) takes place exclusively over bundles of 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛] non-price 
characteristics or attributes (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).5  
The EEoA model structures the problem as a two-stage optimization (see Figure 1). In 
the first stage, the public procurement official provides 𝑗𝑗 competing vendors with the evaluation 
criteria, available funding, and the requirement (quantity demanded).6 Given the anticipated 
budget, B, and their respective production technologies (“engineering production functions”) and 
input costs, competing vendors offer their best possible non-price attribute packages bundled 
into each identical unit required.7 Note that the greater the funding available, the greater the 
available funding per unit, which allows vendors to bundle more of the desired attributes into 
each identical unit (e.g., better ventilators, computers, drones, ships).8  
The vendor (supply side) problem is formulated in the section titled First Stage EEoA: 
The Vendor’s Problem (Supply Side). Competition takes place exclusively over non-price bid 
proposals from each vendor, evaluated by procurement officials as bundles of attributes offered 
by each vendor for a standard unit of the requirement. Whereas attributes for each unit of the 
requirement are identical for each vendor, the proposed bundles differ among vendors. 
Competing vendors’ bid proposals (bundles of attributes) depend on a vendor’s specific costs to 
generate each attribute, their individual engineering production function to combine those 
attributes, and anticipated future funding.  
In the second stage, the procurement official’s objective is to select the vendor 𝑗𝑗 that 
maximizes the government’s utility function, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 =  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖, … ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖), subject to projected 
funding (i.e., the per unit affordability or budget constraint), B. For analytic tractability we 
assume the utility function is quasi-concave, and that attributes are continuous, non-negative, 
monotonic increasing variables (i.e., the domain of the buyer’s utility function, and sellers’ 
production functions and attribute cost functions) are the nonnegative real numbers. Non-
satiation in the relevant range of attributes is also assumed, such that, 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ >0, or the 
greater the score of the 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛] desired attributes, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the more value (utility/benefit) for the 
buyer, but the more costly it is for sellers to produce. 
 
5 For example, in the case of military medical transportation of patients to receive emergency treatment, safe 
transport may require the use of a reliable ventilator. In evaluating ventilators, some key attributes include battery 
duration, gas consumption, and levels of leakage (L’Her et al., 2014, Blakeman & Branson, 2013). 
6 Since there is a fixed requirement (quantity demanded), the budget, B, can be interpreted as the unit 
funding/budget available to vendors to produce a unit of the required product or service. For example, if we 
anticipate $25,000 of funding is available for 50 computers, the budget (B) used by competing vendors to build their 
proposals would be $500 per unit. 
7 For example, suppose we have $25,000 of funding for 50 computers, or a budget, B=$500/unit. Then, for example, 
each of 50 identical Apple notebook computers offered at $500/unit would satisfy the basic evaluation criteria 
(screen size, memory, battery life, software), but consist of a somewhat different bundle of those 
characteristics/attributes, than each of 50 identical Microsoft (or Dell, or HP) notebook computers. 
8 The greater the funding available, the greater the funding per unit, allowing vendors to offer more of the desired 
attributes for each identical unit demanded by the buyer. For example, suppose for our 50 computers, instead of 
$25,000 (B=$500) of funding, it turns out $50,000 (B=$1000) will be available. Then each of the 50 identical 
notebook computers offered by Apple will have more and/or better characteristics/attributes, and so will each of the 
50 identical notebook computers offered by Microsoft (e.g. bigger screens, more memory, longer battery life). 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 284 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Following the literature, we allow the buyer’s utility function (scoring/ranking rule) to be 
linear, additive, and separable across attributes (see Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Kirkwood, 1997). 
The public procurement official’s problem is to select a vendor 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] that maximizes the 
government’s utility function:  
(1) 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋 = Uj�𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� = 𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖T, 
where desired attributes are known to sellers, and the bundle of attributes in vector 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋 = 
[𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖 … 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖] represents each vendor’s offer (bid proposal) for each unit required. The relative 
weights for each attribute are the procurement official’s private information, given by the vector: 
𝑾𝑾 = (𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3, … ,𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 | 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛]). 
The procurement official maximizes (1) subject to a funding/affordability constraint:  
(2) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  ≤  𝐁𝐁, 
such that the total unit cost (price) of any vendor’s bid proposal, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, must fit within forecasted 
future funding (i.e., the per unit budget). 𝐁𝐁. Note that whereas the set of non-price attributes in 
the buyer’s utility function are revealed to the 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] competing vendors, the relative 
(preference or “trade-off”) weights, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, are not.9 This reflects practical application of the FAR:  
 
In government acquisition, procuring commands have their own best practices 
and priorities … but they all follow the [Federal Acquisition Regulation]. And in 
their selection of suppliers, they assign weights to their parameter criteria in 
accord with their priorities. … These weights for scoring of proposals do not have 
to be specifically revealed as an algorithm, but are typically communicated to 
offerors in terms of [rank ordering of] importance. 
Colonel John T. Dillard, U.S. Army (Retired), 
Past Program Manager for Advanced Acquisition Programs 
 
In this formulation of the procurement problem, both buyer and seller suffer from 
imperfect and asymmetric information. While the seller does not know the specific relative 
importance/weights assigned to desired attributes (or “evaluation criteria”), the buyer 
(procurement official) does not know the vendors’ costs of producing a particular attribute, nor 
the technology (engineering production functions) that combines those attributes into vendor 
proposals.10 The supply side vendor problem is examined in detail in the next section, followed 
by the demand side procurement problem. 
First Stage EEoA: The Vendor’s Problem (Supply Side) 
The first stage of the two-stage EEoA optimization framework focuses on the vendor’s 
problem. The economic approach assumes vendors are strategic players, so that the 
anticipated/forecasted (per unit) funding/budget, B, for the procurement, impacts vendors’ 
 
9 For example, consider the following summary of Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) Sections 15.1 and 15.3 
“Evaluating proposals under the RFP [Request for Proposal] best value trade-off analysis criteria”: In a negotiated 
bid there are factors [evaluation criteria] with varying weights assigned. The solicitation tells you the weight of each 
factor. However, government contracting agencies are not required to publicize the actual source selection plan [it is 
an internal document]. The agency has broad discretion on what it believes to be the best value. Note, however, the 
agency must be consistent in following their source selection plan in evaluating every vendor, or risk bid protests—
e.g., see Melese (2018). 
10 “Seller costs can be expected to depend on [the] local manufacturing base, and sellers can be expected to be well 
informed about the cost of (upstream) raw materials” (Parkes & Kalagnanam, 2005, p. 437). 
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formulation of their competing bid proposals. Vendor bid proposals consist of optimal attribute 
bundles, 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋, from competing firms that maximize overall performance (output, 𝑸𝑸𝒋𝒋) given their 
respective engineering production functions, costs, and constraints.11 
Specifically, given n desired attributes (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), and anticipated future funding (the per unit 
budget, B), the 𝑚𝑚 vendors each offer competing bid proposals (bundles of attributes), 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋, based 
on their production technology,12 and their unit costs of producing each attribute, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩).13 For 
any fixed requirement (quantity demanded) and funding level (per unit budget, B), a 
representative vendor’s problem is to maximize the attribute output/performance of each 
(identical) unit required, subject to the vendor’s costs of producing each attribute. Wise & 
Morrison (2000) observe that a multi-attribute auction allows competing vendors to differentiate 
themselves in the auction process and bid on their competitive advantages. Competing vendors 
offer their best possible non-price attribute bundle for the projected per unit funding/budget, B, 
given their idiosyncratic technology reflected in their respective “engineering” production 
functions given by Equation 3.  
The vendor’s problem can be expressed as selecting an attribute vector (bid proposal), 
𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋 = [𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖, … ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖] that maximizes output or “product performance” given by their engineering 
production function:  
(3) 𝑸𝑸𝒋𝒋 = 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇), 
subject to total unit costs (TC) not exceeding anticipated per unit funding (B) for the project,  
(4)  𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝒋𝒋 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 (𝐵𝐵) 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝐁𝐁. 
Hollis Chenery was the first economist to introduce “engineering production functions” 
similar to Equation 3. In his pioneering article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, he 
observes: “The engineer must usually resort to testing various sizes and combinations of 
equipment to determine the effect of such variables as size, speed, temperature, etc., upon total 
performance” (Chenery, 1949).14 A detailed survey by Soren Wibe (1984) in Economica offers a 
useful contrast between “engineering” and “economic” production functions.15 Similarly, but in a 
different context, Hildebrandt (1999) in this journal introduced what he calls a “technological 
military production function” derived from underlying technical relationships that relate military 
inputs to measures of effectiveness/performance. In his study, alternatives are scored along 
their important attributes to estimate a measure of effectiveness that reflects capabilities 
required to complete a mission. Although their theoretical foundations differ, engineering 
production functions parallel traditional MCDM approaches in the use of so-called “value” 
functions to estimate effectiveness.  
For ease of exposition, the remainder of the study focuses on two vendors and two (non-
price) attributes. We assume each vendor has a different technology (engineering production 
 
11 Note the supply-side development in this section generalizes a special case of the multi-attribute auction found in 
Simon and Melese (2011). 
12 Each vendor’s bundle is a technologically-determined combination of attributes: for instance, a computer is a 
combination of screen size, memory, battery life, and others with unit costs associated with each attribute.  
13 For instance, with bigger budgets, a vendor’s costs to provide more of a particular attribute (say computer 
memory) might enjoy increasing returns to scale because of quantity discounts. 
14 Chenery (1949) connects his engineering approach to production functions to studies that helped motivate 
Lancaster (1966), stating: “The use of multi-dimensional products has already been suggested in the field of 
consumption” (p. 514). 
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function) to combine the two attributes, and different attribute costs. The Lagrangian function for 
the vendor’s problem is given by:  
(5) ℒ𝑖𝑖  = 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖  ,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖 ,𝑩𝑩) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖[𝑩𝑩 − ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑩𝑩) 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖], for j=1,2. 
Since vendors compete on their product’s quality/performance, we assume they will use the 
maximum expected per unit funding, B, to develop their bid proposals, so that Equation 4 is an 
equality. First order necessary conditions for an optimum are given by: 
(5a) 𝜕𝜕ℒ𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖⁄  – 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 0, 
 
(5b) 𝜕𝜕ℒ𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖⁄  – 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 0, 
 
(5c) 𝜕𝜕ℒ𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖⁄ = 𝑩𝑩 −∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑩𝑩) 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0. 
Solving Equations 5a–5c, yields optimal attribute bid proposals (performance outputs) for each 
vendor 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, for each identical unit required, for any given per unit budget, B:  
(6a) 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑩𝑩), 
 
(6b) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩), 𝑩𝑩). 
For purposes of illustration, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas (see Cobb & Douglas, 
1928; Douglas, 1976) engineering production function in the spirit of Charnes et al. (1991) and 
others, with two attributes (𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖) as inputs:  




where the elasticities, 𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 (i.e., the % change in output/performance from a % increase in an 
attribute), are assumed to be independent of available funding (the budget, 𝑩𝑩), and sum to 1. 16 
As stated by Charnes et al. (1986), the Cobb-Douglas engineering production function 
given by Equation 6 is “the simplest … case of static production with a single output [bundle of 
attributes] to be produced with a single function—one to a firm [vendor] or plant—from factors 
[yielding attributes] which are acquired at fixed prices per unit [i.e., fixed unit costs to produce 
each attribute].” In terms of our model, this suggests starting with the assumption that the unit 
costs for each vendor, j, are independent of available funding, or that: 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖, and 
𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖. 
Two special cases help illustrate our model: 1) where vendors share common attribute 
costs, but have different production technologies (engineering production functions), and 2) 
where vendors share the same production technology, but have different attribute costs. 
Vendors with Common Costs and Different Technologies  
In the first case (illustrated in Figure 2), vendors 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2 have identical, attribute costs 
(i.e., 𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐1 and 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐2), but different, constant engineering production functions (i.e., 
 
16 Interestingly, an article by Marsden et. al. (1972) in Applied Economics shows how a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for waste treatment plants can be derived from chemical and biological laws. Another notable engineering 
production function study by Kurtz & Manne (1963) in the American Economic Review estimates a Cobb-Douglas 
production function from engineering data for various metal machining processes. They also emphasize “it is the 
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𝑦𝑦11 ≠ 𝑦𝑦12 and 𝑦𝑦21 ≠ 𝑦𝑦22). From the first order necessary conditions for an optimum ((5a) – (5c)), 
and (6), competing vendors’ optimal attribute bundle bid proposals, for the expected per unit 
funding/budget level B, are given by: 
(6a’) 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ = [𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖/(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖) 𝑐𝑐1] B, and 
 
(6b’) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ = [𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖/(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖) 𝑐𝑐2] B. 
Figure 2 illustrates optimal attribute bundle bid proposals for each vendor for a specific 
unit funding/budget level, B: 𝐴𝐴1 = (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 𝐴𝐴2 = (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ). The optimum for each vendor is 
determined graphically by the tangency of each vendor’s isoquant (derived from their separate 
production functions), with the common budget constraint.  
 
EEoA: Vendor Expansion Paths with same Costs 
Maximize Attribute Bundle subject to Budget Constraint
(Assumptions: Identical, constant, attribute costs (i.e. 𝑐𝑐11 𝑩𝑩 = 𝑐𝑐12 𝑩𝑩 = 𝑐𝑐1 and 𝑐𝑐21(𝑩𝑩) =
𝑐𝑐22(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐2), and different, constant, technology (i.e. attribute output elasticities are 









Vendors’ budget constraint: TC = 𝑐𝑐1𝑎𝑎1  +  𝑐𝑐2𝑎𝑎2  =  𝑩𝑩  =>   𝑎𝑎2  =  𝑩𝑩/𝑐𝑐2 – 𝑐𝑐1/𝑐𝑐2 𝑎𝑎1
𝑩𝑩/𝑐𝑐2
B/𝑐𝑐1
𝒂𝟏𝟏∗ = [𝑦𝑦12/ 𝑦𝑦11 + 𝑦𝑦21 𝑐𝑐𝟏]𝑩𝑩
𝒂𝟐𝟏∗ = [𝑦𝑦21/ 𝑦𝑦11 + 𝑦𝑦21 𝑐𝑐𝟐]𝑩𝑩 
𝒂𝟏𝟐∗ =  𝑦𝑦12/ 𝑦𝑦12 + 𝑦𝑦22 𝑐𝑐𝟏 𝑩𝑩 
𝒂𝟐𝟐∗ =  [𝑦𝑦22/ 𝑦𝑦12 + 𝑦𝑦22 𝑐𝑐𝟐]𝑩𝑩 














FIGURE 2. Common Attribute Costs but Different Technologies 
 
Suppose instead of a single funding forecast, the buyer (procurement official) reveals a 
range of possible budget estimates for the procurement (say optimistic, pessimistic, and most 
likely).17 Then Equations 6a’ and 6b’ can be combined to yield each vendor’s expansion path, 
given by: 
(7) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖  = [(𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖(𝐵𝐵))⁄ (𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖)⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 , for 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2. 
The two expansion paths defined by Equation 7 reveal optimal attribute bundles offered by each 
vendor at different possible funding levels, B. Each point on the expansion paths derived for 
each vendor reveals optimal attribute bundle offers (bid proposals) for each identical unit 
required, over different possible budgets.  
 
17 For example, see Simon & Melese 2011. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 288 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Given this formulation, if attribute costs and technology parameters are constant (i.e., 
independent of funding levels), then the expansion paths are linear.18 Expansion paths for the 
first case, where vendors’ share common costs but different technologies, are given by:  
(7a) 𝑎𝑎21  = [𝑐𝑐1 𝑐𝑐2⁄ ][𝑦𝑦21 𝑦𝑦11⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11, for vendor 1, and 
 
(7b) 𝑎𝑎22  = [𝑐𝑐1 𝑐𝑐2⁄ ][𝑦𝑦22 𝑦𝑦12⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎12, for vendor 2. 
This is illustrated as two straight lines from the origin in Figure 2. For the specific per unit budget 
level, B, the two competing attribute bundle bid proposals offered by each vendor (from 
Equations 6a’ and 6b’) appear as points 𝐴𝐴1 = (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 𝐴𝐴2 = (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ) on the competing 
vendors’ expansion paths. 
Vendors With Common Technologies and Different Costs  
Turning to the second example (illustrated in Figure 3), suppose vendors have different 
(constant) attribute costs, but identical (constant) engineering production functions (i.e., in 
Equation 6: 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦1 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦2 for j=1,2), together with constant returns to scale (such that: 
𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2 = 1;  𝑖𝑖. 𝑒𝑒. 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦1 = 𝑦𝑦 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛 𝑦𝑦2 = 1 − 𝑦𝑦 ). In this case the two vendors’ optimal bid proposals 
for unit funding/budget level, B, are given by: 
(6a’’) 𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖∗ = [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐1𝑖𝑖] B, and 
 
(6b’’) 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖∗ = [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐2𝑖𝑖] B, (j=1,2). 
 
EEoA: Vendor Expansion Paths with same Technology































FIGURE 3. Common Technology but Different Attribute Costs 
 
Similar to the first case, Figure 3 illustrates competing optimal attribute bundle bid 
proposals for each vendor, for the unit funding/budget level, B: 𝐴𝐴1 = (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 𝐴𝐴2 =
 
18 For example, see Nicholson & Snyder (2017), pp. 330–333. 
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(𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ). Now the optimum for each vendor occurs at the point where their respective budget 
constraints are tangent to their common isoquant. If vendors’ technology and attribute cost 
parameters are constant (i.e., independent of funding levels), both expansion paths are again 
linear. Expansion paths for this second case (where vendors share a common technology, but 
have different attribute costs), are illustrated as two straight lines from the origin in Figure 3, 
given by: 
(7a’) 𝑎𝑎21  = [𝑐𝑐11 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11, for vendor 1, and 
 
 (7b’) 𝑎𝑎22  = [𝑐𝑐12 𝑐𝑐22⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎12, for vendor 2. 
Focusing on this second case (where vendors share a common technology, but have 
different attribute costs), for any unit funding/budget level, B, connecting the two optimal vendor 
attribute production points (𝐴𝐴1 and 𝐴𝐴2) creates an attribute “production possibility frontier” (PPF), 
illustrated in Figure 3. The slope of this PPF reflects attribute trade-offs possible in the 
marketplace by switching from one vendor to another. This technical (or engineering) trade-off is 
given by the slope: ∆𝑎𝑎2/∆𝑎𝑎1 = (𝑎𝑎21∗ − 𝑎𝑎22∗ )/(𝑎𝑎11∗ − 𝑎𝑎12∗  ). 
The first stage vendor optimization problem in the two-stage EEoA framework highlights 
the importance of modeling the supply side (i.e., vendor decisions in response to anticipated 
future funding). The second stage focuses on the demand side (i.e., the procurement official’s 
source selection problem).19  
Second Stage EEoA: Procurement Official’s Problem (Demand Side) 
For any given requirement (quantity demanded), and forecasted per unit funding/budget, 
B, the procurement official (decision-maker) must rank the vendors’ (optimized) bid proposals. 
For example, consider attribute bundles such as those illustrated in Figure 3: Vendor 
1=>(𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and Vendor 2=>(𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ). Recall the lens through which the government evaluates 
competing vendors is the utility function given by Equation 1.20 In EEoA, the government 
supplier decision (“source selection”) depends on the public procurement official’s (decision-
maker’s) preferences revealed through explicit trade-offs for any pair of attributes that leave 
decision-maker’s indifferent in any given scenario. These explicit pair-wise comparisons elicited 
from a public procurement official (or expert decision-makers) generate relative weights 
assigned to the desired attributes. 
The public procurement official’s problem is to select a vendor 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] with a bid 
proposal (per unit attribute bundle) 𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖 = [𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 ,𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖, … ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖]) that maximizes the government’s utility 
function given by Equation 1. Recall, following the standard assumption in the literature (see 
Keeney & Raiffa [1976]; Kirkwood [1997]), the utility/benefit provided by any vendor 𝑗𝑗 is given by 
the linear, separable utility function: 
(1’) 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋 = Uj�𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� = 𝑾𝑾𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖T = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
where the vector 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋 = [𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖 … 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖] represents the bundle of attributes (performance) of each 
unit, offered by each of the 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚𝑚] competing vendors. As discussed earlier, specific relative 
trade-off weights for every attribute are the procurement official’s private information, given by 
the vector:  
 
19 Note this second stage demand-side problem is the exclusive focus of most textbooks, the majority of the related 
decision sciences and operations research literature, and standard support tools and algorithms. 
20 An interesting extension of Equation 1 is developed later to address uncertainty when different possible scenarios 
(states of nature) impact the government’s utility function (for example, due to possible future changes in the 
political, economic, or threat environment). 
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𝑾𝑾 = (𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2,𝑤𝑤3, … ,𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 | 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛]). 
The procurement official is also fiscally informed, with a forecasted funding/budget (affordability) 
constraint for the procurement given by Equation 2. So the per unit price (total unit costs) of any 
vendor proposal, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, must fit within forecasted future funding (the anticipated per unit budget, 
𝐁𝐁), or 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝐁𝐁. The next step is to combine demand and supply (i.e., the procurement official’s 
source selection problem) with vendors’ (optimization-generated) bid proposals. The following 
simple source selection example demonstrates how EEoA integrates demand and supply. 
Demand and Supply: A Two Scenario, Two Vendor, Two Attribute Example 
For purposes of illustration, suppose a public procurement official responsible for UN 
peacekeeping missions is asked to select a vendor for a new fleet of Autonomous Electric Off-
road Light Armored Transport Vehicle (AEOLATV). Assume the anticipated (per unit) budget, B, 
for the program allows two competing vendors to offer the required set of vehicles, and that 
there are only two evaluation criteria in the government’s utility function: Top Speed of each 
vehicle measured in miles per hour (𝑎𝑎1), and Range measured in miles (𝑎𝑎2).21 In Figure 3, this 
involves a choice between vendor 1 that offers less speed but more range (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ), and vendor 
2 that offers more speed, but less range (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ ).  
In EEoA, the source selection decision (vendor ranking) depends on the procurement 
official’s (decision-maker’s) preferences revealed through pair-wise comparisons (i.e., explicit 
acceptable trade-offs between pairs of attributes within a particular scenario). This generates 
relative weights assigned to the desired attributes within a particular scenario.  
A straightforward modification of Equation 1’ allows us to extend the analysis to address 
different possible scenarios (states of nature) that could impact the procurement official’s pair-
wise comparisons.22 Equation 8 accounts for k possible scenarios (or “states of nature”), NS, 
∀𝑠𝑠 ∈ [1,k], with corresponding probabilities, 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠). This linear, separable expected utility 
function captures the differing relative weights, derived from explicit preference trade-offs 
among pairs of attributes that depend on specific scenarios (states of nature). Now the 
procurement official’s problem is to select the vendor (e.g., bidder or investment alternative), 𝑗𝑗 ∈
 [1,m], that maximizes the government’s expected utility given by:  
(8) E(𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠)𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Consider a simple case with two possible states of nature N1 & N2, (e.g. Scenario s=1 a 
High Tech Threat environment, vs. Scenario s=2 a Low Tech Threat Environment), with 
corresponding probabilities, P(N1) and P(N2).23 From Equation 8, the government’s expected 
utility function (scoring rule) for the two scenario, two attribute case is: 
(8’) E(𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁1)[𝑤𝑤11𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖+𝑤𝑤21𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖]+ 𝑃𝑃(𝑁𝑁2)[𝑤𝑤12𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖+𝑤𝑤22𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖]. 
Totally differentiating the procurement official’s (government’s) utility function (8’) and 
setting the result equal to zero in each scenario (N1 & N2), generates two sets of relative 
weights (or indifference curves). In general, relative weights for any two pairs of attributes 
(𝑎𝑎1,𝑎𝑎2) in each of the k scenarios in Equation 8 are given by: 
 
21 For example, we could assume all other characteristics (or attributes) of the vehicles offered by the vendors are the 
same, so top speed and range are the only differentiating factors. 
22 For example, different possible threat environments in which the United Nations might operate. 
23 In the AEOLATV example, scenario N1 could represent the possibility of facing a fast adversary with limited 




Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 291 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
(9) 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2/𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1 = −(𝑤𝑤1𝑠𝑠/𝑤𝑤2𝑠𝑠) = −𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠, ∀𝑠𝑠 ∈ [1,k]. 
 
The last term in Equation 9, 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 > 0, represents the acceptable trade-off determined by a 
decision-maker (procurement official) between any pair of attributes (𝑎𝑎1,𝑎𝑎2) for a specific 
scenario: 𝑤𝑤1𝑠𝑠 = (𝑤𝑤2𝑠𝑠)x(𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). It reflects acceptable pair-wise trade-offs for the government over 
the relevant range of attributes in each scenario. These preference trade-offs define linear 
indifference curves between any two pairs of attributes in each scenario (or piecewise linear 
approximations over specific ranges of attributes). The slopes of these indifference curves are 
the relative weights for each pair of attributes, in each state of nature, over relevant ranges of 
each attribute. 
Optimal vendor rankings in EEoA can be determined by comparing the slope of the 
government’s (buyer’s) revealed preferences (indifference curves), with the competing vendor-
proposed bundles of attributes (production possibility frontiers). For example, Figure 4 illustrates 
two different sets of indifference curves (dashed lines) that reflect two different scenarios. In 
turn, these yield two different vendor rankings.  
For a given per unit budget, B, if the slope of the indifference curve is steeper than the 
slope of the production possibility frontier (where the PPF reflects technical/engineering trade-
offs available between competing vendors), or if from Equation 9, -X = −(𝑤𝑤1/𝑤𝑤2) < −(𝑎𝑎21∗ −
𝑎𝑎22∗ )/(𝑎𝑎11∗ − 𝑎𝑎12∗  ), then vendor 2 is selected, since U2∗>U1. If the reverse is true, then vendor 1 
wins, since U1∗>U2 (see Figure 4).  
Suppose a government decision-maker (public procurement official) is willing to trade off 
relatively more range (𝑎𝑎2) for the same incremental increase in top speed (𝑎𝑎1) in scenario N1, 
than in scenario N2. For example: 20 miles of range for an extra 10 mph top speed in 𝑁𝑁1, versus 
only 10 miles for an extra 10 mph in 𝑁𝑁2. In this case,−𝑋𝑋1 = −2 < −𝑋𝑋2 = −1, implies the slope 
of the indifference curve is steeper (more negative) in Scenario 𝑁𝑁1 than in 𝑁𝑁2.24 From Figure 4, 
vendor 2 is ranked higher (offers greater utility) in scenario N1, and vendor 1 in scenario N2. 
This is consistent since the decision-maker revealed a stronger relative preference for top 
speed in scenario N1 (i.e., was willing to trade off more range), and vendor 2 offers relatively 
higher top speed (𝑎𝑎12∗ ) than vendor 1 (𝑎𝑎11∗ ). 
 
24 In this case, under scenario N1 vendor 2 ranks higher (offers greater utility) than vendor 1, and there is a rank 
reversal under scenario N2. 
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EEoA: Procurement Agency Choice








































𝑩𝑩 𝑼𝑼𝟏∗ = 𝒘𝟏𝒂𝟏𝟏∗  +  𝒘𝟐𝒂𝟐𝟏∗ =  𝑴𝑶𝑬𝟏
𝑼𝑼𝟐∗ = 𝒘𝟏𝒂𝟏𝟐∗  + 𝒘𝟐𝒂𝟐𝟐∗ =  𝑴𝑶𝑬𝟐
 
FIGURE 4. Procurement Agency Vendor Selection 
 
In general, probabilities assigned to each scenario in Equations 8 or 8’ generate an 
Expected Utility vendor ranking metric that consists of a probability-weighted average of pair-
wise attribute trade-offs (-Xs) that define expected utility functions in each of the 𝑠𝑠 ∈ [1,k] 
scenarios. For example, in the two scenarios, two vendors, two attributes case, this determines 
the slope of a new indifference curve that is a combination of the two indifference mappings 
illustrated in Figure 4. For any specified budget, the tangency (or corner point) of this new 
indifference curve with the PPF reveals the optimal Expected Utility ranking of the two vendors. 
The next section contrasts this EEoA with the standard textbook MCDM model commonly 
applied by public procurement officials to guide government supplier decisions. 
Comparison of EEoA and MCDM Models 
The topic of multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) has spawned a rich literature with 
many variations to account for decision-making in complex scenarios. This section presents a 
standard textbook MCDM model frequently applied to guide government supplier decisions as a 
baseline (see Keeney & Raiffa [1976]; Kirkwood [1997]). We contrast this MCDM model with the 
EEoA approach within a single scenario. The MCDM additive value function typically used to 
rank vendors is given by:  
(10) 𝑽𝑽𝒋𝒋 = Vj�𝑨𝑨𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� = 𝝀𝝀𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). 
This value function is the sum of individual value functions, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), defined over relevant ranges 
of each attribute 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛], for any vendor 𝑗𝑗. The vector of preference weights is given by: 
𝝀𝝀 = (𝜆𝜆1, 𝜆𝜆2, 𝜆𝜆3 … , 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 | 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ+, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑛𝑛]). 
The individual value functions 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are typically monotonic and scaled (normalized), 
while the preference weights (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖) reflect the importance of each attribute. While these weights 
(𝝀𝝀) are analogous to the relative weights (𝑾𝑾) in EEoA, they are only equivalent if raw attribute 
measures are used in MCDM instead of normalized values to determine pair-wise trade-offs 
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(i.e., iff 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). For purposes of comparison with EEoA, it is convenient to assume 
procurement officials (decision-makers) are subject to the same funding/affordability constraint 
given by (2): 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝐁𝐁. Implications of this MCDM model are explored in the next section under 
the usual assumption that attribute measures are normalized using individual value functions 
with preferential independence.  
Implicit Trade-Offs in MCDM vs. Explicit Trade-Offs in EEoA  
From Equation 10, the only theoretical difference between the procurement official’s 
objective function (1) or (1’) in EEoA, and MCDM is an additional step in Equation 10 that 
involves normalizing attribute measures through individual value functions. In fact, the demand 
side of EEoA can be thought of as a special case of MCDM, where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
In theory, any value function, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, in conjunction with the appropriate attribute weights 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, 
can recover the EEoA utility function for any given vector of attributes 𝑨𝑨𝒋𝒋.This is clear when we 
consider a procurement official’s value function with two attributes as before:  
(10’) 𝑽𝑽𝒋𝒋 =∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) => [𝜆𝜆1𝑣𝑣1(𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖)+𝜆𝜆2𝑣𝑣2(𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖)]. 
Totally differentiating Equation 10 or 10’ and setting the result equal to zero yields implicit 
trade-offs in the MCDM approach between any two pairs of attributes (𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2) (i.e., the first two 
terms in Equation 11). For sake of consistency given a particular decision-maker’s preferences, 
this should precisely correspond to the explicit trade-offs (revealed preferences) obtained from 
that decision-maker in EEoA (i.e., represented by the last two terms in Equation 9).  




While the MCDM approach adds a degree of freedom for procurement officials and 
expands the decision space, it risks obscuring explicit trade-offs between attributes revealed in 
the EEoA approach. From Equation 11, we see that: 
𝜆𝜆1 /𝜆𝜆2 = 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠[𝑣𝑣2′(𝑎𝑎2)/𝑣𝑣1′(𝑎𝑎1)], or 
 
𝑍𝑍 = [𝑣𝑣2′(𝑎𝑎2)/𝑣𝑣1′(𝑎𝑎1)], 
where the constant Z= 𝜆𝜆1 /(𝜆𝜆2𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). So in general, for any pair of attributes, and alternatives (i.e., 
vendors 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1,m]),  
(12) 𝑍𝑍𝑣𝑣1′�𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖� = 𝑣𝑣2′(𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖). 
  
Integrating both sides of (12) yields: 
(13) 𝑣𝑣2(𝑎𝑎2𝑖𝑖)/𝑣𝑣1�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 𝑍𝑍 = 𝜆𝜆1/(𝜆𝜆2𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠). 
That is to say, if the goal is to ensure EEoA and MCDM approaches generate the same rank 
ordering, procurement officials must set individual attribute value functions 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖’s and attribute 
weights 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖’s in the precise ratio specified in Equation 13.  
In practice, there is no reason to assume this happens, and reconciling the two 
approaches to generate the same rank ordering is non-trivial. While a procurement official may 
have a certain trade-off in mind between pairs of measurable attributes when developing the 
MCDM value function, normalizing each attribute with individual value functions, and selecting 
appropriate weights to assign to those value functions, can easily yield implicit pairwise trade-
offs among attributes that generate different rank orderings than the explicit pairwise trade-offs 
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determined in EEoA.25 Which decision support model best elicits public procurement officials’ 
(decision-makers’) preferences remains an important empirical question and warrants further 
research. We now turn to another important contribution of EEoA: the importance of modeling 
the supply side; specifically, accounting for vendor responses to anticipated future funding. 
Accounting for Vendor Responses to Anticipated Future Funding 
Traditionally, MCDM models focus on the demand side of a public procurement and treat 
supply side vendor decisions as exogenous. This section demonstrates the potential value of 
explicitly accounting for vendor responses to anticipated future funding (affordability or 
procurement official’s budget constraints).  
Since each vendor’s expansion path represents their optimal attribute bundle bid 
proposals for any given budget (see Figures 2, 3, and 4), these expansion paths can easily be 
converted, through the buyer’s utility function (1’), into cost-effectiveness (or Budget-Utility) 
functions for each vendor. For example, substituting each vendor’s optimal attribute bundle 
(6a’’) & (6b’’) into Equation 1’ for any specific scenario yields two points in cost-effectiveness 
space that represent the utility of each vendor’s bid proposal for the per unit funding/budget, B: 
(U1∗,𝐁𝐁) and (U2∗ ,𝐁𝐁). Different budgets represented along the expansion paths generate different 
utility. For example, the cost-effectiveness/utility relationships illustrated in Figure 6 reflect the 
value to the government of each vendor’s offers at different funding levels.  
There is an important contrast between the endogenously derived EEoA cost-
effectiveness functions for each vendor, and the exogenous cost-effectiveness points 
generally used to represent vendor offers in MCDM.26 This becomes especially apparent when 
vendor costs depend on anticipated future funding. For instance, with bigger budgets, a 
vendor’s costs to provide more of a particular attribute (say computer memory) might enjoy 
increasing returns to scale because of quantity discounts, learning curves, the ability to employ 
just-in-time inventory techniques, or the possibility of adopting other process improvements that 
reduce a vendor’s costs of incorporating/producing a desired attribute. 
Consider the case illustrated in Figure 5, where vendor 1’s costs of producing attribute 1 
are assumed to depend on the funding level or anticipated per unit budget, B (i.e., 𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩)). For 
ease of exposition, suppose both vendors 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2 have identical, constant production 
technologies (i.e., 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦1 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦2), and constant returns to scale 𝑦𝑦1 + 𝑦𝑦2 = 1. The 
difference between them is in their individual attribute costs. As before, let 𝑐𝑐12(𝑩𝑩) =
𝑐𝑐12; 𝑐𝑐22(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐22; and 𝑐𝑐21(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐21, but now suppose vendor 1’s costs for attribute 1 depends on 
the budget. For example assume the following relationship: 𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) = 𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝑩𝑩 > 0. Also let 𝑩𝑩 <
𝑐𝑐11/𝑘𝑘, 𝑐𝑐11 > 𝑐𝑐12, and 𝑘𝑘 ∈ [0,1).27 In this case (from (6a’’) and (6b’’)), each vendors’ optimal 
attribute bundle proposals for a unit funding/budget level 𝑩𝑩 is given by: 
 
25 Note: Linear normalization combined with careful swing weighting in MCDM could recover similar trade-offs to 
those explicitly revealed in EEOA (see Equation 9), resulting in an identical rank ordering of competing vendors. 
(An example is available upon request.) 
26 For an example of the latter, see the U.S. Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which states: “Cost-effectiveness 
comparisons in theory would be best if the analysis structured the alternatives so that all the alternatives have equal 
effectiveness (the best alternative is the one with lowest cost) or equal cost (the best alternative is the one with the 
greatest effectiveness). Either case would be preferred; however, in actual practice, in many cases the ideal of equal 
effectiveness or equal cost alternatives is difficult or impossible to achieve due to the complexity of AoA [Analysis 
of Alternatives] issues. A common method for dealing with such situations is to provide a scatter plot [of points 
representing competing vendor proposals] of effectiveness versus cost” (emphasis added; DoD, n.d., ch. 2–2.3., 2.7). 
27 These simple assumptions help illustrate our point. A model with quadratic costs could add another dimension (a 
“knee of the curve,” i.e., monotonic increasing with a single inflection point) to the cost-effectiveness function, 
which could offer an interesting extension of the model. 
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(14a) 𝑎𝑎11∗ = [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩)] 𝑩𝑩 = [𝑦𝑦/(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝑩𝑩)]𝑩𝑩, 
 
(14b) 𝑎𝑎21∗ = [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐21]𝑩𝑩, and 
 
(15a) 𝑎𝑎12∗ = [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐12]𝑩𝑩, 
 
(15b) 𝑎𝑎22∗ = [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐22]𝑩𝑩. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates each vendor’s optimal attribute bundle bid proposals (given by Equations 
14a and 14b and Equations 15a and 15b) for a specific budget, B (i.e., points 𝐴𝐴1: (𝑎𝑎11∗ ,𝑎𝑎21∗ ) and 
𝐴𝐴2: (𝑎𝑎12∗ ,𝑎𝑎22∗ )). 
 
EEoA: Procurement Agency Choice





𝒂𝟏𝟐∗ =  (𝒚/𝒄𝟏𝟐)𝑩𝑩 

















[(𝟏 − 𝒚)/𝒄𝟐𝟏]𝑩𝑩 
𝒂𝟏𝟏∗ = (𝒚/𝒄𝟏𝟏)𝑩𝑩 
𝒂𝟐𝟐∗ =
[(𝟏 − 𝒚)/𝒄𝟐𝟐]𝑩𝑩 𝑼𝑼𝟏
∗  =  𝒘𝟏 𝒂𝟏𝟏∗  +  𝒘𝟐 𝒂𝟐𝟏∗
𝑼𝑼𝟐∗  =  𝒘𝟏 𝒂𝟏𝟐∗  +  𝒘𝟐 𝒂𝟐𝟐∗
 
FIGURE 5. Vendor Selection When Vendor 1’s Attribute Costs Depend on Budget 
 
The expansion path for vendor 2 is again linear, with the same positive, constant slope 
for any budget (i.e., identical to (7b’)). However, since vendor 1’s attribute costs now depend on 
the anticipated per unit funding/budget, B, vendor 1’s expansion path is nonlinear, increasing at 
a decreasing rate as illustrated in Figure 5 and given by:28 
(16) 𝑎𝑎21  = [𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11 = [(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] 𝑎𝑎11, 
where the slope (first derivative) is given by:  
(16’) 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎21 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎11⁄  = [𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] = [(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] >0, 
 
 
28 The illustration of the two expansion paths assumes that throughout the relevant range of budgets (funding levels), 
(𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ) > (𝑐𝑐12 𝑐𝑐22⁄ ). 
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and change in slope with a change in the budget (second derivative) given by: 
(16’’) 𝜕𝜕(𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎21 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎11)⁄ /𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵 = [𝑐𝑐11′(𝐵𝐵) 𝑐𝑐21⁄ ][(1 − 𝑦𝑦) 𝑦𝑦⁄ ] < 0. 
Substituting vendor 1 and 2’s optimal attribute bundle offers Equations 14a and 14b and 
Equations 15a and 15b into the procurement official’s (buyer’s) utility function for any given 
scenario in Equation 8’ yields:29 
(17) U1∗ =  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎11∗ +  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎21∗ = 𝑤𝑤1 [𝑦𝑦/𝑐𝑐11(𝐵𝐵)] 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑤𝑤2 [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐21] 𝐵𝐵 
 
(18) U2∗ =  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎12∗ +  𝑤𝑤1𝑎𝑎22∗ = 𝑤𝑤1 [y/𝑐𝑐12] 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑤𝑤2 [(1 − 𝑦𝑦)/𝑐𝑐22]𝐵𝐵. 
Equations 17 and 18 represent functions that can be plotted in cost-effectiveness (Budget-
Utility) space over a relevant range of funding scenarios (see Figure 6). In this case, assuming 
identical, constant costs for attribute 2 (i.e., 𝑐𝑐21 = 𝑐𝑐22 = 𝑐𝑐2), from Equations 17 and 18,  
 (19) U1∗ ⋛ U2∗  as 𝑐𝑐12 ⋛ 𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩) = 𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑘𝑘𝑩𝑩 or as 𝑩𝑩 ⋛ (𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑐𝑐12)/𝑘𝑘 = 𝐵𝐵’. 
 
 
Economic Evaluation of Alternatives
Cost-Effectiveness (Budget-Utility) Analysis
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B’
 
FIGURE 6. Vendor Selection in Cost-Effectiveness (Budget-Utility) Space 
 
What is revealed in Figure 6 is an optimal rank reversal. The relation given by Equation 19 
indicates it is optimal for the buyer to switch vendors at B’. For any unit funding/budgets B>B’, 
vendor 1 is ranked higher than vendor 2. The two are ranked the same for the budget, B=B’, 
and for budgets B<B’, vendor 2 is ranked higher than 1. As expected, evaluating the slopes of 
the two vendors’ cost-effectiveness functions at the switch point, B’=(𝑐𝑐11 − 𝑐𝑐12)/𝑘𝑘, yields:  
 (20) 𝜕𝜕U1∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑩𝑩⁄ > 𝜕𝜕U2∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑩𝑩⁄  or (𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩) − 𝑐𝑐11′ (𝑩𝑩)𝑩𝑩)/𝑐𝑐11(𝑩𝑩)2 > 1/𝑐𝑐12 since 𝑐𝑐11 > 𝑐𝑐12. 
 
29 For a specific unit funding level B, this represents two optima that can be compared that represent the maximum 
utility a buyer can obtain from each vendor. This is illustrated in Figure 4 as the highest indifference curve attainable 
given the corresponding point on the attribute production possibility frontier. 
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This highlights the importance of modeling the supply side. Specifically, this 
example emphasizes the importance for public procurement officials to obtain 
realistic budget forecasts for government programs, and to offer those as 
guidance to vendors. As two pioneers in defense economics Hitch and McKean 
(1967) wisely counseled: “As a starter ... several budget sizes can be assumed. If 
the same [vendor] is preferred for all … budgets, that system is dominant. If the 
same [vendor] is not dominant, use of several … budgets is nevertheless an 
essential step, because it provides vital information to the decision maker.”  
Instead of plotting procurement alternatives (vendor bid proposals) as single points in cost-
effectiveness (budget-value) space, EEoA encourages procurement officials in fiscally 
constrained environments to solicit bids over a range of possible budget scenarios.30 
From a practical standpoint, the biggest limitation of the EEoA approach is that as the 
number of attributes (𝑛𝑛) under consideration expands, it is increasingly burdensome to generate 
required pairwise comparisons. For example, assuming each alternative (vendor proposal) 
includes a set of 𝑛𝑛 attributes, applying EEoA requires 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛−1)
2
 pairwise comparisons to fully flesh 
out the decision-maker’s preferences. Interestingly however, EEoA could be applied in 
combination with MCDM as a consistency check for important attributes. That is to say, if 
𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎2/𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎1 = −(𝑤𝑤1𝑠𝑠/𝑤𝑤2𝑠𝑠) =  −𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 is the explicitly determined trade-off that a public procurement 
official is comfortable with in a particular scenario, given specific ranges for each attribute, then 
weights developed in MCDM should reflect this relative preference (trade-off).31 The test simply 
involves application of Equation 11.  
In other words, procurement officials can generate pairwise comparisons for the most 
critical attributes as a consistency check. For example, when comparing options for AEOLATV 
procurement, it may be the case that Top Speed and Range are the most important attributes to 
consider among the dozens or even hundreds of other attributes. After carefully applying 
traditional MCDM techniques to develop measures of effectiveness for each AEOLATV 
alternative, use EEoA’s explicit trade-off determination to ensure that the decision-maker is 
indeed willing to trade X amount of Top Speed for Y amount of Range, and vice versa, in the 
specified attribute ranges. If the explicit trade-off determination is one that the decision-maker is 
uncomfortable with, it is crucial to revisit the value functions and weighting schemes used to 
generate the measures of effectiveness for each option. While this can be a time-consuming 
process, it ensures that the best alternative is chosen for large procurements to satisfy the 
mission. 
Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research 
This paper offers an economic model to assist public procurement officials to rank 
competing vendors when benefits cannot be monetized. The problem of ranking public 
investment alternatives when benefits cannot be monetized has spawned an extensive literature 
 
30 In this case, the standard technique of eliminating “dominated alternatives” could lead to sub-optimal decisions. 
For example, see Melese (2015) or the specific example of the EEoA model developed in Simon & Melese (2011). 
31 If the extra burden of normalization and swing weighting required in MCDM causes a decision-maker to 
“misevaluate” their trade-off preferences, then EEoA offers an alternative framework/perspective that can help to 
realign their weighting. Note that in theory a rational decision-maker with perfect information and infinite 
computational capability would never need to do this. Since in practice it is difficult to define “correct” weighting 
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that underpins widely applied decision tools. The bulk of the literature, and most government-
mandated decision tools, focus on the demand side of a public procurement. The EEoA extends 
the analysis to the supply-side.  
Introducing the supply side offers multiple avenues for future research. Notably, it 
provides fertile ground to apply both auction and game theory literatures. An interesting 
extension would be to leverage auction theory and introduce strategic shading of bids by 
vendors. Another is to consider the risk of collusion among vendors, or allow some vendors to 
enjoy economies of scale (or to make engineering production function parameters a function of 
the budget). Whereas EEoA models vendors as proposing bundles of characteristics to win a 
prize (i.e., funding), alternative optimization assumptions and strategic behaviors could be 
assumed.  
A rich opportunity also exists for both experimental and qualitative research to 
significantly improve public procurement. An important empirical question is whether 
procurement officials and managers would have an easier time using EEoA or MCDM (or some 
combination)? Consistency tests could be conducted in experimental settings to explore when 
the two techniques converge (offer identical vendor rankings), and when (and why) they 
diverge?  
In conclusion, the EEoA captures both demand side—government procurement official 
decisions—and supply side—vendor optimization decisions. A unique feature of EEoA is to 
model vendor decisions in response to government funding projections. Given a parsimonious 
set of continuously differentiable evaluation criteria, EEoA provides a new tool to rank vendors. 
In other cases, it offers a valuable consistency check for MCDM models to guide government 
supplier decisions. 
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Abstract 
China believes logistics in the contested environment is an Achilles’s heel for the U.S. Navy. It is 
therefore critical that we explore ways to develop capabilities to replenish potential combating 
forces through Next Generation Logistics Ships (NGLSs).  
The objective in this research is to study and analyze options for rearming, refueling, and 
resupplying in the contested and distributed environment. The framework created is flexible in 
terms of the scenarios. 
Feedback from subject matter experts (SMEs) helped us gain insight into the complexity of the 
problem and its vast scope. We developed mathematical models based on the scenarios 
approved by the sponsor. The sponsor did not wish us to model an objective of minimizing costs 
or the number of ships required to deliver commodities within a certain deadline or under a 
certain schedule. Measuring the number of deliveries required in a scenario supplied by SMEs 
allowed us to determine a mix of NGLS vessels without cost or deadline data. We would like to 
point out that the number of deliveries needed by vessels of each type, as described in the report, 
can be interpreted in many ways, in terms of the number of ships required. The summary of our 
results and analysis suggests certain recommendations. 
 
 
1 Please note that this is an abridged version of the original technical report. The full report is available as 
NPS-LM-20-155 at ARP. 
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Introduction and Background 
The U.S. government came out publicly with an explicit statement that the so-called 
“nine-dash line,” which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) asserts delineates its claims in the 
South China Sea, is contrary to international law (Figure 1). China claims that the “nine-dash 
line” encircles as much as 90% of the contested waters. The line runs as far as 2,000 km from 
the Chinese mainland to within a few hundred kilometers of the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam. The PRC maintains that it owns any land or features contained within the line, which 
confers vaguely defined “historical maritime rights” (Liu, 2016). It encircles the area where China 
demands economic rights. Another interpretation is that the line marks the islands and reefs 
China wants to control rather than the waters inside its boundaries. The PRC has long favored a 
strategy of ambiguity. It does not openly go against international law but prefers to leave space 
for its more ambitious claims (Apte et al., 2020). 
 
Figure 1. The Nine-Dash Line and Surrounding Countries 
China defiantly lands planes on artificial islands in the South China Sea while U.S. 
warships patrol in protest (Figure 2). The string of “unsinkable aircraft carrier” islands is an 
imminent threat to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. This, plausibly, is where a war with China will 
likely be fought. When thinking in a geostrategic sense about China, the island-chain 
formulation is helpful. Since the 1950s, U.S. planners have described a first island chain, 
running from the Japanese islands through the Philippines and down to the tip of Southeast 
Asia. Dominating inside that line has been the goal of China’s recent buildup in naval and 
missile capabilities. But U.S. officials warn that Chinese strategists are becoming more 
ambitious, set on gaining influence up to the second island chain—running from Japan through 
the Micronesian islands to the tip of Indonesia (Figure 3). 
As with its initial forays into the South China Sea, China is using so-called scientific 
missions and hydrographic surveying ships as the tip of the spear. Japan and Singapore 
essentially serve as anchors at the north and south ends of the island chains. These two nations 
have been integrating their defense capabilities with the United States through training, 
exercises, and arms purchases. They are exploring better relations with India as the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans are increasingly viewed as a single strategic entity. This nascent alliance is a 
crucial element in the U.S. strategy for the region. 
China believes logistics in the contested environment is an Achilles’s heel for the U.S. 
Navy (USN). It is therefore critical that we explore ways to develop capabilities to replenish 
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Figure 2. Chinese Dredging Vessels in the Waters Around Mischief Reef in the Disputed Spratly Islands 
in the South China Sea 
 
Figure 3. First and Second Island Chains 
In this research, we offer a framework using mathematical models to refuel, rearm, and 
resupply for future logistics in such contested environments to support the potential combat 
operations of the USN. The resupply mission scenarios developed for this research are based 
on actual data supplied by subject matter experts (SMEs), but those data are disguised by the 
authors. At the foundation of the framework are the following research questions: 
1. Is the current fleet of vessels adequate to carry out the mission? 
2. Are there new vessels that can be modified or produced for the purpose of better 
sustainment through the three vectors of refuel, rearm, and resupply? 
3. If so, what type of vessels, and how many of each kind, should be acquired?  
In order to answer these questions, we first look at answers from existing literature on 
logistics, perhaps derived from a different environment. The capabilities of the new vessels 
mentioned in question 2 are based on top-level requirements supplied to the authors by SMEs. 
The methodology considers the supply chain from controlled zone to contested zone, utilizing 
only those new vessels. We develop and use different scenarios and methodologies to arrive at 
answers based on different objectives. We develop a framework for augmenting the current fleet 
with NGLSs for support in contested logistics. The objective is to study and analyze options for 
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Motivation for the New Vessels 
To optimize its future fleet logistics platforms, the USN and United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) are exploring the concept of a common hull, multi-mission auxiliary ship design. The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, explained his perspective on 
amphibious forces, including the need for more small ships, at an Amphibious Warship 
Industrial Base Coalition event:  
I think our amphibious fleet has great capability. It is not enough for 2030. 
It is not enough for 2025. We need the big decks, absolutely. We need the 
LPD-17, that is the mothership, the quarterback and the middle. But we 
need a light amphibious force ship, a lot of them that we don’t have today. 
(Abott, 2020, para. 8) 
Abott (2020) continues that the Navy said this non-acquisition program will be one “that 
designs, develops, and tests the Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment, to evaluate next 
generation medium platform solutions for logistics mission requirements in support of 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Littoral Operations in Contested Environment 
(LOCE)” (para. 11). 
The USN and USMC announced that they will seek a medium amphibious ship that can 
support the kind of dispersed, agile, constantly relocating force described in the LOCE and 
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concepts the Marine Corps has written, as 
well as the overarching DMO from the Navy (Eckstein, 2020). Marine Corps planners described 
the features they need on this medium amphibious ship. They not only wanted a ship that could 
move Marines around with some range, but they also wanted the ship to be able to beach itself, 
like a landing craft, to help offload gear and vehicles as needed. Presently, there is a new focus 
on the stern landing vessel designed by Australian company Sea Transport, which could serve 
as the new inspiration for the medium amphibious vessel as requirements development, EABO 
wargaming, and simulations take place. 
Future Surface Combatant Force is developing alternate surface ship force structure 
concepts and evaluating their cost and effectiveness, performing force-wide warfighting and 
mission effectiveness studies, identifying capabilities and characteristics needed to meet future 
threats, and developing a Technology Investment Strategy to help guide investments for an 
effective future fighting force. Our research supports this concept. 
Some of the vessels, NGLSs, will be commercial ship designs tailored to fit the top-level 
requirements that can conduct logistics missions in a contested environment. Through these 
new NGLS vessels, the USN will enable refueling, rearming, and resupply of naval assets, 
afloat and ashore, in support of LOCE and EABO (Katz, 2020). In a memorandum signed by the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the USMC (O’Rourke, 2020), Force 
Structure Assessment (FSA) morphed into Integrated Naval FSA (INFSA), where Naval refers 
to Navy and Marine Corps. Acting Secretary of the Navy Modly announced that  
there are certain ship classes that don’t even exist right now that we’re 
looking at that will be added into that mix, but the broad message is, it’s 
going to be a bigger fleet, it’s going to be a more distributed fleet, it’s going 
to be a more agile fleet. And we need to figure out what that path is and 
understand our topline limitations. (O’Rourke, 2020) 
He added that the service is also considering new amphibious ships, as well as new kinds of 
supply ships and “lightly manned” ships that are “more like missile magazines that would 
accompany surface action groups” (O’Rourke, 2020).  
General David H. Berger, the commandant of the Marine Corps, states,  
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We must also explore new options, such as inter-theater connectors and 
commercially available ships and craft that are smaller and less expensive, 
thereby increasing the affordability and allowing acquisition at a greater 
quantity. We recognize that we must distribute our forces ashore given the 
growth of adversary precision strike capabilities, so it would be illogical to 
continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The adversary will 
quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the 
preferred option. We need to change this calculus with a new fleet design 
of smaller, more lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms. (O’Rourke, 2020)  
We now offer a summary of certain requirements for these vessels that lead to their 
capabilities since we base our assumptions underlying the developed models on their top-
level requirements (TLRs). TLRs are design specifications of performance requirements 
for future ships. 
Description of the New Vessels: Next Generation Logistics Ships (NGLS) 
These vessels do not necessarily exist yet but have TLR thresholds defined for each 
performance dimension.  
Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) 
In summary, the vessel should have a sustained speed of about 11–12 knots. The range 
of travel for the platform supply vessel (PSV) is about 3,500 nm. Its fuel capacity needs to be 
about 20,000 bbl. Ammunition and cargo capacity needs to be adequate for replenishing cargo, 
ammunition, and fuel at sea from Combat Logistics Force (CLF), specifically, about 800–900 
short tons and deck area being about 10,000 sq ft. A major capability planned for the PSV is to 
deliver about 5,000 bbl of fuel in under about 2 hours at sea. In addition, it needs to be able to 
deliver 15 loads/hour of ammunition and/or cargo in parallel with refueling. This vessel will be 
unmanned throughout the operational cycle with organic support only when necessary. 
Autonomously executing the mission is a required capability of PSV. 
Fast Supply Vessel (FSV) 
Much smaller than the PSV but much faster, the sustained speed of a fast supply vessel 
(FSV) is 23 knots, and the range of travel is about 800–1000 nm. The fuel-storage capacity is 
required to be about 1,000 bbl. Deck area for ammunition and dry cargo is about 2,500 sq ft. A 
major capability planned for the FSV is to replenish the PSV in littorals. It also needs to do water 
transfers with hose reel with roll-on/roll-off capabilities. On shore, the FSV needs to be able to 
refuel at a minimum of about 500 gallons/minute with a 2,000-ft hose reel. It also needs to be 
capable of conducting missions for 2–3 days without replenishment. Finally, it needs to be able 
to transfer cargo to a pier or ashore.  
Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) 
These lighter ships will help the Navy and Marine Corps meet new challenges, including 
sea-control-and-denial operations. The light amphibious warships (LAW) will serve as maneuver 
and sustainment vessels to confront the changing character of warfare. The LAW will have 
beachability and the ability to maneuver shore to shore. It will also be able to provide transfer of 
fuel and cargo from T-ships on beaches and ports (developed and undeveloped) to forces within 
contested environments. The idea is to have a risk-worthy vessel (defensible enough that risks 
are not excessive or cheap enough that we can afford to lose it) with priority for personnel 
survivability. Being an amphibious vessel, the LAW should deal with 1:40 to 1:100 beach 
gradients. The loaded LAW should have a speed of about 18 knots. Thus, its speed is between 
the speeds of the PSV and FSV. Its minimum operating range is to be about 5,000 nm. It is to 
be capable of transferring 500 gallons/minute of fuel at sea or to shore. The LAW is to be 
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capable of conducting up to 11-day missions without replenishment. It is expected to receive, 
store, and transport up to 90,000 gallons of fuel in port as well as at sea. This fuel will be 
transferred at the rate of 150 gallons/minute in port as well as at sea. It can have four fueling 
stations around its cargo deck for filling trucks and vehicles. It has a crane with maximum 
outreach of about 14 T. It has a cargo area of about 10,000 sq ft and deck loading capacity of 
about 500 lb/sq ft. 
Our methodology derives a mathematical model based on capabilities for resource 
optimization for humanitarian missions (Apte & Yoho, 2018). However, we bear in mind the 
distinction between a contested environment and an uncontested environment, since the PSV 
and the FSV cannot defend themselves, but the LAW can. Therefore, if the NGLS ships do not 
encounter combat, the missions are similar. If they do encounter combat, the PSV and FSV will 
simply be lost, while the LAW will face an attrition rate. The attrition rates of these vessels have 
been estimated elsewhere (Dougherty et al., 2020). Since our results can simply be adjusted to 
account for those already estimated attrition rates, we do not model combat attrition in this 
study; we merely note that it is a factor which favors the LAW over the alternatives. In short, the 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) inference is relevant in the contested 
environment.  
Methodology  
We include the capacities of the vessels and offer an objective that minimizes the 
number of deliveries by the appropriate vessels on corresponding route. There exists a time 
constraint for total unload time to ships in the Weapon Engagement Zone (WEZ). To model this 
unload-time constraint, we modified capacities of the vessels per the time constraint in order to 
represent the time constraint of delivery. For example, if unload time was constrained to 1 hour, 
and an NGLS vessel could only unload 10 pallets in an hour or 5,000 BBL of fuel, we modified 
its cargo-capacity accordingly.  
These transportation/transshipment models consider controlled and contested zones. An 
assumption of the scenarios we were given is that most of the supplying vessels and Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF) are in the controlled zone, so there is transfer of commodities in the 
contested zone from NGLSs to the SAG and transshipment nodes. The transshipment node 
provides supplies for the different Expeditionary Advance Bases (EABs) on the shore in the 
contested zone. We developed models and analyzed scenarios for the NGLS vessels. The 
modes of transportation in the models and scenarios are the PSV, FSV, and LAW. Each of 
these vessels have certain preferred routes and requirements for capacities, loading/unloading, 
and platforms. These translate into restrictions and constraints for the models.  
We define a delivery as the carrying of commodities from a supply node to a demand 
node on the given route by a vessel designated to travel on that route. The models are executed 
using plausible but hypothetical numbers in order to maintain the unclassified nature of the 
report. The tables list the supply and demand at the nodes of the network. Though the results 
are based on hypothetical numbers, these numbers can be scaled up or down by using an 
appropriate multiplier.  
In the process of developing these models, given that the fuel (F) is stored separately 
from ammunition and supplies (A-S), we separated the models for F and A-S. Fuel capacity is 
measured in barrels, whereas ammunition and supplies are in pallets. In the case of A-S, both 
potentially occupy the same square footage of the vessels. Therefore, we combined these two 
commodities (A-S) when we developed square footage constraints for the models. The models 
for both F and A-S are very similar except for the supply, demand, and capacities.  
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Scenario: Capability Restricted Transportation  
We offer two scenarios and the corresponding models based on feedback from SMEs. 
Vessels allowed on the respective routes are shown in Figure 4-1. This scenario first looks at 
the entire network (Figure 4-1). We offer a different perspective by splitting the transshipment 
network into two separate transportation networks (Figure 4-2). In these scenarios, the model 
treats SAG (node 2) as one entity.  
 
Figure 4-1. Scenario Based on Subject Matter Expert Feedback 
 
Figure 4-2. Scenario Based on SME Feedback With Split 1 and Split 2 
As shown in Figure 4-2, Split 1 transports commodities from CLF to SAG and Transshipment, 
whereas Split 2 transports commodities from Transshipment to ASuW, FARP, and LOG. The 
advantage of splitting the entire/combined/transshipment network into two transportation 
networks is twofold. First, Split 1 focuses on the USN, whereas Split 2 focuses on the USMC. 
This helps in maintaining the needs of Marines ashore and Navy forces afloat. Second, 
transshipment of the commodities is assumed to be done sequentially, and though the two 
transportation networks have the same assumption, they can be executed in parallel, thus 
reducing total time. In the split model, of course, the supply from the transshipment node is set 
equal to the demand to the transshipment node. The corresponding model is given next.  
Model (Split) for Capability Restricted Transportation based on Scenarios in Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 for Fuel 
Total supply at node i for fuel = SFi,, Total demand at node j for fuel = DFj  










































Split 2 Split 1
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 309 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Shared volume capacity for fuel on vessel k enroute from node i to node j = cFkij 
Modes of transportation, k: PSV =1, FSV = 2, LAW = 3  
Split 1 
Decision Variables: 
XFkij = flow of fuel from source i to node j on vessel k, i=1, j= 2, 3, k = 1 
Ykij = # of deliveries by vessels of type k from node i to j and l  
Objective Function: Minimize Number of Deliveries 
 112 113min( )y y+    
Constraints: 
Supply  at CLF = 1, 112 113 1( )F Fx x SF+ ≤   
Demand  at SAG = 2, 112 2Fx DF≥     
 at Transshipment = 3, 113 3Fx DF≥  
Capacity Fuel Volume 










   
Ykij’s integer and ≥ 0,  Xkij’s ≥ 0 
Split 2 
Decision Variables: 
XFkjl = flow of fuel from transshipment node j to sink l on vessel k, j=3, l=4, 5, 6, k = 2, 3 
Ykjl = # of deliveries by vessels of type k from node j to l  
Objective Function: Minimize Number of Deliveries 
 234 235 236 334 335 336min( )y y y y y y+ + + + +      
Constraints: 
Supply at Transshipment = 3, 234 235 236 334 335 336 3F F F F F Fx x x x x x SF+ + + + + ≤  
Demand at ASuW = 4, 234 334 4F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at FARP = 5, 235 335 5F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at LOG = 6, 236 336 6F Fx x DF+ ≥  
Capacity Fuel Volume 
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 Ykjl’s integer and ≥ 0, Xkjl’s ≥ 0 
Results 
We further evaluated the number of deliveries by the vessels by incorporating the 
restrictions on the vessels due to their capabilities. Top-level requirements for NGLSs informed 
us of the inability of certain vessels for transportation between certain nodes. These were 
incorporated in the structure of the scenarios and corresponding models. The supply and 
demand at the nodes and capacities of vessels in these scenarios are given in Table 1 for F and 
for Ammunition and Supplies. In Table 1, the capacity of vessels for ammunition and supplies is 
constrained from CLF to SAG by the length of time of 1 hour, the maximum time any ship in the 
SAG can be engaged for fueling. The assumption is that since the pallets are delivered at the 
rate of 60 pallets/hour, only 60 pallets can be delivered to SAG, though the true capacity of the 
PSV is 800 pallets.  
Table 1. Supply, Demand, and Capacities: Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets 
 
In Table 2, results for the scenario in Figure 4-1 and 4-2 show that it is necessary to 
have a total of 11 deliveries for fuel and 6 for ammunition and supplies. It can be seen from 
Fuel in BBL Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets
Nodes Supply/Demand Supply/Demand
Supply at CLF 1 100000 100000
Supply at  Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at SAG 2 22000 100
Demand at Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at ASuW 4 100 50
Demand at FARP 5 6300 350
Demand at LOG 6 100 350
Routes Capacity Capacity
PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 5500 800
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1000 250
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 2200 1000
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Table 2 that the number of deliveries in the combined network and the total from Split networks 
are the same, however.  
Table 2. Minimum Number of Deliveries for Transportation of Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets 
 
In order to offer another perspective, we further expanded the scenarios where we 
separate SAG 2 into three DDGs and one LCS (Figure 5-1) in one case and three DDGs and 
one FFG (Figure 5-2) in the other. It needs to be noted that splitting SAG in corresponding 
vessels offers better insight into the situation since it offers delivery numbers for each demand 
node. We believe this will further help decision-makers.  
In both scenarios, the demand node afloat is SAG, and demand nodes ashore are 
EABs, specifically ASuW, FARP, and LOG. It should also be noted that we used a period of 8 
days in this scenario, since it is the maximum period for a DDG between refueling events. This 
assumption forces an LCS in the first case and an FFG in the other to be refueled twice; 
therefore, we assumed the demand at LCS in the first case and FFG in the other to be twice as 
much. The increased demand for these vessels increases the deliveries to these ships and not 
to DDGs. Given the capacities of the NGLS vessels and the demand at LCS and FFG, the 
delivery numbers were different. In case of ammunition and supply replenishment, this scenario 
changes. DDGs can only be engaged for at most 1 hour for delivery of fuel. Therefore, we 
assumed that a corresponding A-S delivery, since it is done by the same vessel, can also be 
done in parallel for only 1 hour at the rate of 60 pallets per hour. If we remove this restriction for 
A-S delivery, the capacities change. The idea here is that the refueling can be done for one 
DDG at a time independently or consecutively (like a milk run). Though we separated SAG into 
different demand nodes, we did not execute the model for minimizing delivery time since 
approximate distances from CLF to each node in SAG would be similar. The model for these is:  
Models based on scenarios in Figure 5-1 and 5-2 for Fuel 
Total supply at node i for fuel = SFi,, Total demand at node j for fuel = DFj  
Shared volume capacity for fuel on vessel k enroute ij = cFkij 
Modes of transportation: PSV =1, FSV = 2, LAW = 3  
Decision Variables: 
XFkij = flow of fuel from source i to node j on vessel k, i=1, j= 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, and 3, k = 1 
XFkjl = flow of fuel from transshipment node j to sink l on vessel k, j=3, l=4, 5, and 6, k = 2, 3 
Combined Split 1 Split 2 Combined Split 1 Split 2
Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries
PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 4 4 2 2
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 2 1 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 0 1 0
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 1 0 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 1 0 1
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 3 1 1
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 0 1 1
Total 11 6 5 6 3 3
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Ykij = # of deliveries by vessels of type k from node i to j and l  
Objective Function: Minimize Number of Deliveries
112 1 112 2 112 3 112 4 113 234 235 236 334 335 336min( )y y y y y y y y y y y− − − −+ + + + + + + + + +     
Constraints:  
Supply at CLF = 1, 112 1 112 2 112 3 112 4 113 1( )F F F F Fx x x x x SF− − − −+ + + + ≤  
 at Transshipment = 3, 234 235 236 334 335 336 3F F F F F Fx x x x x x SF+ + + + + ≤  
Demand at DDG = 2-1, 112 1 2 1Fx DF− −≥  
 at DDG = 2-2, 112 2 2 2Fx DF− −≥  
 at DDG = 2-3, 112 3 2 3Fx DF− −≥  
 at LCS or FFG = 2-4, 112 4 2 4Fx DF− −≥     
 at Transshipment = 3, 113 3Fx DF≥  
 at ASuW = 4, 234 334 4F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at FARP = 5, 235 335 5F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at LOG = 6, 236 336 6F Fx x DF+ ≥  
Transshipment (Flow Balance) 
 113 234 235 236 334 335 336( ) 0F F F F F F Fx x x x x x x− + + + + + ≥  
Capacity Fuel Volume 
 
112 1 112 1 112 1
112 2 112 2 112 2
112 3 112 3 112 3
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Scenario: Separated SAG: Three DDGs and One LCS or Three DDGs and One FFG  
 
Figure 5-1. Scenario Based on Separated SAG: Three DDGs and One LCS 
Separating SAG into DDGs and LCS or FFG creates a unique difficulty in replenishment. 
However, we adjusted ship capacity to accommodate the differences between resupply periods.  
 
Figure 5-2. Scenario Based on Separated SAG: Three DDGs and One FFG 
The supply and demand at the nodes, and capacities of vessels, in these scenarios are given in 
Table 3 in case of LCS and in Table 4 in case of FFG. Assuming that DDG can sustain for 8 
days without refueling, FFG must be refueled every seven days and LCS every four days. We 
incorporated this by adjusting the demands for the given period in the models based on Figures 
5-1 and 5-2.  
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Table 3. Supply, Demand, and Capacities: Three DDGs and One LCS 
 
 




Fuel in BBL Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets
Supply/Demand Supply/Demand
Supply at CLF 1 1000000 100000
Supply at  Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at DDG 2-1 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-2 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-3 5000 25
Demand at LCS 2-4 3000 20
Demand at Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at ASuW 4 100 50
Demand at FARP 5 6300 350
Demand at LOG 6 100 350
Capacity Capacity
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-4 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 5500 800
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1000 250
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 2200 1000
Fuel in BBL Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets
Supply/Demand Supply/Demand
Supply at CLF 1 1000000 100000
Supply at  Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at DDG 2-1 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-2 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-3 5000 25
Demand at FFG 2-4 7000 25
Demand at Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at ASuW 4 100 50
Demand at FARP 5 6300 350
Demand at LOG 6 100 350
Capacity Capacity
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-4 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 5500 800
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1000 250
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 2200 1000
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The results with LCS are given in Table 5. Table 6 describes the results with FFG.  
Table 5. Minimum Number of Deliveries for Transportation of Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets: Three DDGs and One LCS 
 
 
Table 6. Minimum Number of Deliveries for Transportation of Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets: Three DDGs and One FFG 
 
Summary, Analysis, and Conclusion 
Feedback from the SME helped us gain insight into the complexity of the problem and its 
vast scope. We used this input to refine our scenarios. We developed mathematical models 
based on these scenarios. We have listed those scenarios that will offer decision-makers with a 
choice based on their requirement. We constrained the capacity based on the maximum time a 
ship can be engaged in a supply event to reflect the delivery time.  
The top-level requirements of the vessels under consideration, as we understood, 
incorporate capability of a vessel on a certain route based on speed, platform, and capacity. 
The fuel storage tanks are separate from the storage for ammunition and supplies. Hence, we 
kept these two commodities separate. Fuel has its own issues, and so do ammunition and 
supplies. Note that the separate trips for these two commodities could be combined when trying 
to operationalize these results into a schedule involving a particular number of ships. 
The sponsor did not wish us to model an objective of minimizing costs (which were not 
available) or the number of ships required to deliver commodities within a certain deadline or 
Fuel Ammunition and Supplies
Deliveries Deliveries
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to LCS 2-4 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 1
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 0
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 1
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 1
Total 11 8
Fuel Ammunition and Supplies
Deliveries Deliveries
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to LCS 2-4 2 1
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 0
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 1
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 1
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under a certain schedule (because deadlines and schedules change based on operational 
priorities). Measuring the number of deliveries required allowed us to determine a mix of NGLS 
vessels without addressing cost, deadline, or scheduling restrictions.  
In our model, number of deliveries are the deliveries made by a specific vessel, from a 
supply node to a demand node, on a specific route for a specific commodity. We would like to 
point out that deliveries can be interpreted in many ways. For example, a LAW making 13 
deliveries of fuel to FARP can be (a) 13 LAWs (making one delivery each), or (b) seven LAWs 
(six LAWs making two deliveries each and one LAW making one delivery), or six LAWs (making 
one delivery each, and one LAW making seven of the 13 deliveries). Thus, it is up to the 
decision-makers to determine how they would like to interpret and implement the results. A 
decision-maker may go for 13 LAWs if the cost is reasonable and the environment is highly 
contested. But if it is not, perhaps seven LAWs will be adequate. Again, the number of deliveries 
may be interpreted by the decision-makers based on their preference and available budget, and 
there could be many such interpretations. Similar statements can be made about PSVs or 
FSVs. For example, if there are five deliveries made by PSVs, it could mean that (a) there are 
five PSVs making one delivery each, or (b) two PSVs making two deliveries each and one PSV 
making one. One must note, however, that the deliveries will be constrained by overall capacity 
of the vessel. If one PSV tops out after four deliveries, then the interpretation would change. It 
would be entirely up to the decision-makers to decide how they would want to interpret the 
solution. In Table 7 we summarize the results of the scenarios.  
Table 7. Summary of Scenario Results  
 
The models we have developed are scalable. The scenarios can be expanded as per 
the requirement of number of demand nodes. For example, if there are three SAGs that must be 
supported, the demand of one SAG in our scenario can be multiplied by three. Of course, in that 
case, the number of deliveries will increase. Or there may be more than one ASuW Strike EAB, 
say two, or both of these cases may exist. In that case, the demand for that demand node can 
be doubled. Such adjustments can be also be made to distances or when minimum time for 






























Scenario Based on Figure 4-1 and 4-2
Combined 6 2 3 11 3 1 2 6
Split 1 and Split 2 6 1 4 11 3 0 3 6
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
and LCS (Figure 5-1) 6 2 3 11 5 1 2 8
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
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Table 8. Minimum Deliveries With Increased Demand Nodes: Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets 
 
As stated earlier, we did not incorporate load and unload time. Incorporating load and 
unload time might increase the total time for deliveries. This may lead to acquisition of more 
vessels so the actual transportation and delivery can be done in parallel to reduce the time. For 
example, in case four PSVs are needed to deliver required fuel to SAG (based on the 
assumptions about distance and speed of the PSV), and that a warship can only be engaged for 
at most 1 hour for this delivery, our model shows it takes a total of 7 days. However, given that 
DDGs can sustain for 8 days after one refueling event and there are three DDGs in a SAG, an 
acquisition strategy for acquiring four PSVs so each PSV takes less than 2 days to deliver may 
be a better solution than one PSV making four deliveries in 7 days. Again, this is a choice the 
decision-makers can make based on the flexibility of these models.  
Based on our analysis, we recommend the following to negotiate battlespace 
constraints. We suggest that the time constraint for a PSV engaging with SAG in WEZ should 
be investigated, since that is the binding constraint on capacity to transfer. The capacity of the 
PSV for carrying fuels is much larger than that, and the same is true for transferring the pallets 
of ammunition and supplies. It will be necessary to increase the rate of transfer if the time spent 
in the WEZ cannot be altered. Our capacity assumptions were based on threshold as opposed 
to objective TLRs. Hence, objective TLRs may be the direction to go. This may need tweaking 
at the TLRs and some platform modification so that sustainment can be made much faster and 
with fewer deliveries. We summarize the number of deliveries made by FSV and LAW for each 
of the scenarios in Table 9.  
Based on this summary, one can see that the most FSVs needed for each of these 
scenarios to transport fuel are two, whereas for the same scenarios, five LAWs are also 
needed. Similarly, the most FSVs needed for each of these scenarios to transport ammunition 
and supplies is one. However, three LAWs are also needed for those scenarios. These results 
and our analysis therefore suggest that acquisition of LAWs is preferred to FSVs, since it may 
be prohibitively expensive to maintain a separate maintenance support infrastructure for FSVs 
when their range of usefulness is relatively narrow. A closer examination of those instances in 
which the model recommended FSVs on a route reveals that, in every case, a LAW could have 
accomplished the resupply mission in an equal number of trips. That is, the model 









PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 12 5 4 2 12 5
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 1 2 1 2 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 0 1 0 0 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 1 3 1 3 1
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 1 0 1 1 1
Total 19 9 11 6 19 9
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FSV does not look very useful in these scenarios, these scenarios did not require the TLRs 
(especially speed, since deadlines were not given) in which that ship dominated the others. 
 
Table 9. Deliveries by FSV and LAW 
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Scenario Based on Subject Matter Expert 
Feedback (Figure 4-1 and 4-2)
Combined
Split 1 and Split 2
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
and LCS with Sustainment (Figure 5-1)
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
and FFG with Sustainment (Figure 5-2)
Scenario Based on Increased Demand Nodes
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1 3 1 2
2 4 0 3
2 3 1 2
2 3 0 3
0 5 0 3
0 5 0 3
1 4 0 3
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Abstract 
This paper describes an innovative Hybrid Optimization and Simulation approach for assessing 
acquisition strategies in the Armed Forces. This work has been conceptualized and is currently 
being developed with and for experts in the field of disaster and emergency management in order 
to tackle the real issues arising during such crises. As the overarching framework, we operate 
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under the umbrella of Capability Based Planning (CBP), a methodology widely used by the 
defense community and referred to by many as the “gold standard” for strategic planning. 
Drawing from the general building blocks of CBP, we aim to develop an analytic process to 
transparently assess and explain humanitarian capabilities acquisitions in the Armed Forces and 
include them in its traditionally defense-oriented strategic planning.  
Keywords: Strategic Acquisition, Humanitarian Logistics, Capability Based Planning, Defense 
Planning 
Introduction 
The significance of disasters for societies is tremendous. It has been estimated that, 
every year, more than 500 disasters strike our planet, with a death toll of over 75,000 people 
and affecting more than 200 million people (Caunhye et al., 2012). Furthermore, several studies 
have demonstrated an increasing trend in both the frequency and severity of these events (Behl 
& Dutta, 2019; Habib et al., 2016; Leiras et al., 2014). In order to lessen their effects, be it the 
loss of human life or the impact on the economy, and to bring society back to a state of 
normality, the field of Disaster and Emergency Management (DEM) prepares resources and 
activities that will deal with the humanitarian aspect of emergencies. Due to the sheer 
complexity of DEM operations, cooperation between military and civilian actors is often required. 
Beyond the context of war, military forces are particularly well equipped to deal with certain key 
areas in DEM, like logistics and engineering, among other support possibilities that could be 
explored to mitigate the impact of disasters on civilian populations.  
This paper proposes the integration of these support possibilities in the strategic analysis 
of the Armed Forces while still maintaining defense-related investments as a priority.   
Preliminaries and Background 
Capability Based Planning 
Capability Based Planning (CBP) is a general planning framework that aims to provide 
an organization with capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and risks, 
simultaneously framing these capabilities within an economic framework (Davis, 2002). This 
approach relies on goals and functional needs for broadly defined scenarios, making planning 
more responsive to uncertainty and risk, and provides a rational basis for decisions on future 
acquisitions. In this sense, CBP differs from threat-based planning, a framework popular during 
and up to the end of the Cold War, where strategic planning was heavily oriented towards 
specific threats or scenarios (Hales & Chouinard, 2011). 
While CBP has been widely adopted by the Defense community, with notable results in 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, its extension to the field of 
Safety and Security, including DEM, proved challenging (Hales & Chouinard, 2011). These 
challenges arise, primarily, from perspective differences between the Defense and the DEM 
communities, and from within the DEM community itself. Going a step further in the analysis, the 
internationally funded Technical Cooperation Program (Taylor, 2013; Technical Cooperation 
Program Joint Systems Analysis Group Technical Panel 3, 2004) identified four main building 
blocks in the general framework of CBP: 
1. High level capability objectives derived from government guidance. 
2. Operational concepts for strategic, operational, and tactical levels to describe the 
systems and possible interactions. 
3. Standard groupings of disparate elements in capability clusters to make the analysis 
process more manageable. 
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While these blocks are almost exclusively built and described around defense concepts, 
it is possible to partially abstract them as an optimization problem. This, in turn, allows the 
inclusion of tasks and operations outside the typical concepts in defense but connected at its 
core. 
This research proposes an extension of CBP to include humanitarian capabilities and 
operational concepts while preserving the resource constraints at strategic levels. In essence, 
we aim to study and expand existing military capabilities befitting humanitarian operations, 
acknowledging the existing economic restrictions at strategic levels. 
Operations Research in the Context of Capability Based Planning 
Operations Research (OR) has long been applied to the higher level of strategic defense 
planning. The following paragraphs describe the intended approach to meet the requirements of 
all CBP building blocks using OR methodologies. 
The definition of OR has been approached from multiple perspectives by many relevant 
authors in the field. In the interest of clarity and simplicity, we will adopt the OR definition 
described by the Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO): 
[Operations Research] can be described as a scientific approach to the solution of 
problems in the management of complex systems. In a rapidly changing 
environment, an understanding is sought which will facilitate the choice and the 
implementation of more effective solutions which, typically, may involve complex 
interactions among the elements of the system, for instance, people, materials and 
money.1  
Closely related to the building blocks of a CBP framework described earlier, an effective 
CBP implementation requires the developed plan to meet the capability objectives under the 
defined operational concepts, minimizing risk and cost and complying with the resource and 
general constraints (Technical Cooperation Program Joint Systems Analysis Group Technical 
Panel 3, 2004). In order to optimally distribute resources, CBP depends on OR methods to help 
make better decisions. In particular, this research leverages two powerful techniques found at 
the intersection between OR and CBP, Simulation and Optimization.  
On the one hand, different simulation methodologies are used for representing 
operational concepts and to develop and explore the sandbox in which different scenarios will 
be tested. These are the different techniques used in this work:   
 System Dynamics (SD) is a modeling a simulation technique for studying the dynamics 
of complex systems (Sterman, 2000). It uses a set of simple building blocks and entities, 
namely Stocks, Material, and Information Flows and Delays to describe how these 
systems change over time. Due to a high level of abstraction in the modeling approach, 
SD is normally regarded as a strategic modeling methodology.  
 Discrete Event Simulation (DES) is a method that requires the modeler to divide the 
studied system into a sequence of operations performed across entities over discrete 
time (i.e., the model clock only advances when something significant happens in the 
model). It is generally considered to be a low abstraction modeling technique and is 
used to model processes in-depth (Borshchev, 2013). 
 Agent Based Modeling (ABM) is a more recent modeling approach, focusing on the 
behavior of individual interacting entities (namely, agents) to create emergent behavior 
 
1 from https://www.euro-online.org/ 
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(bottom up approach), instead of the process affecting those entities (top down; 
Borshchev, 2013). 
 In order to exhaustively explore scenarios under uncertainty, Monte Carlo Simulation 
allows the modeler to assess individual simulation run outcomes by stochastically 
varying input parameter values (Rubinstein & Kroese, 2016). This technique is well 
suited to deal with systems where the input-output interactions are too complex to 
assess analytically.  
Architecturally, two main streams can be identified with respect to simulation techniques. 
The first stream combines SD, DES, and ABM into a single model using multimethod modeling 
(Borshchev, 2013). The second stream considers exclusively the Monte Carlo simulations, 
running parallelly to the first stream.  
Analytical optimization approaches, on the other hand, are also used for finding, at 
different strategic levels, the best resource allocation strategy from an economic and operative 
standpoint. These models have been successfully applied in several DEM problems, as shown 
in Behl and Dutta (2019) and Habib et al. (2016). In this work, two practical optimization 
problems will be explored: a modification of the vehicle routing problem (VRP; Lahyani et al., 
2015; Toth & Vigo, 2002) and a strategic acquisition problem framed as an extension of the 
classical Knapsack Problem (Bakirli et al., 2014; Brown et al., 2004). Both problems are solved 
in a sequential workflow, as explained in the Methodology and Concept Description. 
Humanitarian Logistics and Capability Based Planning 
In a humanitarian context, the term logistics represents the processes and systems 
involved in mobilizing people, resources, skills, and knowledge to help vulnerable people 
affected after a disaster. Given the wide array of problems that this field encompasses, we will 
focus on the Last-Mile Relief Distribution (LMRD) problem, a well-known problem that will act 
as a proxy for humanitarian operations (Balcik et al., 2008; Stapleton et al., 2011). In this 
problem, a fleet of capacitated vehicles must economically distribute relief resources between 
local depots and affected areas. 
An interesting characteristic of the LMRD problem is the trade-off between economic 
distribution and the life-saving utility: There is a clear correlation between the number of 
vehicles and the achievable satisfaction of demand. Due to limited resources, however, it is 
necessary to correctly assess the optimum supply and transport capacity that can successfully 
satisfy this demand while reducing transportation costs and idle capacities. 
The extension of humanitarian logistics to the CBP framework, while not exactly easy, is 
conceptually quite straightforward: First, the number of transportation units and supply 
capacities robust against a broad set of disaster scenarios is calculated and immediately 
compared with present distribution capacities. If a need for improvement in transportation 
capacities is detected, it will be included in the much broader strategic investment plan, 
considering the investment priorities of the Armed Forces as a whole.  
Research Question 
The concrete question that this research aims to answer is How can humanitarian 
capabilities for military support in DEM be characterized when framed within a broader strategic 
acquisition plan in the Armed Forces?  
By answering this question, we expect to bridge an observed gap in military strategic 
planning, broadening the application potential of CBP by enriching its current defense-oriented 
paradigm with humanitarian goals. 
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Methodology and Concept Description 
Conceptually, this work is being developed with experts in the field of DEM, both from 
civil organizations and with military backgrounds.  
Figure 1 shows the broad framework description: On the right, the classical capability 
and investment approach remains unchanged. On the left, we show the proposed extension to 
the classical approach by linking humanitarian operations to optimal capability requirements—
as described in problem (a)—and finally conducting a holistic assessment of the acquisition 
requirements and transparently supporting decision-makers with optimal economic 
distribution—tackled in problem (b). The connection shown in this figure between the classical 
CBP approach (right side) and the proposed extension (left side) represents the multi-purpose 




Figure 1. Proposed CBP-Based Acquisition Framework (Left Side) 
Architecturally, this work adopts a connected modular approach, developing two different 
models tackling different organizational levels:  
a) the relief distribution problem, used to identify a gap in capabilities, and 
b) the acquisition problem, supporting the acquisition of those capabilities. 
Figure 2 shows a conceptual description of the process flow and the connection between both 
problems, with their corresponding inputs and outputs. 
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Process Flow 
Problem (A): Determining Humanitarian Logistics Capabilities 
This problem encompasses both the tactical and operational levels observed in the CBP 
framework and will, for practical purposes, keep a narrow perspective within Humanitarian 
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Operations. At this level, we developed a multi-method simulation model of a disaster requiring 
civilian relocation to shelters. The behavior of this model was designed in cooperation with 
experts in logistics and DEM and follows real constraints and variables to the best extent of the 
possibilities.  
The scenario used to exemplify typical operations observed in this model can be 
described as follows:  
In the aftermath of a disrupting disaster (e.g., earthquake, pandemic with quarantine 
demands, large scale blackout, among others), the civilian population is relocated to shelters for 
their safety. Regional military forces are in charge of supplying these shelters using limited 
structural resources and commodities, with optional civilian support that can be required at 
higher costs. The central task at this level is the determination of required vehicles (both military 
and civilian)—together with corresponding distribution routes—for a timely delivery of relief 
goods to the population in need.  
There are two main decisions at this level; the first one, of an operative nature, involves 
the cost and time efficient determination of routes and supply schedule for every vehicle, given 
specific fleet configurations.  
In order to shift the problem complexity away from the user, a Rich-Vehicle Routing 
Problem (R-VRP; Lahyani et al., 2015) optimization model is solved parallelly to the simulation, 
identifying the optimal routing strategy for each vehicle in the fleet. This mathematical model 
was developed exclusively for this research and captures a complex set of real-world VRP 
taxonomic features not simultaneously contemplated in previous mathematical VRP models, 
such as 
1. Split-Delivery: Multiple vehicles are allowed to visit a single shelter, effectively sharing 
the supply requirements for that shelter. 
2. Multi-Echelon: Unlike traditional VRP, in this case, the fleet is not necessarily stationed 
at the depots and might have their own fleet base (for example, one or more supply 
regiments) 
3. Multi-Depot: This problem needs to contemplate multiple sources of relief in the map. 
4. Heterogeneous Fleet: As observed in real world problems, a fleet normally comprises 
different types of vehicles, each with its own fuel consumption, fixed usage costs, and 
load capacities.  
5. Multi-Trip: Vehicles can travel multiple time between depots and shelters in order to 
resupply if needed. 
6. Multi-Commodity: Each vehicle can transport multiple products with different packaging 
options.     
The transportation parameters used in this problem are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Load Transportation Parameters 
(Note: This figure is the authors’ own elaboration with image captions from 
https://commons.wikimedia.org.) 
 
A conceptual description of the user interface designed for this level can be seen in 
Figure 4. Shelters and Depots show a live feed of their stock levels (red and green bars), and 
the position of every vehicle in the fleet is updated in a GIS environment. Using this module as a 
sandbox, users can modify input parameters and observe the success potential of different 
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The second type of decision in problem (a) is of a strategic nature and aims to explore 
and identify the best combination of structural and fixed-operational resources to successfully 
see the delivery plan through to completion.  
Essentially, the structural resources to define at this stage are 
 Transport capabilities (number and type of vehicles in the fleet) 
 Supply capacities (units per day of each product that depots can supply) 
In Figure 5, an example is shown based on a real case study that has been anonymized 
for presentation purposes. The problem includes a fleet base (green triangle), three depots 
(blue squares) and three shelters (red exclamation marks). The goal is to design the optimal 
distribution plan for a fleet of heterogeneous vehicles starting from and returning to the fleet 
base. Each vehicle must pick up two types of commodities at the depots and distribute them to 
the different shelters. The Rich-VRP features included in this model are shown in the green box 
in Figure 5. The right side of this figure shows the results of wrapping the optimization model in 
a Monte Carlo framework, stochastically varying the population sizes at the shelters (first three 
columns), and defining a new demand composition at each scenario. The last three columns 
show the optimum number of truck types for each scenario and the cost of that solution, 
respectively. The row in blue indicates the highest demand scenario. 
 
 
Figure 5. Conceptual Map and Different Scenarios Designed in a Complex Rich-VRP 
 
 Problem (B): Strategic Acquisition Plan, Defense Structure Coupled With Humanitarian 
Operations 
The acquisition problem represents the strategic level and takes as input an explicit 
formulation of capability requirements from multiple defense branches in the Armed Forces and 
the humanitarian capabilities determined in problem (a). The goal at this level is to formulate 
the acquisition strategy that maximizes the capability needs of the army for both defense 
and humanitarian considerations. This problem assumes that all inputs provided by the 
defense branches are the output of similar analytic assessments conducted by experts and, 
hence, out of the scope of this project. The generic hierarchical structure used in this problem is 
shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Example of a Generic Hierarchical Structure in the Armed Forces 
 
The implementation of this problem consists of a modified knapsack optimization model 
aiming to maximize the value of an investment while not exceeding the available budget. Built 
on top of this optimization model, a user interface allows experts and decision-makers to 
explore and configure different parameters at each strategic level in the army. 
The designed interface, shown in Figure 7, gives an overview of the outputs produced by 
the model, with the total distribution of funds for each branch of arms and the capability of 
exploring and parameterizing specific hierarchical levels individually. At this point, it is worth 
noting that the outputs of this model do not replace by any means the need for expert 
assessment or decision-makers. These results are exclusively meant to support the decision-
making process and reduce the burden of computing complex calculations on the user. 
Finally, both problems are merged in a single platform and under a comprehensive 
management dashboard in order to provide tactical, operative, and strategic information of the 
different scenarios contemplated for analysis.  
 
Figure 7. User Interface for the Strategic Acquisition Problem With Detail for Higher Hierarchical Level 
(Armed Forces Strategic Command) 
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First Results 
Due to the early stage of this project and the sensitive nature of the information used, 
results will be presented on a qualitative basis, with the goal of assessing feasibility and 
scalability of the approach. With respect to the former, the approach yields promising results: 
Figure 4 and Figure 6 showcase not simply conceptual designs, but actual results of this 
framework, specifically from the management dashboard, in a dynamic environment with which 
the user can interact. Furthermore, the quantitative values in those figures correspond to real 
values calculated using the underlying mathematical models. An analysis of those values in 
these lines would not be of interest since all values shown are generic, given the confidentiality 
of the information handled. 
With respect to scalability, it was observed that the bottleneck of this approach is the 
relief distribution problem (a), which might struggle when the problem is too expressive (e.g., 
due to multiple transportation options and complex routing strategies considered) or too large. 
As a reference, the current optimization model correctly handled maps with simple behavior with 
up to 75 nodes; however, it struggled with larger instances. For the full expressiveness of the 
model, instances with up to 16 nodes were solved in realistic time.  
Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper described the concept behind a streamlined framework for the integration of 
humanitarian operations within the strategic planning of the Armed Forces. Concretely, this 
research bridges an observed gap in military strategic planning, broadening the application 
potential of Capability Based Planning by enriching its current defense-oriented paradigm with 
humanitarian goals. Even though the project has an already working implementation of the 
described concept, several validation steps are still needed, as well as a deeper development 
regarding the hierarchical army sub-structures and the specifics of each disaster tackled. 
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Abstract 
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization designated “coronavirus disease 2019” 
(COVID-19) a global pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic caused massive shortages in the 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) supplies needed to treat the virus as the disease spread 
rapidly throughout the world during 2020. Global supply chains suddenly became a new problem 
in public attention.  
In the United States, there were no reliable databases about what was needed in different hospitals, 
states, or healthcare systems. Also, there was no accurate database of the production capabilities 
of U.S. suppliers of PPE. 
The aim of our research was to investigate the best approaches to determine the needs for PPE 
during the pandemic and to improve the methods used to predict the PPE needs for hospitals and 
other healthcare facilities. The second part of our research was to develop an understanding of the 
capabilities of the U.S.-based companies to produce large quantities of specific PPE for both the 
current pandemic and future needs. We feel that this work has implications for anyone in the 
healthcare supply chain space (Department of Defense [DoD] task forces, Defense Logistics 
Agency [DLA], Defense Health Agency [DHA], Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 
Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS], Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
state, local, and healthcare systems).  
Keywords: COVID-19, Shortage, Supply Chain Challenges, Personal Protective Equipment 
Introduction 
In November 2019, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) first appeared in China (Scher, 
2020). Soon after, Thailand and Japan became the first and second countries outside China 
confirming COVID-19 cases in mid-January 2020 (Joseph, 2020; Schnirring, 2020). In quick 
response, screening travelers was started at three U.S. international airports: Los Angeles (LAX), 
San Francisco (SFO), and New York (JFK) on January 17, 2020 (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention [CDC], 2020). The first COVID-19 case in the United States was detected in 
Washington State on January 20, 2020 (Holshue et al., 2020). Then the virus started spreading 
across the country. COVID-19 has hit the United States harder than any other country in the world 
(WorldOMeter, n.d.). The number of deaths rose quickly, and just in 4 months, late May 2020, the 
number of deaths reached 100,000 (Winsor et al., 2020). At the end of March 2021, the total 
number of cases globally was approximately 129 million, resulting in 2.82 million deaths. About 
20% (0.552 million) of these were in the United States (Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, 
n.d.).  
One of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic was a major disruption to the PPE supply 
chains in the United States and large PPE shortages across the country. Before the pandemic, 
more than 70% of the critical respiratory-related PPE used in the United States was sourced from 
overseas companies, primarily in China. When high global demand drastically reduced available 
supplies from China during early 2020, major distributors were unable to fill orders. We quickly 
saw two major problems. In the United States, there was a lack of information about what was 
needed in different hospitals, states, or healthcare systems. Models were developed using 
available estimates of infections, hospitalizations, intensive care unit (ICU) usage, and other 
factors, but most of these models were seriously flawed. Even worse, the data needed in these 
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models were not accurate, timely, or complete (Davenport et al., 2020). Without accurate and 
timely data, it is difficult to construct objective-based responses that provide lifeline services for 
communities in emergencies.  
The second major problem was the lack of an accurate database of the production 
capabilities of U.S. suppliers of PPE. Many who produced end-product PPE soon discovered the 
materials they needed were no longer available. Others discovered that they were missing several 
critical items in the supply chain or that these items were in short supply. Others found they had 
the capability to ramp up production quickly, but they wanted guarantees of purchases before 
committing to major investments. Without a national understanding of demand, companies were 
hesitant to make large investments.  
This research investigates the best approaches to determine the needs for PPE during the 
pandemic, suggests improvements of the methods used to predict the PPE needs for hospitals 
and other healthcare facilities, and develops a better understanding of the supply chain 
capabilities for PPE. Future materials acquisition programs for similar situations need better 
models as well as new data collection, data management, and data quality strategies. This study 
also provides a better understanding of the capabilities of U.S.-based companies to produce large 
quantities of specific PPE for both the current pandemic and future needs.  
Supply Chain Challenges in Healthcare  
Supply chain management in healthcare is a dynamic process that includes 
manufacturing facilities, purchasers, and distribution services for commodities and services to 
health providers and patients (Iyengar et al., 2020). Implementation of modern supply chain 
management strategies in the healthcare area has been extremely slow. The top three 
challenges in healthcare supply chain management are costs, including invisible costs, lack of 
supply chain health information technologies, and lack of quality. Many extra costs within the 
healthcare supply chain are a result of inefficient and unnecessary processes involved in the 
transportation and delivery of supplies from suppliers to healthcare providers. 
The lack of a modern information technology system for demand and supply chain 
transparency is another challenge. Exchanging health data is often difficult, and there are many 
problems with digital sharing. The number of competing health systems and different platforms 
creates addition complications. These inefficiencies often lead to delays, poor-quality care, and 
additional costs. Healthcare organizations are often highly dependent on group purchasing 
organizations and usually do not have access to details about the critical supply chains.  
During the pandemic, the demands for PPE were far higher than supplies, leading to 
rapid increases in prices for available PPE and serious shortages. Many new organizations took 
this opportunity to start producing needed PPE, often with little regard for standards and 
adequate quality. Many of these organizations, both manufacturers and distributors, had no 
experience in producing and/or distributing these products. Promises were made with no 
certainty the supplies could be produced or sourced, extreme delays in delivery—or sometimes 
any delivery—were common. It is also clear, even in non-pandemic situations, that supply chain 
management is more complex in healthcare than in other industries because of the impact on 
people’s health, requiring adequate and accurate medical supply according to the patient’s 
needs (Beier, 1995).  
Supply Chain of Personal Protective Equipment 
According to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) is defined as equipment that is worn with the objective of 
minimizing the exposure to hazardous substances. The most common items are gloves, foot 
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and eye protection, protective hearing devices, hard hats, respirators, and full body suits 
(OSHA, 2004). 
PPE plays a critical, major role in healthcare environments and many other industries. 
PPE is used by professionals, especially healthcare workers, who are exposed to viruses, 
infections, and disease during their daily activities. The use of PPE is essential to protect 
healthcare workers from disease spread (CDC, 2004). These protective items like gloves, 
gowns, masks, respirators, googles, and face shields became especially critical products during 
the COVID-19 pandemic in healthcare systems. 
One of the main characteristics of the supply chain of PPE in the United States is that it 
is similar to many other goods based on demand. Products are manufactured only in sufficient 
quantities to cover the anticipated normal demand, leaving little ability to increase production if 
needed (Patel, 2017). As a result, it becomes extremely difficult to accommodate abrupt 
increases in the demand, as would happen with a public health crisis similar to the current 
pandemic, where demand increased rapidly.  
Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic in Healthcare Supply Chain and Personal Protective 
Equipment Shortages 
As the coronavirus pandemic spread across the world rapidly, healthcare systems 
quickly faced major shortages in many countries. Production and distribution of PPE to 
healthcare frontline workers quickly became one of the main public health challenges during 
COVID-19. 
There are a number of factors that contributed to the massive shortages of PPE. The 
practice of many healthcare organizations and their purchasing organizations of just-in-time 
delivery was one of these factors (Rondinone et al., 2021). This practice, which works well in 
normal time, limited excess inventory and unnecessary costs. However, this model did not have 
the necessary flexibility to meet the current situation with rapid increases in demand. Suppliers 
who normally produced based on a predictable and regular demand struggled to change their 
production processes to meet the rapid changes in demand. The inventory management 
strategies that meet normal demand cycles need a reconsideration to avoid shortages of 
essential supplies in medical crises (Patrinley et al., 2020). 
Another factor that contributed to the current shortages is the global nature of the 
medical supply industry. Around 50% of masks used in the world are made in one country, 
China. As the virus hit China first, the lockdowns there stopped production quickly, causing 
significant shortages of masks throughout the world (Wang et al., 2020). 
U.S. Response to COVID-19 and Personal Protective Equipment Shortages 
After the COVID-19 epidemic began, there were no clear ideas for countries to proceed 
and control the spread of the virus. The spread of the virus is not only through air by coughs and 
sneezes, but also through contact surfaces as well as community transmission (CDC, 2020; 
WebMD, n.d.). Different countries responded differently to this situation; preparing PPE for the 
healthcare frontline workers and general people was a critical and immediate job in every 
country.  
The U.S. government, like other countries, needed proactive responses to ensure the 
safety of citizens. Travel restriction was one of the first U.S. responses to COVID-19. It was 
mandatory to confirm that the virus was not carried through travelers from other countries. 
Screening at the port of entry and mandatory home quarantine was assured for travelers 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2020).The United States’ second action was stay-at-home 
orders instructing citizens to restrict their commuting outside their homes if not required 
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(Mervosh et al., 2020). Practicing social distancing and wearing masks in public areas were also 
recommended by the U.S. government and the CDC (Barthel, 2020; Kopecki, 2020). Many felt 
that despite these actions, the U.S. government made a delayed response to the COVID-19 
crisis (Pew Research Center, 2020). 
In addition, the United States faced large PPE shortages during COVID-19. Hospitals 
and other healthcare providers were faced with extremely high demand for PPE products. The 
radical increase in demand significantly affected the supply chain network, which caused many 
shortages of supplies and many disruptions in distribution. Most hospitals had only a few days 
of PPE on hand when COVID-19 hit their regions, and the national stockpile was exhausted 
quickly. Most hospitals traditionally relied on third-party organizations for supply chain 
management, who in turn focused primarily on low-cost supplies primarily manufactured outside 
of the United States. Many of these offshore suppliers, naturally, had diverted their production to 
the needs of their own countries. Several U.S. companies that supplied a significant percentage 
of PPE found that some parts of their supply chains were disrupted (Arangdad et al., 2021).  
The United States had not only failed to provide a prompt, transparent response, but it 
also was not successful in delivering enough PPE to frontline healthcare providers (Zurcher, 
2020; Robbins & Garde, 2020). A large number of deaths could had been avoided by timely 
response (Sebenius & Sebenius, 2020). However, no country was sufficiently prepared for such 
a pandemic, and the U.S. government is no exception. However, in some ways the U.S. 
response to COVID-19 has been remarkable. In response to these shortages, many companies, 
organizations, and universities made great efforts to help with this crisis.  
Many apparel companies quickly turned their production lines to making masks and 
gowns. Nonwoven companies focused the melt blown and spun bond nonwovens facilities and 
expertise to produce specially designed fabrics that can be delivered to U.S. manufacturers to 
produce respirators. 
Many non-textile manufacturers (e.g., Ford and Honeywell) also responded to contribute 
to the manufacture of PPE (Ford, 2020; Honeywell, 2021). Many universities also responded to 
the current critical situation. Even though most universities suspended their normal operations in 
March, switching to an online format to protect students, professors, staff and some research 
laboratories remained open to assist with PPE supplies. Institutions around the country have 
worked hard in the past months to assist with the manufacture of materials required for the 
construction of PPE, to assemble finished products, or to produce innovative products and 
technologies as an alternative to the shortages of traditional PPE items. 
Management of COVID-19 Data in the United States 
The current PPE needs were identified using the data on patients in hospitals, in states, 
and in regions of the country. In the first few months, PPE needs were further complicated by a 
lack of testing resources and extremely long turn-around times for test results. This situation 
created large numbers of “suspected COVID-19 cases” that had to be treated exactly as a 
known case, creating double or even triple use of PPE. Further complicating the PPE demand 
estimates was the fact that many PPE were single use, meant to be used once and thrown 
away. When PPE shortages became critical, many hospitals started reusing these PPE, and 
many organizations created and published methods for cleaning and reusing what were 
considered disposable items.  
Data helps to evaluate existing situations, predict upcoming crises, and make influential 
decisions (Lithios, 2020). 
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) was created in the United States in 2002 through 
federal funding and other initiatives related to the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism and 
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Response Act. The expressed purpose was to create a special inventory of items that could 
provide healthcare workers and other professions with critical supplies during a health crisis. 
This stockpile included many PPE items such as gloves, masks, and surgical gowns as a result 
of both real and simulated health emergencies (Yorio et al., 2019). During the recent pandemic, 
these supplies were quickly exhausted. There was much uncertainty and a lack of unified 
knowledge in sourcing for specific product components and testing requirements, as well as a 
lack of connection between product suppliers, healthcare organization needs, and the 
healthcare systems.  
Handfield et al. (2020) have reviewed the current situation of the SNS and made several 
recommendations for major changes in the SNS. The development of strategic plans was 
recommended, which can be incorporated in the supply chain. It is essential to use all resources 
from the federal SNS for PPE manufacturing and exploring the quality of needed products and 
the required storage space for such products, as well as keeping inventories relevant with the 
most proper product replacement system (Handfield et al., 2020). The recommendations of 
Handfield et al. (2020) and others should be a priority for the U.S. Administration and Congress 
to rethink the SNS.  
Prediction Models Based on Personal Protective Equipment Needs 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a fundamental challenge to managing supply and 
demand on a massive scale. High demand of critical products and shortage in supply had a 
huge impact on healthcare supply chains. We are just beginning to understand and study what 
worked and what didn’t. 
Although the current pandemic has been addressed primarily by the healthcare systems 
and public health organizations, concepts from operations management shed light on many of 
the challenges faced by the healthcare industry. It is clear that many of the operational problems 
during the COVID-19 pandemic stem from the current supply chain management systems that 
have been primarily designed for cost efficiency. The challenges managing supply chains during 
a pandemic require flexible systems designed to quickly adapt to a rapidly changing landscape. 
COVID-19 has taught us that healthcare systems must have more flexible backup systems for 
supply chains to stymie disease spread and adequately equip providers to care for patients in 
their time of need (Patrinley et al., 2020). 
Three Short Examples 
The following three short examples illustrate many of the problems in creating working 
supply chains for PPE during a pandemic.  
One of the first shortages was protective gowns for nurses, patients, and others in 
healthcare settings. Soon, pictures were appearing in the national press of nurses wearing 
garbage bags in an effort to be at least partially protected. Although a high percentage of 
hospital gowns were usually made by a major U.S. company, it was soon discovered that their 
major supplier of fabric in Central America had been closed, and existing fabric supplies were 
soon exhausted. Two of the largest cotton yarn manufacturers in the world are located in the 
United States, and there is actually a large weaving capacity. A number of companies soon 
created a coalition to respond to the crisis, providing millions of yards of high-quality fabric for 
the production of gowns. But as soon as low-cost supplies were available from other countries, 
the gown manufacturers sourced the cheapest fabrics, and the U.S. manufacturers were left 
holding millions of yards of fabric in unsold inventories.  
Face shields were also in extremely short supply during the early days of the pandemic, 
and some healthcare providers are still reporting difficulties in sourcing the numbers they need. 
There were many stories of organizations quickly pivoting to make these shields. Many 
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organizations, especially research labs in universities, have numerous 3D printers. Designs for 
the face shields were rapidly shared, and soon tens of thousands of face shields were being 
produced. One university even partnered with a nearby medical school whose students worked 
in its mechanical engineering labs in shifts, producing shields for all the nearby hospitals. 
Although there were some problems sourcing the polymers for the shields, the main bottleneck 
quickly became the elastic for the headbands for the shields. The shield makers, almost all not 
connected to the apparel and textile manufacturing complex, found themselves competing with 
the manufacturers of surgical face masks and N95 respirators for short-supply, narrow-width 
elastic fabrics.  
The most critical PPE shortage was the N95 respirators needed in healthcare settings. 
The N95 respirator is designed to achieve a close facial fit and efficiently filter airborne particles 
when properly worn. The FDA states that the N95 should be discarded after each patient 
encounter. They should not be shared or reused. The N95 respirator is evaluated, tested, and 
approved by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as per the 
requirements of 42 C.F.R. Part 84. The CDC did not recommend these for the general public 
since they are critical supplies that should be reserved for healthcare workers and other medical 
first responders. The shortages of these critical PPE items were so great that many healthcare 
workers were asked to wear theirs for several days or even weeks or resorted to wearing the 
less efficient surgical masks or even homemade cloth masks.  
The N95 respirator is typically made of three layers of nonwoven materials, two spun 
bond and one melt blown, with the spun bond layers providing structural integrity and the melt 
blown layer providing the filtering capability. Although the United States is still the number one 
producer of nonwovens in the world, almost all plants were already running at close to full 
capacity prior to the pandemic, with many making other critical healthcare supplies. It was 
difficult, but not impossible, for these companies to pivot to add the melt blown fabric capabilities 
to produce the critical filter layer. But almost all of the high-quality nonwoven machinery is made 
outside the United States; backlogs for the German equipment that could help companies ramp 
up to meet the N95 needs were 3 to 6 months, even with expedited deliveries. Other equipment 
was needed to add automated lines to mold the completed respirators into the critical shapes 
required, to attach the headbands, and to package the completed product. Although these 
upgrades to the nonwoven manufacturing plants were available—even after a rather long 
delay—the potential manufacturers were reluctant to make the multi-million-dollar investments 
with the uncertain market conditions and the almost certain feeling that the healthcare providers 
would switch quickly to lower-cost offshore products as soon as they were again available (FDA, 
2020).  
The previous examples illustrate several major issues. Almost all of the critical PPE 
could be manufactured in the United States and distributed quickly to the healthcare providers 
and others with critical needs. No producer of the end items controlled the supply chains end-to-
end needed to produce these items. Most producers were concerned that critical elements of 
the supply chain would revert to the lowest cost producers outside the United States as soon as 
possible. These concerns were well founded. Most potential producers of PPE were concerned 
that they would not be able to recoup their investments in new equipment or facilities, as 
purchasers would revert to sourcing the lowest cost products when they could. Many also 
feared that critical elements of the supply chain would soon be refocused on higher-end 
products as retail customers returned or companies returned to normal production.  
Other countries countered these concerns in several ways. Taiwan created an adequate 
supply of face masks quickly by providing loans for new equipment that would be forgiven after 
a specified number of masks were provided to the government. This strategy worked amazingly 
well. Not only were the supplies created for use in Taiwan quickly, but these companies soon 
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became exporters of these masks to other countries still facing shortages (Jao, 2020). The 
United Kingdom, also facing severe shortages, used a different approach. The government 
guaranteed purchase of a large number of critical PPE items if manufacturers quickly ramped 
up production to provide what was needed. This is almost the identical approach the United 
States used for accelerating the creation and production of the vaccines by Pfizer. Some 
countries just made direct grants for needed equipment to encourage companies to become 
capable of producing needed PPE.  
Compounding the problems addressed previously was the lack of reliable test facilities 
for assuring that the products created or rapidly sourced from new suppliers and distributors met 
the quality standards created by the FDA, CDC, and NIOSH. Examples of products that failed 
even the basic measures of quality were common. Sometimes over 80–90% of masks were 
found to be substandard in a large shipment. Some healthcare providers enlisted labs at local 
universities to provide basic testing on shipments of suspect quality. Other organizations 
created in-house facilities to do at least rudimentary testing. The largest provider of the critical 
N95 mask in the United States sued five vendors who targeted officials in three states by 
offering nonexistent N95 respirators. Federal agents in the United States seized more than 10 
million fake 3M brand N95 masks in early 2021 (Long, 2021). In the United Kingdom, 50 million 
masks bought by the government were not used by the National Health Service (NHS) because 
of safety concerns (Kemp, 2020). 
COVID-19 and the U.S. Textile Supply Chain 
The U.S. textile supply chain is actually far stronger than most people realize. In 2019, 
the U.S. textile supply chain accounted for 585,000 jobs and $29 billion in exports, with the total 
value of shipments of man-made fibers, yarns, fabrics, apparel, and non-apparel sewn products 
around $76 billion. New investments in 2018 (the last year data are available) were $2.5 billion. 
The United States is the world’s second largest exporter of textiles (Glas, 2021).  
The economic crisis of COVID-19 led to sharp drops in demand from retail customers, 
forcing many textile and apparel companies to reduce capacity. Clothing sales fell by 49% in 
March 2020, 87% in April, and 63% in May. Some textile companies were running at 10% of 
capacity at the height of the crisis (Glas, 2021). The capabilities of the U.S. textile and apparel 
supply chains and the available capacities during the COVID-19 pandemic makes one wonder 
whether even the most basic coordination efforts and leadership by the U.S. government could 
have created surpluses of critical PPE rather than the shortages which still exist in 2021. We 
feel that any of the approaches used to stimulate production mentioned previously could have 
made major impacts.  
There are currently many proposals in the U.S. Congress for stimulating the production 
of PPE in the United States and providing a more stable manufacturing base before the next 
crisis. Information on some of these initiatives is available at the website created by the National 
Council of Textile Organizations, MakeAmericaPPE.org. One worry is that we will create 
nationalistic policies to restrict exports when questions arise as to how much inventory resides 
in stockpiles (Finkenstadt & Handfield, 2021). These are desperate measures taken by 
governments under pressure by citizens concerned about their own healthcare system 
shortages and ignore the bigger issues facing governments in the face of a crisis: the lack of 
global stewardship for combating a world crisis (Finkenstadt & Handfield, 2021).  
Discussion and Conclusion 
When the demand for products changes rapidly and dramatically, the supply chain is 
stressed. Normally, products are manufactured only in sufficient quantities to cover the 
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anticipated normal demand, leaving little ability to increase production if needed (Patel et al., 
2017) 
There was uncertainty and a lack of unified knowledge in sourcing for specific product 
components, testing requirements, and a lack of connection between product suppliers, needs, 
and the healthcare systems. 
One of the pervasive challenges throughout this pandemic has been the lack of 
information. Data needed to understand what was needed, when, and where was often totally 
lacking or of extremely poor quality. Over 6 months into the pandemic, the federal government 
was still making changes to who was responsible for the data collection and analysis on even 
such basic information as number of cases, hospitalization, ICU utilization, and deaths 
(Davenport et al., 2020).  
Blindly ordering materials based on flawed best guesses will create many shortages, 
overstocks, and even wrong supplies similar to what we have experienced with COVID-19. 
The second part of our research was to develop an understanding of the capabilities of 
U.S.-based companies to produce large quantities of specific PPE for both the current pandemic 
and future needs. Unlike supply chains in the automotive and aerospace industries with well-
defined tiers of suppliers with which we were familiar, we found healthcare systems were 
heavily reliant on group purchasing organizations that are focused almost entirely on the costs 
of the end items. These organizations have little knowledge of the critical supply chain 
elements. Future healthcare materials acquisition programs should be based on much deeper 
understandings of the entire supply chain. Clear specifications not just for end products but also 
for intermediate materials must be developed. Quality measurement plans must be 
implemented for each critical phase of the supply chains. There needs to be a strong feedback 
from end users back through each stage of the supply chain to quickly address problems. We 
feel that this work has implications for anyone in the healthcare supply chain space (DoD task 
forces, DLA, DHA, FEMA, DHHS, DHS, state, local, and healthcare systems). Even beyond the 
healthcare supply chain space, this work should be of use to anyone concerned about better 
approaches to prepare for contingency sourcing. 
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Abstract 
Science and Technology (S&T) programs serve an important function in the defense acquisition 
process as the initial phase leading to discovery and development of warfighting technology. The 
results of these programs impact the larger Major Defense Acquisition Programs that integrate 
the technologies in subsequent phases of the lifecycle. Despite this important role, little prior 
research has examined the performance of S&T programs. Therefore, we investigate the impact 
of technological maturation as a critical success factor in S&T programs. The results suggest that 
S&T programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience above average cost growth 
and larger contract values while being less likely to experience schedule growth. Additionally, we 
find the partnership method between the government and contractor matters for both 
technological maturation and schedule growth. Lastly, the nature of the S&T program is 
important, with aerospace programs more likely to technologically mature than human systems 
programs. 
An Analysis of Science and Technology Program Performance 
Program management focuses on cost, schedule, and performance as the three key 
measures of success (Meredith & Mantel, 2003; Pinto & Slevin, 1998). A large body of literature 
identifies critical factors that lead to program success in both private industry (Nasir & 
Sahibuddin, 2011; Pinto & Slevin, 1987; Zwikael & Globerson, 2006) and the public sector 
(Rendon, 2012; Rodriguez-Segura et al., 2016; Tishler et al., 1996). Prior analyses of program 
performance in defense programs, however, have focused almost exclusively on larger, more 
mature programs that have reached the Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase 
of the lifecycle or beyond. An abundance of studies exploring cost growth or schedule growth 
can be found for these Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs; Bolten et al., 2008; 
Cancian, 2010; Smirnoff & Hicks, 2008). Missing from the literature is an exploration of smaller 
programs that feed basic science and technologies to subsequent acquisition programs or that 
develop new systems and technologies on a smaller scale. These are the Science and 
Technology (S&T) programs that are undertaken in defense research labs. This article seeks to 
bridge that gap through an exploratory analysis of program performance in Air Force S&T 
programs. 
Importance of Science and Technology 
The vision to implement science and technology as a centerpiece of our nation’s 
airpower strategy has been around since 1945 (Duffner, 2000). General H. H. “Hap” Arnold, 
commanding general of the Army Air Forces, enlisted the aid of leading aeronautics scientist Dr. 
Theodore von Karman to lead the first of these efforts, recommending the creation of an agency 
devoted exclusively to aeronautical research and development (Gorn, 1988). Over time, that 
agency has evolved to what is known today as the Air Force Research Laboratories (AFRL; 
Duffner, 2000). 
S&T’s enduring importance is demonstrated in the 2019 publication of the Air Force 
Science and Technology Strategy for 2030. The 2030 S&T strategy aligns with the National 
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Defense Strategy to empower S&T programs to develop and deliver warfighting capabilities 
rapidly and effectively (U.S. Air Force, 2019). How does S&T fulfill this need? S&T functions as 
the initial phase of the acquisition process by which technologies are matured and, where 
appropriate, transitioned for acquisition by the Air Force (Office of the Chief Scientist of the U.S. 
Air Force, 2010). Continual advancement in these cutting-edge technologies is crucial, as the 
Air Force faces ever-changing threats and adversarial advancements in technology. 
The Anatomy of Air Force Research Labs 
The S&T data analyzed in this paper are from AFRL programs. A brief organizational 
description is provided for those unfamiliar with the laboratories. AFRL is headquartered at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB) in Ohio. It is comprised of nine technology directorates 
in the continental United States and four locations overseas in Hawaii, the United Kingdom, 
Chile, and Japan, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: AFRL Locations and Major Offices 
 
Each technology directorate focuses on the development and innovation of leading-edge 
technologies and is separated by technological capabilities. A list of AFRL’s technology 
directorates, office symbols, and program descriptions are provided in Table 1. The analysis of 
individual technical directorates will be one of the ways this research segments the data. 
 
Table 1: AFRL Technology Directorates 
Technology Directorate Symbol Program Descriptions 
Air Force Office of Scientific 
 
AFOSR Basic Research Manager for AFRL 
711th Human Performance Wing RH Aerospace Medicine, Human Systems Integration 
Directed Energy Directorate RD Laser, Electromagnetics, Electro-Optics 
Information Directorate RI Information Fusion, Exploitation, Networking 
Aerospace Systems Directorate RQ Aerodynamics, Flight Control, Engines, Propulsion 
Space Vehicle Directorate RV Space-Based Surveillance, Capability Protection 
Munitions Directorate RW Air-Launched Munitions 
Materials & Manufacturing 
 
RX Aircraft, Spacecraft, Missiles, Rockets 
Sensors Directorate RY Sensors for Reconnaissance, Surveillance 
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Measures of Success: The Role of Technology Readiness Levels 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has identified technology maturation as a critical 
success factor in product development (GAO, 1999). The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 
approach to incorporate this critical success factor has been to emphasize Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRLs) as a measure for selecting mature technologies for inclusion in a 
program (DoD, 2011). The TRL concept was developed by NASA (Sadin et al., 1989) and has 
subsequently been adopted by AFRL. A TRL is a tool to measure the technology maturity of a 
system or subsystem using a nine-level ordinal scale (DoD, 2011). Detailed TRL definitions and 
descriptions can be found in Appendix A. 
It is believed that “programs that enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD) phase of the Defense Acquisition System and have immature technologies will incur cost 
growth and schedule slippage” (DoD, 2009). In an effort to reduce the risk associated with 
entering the EMD phase of the acquisition lifecycle at Milestone B, DoD Instruction 5000.02 
requires technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant environment (i.e., obtain a TRL of at least 
6; DoD, 2011). AFRL, through the S&T programs it oversees, serves a key role in the creation 
and maturation of these technologies to reach those thresholds. 
Despite TRLs being identified as a critical success factor, the literature is sparse with 
empirical examinations. The dearth of analysis is particularly acute for S&T type programs, but 
even MDAPs have relatively few studies examining TRLs. Dubos et al. (2008) analyzed the 
relationship between technology uncertainty and schedule slippage in the space industry. Their 
research resulted in the creation of TRL-schedule-risk curves that are intended to assist 
program managers to make informed decisions regarding the appropriate TRL to consider when 
confronted with schedule constraints. The research of Dubos et al. (2008) suggested a close 
relationship between technology uncertainty and schedule risk, where the more mature a 
technology is (the higher the TRL), the less potential schedule slippage. 
Katz et al. (2015) specifically studied the relationship of TRLs to cost and schedule 
changes during the EMD phase. They found that weapon systems that achieved a TRL of 7 or 
greater at Milestone B had a lower probability of schedule slippage during the EMD phase than 
weapons systems that had a TRL of less than 7. While Katz et al. (2015) found evidence to 
suggest that technology maturity is related to schedule change, they did not find a relationship 
with cost changes. 
Smoker and Smith (2007), however, found evidence that suggests costs vary 
exponentially across time as the system’s technology progresses through each TRL. Similarly, 
Linick (2017) found that as the TRL increased throughout the development phase, the percentage 
of the development cost increased at an increasing rate. As shown by the literature, the extant 
TRL studies are primarily focused on programs once they reach the EMD stage. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no studies that focus solely on S&T programs—a gap this paper is 
designed to fill. 
Data 
The data for this research was obtained from the AFRL cost and economics division. 
S&T programs typically fall below the dollar threshold for traditional standardized reporting 
such as Contract Performance Reports (CPRs). Instead, the S&T programs receive Funds and 
Man-Hour Expenditure Reports (FMERs). These FMERs provide the procuring activity visibility 
into the contractor’s expenditures for labor, materials and parts, travel, subcontractors, and other 
charges. Like CPRs, these reports are required on a periodic basis from the contractor, usually 
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monthly. Unlike CPRs, FMERs do not report standardized cost elements like the ones found in 
MIL-STD-881D. The initial AFRL dataset consisted of 165 S&T programs with contract start 
dates spanning from 2009 to 2017. 
Research Summary Reports were also collected for these programs. These reports are 
generated at the start of the program (Initial), during the program (Periodic), and at the end of the 
program (Final). Research Summary Reports include general information such as the program 
title, lead technical directorate, and start/end dates. They also include DoD-required information 
such as performance type, joint capability area, Air Force technical capabilities, and TRLs. An 
example of a Research Summary Report can be found in Appendix B.  
Of the 165 programs obtained from AFRL, 43 are included in the final dataset. Table 2 
provides the exclusion criteria and associated number of programs remaining in the analysis.  
 





Programs Obtained from AFRL  165 
Missing Elements 64 101 
Inadequate TD Sample Size 10 91 
Less Than 92.5% Complete 48 43 
Final Dataset for Analysis  43 
 
As shown in Table 2, programs which had missing elements are excluded. These 64 
programs had their costs reported on the FMER in unique ways to include cost burn rates, 
earned value management graphs, total costs in phases, or simply an overall total cost or labor 
hours spent. These reporting methods lack the specific elements needed in this analysis to 
compute percentages of total cost which are used to observe the program’s behavior. Of the 
101 remaining programs, 10 programs fall under four different technical directorates (RD, RI, 
RX, and RY). Each technical directorate represents unique programs with different 
characteristics which precluded aggregation above the technical directorate level. Therefore, the 
small sample size in these directorates would likely skew the analysis results, especially when 
observing how these programs behave at the technical directorate level. For these reasons, the 
programs are excluded from the analysis. Finally, programs with a completion percentage of 
less than 92.5% are excluded from the dataset. A program’s completion percentage is 
computed using the total cost from the last available FMER to the program’s contract value at 
that time. Previous research determined that a program with a completion percentage of 92.5% 
or greater accurately predicts the final cost of the program (Tracy & White, 2011). The final 
number of programs in the dataset is 43, which is sufficient to conduct a robust analysis. 
Methods: Contingency Table Analysis 
The dataset consists largely of qualitative variables. Therefore, the methodological 
approach employed is a two-way contingency table analysis. This type of analysis is used to 
summarize the relationship between two categorical variables based on the data observed. The 
contingency table analysis uses a 2 × 2 table to test for independence. For each test, the same 
type of hypothesis test will be implemented, as shown in Equation 1: 
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𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜: The two classifications are independent 
(1)  
𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎: The two classifications are dependent 
 
The chi-square distribution is the test statistic used for considering inferences about the 
category probabilities. If there is a failure to reject the null, the two variables are independent 
and are not statistically related to one another. If the null is rejected, then the variables are 
dependent, and a statistical relationship exists between them. The two-way contingency 
analysis examines the categorical variables (see Table 3) with subsequent discussion on the 
rationale behind variable selection and categorization. 
When highly significant results are found, one of the benefits of a contingency table is 
that odds ratios and their associated confidence intervals can be produced. An odds ratio is a 
measure of association for a two-way contingency table. The ratio is the odds of an event 
occurring in one group to the odds of the same event occurring in another group. In other words, 
the odds ratio is the ratio of the probability of a property being present compared to the 
probability of it being absent. If the odds ratio is 1, the two events are independent. 
 
Table 3. Categorical Variables Used in Contingency Table Analysis 
Categorical Variables 
Technical Directorate Cost Growth > 0% 
Performance Type Cost Growth > 33.7% 
TRL Increase Cost Growth > 44.1% 
Last Known TRL ≥ 6 Cost Growth > 56.5% 
Final TRL ≥ 6 Cost Growth > 60.5% 
TRL 1 – 3 Cost Growth > 68% 
TRL 4 – 5 Contract Value > $1M 
TRL 6 – 7 Contract Value > $3M 
TRL 8 – 9   
Schedule Growth > 0%   
Schedule Growth > 33%   
Schedule Growth > 63%   
 
Categorical variables for the Technical Directorate (TD), Performance Type, and TRLs 
are obtained from the Research Summary Reports. The TD variable denotes which AFRL 
directorate is the lead on the program. Such a variable may capture 
organizational/managerial/technological differences. For this dataset, the TD variable is either 
RH or RQ. (This limitation is due to the sample size of the other TDs as previously discussed.) 
The performance type represents the partnership method between AFRL and the contractor. 
This variable consists of Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) and Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) relationships. This type of variable may capture 
differences due to the size, skills, or knowledge of the company types (e.g., small versus large 
companies). TRL data for the S&T programs are used in seven different categorical variables. 
TRL Increase indicates if the TRL increases at any point during the program’s lifecycle. Last 
Known TRL ≥ 6 denotes the last reported TRL of the program, while Final TRL ≥ 6 only 
analyzes programs that have a Final Research Summary Report. The decision to categorize 
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based on TRL level 6 is due to the role this TRL level fulfills in the defense acquisition process. 
Specifically, a TRL of 6 is equivalent to demonstration in a relevant environment which is 
needed for a program to enter Milestone B (DoD, 2011). Four variables were created by 
grouping TRLs based on the maturity of the technology and the product’s requirements, as 
determined in the literature (GAO, 1999). See Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Using TRLs to Match Technology With Requirements  
(GAO, 1999) 
 
Additional variables of interest created from the Research Summary Report contract 
information include schedule growth, cost growth, and contract value. These attributes are 
commonly studied for acquisition programs at all phases of their lifecycles. 
The variables for cost growth, schedule growth, and contract value have been converted 
from continuous variables to categorical variables in order to be included in the contingency 
table analysis. Binary (or dummy) variables with methodical break points were created in order 
to test the relationships at different locations. These breakpoints were derived either from the 
literature review or from descriptive statistics of the variable itself in the dataset with its mean 
and/or median. For example, the mean cost growth of the dataset was 68%, which led to the 
creation of a dummy variable (Cost Growth > 68%), separating programs that are above and 
below the sample mean. Likewise, Bolten et al. (2008) distinguished mean and median 
percentages of total DoD and Air Force acquisition program development cost percentages. 
These thresholds from Bolten et al. (2008) are also examined. A summary of the break points 
can be seen in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Break Point Summary 
Category 
Break 
Point Reason Source 
Schedule Growth 0% Any growth Dataset 
  33% Median Dataset 
  63% Mean Dataset 
Cost Growth 0% Any growth Dataset 
  33.7% DoD Development – Median Bolten et al. (2008) 
  44.1% Air Force Development - Median Bolten et al. (2008) 
  56.5% DoD Development – Mean Bolten et al. (2008) 
  60.5% Air Force Development - Mean Bolten et al. (2008) 
  68% Mean Dataset 
Contract Value $1M Median Dataset 
  $3M Mean Dataset 
 
Results and Discussion 
The contingency table results are organized into four sections: technical directorate, 
performance type, TRL, and growth relationships. Using the chi-square distribution as the test 
statistic, relationships are identified when Pearson’s chi-squared test is significant at a p-value 
of less than 0.10. For highly significant results (p-value < 0.01), the odds ratio and its associated 
confidence interval are analyzed. It is important to note the possibility of spurious relationships. 
Spurious relationships occur when the two variables are associated but not causally related, 
possibly due to an unknown mediating variable. With the sheer number of 2 × 2 tables 
generated in this analysis, spurious relationships are possible. Therefore, only highly statistically 
significant results (p-value < 0.01) will be studied in detail (i.e., full contingency table shown), 
while the other significant variables are observed solely as potential findings. 
Technical Directorate 
The TD categorical variable denotes which AFRL directorate is the lead on the 
respective program: either RH (Airman Systems) or RQ (Aerospace Systems). Analyzing the TD 
variable resulted in 19 contingency tables to be tested for significance. Two variables were 
significant at an alpha of 0.10, and two were significant at an alpha of 0.05. The full set of test 
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Table 5. Contingency Table Results for Technical Directorate 
 
 
TRL Increase is the only TRL variable with a statistically significant relationship to TD. 
This test suggests that it is more probable to have a program’s TRL increase with RQ 
(Aerospace Systems) programs than with RH (Airman/Human Systems) programs. The RQ 
programs are comprised primarily of engine and propulsion (hardware) system technologies. 
The ability to transition RQ through TRL levels may be due to the relationship of hardware 
versus software (human systems interactions). It is likely easier to make advancements in 
hardware technologies as the testing, failures, and efficiencies may be more conclusive. 
Similarly, the contingency table results suggest that RQ programs are more probable to 
have cost growth as well as schedule growth that is greater than 33% (the dataset’s median) and 
63% (the dataset’s mean). This could be related to the maturing technology (increasing the TRL) 
of RQ programs. If the technology is maturing, a program office may be more likely to increase 
funding and schedule to keep the maturation on track. If the technologies do not mature, it could 
be that the agile nature of S&T programs allows for early decisions to cancel programs. In 




Last Known TRL ≥ 6





Schedule Growth > 0%
Schedule Growth > 33% (Median) **
Schedule Growth > 63% (Mean) *
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median)
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean)
Cost Growth > 0% *
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean)
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 4
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have cost growth, and have schedule growth (greater than the dataset mean and median) when 
compared to RH programs. 
Performance Type 
The performance type variable represents the partnership method between AFRL and 
the contractor: either Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) or Small Business 
Innovative Research (SBIR) relationships. This variable formed 19 contingency tables to be 
tested for significance. One variable was significant at an alpha of 0.10, two variables were 
significant at an alpha of 0.05, and two variables were significant at an alpha of 0.01. The full set 
of test results is provided in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Contingency Table Results for Performance Type 
 
 
Table 6 test results suggest that an S&T program with an RDT&E performance type is 
more likely to have or end with a TRL of at least 6 than an SBIR type program is. SBIR 
programs are developed by small domestic businesses, which potentially provides an agile way 
to stimulate high-tech innovation. But RDT&E programs are dominated by the larger, more 
experienced defense contractors. These results suggest that the larger defense contractors may 
obtain contracts with more mature technologies due to their capacity and ability to develop 






Last Known TRL ≥ 6 **





Schedule Growth > 0% *
Schedule Growth > 33% (Median)
Schedule Growth > 63% (Mean)
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median) ***
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean) ***
Cost Growth > 0%
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median)
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean)
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean)
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 5
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Furthermore, as a potential indication of RDT&E and SBIR working different kinds of 
programs from the start, one can observe that it is more probable to have contract values 
greater than $1 million (the dataset’s median) with RDT&E performance types, as seen in 
Figure 3. Testing significance when the contract value is greater than $3 million (the dataset’s 
mean) produces similar results to Figure 3, with an even smaller p-value. Again, this could be 
due to the differences in the types of contractors involved in RDT&E and SBIR programs. Larger 
defense contractors possibly obtain larger programs because they have more breadth of 
experience or capacity, while the small businesses obtain smaller contracts with a more 
constrained objective; the acquisition community often sees a similar relationship when the 
large defense contractors are prime on a large system and smaller vendors are subcontractors 
for a particular subsystem. Additionally, SBIR programs may target uncertain and risky 
technologies that small businesses research so that AFRL can evaluate which programs have 
the potential to develop into mature technologies. The scale of these uncertain programs may 
contribute to lower contract values. In fact, the odds ratio indicates that given the program has 
an SBIR performance type, the odds of the contract value being less than $1 million is 9.7 times 
higher than when the program has an RDT&E performance type. 
 
 
Figure 3. Contingency Table of Performance Type by Contract Value > $1 Million 
 
The Table 6 contingency test results also suggest that a program with an SBIR 
performance type is more likely to have schedule growth. While test results indicate that RDT&E 
programs are more likely to have higher TRL levels, the opposite could be said in that SBIR 
programs are more likely to have lower TRL levels. Less is known about these immature 
technologies, which could lead these small businesses to spend more time developing them, 
leading to schedule slippage. This result is consistent with the literature findings of Dubos et al. 
(2008). 
In summary, the results suggest that a program that has a performance type of RDT&E 
is more likely to have a TRL of 6. Furthermore, highly significant results point to evidence that a 
program that has a performance type of RDT&E is more likely to have a contract value greater 
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Technology Readiness Level 
TRL data was used to create seven different binary variables, as previously discussed. 
These seven TRL variables were tested for significance against the 11 performance variables to 
produce 77 contingency tables. Seven variables were significant at an alpha of 0.10, four 
variables were significant at an alpha of 0.05, and one variable was significant at an alpha of 
0.01. Despite registering significant Pearson p-values, the contingency table results for the 
seven significant variables at an alpha of 0.10 were found to be invalid. For all seven tests, the 
expected counts of two of the four cells were less than five. This violates an assumption for a 
valid chi-squared contingency table test, which states the sample size should be large enough 
so that the estimated expected count will be equal to five or more. As a further check, Fisher’s 
Exact Test—which is a non-parametric test for small samples—found all seven tests to be non-
significant. This result was largely due to the small number of programs with a TRL of 6–7 (5) 
and a Final TRL of ≥ 6 (4). The full set of test results is provided in Table 7 with special 
subscript designators on those test results deemed invalid. 
  
Table 7. Significant Contingency Tables for Technology Readiness Level 
 
 
The contingency table results suggest that an S&T program is more likely to have cost 
growth greater than 68% (the dataset’s mean) with a TRL of 6 or 7 but less likely to have 
schedule growth with a TRL ≥ 6. Such a finding, perhaps unusual for a development program, is 
both intuitive and precedent in an S&T context. With an early TRL (1–5), there is little 
knowledge of how the technology will mature. This poses a problem to program managers and 
cost estimators. As technologies mature, investments are made, which allow costs to grow over 
their initial estimates. As the technology integrates into a demonstration effort (TRL 6–8), the 















































Schedule Growth > 0% ** *1 *1
Schedule Growth > 33% (Median)
Schedule Growth > 63% (Mean)
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median) **
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean) ** ***
Cost Growth > 0% *1
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median) *1
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median) *1
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean) *1
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean) *1
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean) **
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 0 2 1 1 0 8 0
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These results support previous literature conducted on Air Force programs which concluded 
that estimated costs vary exponentially across time with the progression through the various 
TRLs (Smoker & Smith, 2007). However, for more mature technologies, there is a broader 
knowledge base available for the technology’s development due to more completed research. 
With a higher TRL, and thus more knowledge of the technology available, the better the chance 
of meeting schedule requirements (Dubos et al., 2008). This literature finding is also consistent 
with the results found here. 
Table 7 results also suggest that an S&T program is more likely to have contract values 
greater than $3 million (the dataset’s mean) with a TRL of 6 or greater and less likely to have 
contract values greater than $1 million (the dataset’s median) with a TRL of 1–3. The 
explanation is consistent with the aforementioned cost growth finding. As the program’s 
technology matures, additional investments are made, as shown in the contingency analysis 
results in Figure 4. In fact, the odds ratio indicates that given the program has a TRL of 6 or 7, 
the odds of the contract value being greater than $3 million is 14.5 times higher than a program 
with a TRL other than 6 or 7. 
 
 
Figure 4. Contingency Table of TRL 6–7 by Contract Value > $3 Million 
 
In summary, the TRL results suggest that programs with mature technologies are more 
likely to experience larger than average cost growth and larger contract values. Additionally, 
these programs are less likely to experience schedule growth. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that programs with immature technologies are less likely to have larger contract values. 
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Growth Relationships 
As previously shown, variables for TD, performance type, and TRL were tested for their 
relationships with cost growth, schedule growth, and contract value. An analysis was also 
conducted among these latter variables to analyze their relationships to each other; a total of 63 
relationships were tested for significance. Eight tests were significant at an alpha of 0.10, 11 
tests were significant at an alpha of 0.05, and 22 tests were significant at an alpha of 0.01. The 
full set of test results is provided in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Significant Contingency Tables for Growth Relationships 
 
 
The contingency table results suggest that it is more probable for S&T programs with 
larger contract values to experience cost growth. Observing cost growth relationships with the 
original two contract value variables (using the mean and median of the dataset) provided highly 
significant results. To explore the sensitivity of these relationships relative to the threshold used 
to define the binary variables, additional contract value variables were created with lower and 
higher breakpoints. This additional analysis found contract values greater than $0.9 million to be 
the lowest threshold for which a statistically significant relationship could be found with amount 
of cost growth (i.e., cost growth > 0%). As the contract value threshold increased, additional 
cost growth variables displayed statistical significance until all were significant at a contract 
value of $3 million. This suggests that cost growth and contract value have a positive correlation 
























































































































Contract Value > $0.9M ** ** 2
Contract Value > $1.0M (Median) 0
Contract Value > $3.0M (Mean) 0
Contract Value > $4.0M 0
Contract Value > $5.0M 0
Cost Growth > 0% ** *** *** *** *** ** ** * 8
Cost Growth > 33.7% (DoD Dev - Median) * * *** *** *** *** ** 7
Cost Growth > 44.1% (AF Dev - Median) * * *** *** *** *** ** 7
Cost Growth > 56.5% (DoD Dev - Mean) * ** *** *** *** ** 6
Cost Growth > 60.5% (AF Dev - Mean) * ** *** *** *** ** 6
Cost Growth > 68% (Mean) * *** *** *** *** 5
Total Significant Contingency Tables: 5 7 7 1 3 6 6 6 41
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Table 8 results also suggest that it is more probable for S&T programs with contract 
values greater than $0.9 million to experience schedule growth above the median and mean (i.e., 
greater than 33% and 63%, respectively). This was the only contract value variable to result in 
significant p-values when tested with schedule growth variables. These results imply that 
programs with contract values less than $0.9 million are less likely to experience schedule 
growth. 
Finally, the results suggest that if S&T programs are experiencing schedule growth, then 
it is more likely that they’re also experiencing cost growth. This seems to contradict the findings 
that programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience cost growth while being 
less likely to experience schedule growth. But further analysis of these results suggests that 
programs with large schedule growth percentages are even more likely to experience cost growth 
at all amounts. This is because it is the immature technology programs that are experiencing both 
the schedule and cost growth. 
In summary, the results suggest that S&T programs with larger contract values 
experience cost growth, while programs with smaller contract values are less likely to experience 
schedule growth. Finally, analyzing the relationship between cost and schedule growth suggests 
that programs with schedule growth are more likely to have cost growth as well. Deeper analysis 
revealed that this schedule growth/cost growth relationship is found in those programs with 
immature technologies. 
Conclusion 
S&T programs serve an important role in the defense acquisition process. They 
constitute the initial phase of the acquisition process through discovery and development of 
warfighting technology. The results of these programs impact the larger MDAPs that integrate 
the technologies in subsequent phases of the lifecycle. Despite this important role, little prior 
research has examined the performance of S&T programs. Thus, the overarching goal of this 
paper was to discern new insights from an analysis of S&T program characteristics in relation to 
their program’s performance. 
The literature review identified technological maturity as a critical success factor in 
product development (GAO, 1999). One measure defense programs use for technological 
maturity is TRL levels. TRLs, therefore, were an integral component under investigation in this 
analysis. The objective was to understand how TRLs affect S&T program performance. There 
are several key findings. 
First, the results suggest that aerospace programs are more likely to technologically 
mature when compared to human system programs. In other words, the AFRL aerospace 
programs are more likely to increase the TRLs in their programs. To the extent that 
technological maturity is a measure of success, the aerospace programs outperform. However, 
this technical performance comes at a cost, as the aerospace programs were also more likely to 
experience cost and schedule growth. Intuitively, these results are compatible; with proven 
success in technology maturation, increases in funding and schedule are likely to keep the 
maturation on track. 
Second, the partnership method between the government and contractor matters. The 
partnerships for S&T programs consist of SBIR and RDT&E relationships. The RDT&E 
programs are more likely to have and end with a TRL of 6 or more in comparison to SBIR 
programs. The result is not entirely surprising because, by definition, the larger defense 
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companies comprise the RDT&E category. These larger companies have the capacity and 
resources to mature technology that the smaller SBIR companies may not possess. 
Third, TRLs and program performance are linked. The relationships with TRLs suggest 
that programs with mature technologies are more likely to experience above-average cost 
growth and larger contract values while less likely to experience schedule growth. Additionally, 
the results suggest that programs with immature technologies are less likely to have larger 
contract values. As technologies mature, additional funds for investments are made, which 
increases costs over their initial contract values. This is likely to happen when the program is 
met with new and unexpected challenges as the technology integrates into a demonstration 
effort (TRL 6–8). Linick (2017) found that as the TRL increased throughout the development 
phase, the percentage of the development cost increased at an increasing rate. This literature 
finding is in agreement with these results. Conversely, as these technologies mature, there is a 
broader knowledge base for their development, which increases the chance of meeting 
schedule requirements. 
Lastly, the analysis of “growth” variables (cost growth, schedule growth, and contract 
value) provides additional insights on S&T programs. Specifically, the analysis suggests that 
S&T programs with larger contract values experience larger cost growth at the same time 
programs with smaller contract values are less likely to experience schedule growth. Further 
analyzing the relationship between cost and schedule growth, the results suggest that if 
programs have larger schedule growth, then they are more likely to have larger cost growth as 
well. Deeper analysis revealed that this schedule growth/cost growth relationship is found in 
those programs with immature technologies. 
Prior examinations of S&T programs are scarce. Thus, the possibilities for future 
research are vast. The exploratory analysis conducted here focused solely on AFRL programs. 
S&T programs in the other military services warrant examination. Additionally, one of the more 
surprising aspects of the data obtained from S&T programs was the reported TRL at various 
stages of the program’s lifecycle. In order for a program to advance past Milestone B into the 
EMD phase, a program must have a TRL of 6 or greater. Further research into those S&T 
programs whose technology matured (TRL increased) could identify common characteristics 
which indicate a higher probability of technological maturation. The exploratory analysis 
provided here was just the first step of the journey. Through future research and discoveries, the 
knowledge needed to increase the odds for successful S&T programs is possible. 
 
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. 
 
Appendix A. TRL Definitions, Descriptions, and Supporting Information 
TRL Definition Description Supporting Information 
1 Basic principles 
observed and 
reported. 
Lowest level of technology readiness. 
Scientific research begins to be 
translated into applied research and 
development (R&D). Examples might 
include paper studies of a 
technology’s basic properties. 
Published research that 
identifies the principles that 
underlie this technology. 




Invention begins. Once basic 
principles are observed, practical 
Publications or other references 
that outline the application 
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TRL Definition Description Supporting Information 
application 
formulated. 
applications can be invented. 
Applications are speculative, and 
there may be no proof or detailed 
analysis to support the assumptions. 
Examples are limited to analytic 
studies. 
being considered and that 
provide analysis to support the 
concept. 





Active R&D is initiated. This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory 
studies to physically validate the 
analytical predictions of separate 
elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that 
are not yet integrated or 
representative. 
Results of laboratory tests 
performed to measure 
parameters of interest and 
comparison to analytical 
predictions for critical 
subsystems. References to 
who, where, and when these 
tests and comparisons were 
performed. 
4 Component and/or 
breadboard 
validation in a 
laboratory 
environment. 
Basic technological components are 
integrated to establish that they will 
work together. This is relatively “low 
fidelity” compared with the eventual 
system. Examples include integration 
of “ad hoc” hardware in the 
laboratory. 
System concepts that have 
been considered and results 
from testing laboratory scale 
breadboard(s). References to 
who did this work and when. 
Provide an estimate of how 
breadboard hardware and test 
results differ from the expected 
system goals. 
5 Component and/or 
breadboard 
validation in a 
relevant 
environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology 
increases significantly. The basic 
technological components are 
integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so they can be 
tested in a simulated environment. 
Examples include “high-fidelity” 
laboratory integration of components. 
Results from testing laboratory 
breadboard system are 
integrated with other supporting 
elements in a simulated 
operational environment. How 
does the “relevant environment” 
differ from the expected 
operational environment? How 
do the test results compare with 
expectations? What problems, 
if any, were encountered? Was 
the breadboard system refined 
to more nearly match the 
expected system goals? 
6 System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in a 
relevant 
environment. 
Representative model or prototype 
system, which is well beyond that of 
TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major 
step up in a technology’s 
demonstrated readiness. Examples 
include testing a prototype in a high-
fidelity laboratory environment or in a 
simulated operational environment. 
Results from laboratory testing 
of a prototype system that is 
near the desired configuration 
in terms of performance, 
weight, and volume. How did 
the test environment differ from 
the operational environment? 
Who performed the tests? How 
did the test compare with 
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TRL Definition Description Supporting Information 
expectations? What problems, 
if any, were encountered? What 
are/were the plans, options, or 
actions to resolve problems 
before moving to the next 
level? 
7 System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational 
environment. 
Prototype near or at planned 
operational system. Represents a 
major step up from TRL 6 by 
requiring demonstration of an actual 
system prototype in an operational 
environment (e.g., in an aircraft, in a 
vehicle, or in space). 
Results from testing a prototype 
system in an operational 
environment. Who performed 
the tests? How did the test 
compare with expectations? 
What problems, if any, were 
encountered? What are/were 
the plans, options, or actions to 
resolve problems before 
moving to the next level? 





Technology has been proven to work 
in its final form and under expected 
conditions. In almost all cases, this 
TRL represents the end of true 
system development. Examples 
include developmental test and 
evaluation (DT&E) of the system in 
its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design 
specifications. 
Results of testing the system in 
its final configuration under the 
expected range of 
environmental conditions in 
which it will be expected to 
operate. Assessment of 
whether it will meet its 
operational requirements. What 
problems, if any, were 
encountered? What are/were 
the plans, options, or actions to 
resolve problems before 
finalizing the design? 




Actual application of the technology 
in its final form and under mission 
conditions, such as those 
encountered in operational test and 
evaluation (OT&E). Examples include 
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Abstract 
Engineering involves designing solutions to meet the needs of markets or missions. 
Organizations would like to have the flexibility and agility to address both uncertain needs and 
uncertain technologies for meeting these needs. This article presents and illustrates a decision 
framework that enables flexibility and agility and provides guidance on when to pursue optimal, 
highly integrated solutions. We consider how uncertainties arise, contrasting the automotive and 
defense domains. We propose an approach to managing uncertainties. We consider how to 
represent alternative solutions and project the value of each alternative, including how market or 
mission requirements can be translated into system requirements. Possible use cases for our 
framework are discussed. A detailed case study of autonomous vehicles for enhancing the 
mobility of disabled and older adults is presented. 
Introduction 
Much of engineering involves designing solutions to meet the needs of markets, or 
perhaps military missions or societal sector needs such as water, power, and transportation. 
These needs are often uncertain, especially if solutions are intended to operate far into the 
future. 
There is also often uncertainty in how best to meet needs. New technologies may be 
needed, and their likely performance and cost may be uncertain. Budgets may be insufficient to 
achieve what is needed. Competitors or adversaries may be creating competing solutions that 
are similar or superior. 
Organizations would like to have the flexibility and agility to address both uncertain 
needs and uncertain technologies due to performance challenges, organizational experience, 
supply chains, and so on. This is likely to require ways of thinking and allocating resources that 
are foreign to many organizations. This article outlines and illustrates these ways of thinking. 
To illustrate how companies address uncertainties, consider two experiences at General 
Motors (GM). Both illustrations involved Ford surprising GM. The first led to a major failure and 
the second to a substantial success (Hanawalt & Rouse, 2010).  
In 1981, General Motors began planning for a complete refresh of its intermediate-size 
vehicles: the front wheel drive A-cars and the older rear wheel drive G-cars. The GM10 program 
would yield vehicles badged as Chevrolets, Pontiacs, Oldsmobiles, and Buicks. This program 
was to be the biggest research and development (R&D) program in automotive history and, with 
a $5 billion budget, the most ambitious new car program in GM’s 79-year history.  
The introduction of the Ford Taurus in 1985 was a huge market and business success 
and a complete surprise to GM. It was one of the first projects in the United States to fully utilize 
the concept of cross-functional teams and concurrent engineering practices. The car and the 
process used to develop it were designed and engineered at the same time, ensuring higher 
quality and more efficient production. The revolutionary design of the Taurus, coupled with its 
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outstanding quality, created a new trend in the U.S. automobile industry, and customers simply 
loved the car.  
The Taurus forced GM to redesign the exterior sheet metal of the GM10 because senior 
executives thought the vehicles would look too similar. Many additional running changes were 
incorporated into the design in an attempt to increase customer appeal. The first vehicles 
reached the market in 1988, approximately $2 billion over budget and 2 years behind schedule.  
All of the first GM10 entries were coupes, a GM tradition for the first year of any new 
platform. However, this market segment had moved overwhelmingly to a four-door sedan style. 
Two-door midsize family cars were useless to the largest group of customers in the segment; 
members of the Baby Boomer generation were now well into their child-rearing years and 
needed four-doors for their children. GM completely missed the target segment of the market. 
From 1985 to 1995, GM’s share of new midsize cars tumbled from 51% to 36%. 
The Lincoln Navigator is a full-size luxury SUV marketed and sold by the Lincoln brand 
of Ford Motor Company since the 1998 model year. Sold primarily in North America, the 
Navigator is the Lincoln counterpart of the Ford Expedition. While not the longest vehicle ever 
sold by the brand, it is the heaviest production Lincoln ever built. It is also the Lincoln with the 
greatest cargo capacity and the first non-limousine Lincoln to offer seating for more than six 
people.  
GM was completely surprised by the Navigator. They had not imagined that customers 
would want luxurious large SUVs. GM responded with the Cadillac Escalade in 1999, intended 
to compete with the Navigator and other upscale SUVs. The Escalade went into production only 
10 months after it was approved. The 1999 Escalade was nearly identical to the 1999 GMC 
Yukon Denali, except for the Cadillac badge and leather upholstery. It was redesigned for the 
2002 model year to make its appearance and features fall more in line with Cadillac’s image. 
In 2019, 18,656 Navigators were sold, while 35,244 Escalades were sold. Escalade has 
outsold Navigator every year since 2002. GM had clearly adapted to the surprise of the 
Navigator. One can reasonably infer that the company learned from the GM10 debacle. 
Surprises happen. Be prepared. 
We recently studied 12 cars withdrawn from the market in the 1930s, 1960s, and 2000s 
(Liu et al., 2015). We leveraged hundreds of historical accounts of these decisions, as well as 
production data for these cars and the market more broadly. We found that only one vehicle 
was withdrawn because of the nature of the car. People were unwilling to pay Packard prices for 
Studebaker quality, the two companies having merged in 1954. 
The failure of the other 11 cars could be attributed to company decisions, market trends, 
and economic situations. For example, decisions by the Big Three companies to focus on cost 
reduction resulted in each manufacturer’s car brands looking identical, effectively de-badging 
them. Mercury, Oldsmobile, Plymouth, and Pontiac were the casualties. Honda and Toyota 
were the beneficiaries.  
This article presents and illustrates a framework for addressing such scenarios. We first 
consider how uncertainties arise, contrasting the automotive and defense domains. We then 
propose an approach to managing uncertainties. This leads to consideration of how to represent 
alternative solutions and to estimate the value of these alternative solutions. We discuss 
possible use cases for our framework and present a detailed case study of autonomous 
vehicles to enhance the mobility of disabled and older adults. 
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Sources of Uncertainties 
Table 1 portrays two domains where addressing uncertainties are often central and 
important aspects of decision-making. The primary domain emphasized in this article is 
automotive. However, we also want to emphasize the relevance of our line of thinking to the 
defense domain. The parallels are reasonably self-explanatory, but a few differences are worth 
elaborating. 
In the automotive domain, there are multiple providers of competing vehicles. In defense, 
there is typically one provider of each platform. Many customers make purchase decisions in 
the automotive domain while, in defense, there is one (primary) customer making the purchase 
decision. The lack of competitive forces can lead to requirements being locked in prematurely. 
In the automotive domain, vehicles are used frequently. In defense, platforms are used 
when missions need them, which, beyond training, may never occur. Competitors’ relative 
market positions in the automotive domain change with innovations, for example, in the 
powertrain. In defense, adversaries’ positions change with strategic innovations, for instance, 
pursuits of asymmetric warfare. As former Defense Secretary James Mattis has said, “The 
enemy gets a vote on defense planning” (Mattis, 2019). 
Automobiles have model year changes, usually 3-year refreshes, and life spans of up to 
10 years, typically 6 to 7. The B-52 bomber has been in use for almost 70 years, and the F-15 
fighter aircraft has been in use for almost 50 years. There are block upgrades of military aircraft 
every few years, typically for changes of avionics and weapon systems—rather than body style.  
There are similarities that can be seen in Table 1. Uncertainties associated with market 
needs or mission requirements typically flow down In Table 1. Uncertainties associated with 
technology typically flow up, for example, when the engineering organization (at the company or 
vehicle level) is not sure of how to provide a function or whether performance or cost objectives 
can be met. New technologies enable new military capabilities. The most important weapons 
transforming warfare in the 20th century, such as airplanes, atomic weapons, the jet engine, and 
electronic computers, did not emerge as a response to doctrinal requirement of the military 
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Table 1. Multilevel Comparison of Automotive and Defense Domains 
Automotive Domain Defense Domain 
Economy Geopolitics 
 - Geopolitics (e.g., Regulations, Tariffs, War)  - Military Conflict (i.e., Hot War) 
 - GDP & Inflation (e.g., Recession)  - Geopolitical Tension (e.g., Grey Zone Conflicts) 
 - Financial Markets (e.g., Interest Rates)  - Civil Wars (e.g., Migration) 
 - Energy Markets (e.g., Fuel Prices)  - Soft Power (e.g., Alliances) 
 Market  Economics 
 - Market Growth/Decline (e.g., Consumers)  - GDP Growth/Decline 
 - Segment Market Saturation (e.g., Sedans)  - Inflation/Deflation 
 - External Competitors (Companies)  - Domestic & Allies’ Defense Budgets 
 - Internal Competitors (Brands)  - Congressional Priorities (e.g., Jobs) 
Company Priorities Defense Priorities 
 - Market Strategy (e.g., Positioning, Pricing)  - Engagement Strategies 
 - Product Management (e.g., Processes)  - Missions Envisioned 
 - Dealer Management (e.g., Incentives)  - Adversary Capabilities 
 - Financial Management (e.g., Investments)  - Capabilities Required 
 - Brand Management (e.g., Rebadging)  - Emerging Technologies 
 Vehicle  Platform 
 - Price  - Performance 
 - Design  - Schedule 
 - Quality  - Cost 
 
Automobile companies are currently wrestling with pursuits of battery electric vehicles 
and the uncertain rate of market adoption (Liu et al., 2018). Just over the horizon is the 
opportunity to compete in the driverless car market (Liu et al., 2020), with significant 
uncertainties about the regulatory environment (Laris, 2020). The case study later in this article 
addresses this opportunity. 
There are also uncertainties associated with where to manufacture vehicles (Hanawalt & 
Rouse, 2017). Labor costs used to dominate location decisions, but other economic, legal, and 
political factors are now being considered. Decisions to withdraw from manufacturing in 
Australia, Canada, and South Korea have resulted. 
Product line or program managers in the two domains often have similar questions 
regarding common uncertainties. A comparison of these questions is shown in Table 2. It is 
often socially unacceptable to verbalize such questions. Unfortunately, uncertainties not 
verbalized are seldom well managed (Rouse, 1998).  
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Table 2. Comparison of Automotive and Defense Domains 
Automotive Domain Uncertainties Defense Domain Uncertainties 
Customer future preferences Mission plans will remain relevant 
Customers’ future purchases will favor our offerings 
versus competitors 
Mission platforms will remain superior to adversaries’ 
capabilities 
Performance of our offerings after development Performance of mission platforms after development 
Affordability over the coming years Affordability over the coming years 
Budgets for our offerings across a range of future needs Budgets for mission platforms across a range of future 
needs 
Supply chains will be economical, efficient, and secure Supply chains will be economical, efficient, and secure 
Competitors’ capabilities will not be perceived to be 
superior 
Adversaries’ capabilities will be inferior and certainly 
not superior 




In both the automotive and defense domains there are usually uncertainties about 
market or mission requirements as well as uncertainties about technologies and abilities needed 
to meet these requirements. This section outlines an approach to thinking about managing 
these uncertainties. 
Consider a couple of extremes. You are absolutely sure a function will be required, and 
you are absolutely sure of how to deliver it. In other words, you are not at all uncertain. You 
should invest to create a solution to meet this need, assuming that you are confident the 
necessary human and financial resources are available. At the other extreme, you are 
absolutely sure a function will not be required. Regardless of your ability to deliver this function, 
you should not invest in creating this solution. Between these two extremes, there are several 
strategies a company might adopt. The choice depends on enterprises’ abilities to predict their 
futures, as well as their anticipated abilities to respond to these futures. What strategies might 
enterprise decision makers adopt to address alternative futures? As shown in Figure 1, we have 
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Figure 1. Strategy Framework for Enterprise Decision-Makers (Pennock & Rouse, 2016) 
If the phenomena of interest are highly predictable, then there is little chance that the 
enterprise will be pushed into unanticipated territory. Consequently, it is in the best interest of 
the enterprise to optimize its products and services to be as efficient as possible. In other words, 
if the unexpected cannot happen, then there is no reason to expend resources beyond process 
refinement and improvement. 
If the phenomena of interest are not highly predictable, but products and services can be 
appropriately adapted when necessary, it may be in the best interest for the enterprise to plan to 
adapt. For example, agile capacities can be designed to enable their use in multiple ways to 
adapt to changing demands—for example, the way Honda adjusted production capacity but 
other automakers could not in response to the Great Recession. Their planning was more 
efficient in the long run; even so, efficiency may have to be traded for the ability to adapt.  
For this approach to work, the enterprise must be able to identify and respond to 
potential issues faster than the ecosystem changes. For example, consider unexpected 
increased customer demands that tax capacities beyond their designed limits. Design and 
building of new or expanded facilities can take considerable time. On the other hand, 
reconfiguration of agile capacities should be much faster, as Honda demonstrated. The value of 
this approach is widely known in the military. As renown fighter pilot Robert Boyd—inventor of 
the Observe, Orient, Design, Act (OODA) loop—noted, whoever can handle the quickest rate of 
change is the one who survives (Boyd, 2004). Similarly, Arie De Gues, head of Strategic 
Planning for Royal Dutch Shell, stated that the ability to learn faster than your competitors might 
be the only sustainable advantage (Senge, 1990).  
If the phenomena of interest are not very predictable and the enterprise has a limited 
ability to adapt and respond, it may be in the best interest of the enterprise to hedge its position. 
In this case, it can explore scenarios where the enterprise may not be able to handle sudden 
changes without prior investment. For example, an enterprise concerned about potential 
obsolescence of existing products and services may choose to invest in multiple, potential new 
offerings. Such investments might be pilot projects that enable the enterprise to learn how to 
deliver products and services differently or perhaps deliver different products and services. 
Over time, it will become clear which of these options makes most sense, and the 
enterprise can exercise the best option by scaling up these offerings based on what they have 
learned during the pilot projects. In contrast, if the enterprise were to take a wait-and-see 
approach, it might not be able to respond quickly enough, and it might lose out to its competitors. 
If the phenomena of interest are totally unpredictable and there is no viable way to 
respond, then the enterprise has no choice but to accept the risk. Accept is not so much a 
strategy as a default condition. If one is attempting to address a strategic challenge where there 
is little ability to optimize the efficacy of offerings, limited ability to adapt offerings, and no viable 
hedges against the uncertainties associated with these offerings, the enterprise must accept the 
conditions that emerge. 
There is another version of acceptance that deserves mention—stay with the status quo. 
Yu et al. (2011) developed a computational theory of enterprise transformation, elaborating on a 
qualitative theory developed earlier (Rouse, 2005). They employed this computational theory to 
assess when investing in change is attractive and unattractive. Investing in change is likely to be 
attractive when one is currently underperforming and the circumstances are such that 
investments will likely improve enterprise performance. In contrast, if one is already performing 
well, investments in change will be difficult to justify. Similarly, if performance cannot be 
predictably improved—due to noisy markets and/or highly discriminating customers—then 
investments may not be warranted despite current underperformance.  
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Lucero (2018) proposed that these four strategies would be differentially relevant for 
different areas of an uncertainty space with axes involving uncertainties around the 
requirements and the ability to meet those requirements. We extended his thinking to formulate 
Figure 2, focusing on uncertainties in developing technologies.  
 
Figure 2. Strategies Versus Uncertainties 
This figure depicts the space as having nine discrete cells, which makes it easier to 
explain, but there are unlikely to be crisp borders between areas where the different strategies 
are applicable. 
There are three types of hedges in Figure 2. The upper two cells of the middle column 
represent company or agency investments in creating technology options to meet possible 
requirements. The upper two cells of the left column represent licensing, joint development, or 
other arrangements to buy technology options from partners. The lower cell of the right column 
represents selling options to others so they can hedge uncertainties. 
The criteria on the left of Figure 1 constrain choices of strategies as well as positions in 
the uncertainty space. If, for example, the objectives, dynamics, and constraints are not 
measurable and tractable, then optimization may lead to an inappropriate or at least fragile 
solution (Carlson & Doyle, 2000). 
At this point, we have strategies for addressing uncertainties. We now need to address 
the characteristics of the alternative solutions of interest and then the projected expected utility 
of each alternative. 
Representing Solutions 
Whose preferences should guide decisions? While there may be one ultimate decision-
maker, success usually depends on understanding all stakeholders. Human-centered design 
addresses the concerns, values, and perceptions of all stakeholders in designing, developing, 
manufacturing, buying, and using products and systems. The basic idea is to delight primary 
stakeholders and gain the support of the secondary stakeholders. 
The human-centered design construct and an associated methodology has been 
elaborated in a book, Design for Success (Rouse, 1991). Two other books soon followed 
(Rouse, 1992, 1993). The human-centered design methodology has been applied many times 
and continually refined (Rouse, 2007, 2015). 
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The premise of human-centered design is that the major stakeholders need to perceive 
products and services to be valid, acceptable, and viable. Valid products and services 
demonstrably help solve the problems for which they are intended. Acceptable products and 
services solve problems in ways that stakeholders prefer. Viable products and services provide 
benefits that are worth the costs of use. Costs here include the efforts needed to learn and use 
products and services, not just the purchase price. 
Figure 3 embodies the principles of human-centered design, built around Set-Based 
Design (SBD; Sobek et al., 1999), Quality Function Deployment (Hauser & Clausing, 1988), and 
Design Structure Matrices (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). As later discussed, multi-stakeholder, 
multi-attribute utility theory (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993) is used to project the value of alternatives. 
Note that validity, acceptability, and viability in Figure 3 are defined in the above discussion of 
human-centered design. 
 
Figure 3. Model Structure for Attributes, Stakeholders, Functions, and Solutions 
Sobek et al. (1999) contrast SBD with Point-Based Design. Developed by Toyota, SBD 
considers a broader range of possible designs and delays certain decisions longer. They argue 
that, “Taking time up front to explore and document feasible solutions from design and 
manufacturing perspectives leads to tremendous gains in efficiency and product integration later 
in the process and for subsequent development cycles.” Al-Ashaab et al. (2013) and Singer et al. 
(2017) report on interesting applications of SBD to helicopter engines and surface combatant 
ships, respectively. 
SBD is reflected in Figure 3 in terms of defining and elaborating multiple solutions, 
including those of competitors or adversaries. Quality Function Deployment (QFD; Hauser & 
Clausing, 1988) translates the “voice of the customer” into engineering characteristics. For 
Figure 3, this translates into “voices of the stakeholders.” Design Structure Matrices (DSM; 
Eppinger & Browning, 2012) are used to model the structure of complex systems or processes. 
In Figure 3, multiple models are maintained to represent alternative offerings as well as current 
and anticipated competitors’ offerings. 
The “What the Market Wants” section of Figure 3 characterizes the stakeholders in the 
product or service and their utility functions associated with context-specific attributes clustered 
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in terms of validity, acceptability, and viability. The section of Figure 3 labeled “How We and 
Others Will Provide It” specifies, on the right, the attribute values associated with each solution. 
The functions associated with each solution are defined on the left of this section. Functions are 
things like steering, accelerating, and braking, as well as functions that may not be available in 
all solutions (e.g., backup camera). 
Attribute to function relationships in Figure 3 are expressed on a somewhat arbitrary 
scale from −3 to +3. Positive numbers indicate that improving a function increases the attribute. 
Negative numbers indicate that improving a function decreases an attribute. For example, a 
backup camera may increase the price of the vehicle but decrease insurance costs. 
Solutions on the bottom of Figure 3 are composed of functions, which are related to 
attributes of interest to stakeholders. In keeping with the principles of SBD, multiple solutions 
are pursued in parallel, including potential offerings by competitors. While it is typical for one 
solution to be selected for major investment, the representations of all solutions are retained, 
quite often being reused for subsequent opportunities. 
There are additional considerations beyond SBD, QFD, and DSM. Uncertain or volatile 
requirements can be due to evolving performance targets (Ferreira et al., 2009) or surprises by 
competitors or adversaries (e.g., the Ford Taurus). Both causes tend to result in expensive 
rework. In the realm of defense, the end of the Cold War ended the need for a 70-ton self-
propelled howitzer (Myers, 2001). Advances in anti-ship cruise missiles and a challenging 
performance envelope doomed the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (Feickert, 2009).  
Decision-making may involve more than one epoch (Ross & Rhodes, 2008), including 
both near-term and later decisions. For example, at GM, Epoch 1 involved creating an Escalade 
as a rebadged GMC in 1999. Epoch 2 involved offering an Escalade as a unique upscale SUV 
in 2002. 
Another issue is the costs of switching from one solution to another (Silver & de Weck, 
2007). A surveillance and reconnaissance mission adopted an initial solution of a manned 
aircraft with an option to replace this solution with an unmanned air vehicle (UAV) several years 
later (Rouse, 2010). A deterrent to switching was the very expensive manned aircraft, which 
would no longer be needed. This problem was resolved by negotiating, in advance, the sale of 
the aircraft to another agency, effectively taking it “off the books.” Thus, there can be significant 
value in flexibility. “A system is flexible to the extent that it can be cost-effectively modified to 
meet new needs or to capitalize on new opportunities” (Deshmukh et al., 2010). 
Identifying options can be difficult (Mikaelian et al., 2012). What can you do when, and 
what will it cost? Rouse et al. (2000) discuss case studies from the semiconductor industry. 
Rouse and Boff (2004) summarize 14 case studies from automotive, computing, defense, 
materials, and semiconductor industries. 
Projecting Value 
Using the framework provided by Figure 3 and principles from SBD, QFD, DSM, and so 
on, one can create multi-attribute models of how alternatives address the concerns, values, and 
perceptions of all the stakeholders in designing, developing, manufacturing, buying, and using 
products and systems. The next issue of importance is the likely uncertainties associated with 
the attributes of the alternatives. These uncertainties involve what the market or mission 
needs—or will need—and how well solutions, in terms of functions and underlying technologies, 
will be able to meet these needs.  
The expected value of an alternative can be defined as the value of the outcomes a 
solution provides times the probability that these outcomes will result. The probability may be 
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discrete, or it may be represented as a probability density function. For the former, the 
calculation involves multiplication and summation; for the latter, the calculation involves 
integration. 
Following Keeney and Raiffa (1993), we approach this problem using multi-stakeholder, 
multi-attribute utility theory. We can define the utility function of stakeholder i across the N 
attributes by 
ui = u (x1i, x2i, … , xNi) = u(xi)  (1) 
where the bold x denotes the vector of attributes. The utility of an alternative across all M 
stakeholders is given by  
U = U [u(x1), u(x2), …, u(xM)]  (2) 
The appropriate forms of these functions vary by the assumptions one is willing to make. 
When there are many attributes, a weighted linear from is usually the most practical. The 
weights in Equation 1 reflect how much a particular stakeholder cares about the attribute being 
weighted. It is quite common for most stakeholders to only care about a small subset of the 
overall set of attributes. Those for which they do not care receive weights of zero. 
The weights in Equation 2 reflect the extent to which the overall decision-maker or 
decision process cares about particular stakeholders. For example, is the customer the most 
important stakeholder, or do corporate finances drive the decision? These weights are usually 
subject to considerable sensitivity analyses. 
Who are typically the stakeholders? We have found that the concerns, values, and 






• Current Competitors  
• Possible Competitors  
• Investors 
• Governments (e.g., Regulatory Authorities) 
For the case study presented in a later section, we focus on solely the investor stakeholder. 
Investors in driverless cars are interested in three primary attributes: 
• Competitive Advantage (CA): To what extent will the investment of interest enable value-
added pricing, reduce production costs, reduce operating costs, and leverage existing 
capacities?  
• Strategic Fit (SF): To what extent will the investment of interest leverage technology 
competencies, exploit current delivery architectures, complement existing value propositions, 
exploit current partnerships and infrastructure, and provide other opportunities for 
exploitation? 
• Return on Investment (ROI): What capital expenditures, technology acquisition costs, and 
labor expenses will be needed? What revenue and profits will likely result? 
We will return to these attributes in the case study. 
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Use Cases 
What types of decisions are amenable to the approach just outlined? We have applied 
this line of reasoning to 20+ projects involving science and technology investment decisions—in 
particular, investments in R&D, licensing technologies, and capacity expansion. The case study 
discussed in the next section is an example of this use case. 
Another use case involves exploring tipping points in market/mission analysis, where 
small investments result in sizable performance gains, either for you or for your competitors or 
adversaries. A good example is when Motorola found that offering pagers in colors substantially 
increased sales (Henkoff, 1994). Another example is the aforementioned repurposing of a 
military aircraft. Getting it “off the books” greatly enhanced the UAV investment value and 
secured the needed resources (Rouse, 2010). 
Another use case involves understanding when disaggregated architectures provide 
higher value than integrated architectures. A good example involves investments in system 
infrastructure to support modularity and decrease future switching costs. Tight integration may 
help the current generation of a technology perform better but may undermine the flexibility of 
the next generation. 
A classic use case involves understanding where key points of uncertainty could be 
resolved with more information. For example, business intelligence that enables determining 
competitors’ or adversaries’ actual investments versus advertised intentions can enable 
avoiding investing in competitions that inherently will not happen. This is an important reason for 
modeling solutions of competitors or adversaries as indicated in Figure 3. 
To address these use cases, we need to be able to predict impacts on outcomes (e.g., 
attributes): 
• Impacts of investments on outcomes (e.g., performance, costs) 
• Impacts of particular investments on outcomes (e.g., color on pagers) 
• Impacts of architectures on outcomes (e.g., performance, costs) 
• Impacts of uncertainties on decisions (e.g., strategies, investments)  
Performance can include many things: 
• Mission performance (e.g., sorties, targets hit) 
• Market performance (e.g., sales, profits, earnings per share, share price) 
• Platform performance (e.g., speed, quality) 
• Platform acceptance (e.g., consumer ratings) 
• Platform availability (reliability and maintainability) 
• Time to deployment 
• Time to market 
• Acquisition and operating costs 
Linking alternative investments to these types of metrics require models of how investments 
translate to capabilities, which then translate to platform, mission, and market performance. 
Case Study 
Assistive technologies (AT) hold enormous promise for the 100 million disabled and 
older adults in the United States (Rouse & McBride, 2019). Driverless cars have the potential to 
greatly enhance the mobility of this population with attractive pricing. Note that the platforms of 
interest are autonomous vehicles, while the market or mission is to provide enhanced mobility to 
disabled and older adults. 
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The Auto Alliance hosted a series of three workshops on “AVs & Increased Accessibility” 
(Auto Alliance, 2019). We focused on physical, sensory, and cognitive disabilities. 
Approximately 200 people participated in the three workshops from a wide range of advocacy 
groups, automobile manufacturers, and federal agencies. Workshop participants suggested a 
large number of needs as well as approaches to meeting these needs. We clustered these 
needs into 20 categories. Eight categories covered 70% of the suggestions. Definitions of these 
categories are as follows: 
• Displays and controls concern information that users can see, hear, touch, and so on, and 
actions they can take.  
• Locating and identifying vehicle concerns users knowing where their ride is waiting and 
recognizing the particular vehicle.  
• Passenger profiles include secure access to information about passengers, in particular 
their specific needs.  
• Emergencies concern events inside and outside the vehicle that may require off-normal 
operations and user support. 
• Adaptation to passengers involves adjusting the human–machine interface (HMI) to best 
support particular users with specific needs. 
• Easy and safe entry and egress concerns getting into and out of the vehicle, as well as 
safety relative to the vehicle’s external environment. 
• Trip monitoring and progress relates to providing information as the trip proceeds, 
particularly regarding route and schedule disruptions. 
• Onboard safety concerns what happens in the vehicle as the trip proceeds, assuring 
minimal passenger stress and injury avoidance. 
An example mapping from needs to technologies is shown in Table 3. Technologies required 
include hardware, software, sensing, networks, and especially enhanced HMI. HMIs need to 
enable requesting vehicle services, locating and accessing vehicles, monitoring trip progress, 
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Table 3. Market Needs Versus Enabling Technologies (Auto Alliance, 2019) 
Needs Technologies 
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The wealth of assistive technology (AT) and supporting technologies in Table 3 suggest 
a substantial need for seamless technology integration to avoid overwhelming disabled and 
older adults, or indeed anybody. We expect that artificial intelligence (AI)–based cognitive 
assistants may be central to such integration. The question of who might provide which pieces 
of an overall integrated solution is addressed in this case study. 
The question of interest in this case study concerns how an automotive original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) should position itself relative to this immense market 
opportunity. We begin with SBD. The hypothetical OEM wants to consider five alternative 
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Predominant uncertainties include competitors’ strategies, technologies (particularly 
software), abilities to execute, and time. The third scenario, ally with advocacy groups, merits 
elaboration. The key idea is an American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)–branded 
vehicle—for example, similar to the Eddie Bauer branding of the Ford Explorer—with better 
paint job, leather seats, heated seats optional, and interior accents. This co-branding alliance 
with Ford lasted 20 years.  
The next step in applying the methodology outlined in this article is characterization of 
Competitive Advantage (CA), Strategic Fit (SF), and Return on Investment (ROI) for the set of 
five scenarios. We then want to consider uncertainties associated with each scenario, which for 
this case study will be characterized using discrete probabilities. 
The expected utility of each scenario E[US] can then be calculated using 
E[US] = WCA x PCA x UCA + WSF x PSF x USF + WROI x PROI x UROI   (3) 
where WCA + WSF + WROI = 1 and PCA , PSF , and PROI are the probabilities of achieving UCA , USF , 
and UROI , respectively. As noted earlier, in many situations, probability density functions are 
needed rather than discrete probabilities. The calculation then involves integration rather than 
multiplication and summation. 
Once we have the scenarios ranked by E[US] we will return to consideration of the 
optimize, adapt, hedge, and accept strategies from Figure 1. 
Table 4. Set of Solutions Considered 
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Time to integrate 
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platform design is 
known; can OEM do 
this at the lowest 
cost? 
Time to integrate 











Auto OEMs do not 
really understand 
business model, but 
does anyone? 
Longer time to build 
out entire ecosystem 
 
Table 5 summarizes assumed probabilities and utilities for the five scenarios. The risk 
associated with CA is primarily a requirements risk (i.e., the market risk of not having the right 
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offering or best offering). The risk associated with SF is primarily a technology risk (i.e., the risk 
of not creating, or being able to create, a competitive technology platform). The risk associated 
with ROI includes both requirements and technology risks. 
The reasoning underlying the assumptions in Table 5 is as follows: 
• Competitive Advantage: UCA is high if providing total solution, moderate if only providing 
vehicle; PCA is low without strong partners, not just branding partners 
• Strategic Fit: USF is high if only providing vehicle, moderate if also providing intelligent 
software; PSF is high if only providing vehicle, moderate if integrating partners’ intelligent 
software 
• Return on Investment: UROI is high if providing total solution, moderate if partnering, low if 
only providing vehicle; PROI is low if providing total solution, moderate if partnering or only 
providing vehicle 
The scenarios differ significantly in terms of probabilities of success and utilities if 
successful. The scenarios also differ significantly in terms of costs of success. Scenarios 1 and 
5 represent total up-front commitments and the net present value (NPV) of financial projections 
would underlie ROI calculations. Scenarios 2 and 3 represent hedges against the risks of not 
being a player. For these scenarios, net option value (NOV) would be the metric in ROI 
calculations. Scenario 4 represents an accept strategy, as it exploits existing capabilities and 
will require the least investment. 
Table 5. Assumed Probabilities and Utilities for the Five Scenarios 
 
Scenario 
Competitive Advantage Strategic Fit Return on Investment 
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(P = 0.3) 
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Moderate 
(P = 0.3) 
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(P = 0.1) 
 
High 
(U = 0.9) 
 
Moderate 
(P = 0.7) 
 
Moderate 
(U = 0.5) 
 
Low 
(P = 0.1) 
 
High 
(U = 0.9) 
 
Boer (2008) suggests how to value a portfolio that includes some investments characterized by 
NPV and others by NOV. He argues for strategic value (SV), which is given by 
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SV = NPV + NOV  (4) 
The NPV component represents the value associated with commitments already made, while 
the NOV component represents contingent opportunities for further investments should the 
options be “in the money” at a later time.  
Figure 4 provides results for E[US] with varying assumptions regarding the relative importance 
(weighting) of CA, SF, and ROI. The overall results are as follows: 
• Scenario 2 has the highest E[US] unless SF dominates 
• Scenarios 2 and 3 have the highest E[US] if ROI and/or CA dominate 
• Scenario 4, followed by 2 and 3, has the highest E[US] if SF dominates 
• Scenarios 1 and 5 have the lowest E[US] across all weighting assumptions 
Discussion 
These results reflect, of course, the assumptions in Table 5. These assumptions could 
be varied to assess their impact, but given that W × P × U occurs in all the underlying equations, 
the variations of W in Figure 4 reasonably reflect the range of possibilities. 
Scenario 1 embodies a significant technology risk in a very competitive market, while 
Scenario 5 involves a significant requirements risk in attempting to provide services not typical 
for an OEM. Both of these risks could be hedged with acquisitions of a software company 
(Scenario 1) or a service company (Scenario 5). This might be difficult, as the market 
capitalizations of the automotive OEMs are much lower than the capitalizations of likely and 
attractive acquisition targets. 
 
Figure 4. Expected Utilities for the Five Scenarios With Varying Weights 
Scenarios 2 and 3 represent hedges against these risks as well but result in dividing the 
share of the vehicle that the OEM will provide and, hence, its revenues and profits. 
Nevertheless, they are attractive because they decrease the competition and provide key 
technologies. These scenarios also allow the freedom to pursue other strategies as 
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Scenario 4 focuses on leveraging SF. It represents acceptance by the OEM of whatever 
leverage is provided by its core competencies. This also involves acceptance that they will have 
to compete with the other automotive OEMs that want to provide the vehicle platform. They are 
quite familiar with this type of competition.  
The resulting overall strategy involves a portfolio of three investments: 
• Substantial investment in Scenario 2—a hedge against market and technology risks 
• Moderate investment in Scenario 3—a hedge against Scenario 2 not resulting in a partner 
• Baseline investment in Scenario 4—acceptance of a traditional role in the automotive 
marketplace 
With the strategies decided, one is ready to apply the QFD and DSM aspects of Figure 3 to the 




• Car Service Providers 
• Car Service Customers  
It also requires characterizing competing offerings, whose likely functions, features, and pricing 
will have been sleuthed via business intelligence.  
This illustrates the multilevel nature of the methodology. The first question is which of the 
business scenarios make sense and, for those that make sense, determining the appropriate 
strategy for pursuing each scenario. The idea is to iteratively refine the chosen scenarios and 
strategies, which will influence the nature of investments—for example, whether one makes a 
total commitment up front (NPV), hedges uncertainties with smaller investments (NOV), or 
simply accepts one’s current position and waits to see how the market develops. 
Conclusions 
Engineering involves designing solutions to meet the needs of markets or missions. 
Organizations would like to have the flexibility and agility to address both uncertain needs and 
uncertain technologies for meeting these needs. This article has presented and illustrated a 
framework that provides this flexibility and agility. We considered how uncertainties arise, 
contrasting the automotive and defense domains. We proposed an approach to managing 
uncertainties. We considered how to represent alternative solutions and project the value of 
each alternative. Possible use cases for our framework were discussed. A detailed case study 
of autonomous vehicles to enhance the mobility of disabled and older adults was presented. 
We did not consider but need to acknowledge broader risks. It is quite imaginable that 
driverless car technologies, once deployed, will lead to inadvertent failures with substantial 
consequences (Danzig, 2018). It is also possible that sweeping organizational and societal 
trends will substantially disrupt this seemingly immense market opportunity (Rouse, 2019, 2020). 
The current pandemic is a case in point. The impacts of climate change are on the horizon. 
Understanding and managing uncertainties need to be core competencies in companies, 
agencies, and institutions. As this article has argued, uncertainties need to be rigorously and 
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Abstract 
The Air Force Materiel Command is undergoing a digital transformation to increase the speed of 
delivering new warfighter capabilities. This Digital Campaign consists of six Lines of Effort (LOEs) 
formed with diverse goals to transform the enterprise. This research investigated using the 
Zachman Framework and Systems Modeling Language to analyze this transformation. Extensive 
modeling captured the as-is Preliminary Design Review (PDR) process and mapped LOE goals 
as primary impacts to Zachman cells. This led to an identification of a to-be digital PDR process. 
Secondary impacts were also identified and traced using a relationship analysis. Four discoveries 
were made. (1) Enterprise modeling in Zachman is analogous to a system decomposition under 
typical systems engineering approaches. (2) As long as the transformation goals do not change, 
the Zachman cells, and those entities mapped into those cells, will be directly affected by the new 
digital enterprise. (3) Different from past process transformation efforts, the Digital Campaign has 
focused on technology upgrades to drive process change. (4) Lastly, model analysis revealed 
transformation gaps within certain cells that should be covered with new goals. This research 
provides a formal, model-based methodology for guiding enterprise-wide improvements in pursuit 
of Air Force digital transformation. 
Introduction 
Pressure is being put on the United States Air Force to maintain its dominance over 
potential adversaries as the speed of technology is increasing (Brown, 2020). In addition, the Air 
Force’s time to field its most advanced and complex weapon systems has been increasing over 
the past 50 years. This is allowing these potential adversaries to develop and field new 
capabilities faster than the Air Force. For example, back in the 1970s, the F-16’s concept to field 
averaged about 6 years, whereas the latest aircraft developed, the F-35, will exceed 20 years 
from concept to full operational capability. It is believed that this fielding time will only continue 
to increase unless the Air Force makes a paradigm shift in the way it acquires new capabilities 
(Alia-Novobilski, 2020).  
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This need for change has been realized by senior Air Force leadership including the 
former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Dr. Will 
Roper, and the commander of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), General Arnold Bunch. 
The primary focus of this transformation is the use of digital models and artifacts integrated 
across the lifecycle. To address this digital transformation, Gen Bunch in March 2020 
established a Digital Campaign to drive the whole enterprise to move towards transforming and 
create an environment to promote change in six lines of efforts. These six lines of effort (LOE) 
address (1) Information Technology Infrastructure, (2) Models and Tools, (3) Standards, Data, 
and Architectures, (4) Lifecycle Strategies and Processes, (5) Policy and Guidance, and (6) 
Workforce and Culture.  
Digital Campaign LOE teams are trying to understand and improve a very large and 
complex enterprise comprised of many distributed organizations, people, and processes that 
are highly intertwined. The processes have been continuously evolving since the 1960s (Fox, 
2011). The Digital Campaign is getting things done by grit, experience, and instinct to overcome 
complexity in transforming a very large enterprise. As a result, without a rigorous and structured 
effort to break down the complexity, identify, map, and unravel the interactions, and transcribe 
individual processes and digital flows, the Digital Campaign is bound to miss critical aspects. 
This is where an effort to model an Enterprise Architecture (EA) can introduce a formal 
methodology to provide the insight needed to successfully complete the digital transformation. 
This paper demonstrates a methodology for modeling the AFMC acquisition enterprise to 
visualize and gain insight into the digital transformation effort.  
This research used a systems engineering approach to build a System Modeling 
Language (SysML) model within the Zachman Framework for a technical review of the AFMC 
acquisition enterprise. Once that was completed, the Digital Campaign goals were mapped as 
requirement changes to the model. The primary effects of these changes on the enterprise’s 
people, products, and processes were studied and documented. The research then used the 
inherent structure found in the Zachman Framework of the AFMC EA to show how secondary 
impacts can be identified. The final step of the research identified gaps with the Digital 
Campaign digital change approach following a systems engineering approach applied to the 
SysML model of the enterprise. 
This exploration addresses the digital transformation of the AFMC acquisition community 
and directly supports the AFMC Digital Campaign, its goals, and activities. The AFMC 
acquisition enterprise is large and complex; modeling all of it to the appropriate fidelity would 
take considerable amount of time beyond the scope of a single effort. Therefore, this research 
focused on the particular event of a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) within the Technology 
Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase of a defense acquisition. The PDR process 
involves sufficient personnel, resources, and data artifacts within an acquisition program to 
provide enough model elements permitting adequate research analysis. 
The enterprise is assumed to be acquiring a major capability, either a new program or a 
major modification to an existing weapon system that would require a PDR within the defense 
acquisition process. As always, there are shortcuts and tailoring activities available to a program 
manager and chief engineer. 
The next section addresses the Zachman framework used for this research. Then, the 
paper describes the SysML method used to build the as-is and to-be enterprises. Next, the 
paper addresses the primary impacts analysis from mapping the Digital Campaign goals. The 
paper then details the analysis for secondary impacts and gap analysis, and finally concludes 
with findings and future research opportunities. 
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Zachman Enterprise Architecture Framework 
An architecture framework is a tool for describing an architecture using “conventions, 
principles and practices established within an application-specific domain and/or stakeholder 
community” (IEEE, 2011). It presents unique stakeholder perspectives in views that 
communicate information of concern to that stakeholder about the system.  
The earliest beginnings of EAs can be traced to an IBM methodology in the late 1960s 
called Business Systems Planning (BSP), the purpose of which was to deliberately plan 
information systems by collecting data through interviewing managers and then developing a 
top-down plan involving models representing a logical structure that could be implemented. 
(Kotusev, 2016). There were several improvements of the BSP through the 1980s when John 
Zachman introduced his framework internally to IBM. 
John Zachman published his original framework in 1987 and in 1992 extended his 
framework into 30 categories in a matrix where there were five perspectives (planner, owner, 
designer, builder, and subcontractor) in rows and six interrogatives (what, how, where, who, 
when and why) along the columns. Each of the 30 cells in this matrix is unique, suggesting that 
it serves as a “periodic table” for entities. This resulted in a diagram representing a different 
abstraction and perspective of the EA (Sowa & Zachman, 1992). In 2011, Zachman updated his 
framework matrix to version 3.0 and titled it The Zachman Framework for Enterprise 
Architecture. This version, shown in Figure 1, is a matrix of six perspectives (executive, 
business management, architect, engineer, technician and the enterprise) and six interrogatives 
(what, how, where, who, when, and why). 
There are many different definitions of an enterprise in the literature. The major theme in 
many documents is that an enterprise is an organization or activity whose boundary is defined 
by a common mission and who uses technology, processes, and resources to perform that 
mission (Bernard, 2012). In the Air Force, as in any complex large organization, there are 
numerous enterprises. This research focuses on AFMC as an organization who performs an 
acquisition mission of delivering capability to warfighters. This includes the executing programs 
and the command and center support organizations that can provide enterprise-level processes, 
technologies, and resources to program offices where goal achievement is focused. 
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Figure 1: Zachman Framework, published with the permission of John A. Zachman and Zachman 
International®, Inc. (https://www.zachman.com)  
Modeling Methodology 
Dassault No Magic CAMEO Systems Modeler v19 was used as the modeling tool 
because it was available in the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) academic environment. 
It is also one of the SysML modeling tools used by a large portion of the Air Force acquisition 
community. There are other tools also used within the Air Force enterprise. These include Sparx 
Systems Enterprise Architect, IBM Rational Rhapsody, SPEC Innovations Innoslate, and 
Siemens’ Systems Modeling Workbench. 
The Zachman Framework is a structure for visualizing a complex enterprise. John 
Zachman is clear that he does not prescribe a method for his framework, so it is left up to the 
user to determine the method. This research effort chose to use a systems engineering 
approach using the SysML language as outlined in Figure 2.  
The PDR was picked because it is a prominent technical review within the acquisition 
process that the majority of Air Force programs must go through. The PDR is also relatively 
universal in that there are similar documents needed for the review across different programs. 
The review generally takes place between an external entity (contractor) and a program office, 
where the contractor takes the time to prove to the program office and other stakeholders that it 
has met the system requirements in allocating the requirements down to subsystems, software, 
and components of the needed system. In addition, risk and affordability are looked at during a 
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Figure 2: Systems Engineering Method for Enterprise Design 
Organizing the Acquisition Enterprise Architecture Model 
The first step of this approach is to “organize the model” as shown in Figure 2. To 
accomplish this step within CAMEO, a package model was built as shown in Figure 3, which 
represents the Zachman Framework of Figure 1. A top-level package is created for each 
perspective. A package is a folder that establishes a way to contain and organize related 
information within a model. 
 
 
Figure 3: Package Structure Representing Zachman Framework Matrix 
The perspectives represent the stakeholders within the enterprise and who participate in 
the overall enterprise outcome. For this exercise, only four perspectives (Executive, Business 
Management, Architect, and Engineer) were addressed. The other two perspectives are the 
Technician (contractor) and the Enterprise (instantiations). Within each of the perspective 
packages were packages representing the Interrogatives (columns) of the Zachman 
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Framework. These sub-packages represent the intersection of the perspectives and the 
interrogatives and will be referred to as a cell. It is within each cell that the modeling artifacts will 
reside in the form of diagrams, entities, and relationships. To understand what diagram will go in 
each cell, research was done to define each of the four perspectives. 
The Executive perspective is known as a contextual perspective. This is the person who 
is setting the strategy for the enterprise. This person is concerned with depicting in broad terms, 
the basic scope of the enterprise (Sowa & Zachman, 1992). This research defines this person 
as an AFMC executive with duties to understand and provide the overall resources and data 
needed to meet many customers’ materiel requirements within the DoD acquisition process.  
The Business Management (or business manager) perspective is known as a 
conceptual perspective. This is the person who runs the execution organization. This person’s 
perspective is from someone who has to work within the enterprise business and cares about 
the business products and processes and how they interact (Sowa & Zachman, 1992). This 
research defines this person as a program office director responsible for producing a product 
and related data that meets a customer’s materiel requirement. 
The Architect perspective is known as a logical perspective. This is the person who 
designs discipline into the organization. This person is concerned with the details of the materiel 
solution, data products, and the business processes that produce those data products (Sowa & 
Zachman, 1992). This research defines this person as a chief engineer responsible for the 
detailed processes that produce the materiel solution, and the data products required to meet a 
customer’s materiel requirement. 
The Engineer perspective is known as a physical perspective. This is the person who is 
responsible for applying specific technologies to solve the problems of the organization. This 
person is concerned with the constraints of the technology and processes used to produce the 
data products and must adapt the information technology to meet the enterprise requirements 
(Sowa & Zachman, 1992). This research defines this person as a systems engineer responsible 
for applying available information technology and support personnel to the program office 
business processes that produce the materiel solution and data products.  
The perspective definitions are the rows of the Zachman Framework. The five columns 
for this research are represented as the interrogatives: why, how, what, who and where. The 
sixth column, the when interrogative, was not considered. Definitions of these columns are 
described in the following paragraphs. 
The why column describes the motivation of the enterprise. These are typically 
described in terms of goals and objectives. Within a model these are best represented as 
requirements diagrams depicting relationships of goals to sub-goals (or objectives) of the 
enterprise (Sowa & Zachman, 1992). This research uses requirements diagrams that link the 
executive’s stakeholder requirements (those of the customers’ having a materiel solution need) 
down to the engineer’s IT requirements used to meet the requirements flowing back up to the 
stakeholder’s requirements. 
The what column can be described as the data artifact. Generally speaking, this is the 
“things” of the enterprise (Zachman, 1987). For this research, the things are the data products 
being produced, shared, consumed, used, and stored by the enterprise. These are represented 
by blocks, Block Definition Diagrams (BDD), and their relationships. 
The how column can be described as the function artifact and is the column where 
business processes of the enterprise would be described for creating and transforming the 
enterprise products (Zachman, 1987). Activity Diagrams (ACT) were used to describe the 
processes of concern for each perspective. These perspectives included the executive’s scope 
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of the overall acquisition process to the more detailed processes of the architect and engineer, 
who are involved in preparing and conducting a PDR event. 
The who column is the people and organization artifact. This column depicts 
organizational structure as well as the roles of people within the organization. Organizational 
structure usually shows hierarchal lines of authority or links to who is providing the work product 
or work service (Sowa & Zachman, 1992). BDDs were used to represent parts of the acquisition 
enterprise involved in and concerned with the PDR technical event.  
The where column is the location artifact. This column depicts where the business is 
occurring or flowing between the enterprise network and sites, depending on the perspective 
(Sowa & Zachman, 1992; Zachman, 1987). BDDs, blocks and relationships were used to 
represent locations, where locations are defined as a place for organizations or IT systems 
within the acquisition enterprise. 
This effort used the nomenclature of Figure 4 to refer to each Zachman cell. Each cell is 
the intersection of an interrogative column and a perspective row. For instance, the what 
interrogative column intersects with the engineer perspective and is referred to as the cell of 
“What (Engr),” where engineer is abbreviated as “Engr.” Other abbreviations include “Exec” for 
executive, “BusM” for business manager, and “Arch” for architect. 
 
 
Figure 4: Zachman Cell Definitions Used in This Research 
Developing the As-Is Acquisition Enterprise Architecture Model 
Once the Zachman Framework is set up and understood within the CAMEO tool, the 
next step is to start with modeling the contextual level (executive perspective) representing the 
stakeholder needs, followed by the conceptual level (business manager) representing the 
enterprise requirements. Once complete with these two perspectives, the research moved to the 
next step of high-level design. This step is accomplished by modeling the architect’s logical-
level cells. And finally, the last step of the systems engineering method is to model the detailed 
design for the engineer’s physical-level cells. Relationship analysis is performed throughout this 
modeling process. Each of these steps is referenced in the process of Figure 2. 
WHY HOW WHAT WHO WHERE
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The following paragraphs step through the research activity that resulted in the data 
artifacts produced for each cell within the as-is EA for the what interrogative. The as-is EA is a 
representation of the actual acquisition enterprise for the PDR and related data, organizations, 
personnel, and processes as viewed by each perspective. 
Executive Perspective 
The things that the AFMC Executive is concerned about are represented in the block 
definition diagram of Figure 5. These are the top-level data needed to manage and provide a 
materiel solution to the customer stakeholder. These data include the design, performance, 
cost, risk, requirement, maintenance, operational, logistics, security, test, interface, and 
schedule data of the materiel solution.  
The creation of all diagrams for each cell of the executive perspective sets the context of 
the AFMC acquisition enterprise and the PDR process that this research continues to break 
down through the modeling of the other framework perspectives. The next perspective is the 
business manager or program office director perspective. 
 
 
Figure 5: Enterprise Data for the AFMC Executive (Cell: What (Exec)) 
Business Manager/Program Director Perspective 
The program director is concerned with all of the technical and business processes 
within the AFMC acquisition enterprise. IEEE 15288.2 Standard for Technical Reviews and 
Audits on Defense Programs (IEEE, 2015) was used as the basis for defining the processes 
and documents. The program director is concerned with the data products that are related to the 
data that validate the materiel solution. These are represented by the model in Figure 6. As the 
model shows, the data needed for the materiel solution are contained in the documents 
developed by other processes of the enterprise. These documents are reviewed and approved 
in the PDR process. 
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Figure 6: PDR Data for the Program Director (Cell: What (BusM)) 
Architect/Chief Engineer Perspective 
The chief engineer is responsible for setting up, complying with, managing, and 
executing the PDR process. They have a need to deliver necessary documents for the PDR that 
represent the system under development. These documents include the Cost Analysis 
Requirements Document, the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan, the Integrated Master Schedule, the 
Integrated Master Plan, the Risk Assessment, the documents that represent the Allocated 
Baseline, and Technical Plans. The Technical Plans include documents such as the Test and 
Evaluation Plan, the Systems Engineering Plan, several different levels of verification and 
validation plans, and modeling and simulation plans (IEEE, 2015).  
These documents are the entry products that will contain the data required by the 
materiel solution as shown in Figure 7. In addition, the chief engineer is concerned about other 
entry documents needed to conduct a PDR which include the presentation document, the PDR 
membership list, and the PDR agenda. The other consideration is the PDR closure products as 
shown in Figure 7, which include products such as the PDR minutes, action items, and PDR 
summary report. 
Engineer/Systems Engineer Perspective 
The systems engineer cares about the relationship between the documents required for 
the PDR, and the IT and software tools needed to produce, review, comment on, and approve 
the documentation, and the IT and software tools needed to conduct the PDR meeting. 
Software tools include the MS Office products used to create and review documents, 
SharePoint site, and email used to share documents. The IT tools include the desktop 
computer, the network, and the server where documents are transmitted and stored. The 
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documents include the PDR presentation, which is normally a PowerPoint-created document 
projected on a screen in the room and shared during the meeting for all participants to see. 
There are also several BDDs in this cell such as a BDD to represent the composition of the 
Allocated Baseline, a BDD to represent the composition of the PDR Entry Products and a BDD 
to represent the composition of the PDR Closure Products. These are considered the “things” 
that the system engineer is concerned with. 
 
 
Figure 7: PDR Entry and Closure Products for the Chief Engineer (Cell: What (Arch)) 
This research modeled the enterprise within a framework that addressed four 
perspectives. For each perspective, the research addressed all the interrogatives of why, how, 
what, who, and where resulting in a picture of the business of conducting PDRs. Only the what 
interrogative was shown here as an example. The next step is to look at what are the primary 
effects of the Digital Campaign goals on this as-is enterprise model. 
Primary Impact Analysis 
To address the digital transformation impacts to the as-is AFMC acquisition enterprise 
model, the next step taken was to map the Digital Campaign’s goals to the Zachman 
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Framework. The Digital Campaign was established to digitally transform the acquisition 
enterprise. The Campaign leadership set up six LOE goals to accomplish this transformation. 
Those goals are shown in Table 1. LOE 4 addresses policy and guidance with its primary 
objective to review policies outside the AFMC acquisition enterprise and was not considered in 
this research. 
Table 1: Line of Effort Goals of the AFMC Digital Campaign 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the summary of mapping each LOE goal to its primary cell impacted 
(green cell). The goal words were reviewed and interpreted to determine what Zachman cells 
are primarily affected. It was discovered that it is the Zachman perspectives and the 
interrogatives that are considered when choosing which cells are impacted. This sounds 
counterintuitive in that one would expect that the entities and/or relationships within the cells 
need to be considered for impact. It turns out that when a goal mentions influencing, for 
instance, the infrastructure of the enterprise, it is pretty easy to say that the engineer 
perspective and the what interrogative are primarily impacted. The engineer because this 
person is concerned with the infrastructure and its constraints in meeting the needs of the 
enterprise, and the what because the infrastructure is a thing that exists within the enterprise. 
This process therefore is interpretative based on the words of the LOE goal. 
LOE 0 and LOE 1 goals impact the what interrogative of the engineer perspective 
because the two goals mention changing the IT infrastructure (LOE 0) and Models and Tools 
(LOE 1). The LOE 2 goal impacts the what interrogative of the architect as the goal mentions 
using a Government Reference Architecture (GRA) and related standards and datasets to take 
maximum advantage of an integrated digital environment. This directly impacts the form of the 
data products (models vice documents) which the chief engineer is most concerned about. The 
LOE 3 goal impacts the how interrogative of the architect. The architect is mostly concerned 
with the PDR process, which would be impacted under LOE 3 goal achievement. The LOE 5 
goal impacts the workforce training and the workforce motivation to change to this new way of 
business. This primary impact was applied to the what and the who interrogative of the architect 
perspective because there would be a change in training (what) affecting the skills of the PDR 
participants (who). Another primary impact of LOE 5 was applied to the why of all of the 
perspectives because the goal reads that change needs to occur across the entire enterprise. 
Therefore, every perspective will be affected by this LOE.  
Line of Effort Line of Effort Name Line of Effort Goal
0
Integrated Environment - 
IT Infrastructure
Provide overarching guidance to influence corporate IT improvement investments to 
enable a robust, secure infrastructure for the enterprise-wide Digital Campaign
1
Integrated Environment - 
Tools and Models
Provide an Integrated Digital Environment (IDE) of models and tools for collaboration, 
analysis, and visualization across the functional domains of AF users
2
Standards, Data, and 
Architectures
Provide overarching guidance on the use of Government Reference Architectures (GRA) 
and related standards and datasets for use in an integrated digital environment for 
application at the enterprise and system levels
3
Lifecycle Strategies and 
Processes
Develop Life Cycle Strategies and Processes for Technology Transition, System Acquisition 
and Product Support using an IDE, supporting lifecycle activities from concept 
development to disposal
4 Policy and Guidance
Assess and define the required policy and guidance updates/changes to enable full 
implementation of the Digital Transformation
5 Workforce and Culture
Drive culture change across the AFMC enterprise through training and change 
management, enabling a workforce well versed in Digital Engineering
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Figure 8: Summary of Primary Impacts from Digital Campaign Goals Indicated by Green Cells 
The LOE goal impacted cells give the modeler a place to start in developing the to-be 
digital enterprise. Using LOE 2 as an example will provide a deeper understanding. The LOE 2 
goal centers on the development of reference models to replace the documents that would 
ordinarily be produced during an acquisition. In the PDR process, this changes the data 
products created, used, reviewed, and approved as shown in Figure 9. Instead of an allocated 
baseline in a series of specification documents, it is documented in a model representing the 
system (i.e., a system model). Other impacted documents such as the Systems Engineering 
Plan, the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, and the Integrated Master Plan, as well as other 
acquisition planning documents have their data show up in a model called an Acquisition 
Reference Model (current term being used by the Digital Campaign) as shown in Figure 10. 
A third model is defined as the Government Reference Model (GRM) and has a 
relationship to a Government Reference Architecture. DoD defines a GRA “as an authoritative 
source of information about a specific subject area that guides and constrains the instantiations 
of multiple architectures and solutions” (DoD CIO, 2010). The GRA is the source of the 
information that is documented in at least one model or view. The GRM is that set of models 
and/or views that represents the GRA. Therefore, the GRM contains the data that constrains 
and guides the solution design contained in a system model including a top-level architecture 
model, and requirements and rules for a contractor to follow in proposing, creating, and 
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Figure 9: LOE 2 Impact to PDR Data Products (Cell: What (Arch)) 
 
 
Figure 10: Acquisition Reference Model (Cell: What (Arch)) 
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It is not automatic to discover the LOE goal impacts to the enterprise. SMEs must 
assess the impacts to their areas of expertise based on the technology state-of-the-art that the 
organization desires to implement. The modeling using the Zachman Framework does make it 
easier to see where those impacts are within the framework models, making assessment and 
assignment much easier. 
Secondary Impacts & Gap Analysis 
This section explains the analysis behind determining secondary impacts. These 
secondary impacts are important to visualize because change agents may not understand the 
cascading effects from their original change requirements. This research also will show how this 
modeling and analysis effort was used to find gaps within the Digital Campaign’s approach.  
Tracing Secondary Impacts 
LOE 2 is used as an example to show how secondary impacts can be found from the 
modeling effort. LOE 2 primarily impacts the “What (Arch)” cell as shown in Figure 9. The LOE 2 
team is implementing integrated models and data into the acquisition enterprise through 
architectures and standards as explained in section 4.  
A CAMEO tool analysis method is used to display a relation map showing the 
relationships affected by the LOE 2 goal as shown in Figure 11. This figure shows that there are 
four secondary impacts based on entity use and relationships to other cells. These are the “Why 
(Arch),” “How (Arch),” “Who (Arch),” and “What (Engr)” cells. This could be done manually, but 
the CAMEO relation map capability makes it easy and does the searching automatically. 
Changing from Entry and Closure PDR documents of Figure 7 to the PDR models of 
Figure 12 has an effect on the PDR process occurring in the “How (Arch)” cell as shown in 
Figure 13. With models implemented and the ability to automate and document model validation 
as the system model is being designed, a program can now envision conducting continuous 
PDR reviews. This changes completely the process flow from one major review presentation to 
a cyclical and agile review flow within the models themselves. Another secondary impact of 
changing the data products of the “What (Arch)” cell is to the “What (Engr)” cell. So now the 
models needed for LOE 2 in the “What (Arch)” cell are requiring different tools (such as 
CAMEO) to build, review, and approve the models instead of the MS Office tools for documents 
in the as-is enterprise. A last secondary impact of changing the “What (Arch)” cell data products 
are to the PDR participants of the “Who (Arch)” cell. These individuals will interact with these 
new tools and models through a desktop system as shown in Figure 14. This desktop is now 
connected to a new network and cloud environment (a LOE 0 and 1 goal) where the tools 
reside. The full impact of the LOE 2 goal is shown in Figure 15, where the green-shaded cell is 
the primary impact of the LOE 2, and the yellow-shaded cells are secondary impacts due to 
relationships between the cells.  
 
 
Figure 11: Relation Map for LOE 2 Goal for To Be Enterprise 
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Figure 12: Models Used in To-Be Architecture for PDR (Cell: What (Arch)) 
 
 
Figure 13: PDR Process for To-Be Architecture (Cell: How (Arch)) 
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Relation maps were used to identify all the cells (packages), which had secondary 
impacts for each of the LOE goals. Figure 16 shows these secondary impacts for the overall 
enterprise (yellow cells) that appear outside the primary impacted cells (green cells). As can be 




Figure 14: LOE 2 Secondary Impact to PDR Participants (Cell: Who (Arch)) 
Finding Digital Campaign Gaps 
Upon formation of the Digital Campaign, it may have seemed like all six LOEs were 
aligned based on their goals and that all aspects of the transformation were accounted for. No 
analysis was done to confirm or deny this conclusion. This research attempted to discover gaps 
within the LOEs’ pursuits using a systems engineering model analysis.  
Following a decomposition of requirements into the logical and physical representation 
of the enterprise from the expected changes of the Digital Campaign, one would expect that the 
Architect/Chief Engineer and the Engineer cells would be a primary target for the Digital 
Campaign. The Architect/Chief Engineer perspective represents the logical representation of the 
enterprise. The chief engineer is concerned with the processes, which are analogous with the 
functions of the enterprise (system). They ensure the enterprise design complies with the 
enterprise requirements. In the case of the PDR process, they are the process owner, the data 
coming in and going out, the participants in the process, and where the processes will take 
place. In other words, this perspective is an arrangement of related technical concepts and 
principles that support the logical operation of the enterprise. In order to accomplish a digital 
transformation of the logical perspective, this research contends that all interrogatives must 
have primary goals to drive change to the functions of the enterprise, as would similarly be 
expected by a requirement change to a weapon system. 
The Engineer/System Engineer role is concerned with the physical systems that are 
needed to meet the needs of the digital changes. The physical perspective is where all of the 
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physical systems are for the enterprise. This detailed design must be synchronized with the 
logical perspective. This perspective is an arrangement of the elements that provide the 
physical solution to the enterprise change. This research contends for that to happen, all 
interrogatives of the physical perspective must have a primary goal to drive implementation 
activities for an efficient transformation.  
 
 
Figure 15: Summary of LOE 2 Impacts 
 
Figure 16: Summary of Overall Impacts of LOE Goals on Zachman Framework 
To achieve a more aligned transformation following a systems engineering process, the 
Digital Campaign should have primary goals addressing all of the interrogatives of the architect 
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(chief engineer) and the engineer (systems engineer). The chief engineer perspective has four 
of the five interrogatives with primary impacts. If the Campaign was to focus also on the where 
interrogative then the perspective would be completely covered (and perhaps the when 
interrogative not covered in this research). Since a majority of this transformation involves 
implementing state-of-the art technology, an improvement to the Campaign goals would be to 
also focus on the how, who and where of the systems engineer perspective. Currently, the 
Campaign focus is only on the what and why of the system engineer perspective. An example of 
a goal that might achieve this is the following: “Provide overarching guidance to influence IT 
locations for robust and secure infrastructure for business activities; ensure an organization and 
process is in place for the sustainment of IT infrastructure changes.” This goal mentions the “IT 
locations” taking care of the where, the “business activities” taking care of the how, and the 
“organization” being in place taking care of the who. 
The executive and business manager perspectives are contextual and conceptual 
perspectives. Setting up goals that would primarily impact these do provide for a complete 
picture but would not result in permanent changes to the enterprise. They are like ideas, and 
ideas need to be fleshed out with the logical and physical perspectives. Therefore, it is not as 
important to address the executive and business manager perspectives with specific primary 
Digital Campaign goals. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This research presented a method to build a model that addresses the digital 
transformation of the AFMC acquisition enterprise. The findings of this research are: 
1. It is possible to visualize the enterprise and provide better insight into the intricacies 
and relationships between the people, processes, and infrastructure. Modeling an enterprise 
into the Zachman Framework using SysML is analogous to a system decomposition and 
definition using well-established systems engineering processes.  
2. As long as the transformation goals do not change, the Zachman cells impacted by 
the LOEs will be the same. The goals are interpreted using the definitions of the perspectives 
and the interrogatives to map the LOE goals within the proper Zachman Framework cell. Any 
enterprise entity mapped into those cells will be primarily affected in a to-be digital enterprise. 
The focus of this research was the effect of the digital transformation on the PDR process. The 
focus could have been on other enterprise areas, such as the Air Force Depots or the Supply 
chain. The result of modeling these processes would be an impact to the part of the model 
(views) within the affected Zachman cells by the digital transformation goals. 
3. Changing process is typically the way the Air Force has gone about change (i.e., 
trying to be more efficient and effective by leaning the acquisition processes). Guided by the 
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Digital Strategy, the AFMC Digital Campaign is instead 
focusing on addressing the what (acquisition data using digital system models) and then 
expecting that the how will follow. As shown in this research, changing to digital models from 
documents and upgrading IT infrastructure is the focus of the transformation. The LOE 3 goal is 
not to change process to achieve efficiency, but instead, is written to support the change to the 
Integrated Digital Environment. The Integrated Digital Environment consists of the models, the 
data, and the standards, as well as the tools and IT infrastructure. This implies that process will 
change as a result of the technology change. This is visible with mapping the Digital Campaign 
goals onto a Zachman Framework and performing relationship analysis showing cascading 
impacts to processes from the technology changes. 
4. Lastly, the Digital Campaign should take a more formal and organized architecture 
modeling approach to transforming the AFMC acquisition enterprise. The model analysis 
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revealed gaps in the LOE goals that do not cover all Architect’s and Engineer’s interrogatives. 
Building an EA would reveal gaps if used as a tool for documenting progress and help ensure 
an efficient digital transformation. 
There are several areas not addressed within the scope of this research that could 
advance the promise of modeling enterprises undergoing digital transformation. Many 
enterprises are transforming to digital to increase acquisition speed. This effort did not address 
time as a parameter. This could be an important factor to research in a future effort. This 
research demonstrated the method based on a single exemplary process – PDR. It assumed 
that the Digital Campaign goals always will impact the same Zachman Framework cells 
regardless of the process mapped. This hypothesis could be refined with an effort to map 
additional acquisition processes. This would contribute to the concept that the gaps identified 
within the Digital Campaign goals show themselves as Zachman cells where a primary goal 
does not exist within the logical and physical perspectives. Lastly, a future effort could expand 
the enterprise boundary. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is an enterprise within the larger 
Department of the Air Force (DAF). Looking at the entire DAF Acquisition Enterprise could 
provide more insight into other areas of how acquisition could be improved through digital 
transformation.  
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